Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

PART II
THE OVERLORD PLAN: COSSAC APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE, 1943.

A. CASABLANCA CONFERENCE DECISIONS: JANUARY 1943.

1. After serious consideration, the CCS concluded in July 1942 not to attempt the invasion of Northwest Europe in 1942 with the inadequate resources then available (see Chapter I). The application of available resources to the Mediterranean campaign for the TORCH operation prohibited the accumulation of sufficient strength in England for a full scale invasion in 1943. In the 1942 discussions, it had seemed possible that than forces required for a small scale cross channel operation in the late summer or early autumn of 1943, might still be made available.

2. After the decision was reached to launch TORCH in November 1942, outline planning for cross channel operations was continued in London with the object of having plans and long-term preparations in readiness should the CCS find it possible or expedient to execute some sort of an assault. Studies thus prepared were submitted at the Casablanca Conference which met in January 1943. The CCS then decided that, while the main American-British effort for this first half of 1943 would be directed toward exploiting the success of African operations, planning and preparations for the future cross channel assault should be continued. This would make it possible, when forces did become available, for the operation to be executed without delay.¹

[Page 79 footnote continued.]

[Page 79 footnote continued.]

3. In order to put this further planning on a combined basis, and to make sure that plans were realistically based on the resources which the CCS would be able to allocate to cross-channel operations, the CCS at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, directed the formation of a combined British-U.S. authority with the title of COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command) to undertake detailed planning and preparations for future cross-channel operations.¹ It was also agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should designate a senior British officer to act as COSSAC. General F.H. Morgan was selected for this assignment in February 1943. He set about immediately organizing a nucleus staff and took over and continued the planning that had been begun in 1942 in relation to "ROUND-UP".

B. COSSAC: FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION.

4. The CCS on 12 April 1943, after reviewing the initial steps taken in England to organize planning for the OVERLORD Operation, issued a directive to General Morgan, as COSSAC, covering the following points:

   1. The CCS have decided to undertake preparations for operations against Europe;

   2. The object is to defeat German fighting forces in Northwest Europe;

   3. The CCS have decided to appoint a Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) in the future;

   4. They have decided to appoint you Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) pending SAC's appointment;

   5. You will prepare plans in the following order of priority:

      1. For a return to the Continent with such forces as are available in the event of a German collapse, weakening, or withdrawal. i.e. Operation RANKIN.¹

[Page 84 continued footnotes from page 83]

2. For a limited cross-channel assault with a target date of 1 August 1943, to seize and hold a bridgehead such as the Cotentin Peninsula, in case the CCS decide at a later date to execute such an operation.

3. For a full-scale invasion of northwest Europe in the Spring of 1944.¹
6. Small-scale amphibious operations (COMMANDO raids) will be dealt with by the Chief of Combined Operations consulting you;

7. You will be provided with monthly forecasts of forces likely to be available for RANKIN and other operations;

8. When you have completed your plans you will report to the CCS.

9. You will be provided with a staff drawn from the British and U.S. Navies, Armies, and Air Forces.

10. Service Ministries and ETOUSA will assist on administration and logistic aspects of your plans.

11. Controlling Security Officer will be consulted for coordination of cover plans and deception. ²

5. This directive was modified as a result of the Trident Conference,¹ at which the CCS came to the conclusion that the possibility of even a limited cross channel invasion in 1943 before the weather closed in (15 September) was extremely remote, and that a full scale invasion was the most promising line of strategy for 1944. The new directive ordered COSSAC to submit by 1 August 1943 an outline plan for an assault, employing specified forces for the target date of 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be developed. ²

6. To enable COSSAC to draw up his Appreciation and Outline Plan, he was provided with a combined staff, comprising Army, Navy and Air Officers of both British and the U.S. services. In the beginning this staff consisted of representatives of the various military authorities directly or indirectly involved in this preliminary planning. These representatives at first acted more as liaison officers from their respective chiefs than as officers of one staff. The authorities represented were:

   1. C-in-C, Portsmouth (an R.N. Home Command). This was Admiral Little who was subsequently designated ANCXF.

   2. Commander of British Army forces in the U.K. This was General Paget who was subsequently designated CG 21 AG.

   3. C-in-C Fighter Command (the R.A.F. Commander of fighter air forces in Britain). This was Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory who was subsequently appointed C-in-C, AEAF.

