CV2/A16-3/(0100)

May 15, 1942.

From:	The Commanding Officer.
To:	The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via:	The Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN.
Subject:	Report of Action - The Battle of the Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942.
Reference:	(A)
Enclosures:	(A)	Report of Air Officer, dated May 20, 1942.
	(B)	Supplementary Report of Air Officer, dated June 12, 1942.
	(C)	Report of Air Operations Officer, dated May 13, 1942.
	(D)	Report of Fighter Director, undated.
	(E)	Report of Engineer Officer, dated May 26, 1942.
	(F)	Report of Gunnery Officer, dated May 30, 1942.
	(G)	Report of Medical Officer, dated May 23, 1942.
	(H)	Casualty Report, undated.
	(I)	Hospital Patients, undated.
	(J)	Report of Senior Officer present C & R Dept., dated May 29, 1942.
	(K)	Report of "R" Division Officer, dated May 30, 1942.
	(L)	Report of Chaplain, dated May 12, 1942.
	(M)	Report of Repair II Officer, undated.

FIRST DAY'S NARRATIVE

1. [TEXT MISSING]

2. [TEXT MISSING]

3. [TEXT MISSING]

the scout making the contact had corrected his report when he returned to the ship to 2 CA and 2 CL. This implied to me that there was no carrier present. However, the group was allowed to continue.

4. About 11:30 the group made contact with a carrier of the Ryukaku type and started their attack. VS-2 consisting of 10 SBDs loaded with 1-500 and 2-100 lb. bombs, attacked first and obtained 2 500 lb. bomb hits as follows:

   1 on stern about 50 feet from ramp.
   1 about 2/3 aft on flight deck, center.

   These later were confirmed by independent observers, including Commander of Fighting Squadron Two.

5. VB-2 attacked at 1145 and obtained 5-1000 lb. bomb hits as follows:

   1 about 2/3 aft on stbd. side flight deck.
   1 aft on flight deck amidships.
   1 aft on port side flight deck.
   1 amidships about 1/2 way aft.
   1 near stbd. side aft.

   Sixteen pilots participated in that attack and it is not practicable to determine which ones definitely made direct hits. However, the number of hits was confirmed not only by the participating pilots and the Squadron Commander, but also by the Commander of Fighting Two and others who were in excellent position to observe. The ship was a mass of flames from bomb hits and covered by splashes from the later torpedo hits.

6. VT-2 attacked at 1145 and obtained 9 torpedo hits by planes as follows:

   2-T-l, pilot, Lieut. Comdr. J.H. Brett, Jr., USN.
   2-T-2, pilot, Lt(jg) L.F. Steffenhagen, USNR.
   2-T-4, pilot, Lieut. R.F. Farrington, USN.
   2-T-7, pilot, Lieut. E.W.Hurst, USN.
   2-T-8, pilot, Ensign C. Hamilton, USN.
   2-T-9, pilot, Gunner H.E. Talkington, USN.
   2-T-l0, pilot, Lt.(jg) L.W. Thornhill, USN.
   2-T-ll, pilot, Rad. Elect. J.E. Mattis, USN.
   2-T-l2, pilot, C.A.P. M.H. Georgius, USN.

7. Photographs were obtained during the latter phases of the attack, showing only the bow of the carrier with the rest of it completely enveloped in smoke, splashes, and flames. It is difficult to conceive any other result than complete destruction of this carrier and the personnel loss must have been close to 100%. From the bow silhouette in the photographs plus the cut away flight deck, the pilots descriptions, and radio intelligence it is believed that this carrier was the Ryukaku. These photographs were saved when the Lexington was abandoned.

8. One of our planes was lost in this attack. Lieutenant ALLEN, executive officer of VS-2, was definitely seen to go into the water as the result of enemy fighter action. Another SBD, Lieut(jg) QUIGLEY, of VS-2, was damaged by AA fire, reporting his control wires shot away and his plane became unmanageable. He was directed by his Squadron Commander to bail out or land on Rossel Island in the Louisiades Archipelago. This was friendly territory and it is hoped he made a safe landing. Air Headquarters at Townsville was notified with the idea of his rescue, results so far unknown.

9. The rest of the group returned and landed about 1345. A second attack on enemy ships in the De Boyne Island area was ready at 1450 but was not ordered by the Task Force Commander due to the possibility of other enemy carriers being in our vicinity and not yet located. Evidence existed that we were being shadowed by enemy planes and enemy radio was intercepted giving our approximate position and exact course and speed. The weather in our area was squally, with about 90% overcast, frequent rain squalls, in which ceiling and visibility were zero. Wind varied from 15 to 22 knots from southeast.

10. About 1745, very close to sunset, radar contacts gave a group of enemy planes to the westward. Fighter control directed fighters in the air to intercept and additional fighters were launched. These planes intercepted a formation of nine enemy zero fighters and engaged them in combat. Results were as follows: Four zero Jap fighters shot down, two other zero fighters damaged as evidenced by smoke and gasoline leakage. Yorktown fighters claimed three which would account for the entire formation of nine, if there was no over-lapping.

    Our losses: One VF, Lieut.(jg) P.C. Baker, pilot, failed to return. It is believed that he collided with a zero fighter, included in the above enemy losses.

11. While landing the combat patrol, well after sunset and almost completely dark, strange planes appeared flying around our formation. They were challenged and I received one report that they answered correctly and it was presumed at first they were Yorktown planes approaching to land. One observer reported they were two-engine torpedo planes. Yorktown reported they were enemy planes. Some ships opened fire on them. Yorktown and Lexington planes were still circling to land. However, these strange planes made no hostile move, were burning running lights and eventually moved off thirty miles to the eastward, where radars showed them circling and apparently landing on an enemy carrier. They were definitely enemy planes and apparently mistook us for their own force. The indicated presence of enemy carriers only thirty miles east was reported to the Task Force Commander. It was estimated that these carriers were the Shokaku and the Zuikaku of Cardiv FIVE, which until that time had been unaccounted for.

12. It is belived that this day's action resulted in the complete destruction of the enemy carrier Ryukaku with practically all personnel and ultimate loss of all her planes. In addition, during the day, the following enemy plane losses were inflicted:

    6 zero type VF at 1745.
    4 "97" type VF at scene of enemy carrier.
    1 VT near scene of enemy carrier.

    Total 11 planes. This does not include planes shot down by Yorktown group.

    Our losses during the day were: 2 SBD, 1 VF. The pilot and radioman of 1 SBD may be safe on Rossel Island.

    SECOND DAY'S NARRATIVE

13. The Task Force Commander's decision was to proceed during the night to southwestward and search for and attack the enemy carriers at dawn. The Lexington was directed to search 360°, 200 miles in the northern semicircle and 150 miles in the southern semicircle.

14. Contact was made by Lexington scout 2-S-2, Lieut.(jg) Joseph Smith, about 0820, with a formation of two CV, 4 CA, and 3 DD 170 miles to the northeastward. Attack group consisting of 24 SBDs, 10 VF, and 12 VTB was launched

between 0900 and 0920, and proceeded immediately. At 0832 radio intercepted enemy transmission giving our position, course and speed and we knew definitely we had been located. I predicted enemy attack would come in about 1100. All preparations to receive it were made. Ship was at General Quarters; condition Zed was set; returning scouts were launched as anti-torpedo plane patrol; additional fighters not already in the air were launched at 1030 and 1100; and all stations were warned to be ready.
15. The weather in our vicinity was clear, unlimited visibility and ceiling, few clouds, no rain squalls, wind about 15 knots, from southeast. Radar reported at 1100 many enemy aircraft approaching from northward, distance about 75 miles. First enemy planes were sighted from the ship at 1113. They were torpedo planes. They were at about 6-7000 feet altitude and split and came in from both bows. Ship's speed had been built up to 25 kts. at 1100 when the attack was expected and was immediately increased to 30 kts. when the hostile aircraft were sighted.

16. Our combat patrol, under the Fighter Director, was patrolling at 10,000 feet. Exact altitude of the approaching enemy was not determined, but was known to be over 10,000 feet. The fighters made contact 20-30 miles out but the enemy bombers were at 17,000 feet and the performance of our fighters was not sufficient to gain enough altitude to attack them before they reached the "push-over" point. The bombers intercepted were accompanied by 18 protective fighters, which our fighters subsequently engaged in combat and shot down or damaged six. They were Me-109, 00, 96, and 0 types.

17. The Anti-torpedo Plane patrol was on station at 2000 feet, but about 6000 yards out. This patrol always has a tendency to get too far out, probably due both to concern over AA fire from surface ships and an eagerness to intercept torpedo planes well out. From this position the enemy torpedo planes at high speed came in over them. Even so, the SBDs on the port side intercepted; shot down 4 VT with torpedoes, 4 without torpedoes, 1 VB and 2 accompanying VF. One SBD was shot down by enemy VF.

18. Anti-aircraft fire from this force was opened generally about 1113. Torpedo planes made the first attack, the first approaching from port and others circling to come in from starboard bow. Most of these planes came in at about a 40 or 45° dive from 6-7000 feet, making high speed and dropping their torpedoes in the dive attitude from altitude of 300-500 feet, although some were seen to level off just above the water and make a normal drop. The range at the dropping point varied from 500 to 1200 yards. I turned to port with full rudder to bring the first torpedoes ahead. From then on

torpedoes were coming from both starboard and port and I maneuvered with full rudder both ways as I considered best to avoid torpedoes. Some from starboard crossed ahead; two others ran parallel to the ship, one on each side; some from port ran ahead; two ran under without hitting. At 1120, first torpedo hit ship and exploded just forward of port forward gun gallery; at 1121, one hit a little further aft about opposite the bridge. In the meantime, dive bombers were making their attack from about a 70° dive angle. They were pushing over from high altitude, 17,000 feet, and were not visible until they were in the final stages of their dive. One bomb estimated at 1000 lbs. hit the after end of the port forward gun gallery in the ready ammunition locker just outside the Admiral's cabin. Two other near misses hit close aboard aft on the port side and at first were mistaken for torpedo hits. Another bomb estimated 500 lbs. hit the gig boat pocket on the port side, and one 100 lb. hit the stacks and exploded inside. There were one or more near misses aft on the starboard side, fragments killing and injuring a number of men in the stack machine guns, sky aft, and the after signal station. I personally saw a flaming bomb, approaching the ship from port, and burning with a reddish colored flame. I am unable to say whether or not it hit.
19. Apparently there were seven explosions against the Lexington, two of which are thought to have been torpedoes, 1 1000-lb. bomb hit, 2 1000-lb. bomb very near misses on the port side, and 2 smaller bombs. Fires were started in the main deck near the Admiral's Country, beneath the incinerator, near the gig boat pocket and one in the forward starboard marine compartment near the forward elevator. The ship was listing about 6° to port. Damage control reported they were shifting oil to correct the list and fire parties were fighting the fires. Main control reported all units in commission. Number 2, 4, and 6 fire rooms were partially flooded, but water was being controlled by the pumps. Steering gear was intact and the ship was making 25 kts. under good control. Both elevators at this time were reported out of commission, jammed in the up position, due to machinery casualties in the wells, probably from shock.

20. At about 1300, Damage Control reported the ship on an even keel, that three fires were out and the other one in the Admiral's country under control. The ship was periodically turned into wind to land and reservice aircraft. The attack group returned and was landed, the torpedo planes about 1400.

21. The attack group reported two 1000-lb. bomb hits on enemy carrier of the Shokaku class made by Commander W.B. Ault, USN,

Group Commander, and three other SBDs operating with him. 5 torpedo hits were made by VT-2 as follows:

2-T-3, pilot, Ensign N.A. Sterrie, USNR
2-T-5, pilot, Ensign T.B. Bash, USNR
5-T-6, pilot, Ensign H.R. Mazza, USNR
2-T-7, pilot, Lieut. E.W. Hurst, USN
2-T-l2, pilot, C.A.P. B.C. Shearn, USN

They further reported when last seen she was on fire, settling and turning in a circle. It is believed that this ship was sunk. Radio intercepts later tended to confirm this belief. She was rapidly losing headway.

22. In the meantime, Damage Control was gradually getting all damage checked and cleared up. At 1247 a heavy explosion shook the ship. It appeared to come from amidships well down in the bowels of the ship. Communication with Central Station was immediately lost, all telephones except the JV line went out including the ship's service phones, and a bad fire broke out from the main deck down to the vicinity of Central Station just forward of the main elevator. All pressure was lost in the fire main forward. Rudder indicators on the bridge went out, although steering control was working. By using the JV line to trick wheel to receive reports of the position of the rudder, steering was retained on the bridge. The forward gyro compass system was out, but after gyro compass and repeaters were satisfactory.

23. This heavy explosion at 1247 was what caused the loss of the ship. Until that time everything was well under control. Full propulsive power was available, steering was O.K., the ship was on an even keel, and all fires were either out or under control. The cause of this explosion was uncertain. At first it was thought to be a "sleeper" dud 1000-lb bomb which went off in the bowels of the ship. However, further study indicates that small gasoline leaks from the heavy pounding the ship had received had caused accumulation of gasoline vapors in the lower regions and they were set off by spark of unknown origin. In any event, from this time on the ship was doomed.

24. Hoses from the after section of the fire main were led out and every effort was made to combat the fire. The fire spread aft and additional communications were gradually being lost. The fire main pressure dropped to 30-40 lbs. Minor explosions were recurring at frequent intervals, increasing the fire. Whether these were from 5-inch ammunition going off or from further gasoline

vapors could not be determined. All lights forward were out and the main deck and below were full of smoke. It was a losing fight to control the fire. The JV line to trick wheel went dead and I steered for a while with the engines. Both Gyros and repeaters were out and we used the magnetic compass.
25. At about 1600, the one remaining phone working to Main Control was getting very weak. Main Control had reported the forward bulkhead of Afirm unit was so hot the paint was peeling off in large blisters. I gave them permission to shift to the after spaces. Finally, about 1630, fearing I would lose all communication with them I ordered engineering personnel to secure the plane and get up on deck. The safeties were opened and the ship came to a stop. I ordered life rafts made ready and preparations made to abandon ship. Fire fighting efforts were still being made until the engineering plane was abandoned, when all water pressure was gone. At this time I asked Admiral FITCH for destroyers to come alongside and pass over fire hoses, thinking we might control the fire if we got water. The Admiral directed DDs to come alongside and also directed me to disembark excess personnel to the destroyers alongside. In response to this the USS Morris came alongside and passed two hoses over, which were put to work, and excess personnel went down lines to her deck. However, by this time the fire was beyond control. Additional explosions were occurring; it was reported the war heads on the hangar deck had been at a temperature of 140° F; ready bombs storage was in the vicinity of the fire and I considered there was danger of the ship blowing up at any minute. I had previously directed sick and wounded to be disembarked in our whale boats and excess squadron personnel had gone on lines to the destroyer alongside.

26. At 1707 Admiral FITCH directed me to abandon ship. I issued the orders and orderly disenbarkation began. Boats from accompanying ships came alongside and assisted. Preference was given to lowering wounded and injured into the boats. Most of the men went hand over hand down lines over the side and into the water on life rafts. Most of the men were off by 1800. Admiral FITCH and myself were the last to leave the bridge. He disembarked forward where practically all had gone and I made a final inspection aft. I found a number of men aft on the starboard side and in the port after gun gallery where there seemed to be some difficulty; men in the water were having trouble getting away from the ship due to drift. I directed those men still on board to shift to the starboard side aft where getting away was easier. I made a final inspection and went aft where my executive officer, Commander SELIGMAN, reported to me all men were off the ship. At this time a tremendous explosion about the vicinity of the elevator shook the ship and we had to duck to

avoid falling debris. I directed Commander SELIGMAN to disembark. I saw him in the water swimming toward an approaching motor whale boat. Having assured myself there was no other living person on the ship, I went down a line hand over hand and dropped off into the water, to be picked up by a motor whale boat of the USS Minneapolis. This boat took me to the USS Minneapolis where I reported to Admiral FITCH.
27. The picture of the burning and doomed ship was a magnificent but sad sight. The ship and crew had performed gloriously and it seemed too bad that she had to perish in her hour of victory. But she went to a glorious end, more fitting than the usual fate of the eventual scrap heap or succumbing to the perils of the sea. She went down in battle, after a glorious victory for our forces in which the Lexington and her air group played so conspicious a part.

28. The Phelps was directed by the Task Force Commander to sink the Lexington by torpedoes. Five torpedoes were fired, at least three hit, and she finally went under on an even keel. As she went under a tremendous explosion occurred which rocked ships for miles around. It was the end of the Lexington. These circumstances were reported to me verbally by the Commanding Officer of the Phelps.

29. The survivors were scattered among nearly all of the accompanying ships. Check-ups by signal disclosed a total of about 2735 survivors. There were no drownings in the water due to abandoning ship so far as known. All losses of personnel were due to air combat in the air group or to the bomb explosions and fire on the ship. The preliminary total of personnel losses subject to final check is 26 officers and 190 men out of a total complement of 295l. This in itself is considered to be a remarkable achievement.

30. CONCLUSIONS

    1. Air offense is definitely superior to the defense.

    2. Combat patrols must patrol at 20,000 feet to insure interception prior to attack of high-flying enemy dive bombers.

    3. Anti-torpedo Plane Patrols must keep in close to the torpedo release point, at about 3000 feet altitude, to insure interception of either high or low approach torpedo planes. This

employment of SBDs is a make-shift at best; the best defense would be to have sufficient fighters for both a high and low patrol. This condition will seldom be realized. In this particular attack, the Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol of SBDs was partially effective. They shot down nine torpedo planes, four with torpedoes aboard, four without, and one undetermined. They also shot down two fighters. One SBD was shot down by enemy fighters. The Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol on the port side of the formation made all the intercepts. It was in position 3000 yds. outside of screen at 2000 feet. If it had been at the designated altitude of 3000 feet, its position would have been more effective. It is considered that the Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol of SBDs is amply justified as better than nothing.
4. Our personnel are superior in quality and skill to the Japanese.

5. The ship was completely ready for the attack in every respect. A total of 11 fighters were in the air for defense against bombers, and 14 SBDs for defense against torpedo planes, in addition to planes in the air for defense from the Yorktown. All guns were manned and ready. Material condition Zed to meet the attack was completely set. Twenty-five to thirty knots speed was being made. All personnel were alert.

6. This battle definitely represented the simple problem of carrier against carrier. Both air groups were attacking the other's carrier at about the same time. I predicted ahead of time that it was possible for both attacks to be successful and for both opposing carriers to be destroyed. That is what happened. But few of our attacking planes were destroyed in the attack itself, whereas many of the Japanese planes were destroyed by our fighters and AA fire in their attack on us. The Lexington remained afloat for over seven hours and rescued about 92% of her personnel, whereas the enemy carrier is believed to have sunk within the hour and to have lost a heavy percentage of its personnel.

7. In this battle, the enemy had the advantage of weather. The Lexington was in a clear area, whereas the Japanese were in a rain squall area. Nevertheless, the major part of the Lexington air attack group was able to find its objective.

8. Our own AA fire was, as usual, only partially

effective. The general tendency was still to use insufficient lead and to fire under the target.
9. The loss of the ship was caused by an internal gasoline vapor explosion near Central Station below the armored deck in the vicinity of the forward torpedo shop. This explosion resulted from minor gasoline leaks gradually accumulating highly explosive vapor in the area. It was undetected, due to the complete sealing of the ship in Condition Zed. The adjacent gasoline control room had been flooded and sealed with CO₂ as a preventive measure. For means of preventing see recommendation 31-8 below.

10. The material performance was in general excellent. No gun stoppages or material failures were reported by the planes. The damage control features of the design of the Lexington speak for themselves; she remained afloat for over seven hours after sustaining two torpedo hits, three bomb hits and two near misses and had to be finally sunk by additional torpedo hits.

11. The performance of all personnel was magnificent. I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of the personnel, of the officers and men of the Lexington and her squadrons. The finest traditions of the Naval service were upheld in every respect. Many cases of individual heroism occurred, and they are too numerous to mention in this report. In accordance with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet instructions, separate letter is being submitted with recommendations for suitable awards in these cases. However, I wish to emphasize that every last officer and man performed his duty with the greatest credit to himself, his family and his country. The country can well be proud of their performance.

12. Our present methods of training and tactics are sound, as proven by this engagement. Our attacks were successful and except for the gasoline vapor explosion the ship would have been saved.
31. RECOMMENDATIONS
    1. That a new carrier, the first available, be re-named the Lexington to carry on the traditions of that great ship.

    2. That the officers and men survivors of the Lexington and her air group be retained together as a unit, to man the new Lexington. This will be of the utmost value for morale, not only to these men but for the country as a whole, and will best utilize

this group of well-trained, seasoned, and tested officers and men.
3. That all carriers be immediately filled to their allowance of 27 fighters.

4. That combat patrols patrol at 20,000 feet when enemy dive bombing attack is expected.

5. That Anti-torpedo Plane patrols be stationed at not more that 3000 yds. from the carrier at 3000 feet altitude for protection against both high and low level torpedo planes. Fighters should be used for this if available.

6. That fighters and torpedo planes of greater performance be provided to carriers as soon as possible.

7. That every effort be made to strengthen the air defense of carriers without sacrificing their offensive strength.

8. That damage control instructions to all ships contain the rollowing:

   Whenever structural damage occurs in the general vicinity of gasoline tanks, possibility of accumulation in confined spaces or dangerous concentrations of gasoline vapors exists. The following immediate steps must be taken to prevent destructive explosions:

   1. Pump all gasoline tanks in the vicinity overboard or to tanks in an undamaged area and keep them flushed with salt water.

   2. Take all steps practicable to prevent sparks anywhere near the damaged area.

   3. Ventilate the damaged area thoroughly by all practicable means, including bilge pumps, even though it involves partially breaking material condition Zed in that area.

9. That additional fire fighting apparatus be installed on carriers, prererably separated units of diesel powered fire pumps and hoses, so that entire reliance is not placed on the fire mains.

10. That more rescue breathing or oxygen smoke helmets be provided. Several hundred should be the minimum and all men trained in their use.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

32. Enemy Damage May 7th.

    By Lexington Air Group:

    1 carrier (Ryukaku) sunk. In addition probably all her planes were lost and practically all personnel.
    4 zero enemy fighters (type zero) shot down at 1745.
    2 probable enemy zero destroyed at 1745.
    1 type 97 VF at scene of carrier attack (VB-2).
    1 type 97 VF at scene of carrier attack (VB-2).
    1 3-place seaplane probable, near scene of carrier attack (VF-2).
    2 VF type 97 by VF-2 at scene of attack on enemy carrier.