   4. Commanding General ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations U.S. Army).

   5. COSSAC and personal staff.

   6. Admiralty.

   7. The British War Office.

8. The British Air Ministry.

9. The Chief of Combined Operations, and

10. Other miscellaneous authorities.

The representatives of each of these authorities often had army, air, and naval components so that the early staff was a thoroughly heterogeneous collection.

7. The head of the U.S. section on COSSAC's staff was Brigadier-General R.W. Barker, USA. The U.S. Army Air Forces automatically came under his jurisdiction. During the COSSAC period the U.S. Navy representatives worked under the U.S. Army Command in the European Theater.¹ The U.S. Naval representation on COSSAC's staff included officers designated by ComInCh and ComNavEu who formed part of the ETOUSA section.² Gradually, however, the various elements were sorted out and the staff settled down in an organization with two main sections, the British and the U.S., each with an Army, Navy and Air sub-section. This process was continued until ultimately the two naval sections were working together; the two air sections were doing their part together; and the innumerable sub-sections of the two armies were paired off, each pair doing its part as one team.

8. In view of the fact that the Royal Navy was scheduled to provide the bulk of NEPTUNE sea-going forces, the R.N. section of the COSSAC staff was from the first

regarded as the pre-eminent naval authority.¹

C. COSSAC APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN FOR OVERLORD, JULY 1943.

9. COSSAC was not required to start his planning from scratch. He had available very elaborate and well grounded plans prepared in 1942 for projected operations such as ROUND-UP, SLEDGEHAMMER, HADRIAN and others. In addition, his staff included a large number of officers who had had experience in drafting these plans and in devising the various operations which had been executed in the Mediterranean. The production of the COSSAC-OVERLORD Appreciation and Outline Plan consisted for the most part in a revision of the old ROUND-UP Plan, in the light of Mediterranean experience and on the basis of the forces tentatively allotted for a 1944 Cross-Channel operation.

10. The early phases of COSSAC planning were reviewed in two broad but rather heterogeneous conferences. The first of these, held between 24 May and 23 June, was organized by the CG ETOUSA at the U.S. Assault Training Center, Woolacombe, England, and was primarily a U.S., conference. The second, called Operation RATTLE, was a conference held at Largs, Scotland between 28 June and 1 July 1943. All authorities and agencies of both America and Britain, which would have any possible military connection with OVERLORD, were represented at the RATTLE conference. The agenda of both conferences were given over to a general discussion of all possible aspects of an amphibious operation against the strongly defended shores of Northwest Europe.

11. After these two conferences, a complete but very general summary of the preparations required and of the operational methods appropriate for the proposed operation, was drawn up. Each aspect of the problem was made into a "project". A suitable committee, drawn from all interested authorities,

was set up to deal with each project. In due course each committee submitted its findings. These were then developed by the COSSAC staff into the COSSAC Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation OVERLORD. From time to time during the process of compiling the COSSAC Plan, various drafts were circulated to all interested parties, including the British and American Chiefs of Staff and the CCS, so that all could have a chance to add or subtract or revise the plan before its final publication. The final COSSAC Plan was published on 30 July 1943 under the label COS (43) 416 (O) and CCS 304 of 10 August 1943.
12. The size and nature of the operation as planned by COSSAC, was limited by the forces which the CCS undertook to make available:

    1. The land forces allotted were a maximum of 30 and a minimum of 26 divisions of balanced forces; plus 6½ U.S. divisions scheduled to arrive in the United Kingdom, too late for the assault but soon enough to be used in the later phases of the build-up. In addition, three to five divisions per month were to arrive after the assault.¹

    2. The airborne forces allotted were 2 airborne divisions, 5 paratroop regiments and 1 airborne tank battalion. Air lift for only 2/3rds of one division was available.²

    3. The forecast of available air forces provided for an approximate total of 11,377 aircraft of all types.³

    4. The allotted assault lift was sufficient to land three divisions in assault, two divisions in follow up, and to sustain a build-up of approximately one division a day.⁴

    5. Naval strength sufficient to provide protection against hostile naval forces was available, but naval bombardment vessels were meagre.⁵

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

13. COSSAC's problem was to advise the CCS whether a force so limited could successfully invade Europe by 1 May 1944, and to draw up an outline plan for doing it. The COSSAC Plan therefore included:

    1. A review of the resources which the CCS had authorised

    2. A survey of enemy capabilities, and

    3. A plan by which, under certain conditions, a Cross Channel amphibious operation could be launched from England to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further operations could be developed.