    Total:

    1 CV, (presumably 80 planes); 11 planes additional in combat (part of 80). These losses do not include planes shot down by Yorktown planes.

    Our losses, May 7th:

    1 SBD shot down by enemy fighters at scene of attack.
    1 SBD damaged at scene of attack, force-landing on Rossel Island. Pilot and gunner may be safe.
    1 VF shot down by zero fighters at 1745.

    Total:

    3 planes, crew of one of which may be safe.

33. Enemy Losses, May 8th:

    1 carrier (Shokaku) probably sunk with all planes and heavy loss of personnel.
    4 VT shot down in vicinity of Lexington (by AA).
    1 VT shot down in vicinity of Lexington (VB-2).

    By VF-2: Certain:

    2 VS at enemy carrier.
    1 VF, type 00, at enemy carrier.
    1 VF, Me-109, over Lexington.
    1 VF, 00, over Lexington.
    1 VF 0, over Lexington.

Probable:

2 VF, type 00, at enemy carrier.
1 VF, Me-109, over Lexington.
1 VF, 96, over Lexington.
1 VF, over Lexington.

By VS-2:

4 VT with torpedoes near Lexington.
4 VT without torpedoes near Lexington.
1 VT or VB without bombs or torpedoes near Lexington.
2 VF near Lexington.

2 VF, type 97, shot down by VT-2 on return from attack.

Total:

1 CV, (presumably 80 planes) probably sunk; 29 planes additional in combat (part of 80). These losses do not include planes shot down by Yorktown planes ( or AA fire in vicinity of Yorktown.)

Our Losses, May 8:

1 carrier (Lexington) sunk, but with 92% personnel and 18 planes saved (planes landed on Yorktown).
7 VP shot down at scene of attack on enemy.
1 VT lost, out of gas returning; personnel may be safe.
3 SBD lost, out of gas returning; personnel may be safe.
1 SBD lost, shot down as Anti-torpedo Plane Patrol at Lexington.

Total:

12 planes, personnel of 4 of which may be safe.

34. It is believed the above figures speak for themselves and that on the 7th and 8th of May, the Lexington and her air group achieved two great victories in our country's cause and that her performance will go down in the annals of the Navy as an outstanding example of devotion to duty and successful accomplishment of a mission.

35. This report of these actions is as accurate as I can determine at this time. I have obtained written statements from key personnel and can elaborate on any points if further details are desired, especially on material matters. If my recommendation to keep the officers and crew together is approved, it will facilitate supplemental reports.

36. The question of whether or not the Shokaku is sunk may be controversial at this writing. No report of any sighting of the Shokaku since the attack has been received. All information in my possession points to the probability of the only carrier proceeding away from the area being the damaged Zuikaku, which has been reported from radio intelligence. From the reports of pilots at the scene, stating she was settling, on fire, circling but rapidly losing all way, unless positive information otherwise exists, I believe the Shokaku sank shortly after the attack.

FREDERICK C. SHERMAN.

Copies herewith for:

Cominch
OpNav
ComTaskFor 17

By separate registered mail:

ComTaskFor 11
ComCarPacFlt
CO YORKTOWN

Buaer.

Enclosure A
Report of Air Officer

May 20, 1942.

From:	Air Officer.
To:	Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
Subject:	Report on the Air Engagement and subsequent sinking of the Lexington, 8 May 1942.

1. Upon commencing to write this report the day after the action, I discovered that my mind was filled with a confused group of events which were difficult to arrange in their proper order. The details of the events were perfectly clear but their arrangement in proper order was impossible until I consulted the rough log and the war diary which had most fortunately been saved. Where exact times are given below they have been taken from those logs.

2. The day (8 May) commenced with the usual 45 minute flight quarters and launching of the morning search. The search was a 12 single plane sections search to 200 miles in a 210° sector, median north, and a 6 single plane section search to 100 miles in a 150° sector, median south. VS-2 had only 12 planes available for search, and they took the longer sector. VB-2 the shorter one. In addition, 4 VF were launched for Combat Patrol. Completed launching about 0635. After this brought up 12 VT-2 planes from hangar deck armed with torpedoes.

   0820:

   Received contact report from a plane by voice "2 CV, 4 CA bearing 006°, distance 120, speed 15". Garble and interference prevented hearing plane's call. This prevented the checking of the reported bearing relative to Point Zed since we did not know the sector of the contacting plane, (Point Zed 14°00' S - 156°00' E) nor was the message authenticated which is understandable since the method prescribed was too complicated for use in an airplane. The contact report was then repeated on key by 2-S-2 and received satisfactorily. Could not get 2-S-2 after this to check authenticator. 2-S-3 then repeated the message by voice and we checked him by name for authenticity. Everything looked all right, so we launched Attack Group at 0907 - completed about 0925, the Yorktown starting a little ahead of us. 11 VB, 4 VS, 12 VT, 9 VF plus 4 VF relief Combat Patrol were launched by Lexington. Since the distance to the enemy was so great (180 miles) I personally told Lieutenant GAYLOR (C.O. of Air Group Fighters) to make the trip if gasoline permitted and that his presence over the enemy carrier would be of considerable value even if he did not do much fighting. I also told him that if they encountered the enemy Air Group on the way, to break off and attack,

	returning to the Lexington with them. At this time (pilots were manning planes) Lieutenant Commander HAMILT0N called my attention to the fact that his planes had only 220 gallons of gasoline and said that he would like to have 250 gallons (full). I told him that we were trying to get both groups off as nearly together as possible and there was no time to give him any additional gasoline. Since the planes carried 1000 pound bombs, a full fuel tank required extra wind for the overload condition. There was sufficient surface wind that morning and we could have launched in this heavy condition. I forgot that the planes were gassed to 220 gallons until it was too late to fill them. However, 220 gallons was more than enough fuel to permit them to travel the distances involved.
0928:	Commenced landing Combat Patrol and 6 VB who had returned from search. Continued landings as Yorktown was into wind until 10 SBDs were on board.
1012:	Launched 6 VB and 4 VS Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol, and must have landed some more VS-2 (5).
1030:	Landed 1 TBD with engine trouble.
1057:	Fighter Director reported group of planes 020°, 52 miles.
1106:	Completed launching 5 VF and 5 VS as Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol (2-F-3 was put into commission giving us 19 VF in the air).
1116:	Enemy VT were observed diving to attack on our port bow. Captain started turning to right to comb the torpedo tracks astern.
1120:	One torpedo struck port side just under #2 5" gun gallery.
1120½:	One torpedo struck port side just at the forward elevator. Several torpedoes were observed at this time approaching on the port quarter. The ship had stopped swinging right and was started left. I called to the Captain to go back to the right, because there were more torpedoes coming. This he did. Two of the approaching torpedoes broached about 100 yards out - one resumed its depth and struck the ship at the stem - the other continued on the surface and passed clear. Two others passed about 100 to 200 feet ahead. These last four torpedoes listed, approached the ship from broad on the port quarter. Two others appeared running deep from

	just abaft the beam and passed under the ship between the forward elevator and #2 gun gallery. Another torpedo appeared from broad on the port beam and struck a little aft of the forward elevator. The first three or four torpedoes were dropped from about 1000 yards, but after that the drops were outside of 3000 yards. I believe that the effectiveness of our AA fire was responsible for this as I saw about three of the first torpedo planes shot down. Also the volume of 5" bursts was so great that it obscured the approaching planes. Several of the torpedo planes were noticed streaming gasoline as they flew past, indicating they had been hit. One burst into flames heading directly at the ship, executed a double snap roll and crashed into the water just under the flare of the port bow at #2 1.1 battery. The dive bombers appeared just as the torpedo planes were finishing. One of the first bombs hit just aft of the port beam about 50 yards out. It was about 2 second delayed action and only threw up spray about 50 feet high. Most of the bombs went over. One 1000 pound near miss was received close aboard just under 20 mm. guns in gig boat pocket. Another was close aboard well aft under the port quarter. One of the last bombs released struck the side of the ship at the after end of the #2 gun gallery. I thought it was delayed action AP for the resulting hole was small. I was watching all releases and ducked behind my splinter shield on this one. The explosion raised the flight deck about 6" in the vicinity of the jagged hole. The bomb had hit the fire outlet on the gun gallery, so we ran hoses across the flight deck. The amdyco didn't seem to help much, although there was no flame appearing on the flight deck. I believe the marines put the fire out with below deck hoses.
1132:	The log shows the attack was completed. One of our SBDs tried to approach the ship and apparently was shot down by cruiser and destroyer fire. At least he landed in the water apparently under partial control while they were firing. The signal "Easy Cast Hypo" was hoisted, but no one could stop the fire in time.
1134:	Another SBD tried to land aboard through surface ship firing. We were about 120° out of the wind and turning hard right with about 20 knots. Signal Officer waved him off but to no avail. He struck the deck in a wild diving turn, caught and broke #2 wire and finally went over the side just aft of the barrier taking an arresting gear oper-

	ator with him. Two people were observed in the water and a DD was signalled to the rescue. I believe he reported a successful recovery later.
1145:	Bomb hit hole was no longer smoking, so we washed down the flight deck in vicinity to clear amdyco mess. Shortly after the enemy planes had withdrawn, both elevators were reported to be permanantly out of commission because of torpedo damage to the bottle wells located below the forward elevator well. About the same time I sent aft for Lieut.(jg) DEITZER and asked him for a report on the gasoline system. He reported the port side out of commission. He stated that he had personally made the inspection. We were turning into the wind from a northerly heading when the SBD went over the side. Very shortly thereafter we landed on board 4 VF Combat Patrol and 9 SBDs. Three of these (2-S-l, 2-S-2 and 2-S-19) were from the morning search, the rest from the Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol. While these planes were being respotted for take-off, I reported to the Captain the condition of the gasoline system and that I was not refueling until I was certain all fires were out. We planned to delay until just before the Attack Group returned. I also reported the condition of the elevators and explained that we would have to throw some planes over the side to make room for the rest. Two of the SBDs on deck were badly shot up so the propellors and loose equipment were removed for spares and the planes pushed over the ramp. The log shows a report of all topside fires out at 1142 and a further report of all fires out at 1233. About 1230 we commenced refueling the planes on deck. The fighters were completed first and were launched about 1243. Just after the last fighter had been launched, a terrific explosion occurred below decks forward that vented to the flight deck through the bomb elevator. After a little delay the fueling of the SBDs was completed and their launching finished at 1259. From then on we continued landing operations until we had taken on board 11 VB, 1 VS and 1 VF of the Attack Group at 1328. The gasoline system had been secured just after the explosion at 1247 and was never again reopened. At 1400 we started into the wind to land the torpedo planes which were fired upon by the Yorktown during their approach to the disposition. At 1413 completed landing 10