14. The COSSAC survey indicated that German dispositions for the defense of the French coast were of three kinds:

    1. Garrison troops installed in fixed defensive positions were posted along the entire coast, in varying degrees of strength, covering every stretch of beach which nature had made suitable for landing.¹

    2. The Germans were well aware that an Allied assault could not survive unless it could be sustained and reinforced by a vast build-up. This would force the Allies to concentrate on capturing a major port, without which the build-up would be impossible. The Germans, therefore, made it a second principle of their defense to concentrate heavily on the defense of major ports.

    3. The third component of the German defense was a mobile reserve which could be moved rapidly to any point along the periphery, once the Allies had committed their forces.

The Germans considered that the Allies were most likely to launch their invasion against the Pas de Calais. Hence they had concentrated the bulk of coastal defenses, and the major part of their army forces in that sector.¹
15. The available allied ground and air forces would be adequate to deal with German forces in France provided they could once be firmly established ashore.² The allotted assault lift was sufficient to move a maximum of three divisions in assault, with two more divisions as follow-up forces. This figure set a limit on the weight of the assault which the Allies could deliver. Available cross channel shipping set a limit to the build-up rate of one division per day. The COSSAC Plan conditioned by available solutions of two main problems: first, that of getting assault forces, limited by the available assault lift, onto the beach; and second, that of holding off the German mobile reserve until the allied preponderance of forces could be firmly established, with the available build-up lift.

16. COSSAC planning began with a study of the sectors of the French coast, which would be most suitable for the initial landings. The coast line of Brittany and beyond was dismissed at once, because it was out of range of U.K. based fighter air cover and because the time required, for the turn round of build-up shipping, would reduce the build-up rate below an acceptable minimum. The remaining possible areas were the Pas de Calais area, the area around the mouth of the Seine, the Caen sector, and the Cotentin (Cherbourg) Peninsula. Of these, geography seemed to make the Caen area the least suitable. Its beaches were furthest from U.K. fighter airplane bases; it was furthest from U.K. ports, thus requiring the longest shipping turn round time and therefore the slowest rate of build-up; it had the fewest airfields, and it was not the best area for deploying armor. But its major handicap was that it did not possess a port of sufficient capacity to handle the build-up. The nearest port to the eastward was Le Havre, which could not be reached from the Caen sector, except by a long flank march over difficult country with a very poor lateral road and rail network, and after crossing the wide and well defended Seine river. The nearest port to the westward was Cherbourg, which could

not be reached except after another hazardous flank march, with wretched lateral communications through the Vire swamp and up the rocky difficult Cotentin Peninsula.
17. The Germans had recognized that by nature the Caen sector was the least suitable for landings, and they had therefore left it the least defended. They had concentrated their strongest defense on the Pas de Calais sector which was closest to airfields, closest to U.K. ports, contained the best terrain for manoeuvering, and led most directly into Germany. They had concentrated strong garrison forces around the Seine group of ports and around Cherbourg and the Brittany ports. But they held the coastline from the Vire river to the approaches to the Seine estuary with only one division, behind defenses less concentrated and less developed then in any Sector.¹

18. From the Naval and Air point of view, the Caen sector though less advantageous than the others, was acceptable. From the Build-up point of view the Caen sector, being shy of a major port, was utterly unacceptable, unless a method of discharging the necessary tonnages over the beaches could be devised. COSSAC evolved methods by which the beaches could be sheltered, piers could be run out from the shore and ships could be provided with anchorages. In effect his plan was to build pre-fabricated ports in England and to assemble them on the French shore concurrently with the assault phase. COSSAC therefore, selected the Caen sector for the assault area. It was the only sector in which the German peripheral defenses were weak enough to give the Allied spearhead, limited as it was by the shortage of assault lift, a reasonable prospect of success. But COSSAC laid it down, as a condition, that sheltered water and artificial harbors must be provided.