VT and 1 VF. Sometime before this, Air Plot had reported 1 VT and 2 VF landing in the water about 30 miles short of the ship because of lack of fuel. The Captain requested Admiral FITCH to send a destroyer back for them which I believe he did. CLAG and 3 VS were still missing and Air Plot reported they could not find the ship. Radios were out of commission in Radio IV for some time after the Japanese attack. Commander AULT reported by radio that he had obtained a 1000 pound bomb hit and that he was wounded in the left arm and leg. When our radio and Radar went out of commission again, as result of the internal explosions, the Yorktown was requested to try and bring the lost planes in. She was not successful as these planes are missing. After the first internal explosion at 1247, there were numerous small explosions until at 1442 a large explosion occurred in the forward elevator well. This explosion raised the elevator about six inches, and flames came out around the edges. Communication with the hangar deck had been intermittent for some time due to the large quantities of smoke. After some delay I learned from Lieutenant HIRSCH that the hangar deck sprinkling system was on and that the fire was confined to the forward elevator well. Fire hoses on the flight deck were able to put a little water down the elevator and succeeded in reducing the fire somewhat for a short time. Later this fire increased when all water pressure was lost on the flight deck. This fire slowly spread aft during the afternoon and finally reached and exploded the torpedoes on the hangar deck mezzanine after all hands had abandoned ship. Shortly after four o'clock the destroyer Morris came alongside and gave us two fire hoses which were put down the elevator but to no avail. Since the ship was slowly going down by the head we moved all planes aft to shift this much weight. This was accomplished about 1500. All squadron personnel were assembled aft on the flight deck and were ordered to embark on the destroyers that were standing by. This word was given some time before 1700. These personnel plus wounded were removed by the Morris and another DD astern. The word to formally abandon ship was given by the Captain at 1707 upon the advice of Admiral FITCH. All preparations had been completed some time before this. The disembarkation was conducted in a very orderly manner into life rafts thrown over the bow and stern. About 1750, the Captain, the Navigator and myself left

the bridge, all hands forward being in the water and only a few remaining on deck aft. When we arrived on the flight deck, we discovered some 12 or 15 wounded men being disembarked alongside of the bridge and stack structure. These men had been brought forward from the after stations too late to be placed on the Morris. The three of us assisted by Ensign KNOX put four wounded men over the side into a whale boat thus assisting two small parties headed by Lieut.(jg) LAIRD and a boatswain's mate. When this was completed, the Navigator and myself lowered ourselves into life rafts as the destroyer Hammann came alongside. By this time the fire had spread to the flight deck and the internal explosions were occurring every two or three minutes, making the Hammann's position very dangerous. After rescuing a large portion of the men in the water, she backed clear attempting to drag clear the remaining rafts with tow lines. As she backed clear, some 1.1 ammunition at batteries 3, 4, 5 and 6 exploded. Had the Hammann remained alongside, her bridge would have been stripped. The Hammann's whale boat was sent back to pick up the remaining people in life rafts. The Hammann then put her bow under the stern of the Lexington picking up men and attempted to pull clear the life rafts that were being held alongside by the drift of the ship. Two violent explosions on the flight deck covered the DD with debris and on my advice of the danger of torpedo explosions in the hangar deck the Hammann again backed clear. The Hammann's whale boat was again despatched in and finally succeeded in dragging clear the remaining four or five life rafts. I learned later that shortly after the Hammann backed clear of the starboard side, a violent explosion blew out the quarterdeck door and killed four men in a life raft near by. Had the Hammann remained alongside, this explosion would have blown her bow off together with some one hundred men assisting in rescue work. I wish to take this opportunity to call attention to the outstanding perfornance of the Hammann, her Captain and her crew. His seamanship was superb; their courage without equal. With total disregard for their own safety, the Captain twice placed his ship close aboard the burning Lexington withdrawing only on the advice of Lexington Officers when they felt that further risk of the ship was not warranted. Also to the Hammann's whale boat which time after time returned to the side of the Lexington

removing the final survivors. The story is told in the total survivors on board - 478 officers and men.

3. I heartily concur with the Chief Engineer's recommendation that a separate medal and ribbon be awarded to all participants in the battle of the Coral Sea, 7 & 8 May 1942. All men and officers performed their duties in a most satisfactory manner, fully living up to the finest traditions of the Navy.

H. S. DUCKWORTH,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Enclosure B
Supplementary Report of Air Officer

U.S.S. LEXINGTON

June 12, 1942

From:	Air Officer.
To:	Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
Subject:	Supplementary Report on the Air Action in the Coral Sea on 8 May 1942.

1. The following supplementary report is submitted after consultation with the various officers and men of the Air Department and other departments of the Lexington.

2. The following torpedo hits were observed by the Assistant Air Officer and myself and confirmed by members of the flight deck crews.
   1. Hit frame #10
   2. Hit frame #48
   3. Hit frame #64
   4. Hit frame #86

   Later I talked to Ensign THOMAS, battery officer of "cast" 20 mm. battery (Gig boat pocket) who stated that there were two torpedoes running close together which struck at frame #86 practically simultaneously. This raises the total torpedo hits to five and also accounts for the damage in vicinity of fire rooms #2, 4 and 6.

3. The following bomb hits and near misses were similarly determined:
   1. One 1000 lb. instantaneous near miss about frame #200, port.
   2. One A.P.bomb ½ second delay 50 yard near miss opposite frame #100 port side.
   3. One 1000 lb. instantaneous near miss at frame #88 port side (Gig boat pocket)
   4. One 250 lb. instantaneous hit in stack, setting off the siren.
   5. One 500 lb. instantaneous hit just aft of #6 5" gun frame #50.

   (NOTE) The weights given above are not definitely accurate, but are an estimate based upon the relative power of the several explosions.

4. The following facts have been determined concerning the gasoline system:
   1. The system was secured during the action, all lines above the armored deck being drained and all pressure removed.

2. Shortly after the action the starboard side of the system was tested under pressure, found satisfactory and again secured.
3. That refueling of planes was commenced from the starboard system forward of frame 90 about 1230 after word was received that all fires were out.
4. That when the explosion occurred at 1247, planes were being refueled.
5. That the starboard system was then shut down, inspected and no leaks sighted. Electrical failure prevented draining the lines.
6. That immediately after the attack the port system was thoroughly inspected for breaks in lines in CPO quarters, and found secure and intact.
7. That both starboard and port salt water expansion tanks were found to be full of salt water at 1230. This indicates that no large leaks existed in tanks or lines on either side at that time.
8. That both E valves on the quarterdeck were closed, thus making it impossible for gasoline to be pumped from the starboard side to the port side.
9. That the port gasoline control room was entered and inspected after the action and no damage found, but in view of the outboard piping being damaged this side was secured.
10. That the port gasoline control room was flooded with CO₂ and salt water from the fire mains at about 1200 using the quarterdeck controls.
11. That the starboard control room was not flooded.
12. That there was no fire or dense smoke on the quarterdeck immediately after the explosion at 1247 or at 1255.
13. That all operators left the quarterdeck at about 1248 and it was again visited by Lieutenant (jg) DEITZER of the gasoline detail at 1255. At this time there was no fire in the compartment although an instantaneous flash occurred under the overhead accompanied by explosions in the adjacent forward compartment.
14. That Machinist DAVIDSON was on the quarterdeck at the 1247 explosion and reports heavy concussion effect but no evidence of flame or fire in that compartment. He places the explosion as being under the CPO mess room.
5. After the completion of the attack, the hangar deck was in the following condition.
   1. One bomb fragment entered the hangar deck at about frame 200 from a near miss.

2. Smoke from the bomb hit on the flight deck frame #50 filled the hangar deck entering elevator well via main deck openings, but was cleared by the exhaust blowers.
3. About 75% of the lights were out in the forward bay.
4. There was no fire.
6. The explosion at 1247 came from forward of the elevator well. The blast knocked some of the men down and broke a compressed air line in the elevator well. Upon learning of the casualties in Central Station, the hangar deck crew assisted in their removal. The forward end of the hangar deck was used as an emergency dressing station for some 25 casualties until the smoke and fumes drove them aft to the fuselage deck. Each succeeding blast filled the hangar deck with more smoke and fumes. The heat was so intense that the casualties were moved from the fuselage deck to the main deck and torpedo work shop. There was no fire on the hangar deck during this period.

7. At 1442 there was a violent explosion in the forward elevator well. All lights were extinguished by this blast. The heat of the blast was intense but no flame was observed aft of the after elevator. The forward elevator well was afire as result of this blast and burned continuously thereafter. The heat, fire and smoke were so intense in the forward end of the hangar deck, that personnel were unable to enter the areas to fight the fire. The hangar deck water curtains were turned on about 1500, and delivered a small ineffectual quantity of water. Foamite was not used on the hangar deck at any time. Prior to the 1442 explosion there was no fire in the vicinity and thereafter there was so much fire that the area could not be entered.

H. S. DUCKWORTH,
Commander, U.S. Navy.

Enclosure C
Report of Air Operations Officer

U.S.S. LEXINGTON

CV2/A4-3/A16

May 13, 1942.

From:	Air Operations Officer.
To:	Commanding Officer.
Subject:	Air Operations of LEXINGTON, 7-8 May, 1942 - Report of.

1. Account of Action, morning of May 7th.

   1. Narrative.

      1. During the afternoon of May 6, 1942, orders were received from ComTaskForce SEVENTEEN to prepare for air attack upon enemy (Orange) forces reported to be concentrated in the vicinity of MISIMA ISLAND in the LOUISIADE Archipelago, southeast of the PAPUAN Peninsula, NEW GUINEA.

      2. At 0926 (Zone 11) May 7, search planes from Yorktown reported contact with an Orange combatant force consisting of 2 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers and ________ destroyers, approximate bearing from TF-17 325°(T), distance about 180 miles. At about 0953 the Lexington launched an attack group. The attack group consisted of the Lexington Air Group Commander and two additional SBD, 12 TBD-1 of VT-2, 16 SBD-2 of VB-2, 11 SBD-3 of VS-2 and 10 F4F-3 of VF-2 to act as fighter escort. The TBDs were loaded with one torpedo each, the SBD-2s with one 1000-lb. bomb each (1 sec. fuse setting), the SBD-3s with one 500-lb. (1/3 sec. fuse setting) and two 116-lb. bombs each and the Group Commander section same as VS-2. The F4F-3s carried a full load of caliber .50 machine gun ammunition, belt loading being approximately 2 A.P., 1 tracer, 1 incendiary cartridges. All aircraft carried full gasoline, 180 gallons for the TBDs, 147 gallons for the F4F-3s and 250 gallons for the SBDs. All gasoline was 100 octane, aviation. 8 F4F were retained as combat patrol over the ship, 2 SBD of VB-2 and 6 SBD of VS-2 remained as anti-torpedo defense patrol. The Air Group departed, followed about 15 minutes later by the Yorktown Air Group. The Lexington attack group radios were set on 6645 kcs., the combat patrol on 6540 kcs. and the anti-torpedo patrol on 3265 kcs. YE was turned on all during the attack.

      3. After the Attack Group departed the Force steamed on a westerly course, point option having been given to the Attack Group as 290° (T), speed 15 kts. During the absence of the Group one KAWANISHI 4-engine patrol plane was intercepted by a F4F of the Yorktown combat patrol and shot down in flames.

         The weather at the time of the launch was good, with wind 17 knots from 110 degrees true, sea choppy, visibility excellent, scattered clouds with rain squalls to the westward.

         After the launch the Force moved into an area of heavy rain squalls with occasional small patches of clear weather.

4. The Group attacked and returned at 1309.
2. Damage to Enemy.

   1. All attacks made by the Lexington group, except for one 116-lb. bomb dropped upon a heavy cruiser by a VS-2 pilot, were upon one aircraft carrier. This was the only carrier encountered. It was escorted by a force estimated to comprise four heavy cruisers and four destroyers.