19. Having contrived a method by which the Allied spearhead could gain a foothold, COSSAC next considered the problem of how the Allied army could establish itself in strength before the German mobile reserves would have a chance to crush it. This question resolved itself into the problem of how to win the Build-up race. The Germans would be faced with a Build-up problem too. Their mobile reserved would have to be brought up progressively, one part at a time, just

as allied forces would have to be ferried across the channel progressively. COSSAC believed that if the Allies could stay ahead in the race, they would eventually win, because their reservoir of troops was greater than the German reservoir. The problem was how to win the race with the limited build-up lift available.
20. One essential question faced was that of the early construction and efficient operation of the artificial harbors. A second essential problem was that of disorganizing German lines of communication leading up to the assault area. We would require both air action and sabotage by the French resistance. Another method would be to tie down German armies in the Pas de Calais, Scandinavia, and southern France by maintaining a threat against those areas. Another method would be to tie down German reserves in Italy, the Balkans, and in the German homeland by operations or threatened operations in Italy and the Mediterranean. All of these would contribute to the allied chances of winning the battle of the build-up. But COSSAC realized that, with the cross-channel shipping available to the Allies, they could not win the build-up race, nor maintain their foothold in Normandy, if the Germans had unlimited reserves available. In fact, if German mobile reserves in France exceeded some 12 full-strength first-line divisions, they would in all probability be able to win the build-up race and push the Allies back into the sea, before the full weight of the army could be established in the bridgehead area.

21. COSSAC made one further condition to his plan. The Allies must have overwhelming air supremacy over the channel and assault area. Failing this, the allied armada would be disrupted at sea and the soldiers would never get to the beach. Even if they did reach the beach, a comparatively small scale of German air action over channel build-up lanes could fatally delay the allied build-up, while the necessary disruption of German lines of reinforcement would also be prejudiced.

22. COSSAC reported that OVERLORD in 1944 was possible with the forces allotted, provided these three conditions were met, namely:

    1. overwhelming air supremacy,

    2. artificial harbors,

    3. German mobile reserves not exceeding 18 divisions in France or 15 available to be brought in from Russia or the Mediterranean.

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1. Unless German reserves and the beach defenses of Northwestern Europe were substantially reduced, no limited operation to seize and hold a beach-head in France would be possible with the resources available in 1943 as the Germans still had 41 divisions in France. Even if adequate transport was employed on the BOLERO build-up, the largest number of field divisions the Allies could assemble in the U.K. before the weather closed in would be 17 (12 British and 5 U.K.). Even if all available assault shipping and craft were assembled, assault lift for only two brigade groups (equals approximately one division) would be available;

2. On the basis of available resources detailed plans should be made for the seizure of the Cotentin Peninsula of France;

3. An examination should be made to determine the level to which German reserves in Northwest Europe must sink in order to give a reasonable chance of success to the operations;

4. Preparations to launch the operation should be deferred until the scale of the German reserves available on that date could be reliably estimated;

5. Plans should be made to exploit a breakdown in German morale and for a return to a Continent in the event of German disintegration.

6. In 1944 the relative strength of German forces in France as compared to the assaulting strength of the Allies in the U.K. might be such that a cross channel invasion would be feasible. The reasons for this opinion were:

   1. the increase of Allied assault lift provided by the production of an additional year and the reduction of Mediterranean requirements would make the assault stronger.

   2. considerable increase in available ground forces and supplies should be expected from another year of BOLERO.

   3. The air offensive would have reduced German strength and especially their ability to rapidly reinforce any Mediterranean fronts would create an overall strain on their resources with a proportionate weakening in France.

   4. The continuing air battle would have further reduced German strength over the channel;

7. Plans and preparations should be made for a full scale invasion in 1944 and an examination conducted to determine the level to which German reserves must sink in order to allow a reasonable prospect of success to a 1944 invasion;

8. A combined command organization should be established and a Supreme Commander or a deputy to act on his behalf should be appointed forthwith;

9. This Commander or Deputy Commander should be charged with the task of conducting the surveys, drawing the plans and initiating the preparations referred to above. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals subject to the conditions;

   1. that cross-channel preparations should not be permitted to divert resources from the Sicilian invasion, and

   2. that no cross-channel plans should be considered as commitments without further consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

p.82 #1 In view of the fact that Operations in England were considered to be in Britain's area of principle responsibility, the CCS authorized the British CCS to select COSSAC. For details regarding the decision to form COSSAC see CCS 67th Meeting of 22 Jan 1943; CCS 167 of 22 Jan 1943; CCS, 169 of 22 Jan 1943. For details of the selection of General Morgan see CCS 169/4 of 8 April 1943; CCS 169/5 of 13 April 1943. It is interesting to note that at the time of the Casablanca Conference that the CCS contemplated having a British supreme Commander for OVERLORD. See CCS 170/2 of 22 Jan 1942.