   2. Results of the attack were reported by Group pilots as follows: VS-2 attacked first with eleven 500-lb. bombs. The results of drops were not observed by the pilots but a conservative estimate by them gave at least three direct hits, with more probable. VB-2 and VT-2 made a simultaneous dive bombing and torpedo attack which resulted in six certain 1000-lb. bomb hits, two more probable, two unobserved and six misses out of sixteen bombs; VT-2 scored 9 torpedo hits out of 12 released. VF-2 shot down in flames 2 type zero fighters and damaged one single-float biplane seaplane when three planes attempted to intercept; the seaplane made a force landing on the water. An SBD of VS-2 shot down with fixed guns one type zero fighter which was pursuing a second SBD, while the free gunner in one of the VS-2 planes shot down an intercepting type zero fighter. Group command section scored one 500-lb. bomb hit on CV.

   3. The carrier, believed to be the Zuikaku class, was observed by all pilots to burn fiercely in a manner obviously beyond control. Several severe explosions, other than those resulting from bomb or torpedo hits, were observed, and before the attack was completed the ship was almost entirely hidden by smoke and flame. The smoke cleared before all the Lexington planes left the area and the ship had disappeared. Photographs taken at close range by attacking torpedo planes showed planes still in their attack dives and torpedo approaches when the ship was burning throughout its length.

3. Damage or Injury to Own Forces.

   1. One SBD-3 of VS-2, 2-S-10, piloted by Lieut. E.H. Allen, USN, ROUSE, ARM2c, radioman, was attacked by one or more enemy defense planes after the bomb had been released at the objective. The plane was observed to crash into the water. It did not burn.

   2. One SBD-3 of VS-2, 2-S-9, piloted by Ensign Anthony J. Quigley, USNR, WHEELHOUSE, ARM3c, radioman, had its ailerons jammed, cause not known to the writer. Ensign Quigley announced by radio that he would fly to ROSSELL ISLAND.

He was apparently uninjured, but it is not known whether he attempted to land the plane or parachuted, or whether he reached ROSSELL ISLAND. Apparently the engine was undamaged.

3. One SBD-3 of VS-2, piloted by Lieut. (jg) HALL, USNR, was attacked by enemy defense aircraft. One bullet entered the plane from ahead through the side panel of the windshield and penetrated the left shoulder of the radioman, PHILLIPS, C.C., RM3c. The self-sealing gasoline tanks of this plane did not leak after being penetrated by three bullets, caliber unknown.

4. One SBD-3 of VS-2, piloted by Ensign LEPPLA, USNR, was attacked by enemy defense aircraft but returned safely. The pilot suffered many superficial wounds, left arm and hand, apparently from fragments of an explosive shell. A rifle caliber projectile was found resting on the pilot's parachute seat-pack upon his return to the ship. This pilot is the one mentioned in paragraph (b)(2), who shot down with fixed guns a type zero fighter.

5. Ensign A.J. Shultz, USNR, suffered superficial shrapnel wounds in right arm and right thigh. He was piloting an SBD of VS-2.
4. Enemy Tactics.

   1. From observations of the Air Group Commander it is known that the enemy carrier occupied a position at the center of her supporting forces. There were light or heavy cruisers, type not known, and four destroyers. The cruisers occupied positions at the corners of a square, one at each bow of the carrier and one at each quarter, distance from carrier to cruiser about four miles. The destroyers also appeared to be about four miles from the carrier and they occupied the spaces between the cruisers. Pilots said that the resultant formation seemed wide open and that they found no difficulty in avoiding surface AA fire during approach or retirement.

   2. The maneuvers to avoid our air attack suggested that they were based upon a predetermined plan because all turns of the carrier were 90 degrees.

5. Enemy Air Protection.

   1. Enemy aircraft were in the air and climbing and intercepted the first dive bombers before they attacked. All enemy attention seemed directed on our first bombers (VS-2), and it was the planes of this group which met the most opposition. VB-2, following in later from an altitude of 18,000 feet,

and VT-2, which approached at the same time from 10 miles out at 100 feet, were practically unmolested by enemy aircraft. There was no evidence to indicate that the enemy had had early knowledge of the approach of our aircraft.

2. Account of Action, afternoon of May 7th.

   1. Narrative.

      1. After recovery of the morning attack group Task Force SEVENTEEN continued on a westerly course at speed 15 knots. Combat and anti-torpedo defense patrols were kept in the air or in Condition One on deck.

      2. Late in the afternoon, at about 1735, radar indications were received of an unidentified force approaching from the west. These planes were headed directly toward the Force. The weather was overcast and squally, with occasional rain and many low clouds.

      3. Fighter Director was in the Lexington. Combat patrols from both carriers were directed to intercept. At about twenty or twenty five miles west of Lexington our combat patrol intercepted nine enemy fighters, type zero, proceeding eastward. These planes were flying in a group with five planes in Vee formation and two two-plane sections following astern. Our patrol attacked from astern and above, apparently unobserved. The first section leader attacked the two rear-most enemy and shot them down in flames. His wingman did not shoot. These planes retired. The following combat section attacked the second rear enemy section, downing one in flames and holing the gas tanks in the second. At this time the five leading enemy planes became aware of the attack and broke their formation in a "scatter" fashion. An explosion and fire seen at this time by our retiring patrol was believed to be a collision between an enemy fighter and the section leader of our second combat section, who was pressing home his first attack. This pilot, Lieut. (jg) P.G. Baker, USN, was not heard on the radio during the engagement and did not return to the ship. Repeated attempts to contact him by radio failed.

      4. Combat patrol planes returned to their ships after the interception. At 1825 our planes commenced landing aboard the Lexington. The sun set at 1829. Vessels of the screen reported visual contact with unidentified aircraft in their vicinity. These planes appeared to be enemy torpedo or bombing type, flying very low. Yorktown aircraft circling to land were readily identified as own fighters and not the strange planes. The unidentified planes flashed

the code letter "F" which was interpreted by our signal force as "Friendly" in accordance with instructions in PAC 70, Pacific Fleet Communications Doctrine. The one-letter reply for the hour was therefore made by Lexington, whereupon 8 or 9 aircraft turned on their running lights and assumed a position approximately in the landing circle. Vessels of the Force which were close to the strange aircraft opened fire upon them. The planes extinguished their lights and flew away. These were undoubtedly part of an enemy attack group returning to the parent ship, which in the darkness they confused with our own.

5. All but one of our fighters (2-F-14, Lt. (jg) P.G.Baker, USN) returned aboard at _____.
2. Damage to Enemy.

   1. Three enemy fighters were shot down and seen to crash in the water, burning. One fighter was seen to be streaming gasoline and was a possible loss. It is believed that another fighter collided with one of our own and was lost. The final damage therefore was three fighters shot down, one probably destroyed by collision, one possibly forced down.

3. Damage to Lexington Force.

   1. One fighter lost probably by collision with enemy fighter.
3. Account of Action, May 8th.

   1. Narrative.

      1. At 0625 Lexington launched a search group as follows: 12 SBD of VS-2 and 6 SBD of VB-2 to cover 360° about the force. The northern search, 14 single-plane sections, covered an arc of 210 degrees to 200 miles, geographic, median of the search 000 degrees, true. The southern sector, 150 degrees, was covered to 100 miles geographic by 4 single-plane scouts, median of search 180 degrees, true. A combat patrol of 4 VF was also launched at this time.

      2. At 0828 a Japanese aircraft contact report was intercepted. This report gave position and disposition of our force.

      3. At 0835 a Lexington scout contacted and reported an enemy force of 2 CV, 4 CA and many destroyers, position 175 miles bearing 020 degrees true from Lexington.

4. At 0907 commenced launching attack group, 13 F4F-3 of VF-2, 12 TBD-1 of VT-2, 11 SBD-2 of VB-2, 4 SBD-3 of VS-2 and the Air Group Commander in an SBD-3, as described in paragraph (a)(2), except that the 11 planes of VB-2 were gassed to 220 gallons and radio frequencies were set up. The weather was very good, with a wind of 15 knots from 125°(T), visibility and ceiling unlimited, about four tenths cloud cover, slight sea running from southeast. After the launch our course was maintained into the wind until returning search planes were landed and combat patrols in the air were relieved on station and landed. 10 SBDs from the morning search were launched as anti-torpedo patrol at 1013.

5. An emeny four-engine KAWANISHI patrol plane shadowing the Force was shot down in flames at 1016 by a Yorktown combat patrol plane; the fire was visible from the Lexington.

6. At 1028 1 TBD of the Attack Group and 5 of the morning Search Group were landed. The TBD had experienced engine trouble.

7. At 1050 the last of the morning Search Group were landed.

8. Radar indications showed an unidentified force bearing 58 miles bearing 020°(T), on course toward TF-17 at 1057. Our course was changed into the wind; launching of 5 F4F and 5 SBD defense patrol was completed at 1106 and course 028 degrees, true, was resumed.

9. Enemy aircraft appeared and were taken under fire by Lexington gunfire at 1116. Operations of own defense aircraft were not observed. Fire ceased at 1133.

10. At 1133 2-B-13, Ensign F.R. McDonald, USNR, pilot, and HAMILTON, C.H.O., ARM3c, radioman, fell over the port side during an attempted landing on deck. The pilot had been wounded in the right shoulder by enemy gunfire and lost control of his plane during the landing. Both pilot and passenger were recovered by U.S.S. Morris. Ensign McDonald's right upper arm was broken in two places in the plane crash.

11. Several F4Fs and SBDs of the defense patrols landed aboard at 1135.

12. At 1243 were launched 5 F4F, 7 SBDs of VS-2 and 2 SBDs of VB-2. During this launch several aircraft were landed.

13. At 1322 were landed 11 VB, 1 VS and 1 VF.

14. At 1407 were landed 10 TBD, one having landed on the water out of fuel aout 20 miles bearing about 295°, true, from the Lexington at about 1355. One F4F was also landed at 1407. During the approach to the landing circle these planes were fired upon by friendly vessels. Because of low fuel they had approached without making the usual identification procedure maneuvers. A warning was sent out on the warning net that the approaching planes were friendly. All these planes landed aboard safely and were the last planes operated from the Lexington. Lexington planes patrolling (5 VF, 7 VS, 2 VB) were later landed aboard Yorktown.
2. Damage to Enemy.

   1. From information based upon the incomplete pilot reports available it appears that the enemy suffered damage from two 500-lb. bombs dropped on the flight deck, and from at least two, probably three, torpedo hits. The carrier was the only ship attacked by Lexington aircraft. 11 TBDs of VT-2 attacked, as did 3 or 4 SBDs of VS-2 in the Group Command section. After the launch our course was maintained into the wind until returning search planes were landed and combat patrols in the air were relieved on station and landed. 10 SBDs from the morning search were launched as anti-torpedo patrol at 1013. The weather in the vicinity of the target was bad. At 55 miles from the Lexington the torpedo planes encountered a 1300 foot ceiling which forced them below it. VB-2, flying at 16,000 feet, could occasionally see VT-2 through open areas among the heavy cumulus clouds. VB-2 descended to search for the enemy but had not yet discovered him when shortage of fuel forced them to jettison their bombs and return to the Lexington. The VT Squadron joined up after the attack and proceeded as a unit, flying at about 50 feet above the water. They encountered a group of enemy aircraft apparently returning from their attack upon our Force. Fighters accompanying this group made ineffectual attacks upon our planes and appeared reluctant to closely approach the formation. They made several half-hearted single plane attacks and started a small fire in some rags in one plane. The fire was extinguished without damage. One plane of VT-2 was forced down by fuel exhaustion. It was piloted by Lt. (jg) Thornhill, USNR and it is probable that the personnel were recovered by a destroyer which was dispatched to pick them up. When our attack planes left the enemy carrier it was burning and smoking and appeared too damaged to operate aircraft. It was still underway.