p.83 #1 RANKIN was to take place in the event of partial or complete collapse of the German morale and military defenses and was planned under certain assumed conditions, or "cases". It was decided that a return to the Continent under Operation RANKIN could take place under the following alternatives:

RANKIN - CASE "A" was a plan developed to exploit a substantial weakening in the strength and morale of the German Armed Forces to an extent sufficient to permit a successful assault with the Anglo-American forces available prior to the target date of OVERLORD. The course of action in the event of substantial weakening of German moral in France and the Low Countries envisaged operations in January or February 1944 to put a modified OVERLORD plan into effect, and provided for capture of the port of Cherbourg within the first forty-eight hours. In RANKIN "A" as in the case of OVERLORD, diversionary operations in the Pas de Calais area and from the Mediterranean were considered essential. No assault against organized resistance was believed feasible, unless measures were taken in time to make Naval Assault forces available. As maintenance over beaches and construction of artificial ports would prove too hazardous in winter, it was essential to capture the port of Cherbourg and as many minor ports as possible within forty-eight hours. RANKIN, "A", therefore, was OVERLORD, modified to meet these special requirements.

RANKIN - CASE "B" was a plan to exploit a German withdrawal from the occupied countries. In this event, strategic planners recommended that Cherbourg would be the first place of entry. As German withdrawal proceeded the principal Allied forces would be based at Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, supplemented as necessary by smaller force for the rehabilitation of Southwest France; the ports of Brest and Nantes similarly would be occupied by small forces only, partly to assist in French rehabilitation, but mainly to prepare for a long-term policy for the entry and maintenance of forces direct from America. Forces would also be despatched northward from the Mediterranean as required.

RANKIN - CASE "C" was a plan to exploit an unconditional German surrender coupled with the cessation of organized armed resistance in northwest Europe. Allied forces from the United Kingdom were (1) to occupy and control the Rhine Valley and the Ruhr. (2) to occupy and control Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel Canal, and the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. (3) to operate selected ports on the west coast of France and the Low Countries, and, (4) to undertake rehabilitation measures in order to establish control in Norway and rehabilitate the country. The main object was to expedite disarmament of the German forces. The bulk of Allied forces would have to be carried by sea. In case of re-entry through Copenhagen, Bremen, and Hamburg, minesweeping was expected to impose short delays. Suitable ports for entry into the Rhine Valley and the Ruhr would be Rotterdam and Antwerp respectively.

p.85 #1 The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, particularly Admiral King, made it clear that though they would have preferred to have concentrated on the build-up for cross-channel operations, it having been decided to continue the Mediterranean offensive by assaulting Sicily (Operation HUSKY), resources would not be diverted from HUSKY for use in a 1943 cross-channel effort. See CCS 135 of 26 December 1942 and CCS 68th Meeting of 23 Jan 1943.

p.85 #2 This directive is set out in CCS 169/3 of 5 March 1943. It was approved CCS 74th Meeting of 5 March 1943.

p.86 #1 Held in Washington D.C. in May 1943.

p.86 #2 COS (43) 113th meeting (O) Item 4.

p.87 #1 In accordance with the principle of Unity of Operational Command under an agreement between General Marshall and Admiral King, (W.D. 1120 of 2 June 42; ComInCh serial 00447 of 2 June 42; W.D. 1226 of 12 June 42; See (Chapter III following), and under logistic agreement between Admiral King and General Marshall (See ComInCh serial 1428 of 8 March 1943 and Chapter II, Section 2).

p.87 #2 An exception to this were two U.S.N. officers assigned by ComNavEu to the staff of the CCO, who were re-assigned to COSSAC at an early date.

p.88 #1 On 5 May the Admiralty appointed Admiral Sir Charles Little, who was CinC, Portsmouth, Naval CinC Expeditionary Force (designate) and naval representative on COSSAC's staff. (Admiralty letter M 053171/43 of 5 May 43.) Admiral King and the CCS generally concurred in this selection on 20 August 1942. (See CCS 113th meeting of 20 August 43.) To enable CinC Portsmouth to carry out these duties, Admiralty supplied him with a special staff - the X Staff, under a special Chief of Staff (X). Admiral Sir Philip Vian was originally appointed COS (X) (Admiral Vian subsequently was appointed NCETF for the operation), but being suddenly required for duty at sea he was replaced by Commodore Hughes Hallet as COS (X) and he remained as Chief of Staff to ANCXF until after the assault. Admiral B.H. Ramsay replaced Admiral Little as Senior Naval Member of COSSAC's staff and as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force (ANCXF) on 25 October 1943. (Admiralty letters M 053171/43 of 12 October 43, and M 053171/43 of 4 Nov. 43.) The U.S. Naval section on COSSAC's staff was very much smaller. In the earliest stages COMNAVEU detailed Captain J.H. Wright, USN, to act for him on the staff. Commander E.B. Strauss, USN, and Lieut. E. Russell, USNR, who up until that time were USN representatives on the staff of the British Chief of Combined Operations (CCO) also joined COSSAC at the same time. (Commander Strauss was at that time also U.S. Naval Commander Amphibious Forces Europe.) Pursuant to the Casablanca Agreement, CNO shortly detailed Captain Gordon Hutchins, USN, as senior U.S. Naval Officer with COSSAC, and Colonel R.O. Bare, USMC, and Captain L.A. Thackery, USN, as staff officers. In December Captain Thackery relieved Captain Hutchins as senior representative and Commander W.R. Carruthers, USN, joined the staff.

p.90 #1 Available land forces an estimated by CCS forecasts were:

1. British build-up nay be reduced by a maximum of four equivalent divisions by possible cannibalization.

2. Type not yet decided.

3. Availability doubtful.

4. Assumed available as a basis for outline planning.

5. Excluding ranger battalions and parachute regiments.

6. Excluding commandos and counting four tank brigades and three L. of C. Brigades as two equivalent divisions.

p.90 #2 COSSAC Plan, pages 12 and 13, paragraphs 16, 17, 18.

p.90 #3 The following were the air forces allotted:-

	U.S.A.A.F.		R.A.F.
	Squadrons	Aircraft (UE)	Squadrons	Aircraft (UE)
Heavy Bombers	204	2,448	80	1,600
Medium Bombers	36	576	12	240
Light and Dive Bombers	52	832	13	260
Bomber Recce	...	...	1	14
Day Fighters	100	2,500	44	792
Night Fighters	...	...	6	150
Fighter Recce.	...	...	15	231
Army Support (Fighters)	...	...	8	112
Army Support (Bombers)	...	...	4	56
Photo Recce.	8	168	5	100
Observation	16	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue	...	...	8½	170
Troop Carrier	34	442	7	190
Totals	450	7,302	213½	4,075
GLIDERS.
			U.S.	British
C.G. - 4A	...	...	1,141	-
Horsas	...	...	-	1,465
Hamilcars	...	...	-	146
Total			1,141	1,611

(See COSSAC Plan Appx. K Annexure 1.)

p.90 #4 The available assault lift was as follows:-

SHIPS. APA - 7 AKA - 6 LSI (L) - 14 LSI (M) - 3 LSI (S) - 4 LSI (H) - 17 LSH - 4 LST (1) & (2) - 159 LSG - 1	MAJOR LANDING CRAFT. LSC - 1 LCT (3) & (4) - 381 LCT (5) & (6) - 272 LCI - 104 LCF (S) - 38 LCF (L) - 33 LCG (L) - 5 LCG (M) - 28 ICS (L) - 15
MINOR LANDING CRAFT. LCS (M) - 106 LCS (S) - 8 LCM (1) - 195 LCM (3) - 424 LCA - 495 LCV (P) - 730 LCP (L) & (R) - 289	MISCELLANEOUS. LBO - 100 LBE - 60 LBW - 20 LFF - 10 MOB - 70 LBV (2) - 240 Coasters - 222

p.90 #5 (See COSSAC Plan Page 12, paragraph 8; page 19, paragraph 80, Appx. H and Appx. M).

p.94 #1 Defenses consisted of a belt of shore minefields, under-water beach obstacles, shoreward mine fields, traps of various sorts, well dug in mutually supporting artillery positions with their field of fire covering beaches and beach exits, and well organised infantry entrenchments of both the permanent and the field type. This peripheral defense was relatively lightly manned but designed to accommodate reinforcements. The task of the coast defense was to hold off landings by delaying action until mobile reserves could be brought up.

p.95 #1 See Chapter IV, Section 1 for details of German defences. The German 15th army guarded the Pas de Calais. The smaller German 7th army guarded Normandy.

p.95 #2 And provided also that the German forces did not exceed a certain strength. This limitation is described later.

p.96 #1 By D-day this had been increased to two divisions on the Caen beaches, and there were one or two on the Cotentin area. (See CTF 122 Intelligence Monograph.)