3. Damage or Injury to Our Forces (Aircraft).

   1. Of 13 VF which accompanied the Attack Group only 6 are known to have returned to Lexington. Some may have landed aboard Yorktown.

   2. Of 4 VS in the Group Command section only one returned to Lexington, Ensign Haschke. Commander Lexington Air Group was in voice contact with Lexington until our radio went out. He was lost and unable to use his special homing equipment, apparently because his radioman, previously reported as wounded, was unable to turn it on for him. The controls for the equipment are in the radioman's cockpit. No radar trace indentifiable as that of the Group Commander appeared on the radar plot. He climbed in response to instructions but did not appear. When Lexington radar and radio went out Yorktown was instructed by visual signal to work the Group Commander on 6645 kcs, the Lexington search and attack frequency. Unless Yorktown contacted him immediately after this signal was made it is questionable that the plane contained enough fuel to enable him to return to the ship. The Group Commander had reported earlier that he was wounded.

Enclosure D
Report of Fighter Director

 

THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA.
Report of Action 7-8 May, 1942, by Fighter Director.

7 May 1942

0700	Yorktown launched 12 (?) scouts to search 200 miles covering a sector of 120° median 315° (?). Cruiser launched SOCs for inner and intermediate patrol. The intermediate patrol was a source of constant worry as they did not stay on the screen and we were forced to investigate by vectoring fighters. Many of which turned out to be SOCs. We undoubtedly missed 1-2 Jap shadowers and wasted radio silence and gasoline on too many of our own people. In the future these patrols should never be used unless better organized as to their tactics and unless they have I.F.F. It would have been better if they had stayed down low and off the radar screen. They were finally recalled and the patrol secured.
0730	Lexington launched 9 VSB anti-torpedo patrol and 4 VF for combat patrol. During the period immediately following we were being shadowed by at least two Bogies which we were unable to intercept, one came in at the same time Yorktown scouts were returning from search on 270° distance 25 miles where he began circling, a combat section was vectored but recalled before contact could be made by order other than that of F.D.O. (Fighter Director Officer) when it was felt that planes were identified as friendly, (by circling). Later because the

 

	circling continued, fighters were re-vectored but after a heartbreaking chase were unable to intercept. The Jap apparently saw our fighters but they could not sight him. The section leader Lt. (jg) Clark later reported big black clouds in the area where he was searching. Another heartbreaking chase was made on bogey about 0900 when at one time we had three sections chasing the bogey, approaching him on different courses. This bogey withdrew to 45 miles where he went off the screen. Again the section leader Ens. Eder reported tall columns of puffy clouds which made excellent coverage for a plane wishing to escape. There is no doubt that our force was shadowed continuously for a considerable part of the day by Kawanishi and carrier based aircraft.
0835	VS-2 scout reported enemy position and we prepared to launch attack group. No doubt enemy shadowers observed our launching.
0925	Launched 4 VF Combat patrol and began launching Attack group of 9 VF, 28 VSB and 12 TBD. Two scouts had 500-lb. bombs and 18 bombers 1000-lb. bombs.
1010	Launching completed.
1040	Landed patrols. Yorktown completed launching her attack group consisting of 8 VF, 34 VSB and VTB.

 

	At this period we were passing through rain squalls and VS 42 scouts were returned from search. All scouts (all of our planes for that matter) must have I.F.F. as quickly as possible. Twice two sections of our fighters were vectored to orbit at stations to intercept doubtful bogeys. The fighters were placed on stations 10-15 miles from the fleet center and ordered not to lose sight of the force since it is very difficult to keep an accurate check on them when they are in that close and lots of other planes are cavorting around such as inner and anti-torpedo patrols. Our own fighters were not hard to follow as they had IFF.
1130	Lieut. Crommelin of VF 42 was vectored successfully and he shot down a Kawanishi at 025° distance 15 miles. There was no rain at the time but the weather seemed foggy.
1145	Lexington launched 4 VF landed 4 VF and 5 SBD.
1204	Yorktown launched 12 VSB anti-torpedo patrol 2 VF and landed 4 VF. The attack group was nearly at their objective. The bogeys were giving us a rest for a change. Our radar operators were doing an excellent job and were furnishing us with sufficient information to evaluate the situation within reach of our radar. Ensign Henslee, Asst. Fighter Director officer was especially useful and was proving himself to be extremely capable. He is a little older than the others, very quick, intelligent and resourceful.

 

	The other assistant fighter director officers do a swell job but Henslee has "it". Guymon ACMM did not have much chance to work until late in the day.
1240	Lt. Comdr. Dixon reported "Scratch one flat top". We remained in the vicinity of the Ryukaku and positively saw it sink. Ensign Tony Quigley reported one aileron shot away, unable to return to ship and that he would land on an island probably Rossell. Our returning aircraft appeared on the screen 50-60 miles away by aid of the IFF. Yorktown group returned about the same time. We should have designated some of our IFF planes to accompany Yorktown groups, like wise we should have paired Yorktown fighters up with our people in order to simplify the problem of identification. We tried to do this in the air on the 8th but don't believe the order was ever carried out.
1300	Carriers began recovering returning aircraft.
1304	Lex launched 6 VSB and 6 VF.
1312	Bogey 290/75 same @ 1316 290/82. We had several plots from time to time on this bogey which was a large group which must have been the Japanese attack group looking for us. They were on a Southwesterly course.
1345	Lex completed landing 27 VSB - 12 TBD - 14 VF. Our losses 1 VSB, the pilot, Quigley, probably alive on

 

	Rossell Island. Yorktown lost one bomber. Yorktown apparently attacked the same carrier our people did which was in a sinking condition when they arrived. They could have looked for the other carrier or gotten the cruisers and destroyers. At this time it was difficult to see Yorktown because of a rain squall.
1550	Launched 8 VF wind 19 kts, sea slight swells, weather unsuitable for SOCs, sky overcast.
1555	Msg. received from Neosho "Sinking".
1600	From: Neosho - position @ 2300 16-38 S., 158-28 E.
1615	Landed 4 VF.
1648	Bogey 275°/72 miles is believed to have been same bogeys sighted earlier at 1312 which were undoubtedly an enemy attack group looking for TF17.
1700	We changed zone time to -11.
1715	Yorktown reported a bogey 354°/24 miles which we could not find on our screen.
1737	The radar screen was clear.
1747	A large group possibly two groups of bogeys appeared on the radar screen 144°/48 miles apparently flying toward our ship at high speed at about 1500 feet in altitude. We checked gas of combat pilots in air, most of them had about 60 gallons. We vectored the Agnes division of 4 planes and two sections of Yorktown fighters Brown and Orange who did not get very far before they reported instrument conditions so because of their low supply of gasoline and because they were harder to

 

	track having no IFF, they were recalled. In the meantime Lt. Comdr. Ramsey was about to intercept the Japs who had turned left about 25 miles away to a course of about 275° T., later 260° T.
1755	Lex launched additional fighters followed by Yorktown. The Lex fighters were kept standing by and Yorktown were vectored to assist Ramsey. Lt. Comdr. Flatley with six fighters were ordered to buster. He arrived shortly after Lt. Comdr. Ramsey had made his attack shooting down four Japs, one Jap had holes in his gas tank and was probably lost. Lt. Comdr. Flatley and his group intercepted but we could not tell whether they were getting any Japs or not. Lt. Comdr. Ramsey reported seeing nine Jap fighters. We recalled Lt. Comdr. Ramsey at once for he was forty miles away and low on gasoline. He just had enough to get back and land aboard.
1825	Lex recovering planes.
1852	Yorktown completed recovery of planes. During this period, three fighters were lost, one Lex and one Yorktown, both named Baker, another from Yorktown named Knox. We had thought all of our people were back safe because Baker's wing man had answered up "Agnes White on station" which was Baker's call. Later when we could check and found Baker missing we looked for him on the radar screen and thought we had a plane with I.F.F. about 10 miles away. We could not get any answer to our calls so called him by name where upon Purple 2 from Yorktown answered up "This is Baker". It took

 

	several minutes for us to straighten out this confusing coincidence. At times Purple 2 was very close to our force.
1906	Aircraft for which we could not account were observed approaching the fleet. They appeared to want to land. They flashed on their running lights and when challenged replied with either George Fox or "Slant" (- . . - .). Some ships including the Minneapolis opened fire. Yorktown was landing planes and a Yorktown pilot was heard to cry "What are you shooting at me for, what have I done now?", or words similar. Baker or Purple 2 had reported that he was over the formation at 2500 feet, he wanted instructions, we told him to "pancake" about the time firing started but apparently he was wrong, anyhow, he did not show on the screen. Yorktown tried to bring him in but communications were not good among other things and they finally told him to fly about 320° T/120 miles if he wanted to and that with a 25 knot tail wind at low altitude he might reach land.
2000	Position 13°12" S., 154°40" E., Sea moderate, sky broken clouds, no moon, very dark. Cus. 125°T Axis 270°T Speed 15.
2205	Fleet course 150°T; 20 knots. Estimated Jap losses were 1 CV (Ryukaku), 1 CA, 1 CL damaged 3-96 VF, 3 VP, 6 Kawanishi VP (From Minneapolis log) and 2 VF seaplanes. Our losses were 1 Lex scout, Ens. Tony Quigley believed to have landed on Rossell Island, 1 Yorktown bomber who were with the

 

	attack group. In the evening engagement Lex fighters shot down four possibly five Jap fighters and lost Lt. (jg) P. G. Baker who was either shot down by or collided with a Jap fighter. Yorktown lost two fighter pilots, Baker and Knox. The number of planes shot down is not known.
2400	Cus 120°T/20 knots. Axis 270°.

8 May 1942

0645	Lexington launched 4 VF combat patrol, 12 VSB scouts to search 200 miles from 260° to 080°, searching singly and 6 VSB bombers to search 100 miles 080° to 260°, searching singly. One bomber went 200 miles because of a mistake in navigation.
0657	Course 125°T.
0730	Yorktown launched 4 VF combat patrol and 8 VSB anti-torpedo patrol.
0800	Position 14° 24" S., 154° 30" E.
0807	The first bogey appeared 330°/22 miles on a course of about 240° T high speed, down fairly low. Fighters were vectored to intercept but were unsuccessful. This bogey did not falter in his course or speed but as we would have been perfectly silhouetted for him, he undoubtedly had a good look at us. He was on the screen about 9 minutes and then disappeared at 0816.

 

0829	Lt. (jg) Joe Smith made contact with enemy, including 2 CV, 4 CA and 3 DD. They were 006°/120 miles from point Zed. Point Zed was 13° S/153° E (this should be checked as we are not positive, also Lt. (jg) Well says he went 300 not 200 miles on the search).
0855	We intercepted a Jap message reporting 2 CV on course 028°.
0901	Yorktown began launching their attack group; 6 VF, 14 TBD, 12 VF (these last are doubtful).
0908	ComAir assumes command of fleet (Signal).
0910	Lexington attack group launched, Comdr. Ault with 4 scouts, 1000 lb. bombs, Lt. Comdr. Hamilton with 12 bombers, 1000 lb. bombs and Lt. Comdr. Brett with 12 Torpedo planes and torpedoes.
0920	Attack group departed.
0930	Lex landed 6 VSB and 2 VF. Lt. Comdr. Dixon gave new position on enemy CVs.
0950	Lex landed 4 VSB and 2 VF.
1005	Two bogeys appeared on the screen one bearing about 030°, one was a returning torpedo plane which had to turn back because of engine trouble. Two sections of fighters were vectored to intercept and at 1014 a Yorktown fighter shot down a Kawanishi, four engined flying boat. Some ship reported seeing a Zero fighter but he was not seen by anyone else. Meanwhile our fighters had been unsuccessful in intercepting another bogey which was on and off the screen for about twenty minutes.

 

1030	Lex landed 6 VSB.
1048	Lex landed 2 VSB, the last of our search group. Shortly thereafter, at 1055, a large group of bogeys appeared on the screen bearing 020° distance 68 miles; minimum altitude 10,000 feet. They came straight in to intercept us never disappearing from the screen indicating that they flew out of the big null of our radar which would place them up around 18,000 feet. They were traveling at a high rate of speed.
1100	Lexington launched 5 VF and 5 VSB. Yorktown launched 4 VF, combat patrols in the air did not have enough gasoline to intercept at high speed and fight very long. The freshly launched fighters were vectored. (to intercept).
1113	They intercepted between 20-30 miles out but were unable to get close enough to shoot. Lt. Comdr. Ramsey reported 18 dive bombers and 18 fighters. Lt. Comdr. Flatley and the Yorktown fighters did not intercept and were told to return as quickly as possible to protect the force. About this time a report came through from our attack group that they had made contact with the enemy. Jap torpedo planes had previously been reported. Comdr. Ault reported that he and his four planes had made hits with two 1000 lb. bombs. Later reported that he and his radioman were wounded, the radioman badly. We never had Comdr. Ault on the screen and were unable to help him to return.

 

1115	TF17 opened fire on Jap torpedo planes and bombers.
1121	Lex attacked by torpedo planes and bomb hit received on port gun gallery. Japanese torpedo planes came in at 3000 feet pushed over out of gun range, came in fast and launched torpedoes from 50-200 feet. By this time fighter direction was past control by the Fighter Director.
1123	Yorktown was hit. The radar went out of control and our Fighter transmitter was out but we were able to get back on the air in about twenty minutes. Fighter direction was not shifted to the Yorktown. The Japanese appeared to be returning to the north.
1135	Lexington began recovering aircraft.
1142	Ens. McDonald cracked up coming on board, went into the water; he and his radioman were picked up by a destroyer.
1145	Radar indicated a large friendly group returning to the ship bearing 040°/15 miles.
1210	Lexington stacks cleared, was smoking badly after first hits.
1218	Radar reported friendly planes bearing 348° T.
1223	Lex making 25 knots without trouble.
1241	Friendly torpedo planes bearing 280°/distance 36 miles were reported. These planes were reported friendly from the time they appeared on the screen but in spite of that they were fired upon when they came within gun range.

 

1245	Lex launching and recovering planes.
1330	One Lex torpedo plane landed in the water out of gasoline bearing 290° distance 24 miles. A destroyer was sent back to pick up Lt. Thornhill but was unsuccessful. It was later learned that the destroyer sighted a plane life raft but saw no signs of any personnel.
1340	Minneapolis fired on friendly aircraft.
1404	A friendly group approaching Yorktown were fired upon because they approached from 300° T.
1414	Last of Lexington group were landed on board. Comdr. Ault was still in the air but we were unable to communicate well with him. He was not on the screen.
1452	Flames on Lexington are not under control. We are unable to service aircraft on the deck. Our radar was temporarily out when the power went off the gyro control; we were ready to function when the big explosion came at 1525 cutting off all power. Fighter direction had been shifted to Yorktown. All men in air plot and those in the radar shack stuck to their posts until ordered to leave after it became apparent that we would not be able to function any more. Lieut. Rering; Amey, R.D., Y3c, Wood, V.J., Sea; and Epstein, S.H., Sea2c, stood by in air plot until forced to evacuate by smoke. Ensign Henslee manned the radar shack with his men until ordered away. The following named men manned radar shack during the attack:

 

	Howard, W.H., Sea1c; Duke, E.E., Sea1c; and Shonkwiler, GM3c.
1521	Yorktown launching scouts.
1525	Big explosion on Lex. Lots of smoke.
1600	Lex at standstill.
1605	Getting ready to abandon ship.
1642	Destroyers picking up survivors.
1737	Another big explosion on Lex.
1800	Lex continuing to blow up.
1830	All men have abandoned ship. Captain Sherman Was the last to leave.
1845	Lex burning furiously. Minneapolis and New Orleans and several destroyers stopped around Lex recovering survivors.
1900	Underway on Cus 220-225/19. Are to join up with Yorktown group.
1915	Phelps fired torpedoes (5) into Lex. Lex still burning.
1940	Lex still burning.
1952	Lex turned over and sank.
1954	Phelps reported stern blown off in error when a last terrific explosion occurred on Lex after she had sunk which lifted the Phelps stern out of water.

Respectfully submitted,

F. F. GILL,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy,
Fighter Director.

Enclosure E
Report of Engineer Officer

May 26, 1942

From:	Engineer Officer, U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
To:	Commanding Officer.
Subject:	Report of action in Coral Sea, May 8, 1942 - Engineering Department.

1. This report covers events occuring in the Engineering Department, which came under my observation, and events reported to me by the officers and men of the Engineering Department, during the action and subsequent thereto in the U.S.S. Lexington in the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942.

2. At about 0930 went to general quarters and set condition "Zed". The machinery set up was four units and sixteen boilers on the line. Power was available for maximum speed. The forward dynamo flat was separately exciting the forward auxiliary bus and supplying power to the forward distribution board. The after dynamo flat was separately exciting the after auxiliary bus and supplying power to the after distribution board. The main steam line, the auxiliary exhaust, the high pressure drains, and the fuel oil service were split between the two engine rooms at frame 104. The boiler feed water system was split on the center line. The firemain was split on the center line; the forward fire and bilge pumps feeding the port fire main, and the after fire and bilge pumps feeding the starboard fire main.

3. Fuel oil and reserve feed water tanks and bottoms were filled as follows. Forward of frame 75, all fuel oil tanks and bottoms were full and the fuel oil system secured. Between frames 75 and 133; on the port side the sluice tanks were empty and all other tanks full, on the starboard side the sluice tanks and reserve feed water tanks were empty and all other tanks full, and all bottoms were full except the starboard reserve feed water bottoms which were partially filled. Aft of frame 133; tanks were filled with fuel so that there was one liquid layer around the stern of the ship, and fuel oil bottoms were practically full, fuel oil suction having been shifted to these bottoms the evening of the 7th of May.

4. At about 1100 word was received that many enemy planes had been picked up about 65 miles away. Starting at about 1120 the guns opened fire and enemy bomb hits, near misses, and torpedo hits were felt in Main Control. Numerous jars and shocks were felt estimated between 12 and 15, three of these being very strong, shaking the ship violently.

5. At about 1135 word was received that the attack was over. All stations reported that their machinery was in good condition except for a few minor casualities which were being repaired. Boiler rooms #2, #4, and #6 reported oil and water coming in and were ordered to secure. Reports were received that fireroom #2 had 18 inches of water and oil, fireroom #4 had 12 feet, and fireroom #6 had 5 feet. Orders were given to secure the firemain in these firerooms, for it was suspected that these firerooms were flooding from ruptured firemains, fuel, and feed water lines, which proved to be the case. A bilge suction was taken on these firerooms and within about an hour they were pumped dry. These firerooms all had minor leaks along the seams of the outboard bulkheads, and the bulkheads of the trunks leading to the firerooms were distorted and stove in, especially in #4 fireroom. Baker unit throttle tripped out during the attack but was reset without difficulty. No fires were reported in the engineering spaces except the oil on the surface of the water in #4 boiler was burning but later on was extinguished.

6. Ship took a list to about seven degrees maximum which was removed in about one and a half hours by pumping fuel oil aft of frame 104 from port to starboard. Wing Tank Control reported that fuel oil tanks forward of frame 104 on the port side were contaminated with water.

7. About 1200 word was received from Central Station that all fires were out or under control and word was received to open fittings necessary for ventilation. I left Main Control at this time to inspect boiler rooms #2, #4, #6, leaving the Senior Assistant Engineering Officer in charge.

8. I went forward along the port boiler passageway, stopping by Wing Tank Control. At this time they reported having control. The ship had stopped listing and commenced returning to an even keel. In #2 and #4 boiler passageway a seepage of oil was coming up through the third deck seams, but not enough that it could not be handled by bailing it out with buckets, and later by installing a submersible pump. Lieutenant Hawes in charge of Repair IV made the following reports to me:

   1. That storeroom B-308-A was slowly flooding, and that B-326-A had a hole in it above the water line.

   2. That both elevators were out of commission.

   3. That the hatch going from the forward elevator well down into the port bottle well had been blown open

during the attack and from the fumes escaping that apparently the hydraulic lines and high pressure air lines in this well were ruptured.

4. That this hatch had been closed again.
9. At about 1245, immediately following a heavy explosion forward, Lt. (jg) H.E. Williamson from the forward distribution board reported to me in #2 boiler passageway that hydrogen gas in the forward storage battery had blown up and that there were many injured in Central Station, Interior Communication Room, and the Forward Board. Main Control reported communication lost with Central Station, Interior Communication Room, Forward Board, and Repair II. Some smoke in Main Control accompanied by a sweet smelling gas. Burner control telegraph, "Walker Log", Rudder angle indicator, engine order telegraph, and ship's service telephone put out of operation in Main Control. Used sound powered telephone circuits for control. Put electric fire and bilge pumps on main drain and gradually shifted all steam fire and bilge pumps to the starboard fire main. Fire main pressure maintained at l00# until about 1500 when it fell to 40#. It is believed that this explosion was caused by gasoline fumes leaking into the IC. Motor Generator compartment, and being set off probably from brush sparking of one of the I.C. motor generators or some other electrical sparking. Main Control reported that this explosion was felt in Main Control as severely as any previous explosions. There were no gasoline fumes in the forward elevator well at this time.

10. Ordered Repair IV under Lieutenant Hawes to the scene of the explosion, and requested the Engineering Battle Dressing Station doctor and crew to report to the hangar deck. Called Main Control and reported the explosion. Assistance under C.M.M. Lynch also arrived from Repair V. At this time I personally checked the forward storage battery supply vent in #2 boiler intake. A heavy brown oil smoke was coning from this intake which suggested that there was an oil fire in the vicinty of the battery locker or the acid resisting paint in the battery locker was smoldering. At the forward elevator well the injured were being removed from the I.C. Room, Central Station and Forward Board to the forward end of the hangar deck. This rescue work was carried on under most difficult conditions, all compartments being blanketed in smoke. About twenty-five (25) injured were removed from these compartments to the hangar deck. Remaining personnel were reported either dead or could not be found in the debris. No fires were reported in these compartments. About six inches of water was reported over the I.C. compartment deck. During this period that wounded personnel were being removed, explosions of less violence were occuring intermittently forward of

these stations at periods of about every 20 minutes. White smoke was seen being emitted around the side of the Band Room doors indicating gasoline explosions.

11. The dense brown fuel oil smoke finally became so bad that the repair parties had to abandon these compartments. All doors and hatches were closed before abandoning. Dead and wounded on the hangar deck were moved aft. Hangar deck was filling rapidly with a dense brown smoke. Although exhaust blowers on hangar deck were running, they were not of sufficient capacity to exclude all the smoke. This smoke was being discharged through the hangar deck exhaust blowers on the port side to the boat pockets where it was drawn back into the engineering spaces by the intake blowers of the engineering spaces which are located in the same boat pockets. Thus the engineering spaces were filling with smoke so intake blowers were shut down. This caused the spaces to become unbearably hot.

12. When all hands abandoned the hangar deck on account of smoke I returned to Main Control and was informed that I was to take over the duties of damage control and for Main Control to take over the duties of Central Station if the First Lieutenant could not be found. There being no J.A. outlet in Main Control, the extent of the damage forward of the quarterdeck was not known. At this time telephone communication was still maintained with Repair Parties I, III, IV, and V, over the JZ phones. Through Repair I information was obtained that the Executive Officer and Ensign Dowling were in charge of fighting the fire forward. All spare men and rescue breathers available in Repairs III, IV and V were sent forward. I ordered Lieutenant Hawes with Repair IV to take over the duties of Repair II and to fight the fire aft but not to open up closed compartments, especially the machine shop, hoping that the fire might burn itself out.

13. Explosions forward continued after the first explosion at 1245 at intervals of 20 to 30 minutes. A heavy explosion occured in the forward elevator well at about 1500. After this, lights and power failed forward and circuit breakers on the forward flat were opened caused by grounds from the forward circuits. Lieutenant Hawes witnessed this explosion from the port side of the hangar deck and states that the forward elevator well up to the underside of the elevator, which was in the up position, was in a mass of flames.

14. After the above explosion, orders were received by Repair III from the Gunnery Officer to sprinkle the after magazines and war head locker and to turn on the sprinkler system on the hangar deck. These orders were carried out. Water from

the hangar deck sprinkler system began leaking around the loading hatch between the hangar deck and the forward reserve plane stowage. This caused considerable anxiety for there was danger of flooding the main motors.

15. The heat in the forward machinery space was becoming intense and the forward bulkhead very hot, with paint peeling, indicating a fire in the evaporator spaces. Gasoline was reported leaking out of one of the pneumercator lines in Wing Tank Control from one of the forward tanks. At about 1530, requested permission from Bridge to abandon the forward machinery space due to intense smoke and heat. All machinery and boilers forward of frame 104 were secured and abandoned. The intense heat from the fire could be felt in all compartments below deck. A heavy explosion occurred above #8 fireroom at about 1530. Ordered watch to secure boiler and abandon fireroom. The watch in the forward machinery space are to be commended for their devotion to duty having remained at their stations operating Affirm and Baker units for a period of about one hour after all electric light and power had been lost. No blowers were operating during this period and the smoke and heat became unbearable. A great percentage of this watch were so exhausted that they required assistance of others in leaving this space.

16. At about 1600 communication with Bridge became very weak. Repair V was ordered to rig portable sound powered phone to top side from steering engine room. Soon after, the last word was received over the J.V. phone in Main Control and this was to "secure all machinery and all engineering personnel lay up on the flight deck". This word was relayed to all stations and all hands secured their machinery and went to the flight deck. The fireroom, engineroom, Repair IV, and Repair V personnel escaped through the boiler intakes direct to the main deck. Main Control, Ice Machine, Motor Room, and #1 and #2 Torpedo Air Compressor personnel escaped through the ladders on the starboard side leading up past the refrigerator spaces. Members of Repair III, thrust block rooms, and steering engine escaped through the scuttle in the after reserve plane stowage to the hangar deck, then aft through the carpenter shop, or up through the torpedo workshop.

17. In the Engineering Department no personnel of the Boiler and Main Engine divisions were lost. The following personnel of the Electrical Division are unaccounted for:

 

	NAME	RATE	BATTLE STATION
1.	BARRY, M.F.	Warrant Electrician	I.C. Room
2.	McLAIN, R.L.	C.E.M.	I.C. Room
3.	OHLER, W.G.	C.E.M.	I.C. Room
4.	KING, J.M.	E.M.lc	I.C. Room
5.	ALTO, E.J.	E.M.lc	I.C. Room
6.	ORR, M.S.	E.M.2c	I.C. Room
7.	DUPREE, W.J.	E.M.3c	I.C. Room
8.	SMITH, V.C.	E.M.2c	I.C. Room

It is believed that these men were killed at their battle stations when the first explosion occurred in the I.C. Room at about 1245.

The following personnel of the Auxiliary division are unaccounted for:

 

	NAME	RATE	BATTLE STATION
1.	DAVIS, J.O.	M.M.lc	Fwd "A" Div. Reserves. (Machine Shop)
2.	DUNN, J.J.	F.2c	Torpedo Air Compressor #3
3.	FLATT, G.E.	M.M.2c	Steering Gear.
4.	GARREN, "J". "B".	F.lc	Repair II.
5.	HALL, E.L.	M.M.2c	Ammunition train (B-025-T).
6.	KRAUSE, J.H.	M.M.2c	After "A" Div. Reserves.
7.	LEWANDOWSKI, A.A.	Mldr.2c	Repair II.
8.	THAU, W.A.	M.M.lc	Torpedo Air Compressor #3.

It is believed that Davis, Garren, Hall, and Lewandowski were killed by explosions while fighting fires in the forward part of the ship.

It is believed that Dunn, Flatt, Krause, and Thau were trapped on the hangar deck in trying to escape after word had been passed for the Engineering Department to lay up on the flight deck, or lost in the water during abandon ship.

18. I believe that the above narrative speaks for itself, in commenting on the state of training, devotion to duty, bravery, courage, and self sacrifice displayed by the members of the Engineering Department on May 8, 1942. Each man did everything possible to save his shipmates and to save his ship. All hands did their duty and were in there fighting till the last ray of hope was lost. The high standards displayed by all personnel makes it difficult to bring to your attention individual cases of

men who were outstanding. A separate letter is being forwarded of recommendations submitted by officers of the Engineering Department of particular cases of exceptional courage and devotion to duty which came to their attention during the day. I myself wish to commend all officers for their excellent work and the fine leadership they displayed under the most trying conditions, and also all hands in my department for a job well done.

19. I wish to call to the Commanding 0fficer's attention the excellent work of the U.S.S. Hammann in rescuing personnel from the U.S.S. Lexington. The fine seamanship displayed by the Commanding Officer (Commander A.E. True, U.S. Navy) and his crew is to be commended. This destroyer remained as near to the burning vessel as it was safe to do so, until the last man was rescued from the water. Final count showed that they picked up 454 men and 24 officers. The thoughtfulness, kindness and assistance that was given the Lexington personnel by the crew of the U.S.S. Hammann and later by the crew of the U.S.S. Chester will long be remembered by those who were on board.

20. It is my opinion that the torpedo hits received by the U.S.S. Lexington on the port side forward, opened the inboard and top seams of the fuel oil and gasoline tanks, and water pressure forced petroleum fumes into surrounding compartments. When sufficient gas had accumulated to form an explosive mixture this was ignited from sparks from electrical equipment in the vicinity. The first explosion covered such a large area and started large fires in so many compartments at one time that it was practically hopeless to combat this fire with the equipment that was available. Continued explosions ruptured bulkheads more seriously and fed more fuel to this inferno. Why this fire did not burn itself out from lack of air still remains a mystery as the ship still had condition "Zed" set.

21. Recommendations : -

    1. That gloves be worn by all hands at general quarters to protect their hands from burns. Burns about the hands render one helpless.

    2. That portable sound powered telephone sets with connecting cord be made a part of each repair party equipment in order that new lines of communication may be established quickly.

3. That the Bureau of Ships be requested to continue the study of the prevention of fires from petroleum fumes. Would steam in compartments surrounding gas storage be of any benefit? Is there some chemical that would act as an absorbent for the fumes, that could be spread on the deck of a compartment where fumes are prevalent?

4. In order that all hands down to the lowest seaman may be commended for their actions on May 8, 1942, it is recommended that a medal be issued for the Battle of the Coral Sea bearing on the face a print of a carrier, the color of the ribbon to be green and white, the Lexington colors.

5. That men be given lectures in conservation of energy under battle conditions and also in relaxation.

6. That men be taught the best method of swimming with life belts on.

7. That exercises on board ship include rope climbing.

8. The present type of portable drainage pump is unsatisfactory. The suction clogs too easily, it is cumbersome to handle and it does not have sufficient lift. The old fashion pump used by city sewer departments appears more serviceable. In order that it may be transported more conveniently, consideration should be given to having separate units; pump and a driving unit that could be quickly coupled together.

9. It is questionable in my mind whether a single fire-main system is the most practicable. Would not many individual systems, cross-connected if considered desirable, but each system complete in itself with firemains, pump, etc.

10. All electrical equipment operating the gasoline system and gasoline tanks and the equipment in the adjoining area should be gas tight.

11. Consideration should be given to having portable fire fighting equipment. The fact must be kept in mind that at the damaged area, the fire fighting equipment here is also generally damaged.

12. Present type rescue breathers are unsatisfactory, for repair parties in passing through scuttles or manholes, and for work that required bending over. It is recommended that the oxygen bag be placed on the shoulders or the back.

 

A. F. Junker.

Enclosure F
Report of Gunnery Officer

(EJO/jr)

U.S.S. BARNETT
U.S.S.LEXINGTON UNIT EMBARKED

May 30, 1942.

From:	The Gunnery Officer, U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
To:	Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
Subject:	Action Fought in the Coral Sea with the Japanese Navy, 7 - 8 May 1942.

1. All Gunnery Department activity except for plane arming and re-arming took place on 8 May.

2. The ship went to General Quarters immediately after the attack group was launched about 0930.

3. Many reports of aircraft were received from Air Plot. An enemy aircraft was seen shot down on the port beam. It caused a great column of smoke on the horizon. I believe this was a scout.

4. Shortly before the attack the Gunnery Radar reported planes somewhat forward of the port beam. These planes could not be seen. There were clouds and some haze along the port bow to the port beam. This information was sent to all stations and the director and all port five inch guns were trained on the reported bearing. Very shortly thereafter, Air Plot reported, "Enemy Bombers with Fighter Protection, coming in". The five inch guns were trained to this bearing which was up on the port bow. The guns had barely reached the bearing when the first enemy torpedo plane was sighted on the port beam. Estimated range - 5000 yards. The enemy was in a glide of about 10 - 15 degrees. Short range weapons opened fire almost simultaneously with our sighting him from Sky Forward. He seemed to be making higher speed than our torpedo planes are accustomed to make. Although the automatic weapon fire against him did not look very effective, he kept veering away from it, to his left. He dropped, at about 1500 yards, in such a way that his torpedo was not released until after he had started his turn away; as a consequence his torpedo ran well ahead of the ship, which had commenced its swing to the right. The torpedo plane attack developed from abaft the port beam as the ship swung right.

5. About 45 - 60 seconds after the torpedo plane attack had started, the first dive bomber was sighted on the port bow. The dive bombers were picked up immediately by the automatic weapons. This attack was dispersed considerably in bearing. From then on, I cannot be certain of the order or attack. It seemed that we were engaged continuously until cease firing was given.

6. From my station in Sky Forward, I was unable to see much of the torpedo plane action which was carried out well aft on the port quarter. The glide bombing attack on the port bow was carried out at angles of glide from 40 to 45 degrees. Dropping altitude was estimated to be 2500 feet. Most of the bombs were over. Five inch battery Two was hit in the vicinity of gun no. six. This caused debris and smoke to rise well above Sky Forward. The battery was out of action.

7. A bomb hit the lip of t