Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

PART IV
EASTERN TASK FORCE: FORCES G, J, S.

A. The Channel Passage.

57. For the passage each British Assault Force was organized in 16 or 18 convoys or groups, the composition and numbering of the groups being based on the time of arrival at "the other side". A program was worked out in great detail, times of sailings of the various convoys being adjusted to the widely varying speeds and seagoing capacities of the heterogeneous collection of shipping of which the Assault Forces were composed. The problem was not eased by the necessity for steaming dead across the Channel stream running at times up to 2½ knots¹ and, in the event, the heavy weather conditions added a further complication.- - -

58. At 0900, 5th June, the first groups of Landing Craft sailed from the Portsmouth area, and from then on there was a constant stream of ships passing the Needles and the Nab Tower. Force G proceeded through the Needles Channel; Force J and those portions of Force S in this area - Assault Groups S.1, and S.3. - used the Spithead and Lumps Fort entrances. The sailing of the Assault Forces from the crowded anchorages proceeded smoothly. As the first convoy left Spithead the signal "Good Luck; Drive On" was hoisted in the Largs, Rear-Admiral Talbot's Headquarters Ship - which was anchored at the eastern end of the Force S line of L.S.T., - and kept flying until her own departure at 2145. The wind was west, Force 5, slackening to Force 3 to 4, and veering to W.N.W. in the evening; the sea was 4, swell 1. These conditions were unexpectedly severe and imposed a high test on the landing

craft crews.¹ Their spirit and seamanship alike rose to meet the greatness of this hour, and they pressed forward..... in high heart and resolution; there was no faltering, and many of the smaller landing craft were driven on till they foundered.²
59. The Reserve Group of Force S, - Assault Group S.2, (S.O. Captain Gatto, R.N.) - which had sailed from Newhaven, had a steady beat of 33 miles into a head sea, and was hard put to it to keep to its program. Similar difficulties, enhanced by a strong flood stream, were experienced by the landing craft of Force G in getting clear of the Needles. At 1630, 5th June, H.M.S. Scylla, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian, sailed and closed various groups of landing craft in the vicinity of position E. Once the groups had turned to the southward, it appeared that the major landing craft would not have serious difficulty in keeping to their time table, but conditions were much harder for the L.C.P.(L) and L.C.A. (H.R.) which were in company or being towed.- - - The leading groups of the Assault Forces arrived in Area Z without incident during the afternoon and headed for the entrances to the channels across the German mine barrier.- - -

60. The Assault Forces found little difficulty, generally speaking, in locating the entrance of the swept channels. A few mistakes naturally occurred, but these were of no great moment. For example, four groups of Force J and one of Force S proceeded down the wrong channels, all to the westward of their correct ones, without serious inconvenience to the proper users. These errors were realized before reaching the end of the channels, but the loss of time involved in making to the eastward could not in the case of the L.C.T. (Avre) of Assault Group J.1 be made up. The leading group of Assault Group G.1, which should have used Channel 5, was jostled out of it and to the eastward by a group belonging to Force O, whose tail had drifted down-wind tide. After midnight the tide turned, the tail wagged the other way and the leading group of G.1 was able to enter its correct channel, only to be forced out of it again by overtaking Infantry Landing ships and light cruisers; this group only spent one hour in swept waters.

61. Divergences such as the foregoing were only to be expected in view of the difficulty in the navigation of slow moving craft in a cross stream, accentuated by heavy weather. Casualties on passage were almost entirely due to the weather, only two being caused by enemy action, - H.M.S. Wrestler¹ which was mined at 0545, 6th June, in latitude 49° 36' N, while a cable to the eastward of Channel No. 7 - and later on 1 L.S.T. of Follow-up Force L. The total casualties on passage in the Eastern Task Force are shown in the following Table:

Ship or Craft	Force S	Force J	Force G	Force L	Remarks
HMS Wrestler	-	-	-	-	Mined
L.S.T.	-	-	-	-	Mined
L.C.T.	-	1	-	-	Sank in tow.
	-	-	2	-	Missing
	1	1	3	-	Broke down
M.G.B.	-	1	-	-	Broke down
Rhino Ferry	1	1	1	-	Sank on passage
Rhino Barge	7	7	3	-	Sank on passage
L.C.P.(L)	1	-	1	-	Sank on passage
L.C.A.(R.N.)	8	8	7	-	12 sank in tow; 2 missing; 2 broke down and towed to base

62. In the Eastern Task Force Area, Forces G and J arrived at the Lowering positions without the slightest molestation, the Bulolo (Naval Commander Force G) and leading L.C.T.s anchoring at about 0535 and the Hilary (Naval Commander Force J) at 0558. The only opposition at this stage consisted of a torpedo attack on Force S which developed from the eastern flank just as the leading ships were arriving at the lowering position. This attack, as well as the conditions obtaining at the time, is best described in the words of Rear-Admiral Talbot's report. - - -

    As H.M.S. Largs, bringing up the rear of the L.S.I. convoy, approached the coast of France, the sense that we had achieved a large measure of tactical surprise became apparent. No air attacks, no E-boat attacks, no Radar or W/T jamming worth mentioning. The air plot showed enemy aircraft on patrol away to the eastward in the Pas de Calais area. A glance to starboard showed the assault convoys on time as far as could be judged. The operation was proceeding with unreal precision...."

63. As we approached the lowering position, HMS Warspite, HMS Ramillies, HMS Roberts and HMS Arethusa, were already anchored in their bombarding positions to port of us, down the extension of Channel 10 swept by the 40th M.S.F., H.M.S. Scylla, H.M.S. Mauritius, H.M.S. Danae, O.P.P. Dragon, and H.M.S. Frobisher, disposed at anchor along the swept "Loop" channel joining the lowering position to the southern extremity of Channel 10 extension. The bombarding squadron had opened fire, but were only being engaged by the enemy in a desultory fashion, few shots falling anywhere near them. The bombarding destroyers, under the command of Captain (D) 23rd Flotilla (Captain P.G.L. Cazelet, D.S.C., R.N.) in H.M.S. Saumarez were waiting, as ordered, clear of the swept channels where they merged, to be swept into their inshore positions by the 165th B.Y.M.S. The "D.D." L.C.T. Convoy was just coming up to the lowering position - on time, but the L.C.T.(A) convoy was obviously late. Such was the picture at 0519 as we ran down from the knuckle to join channel 9.

64. Then events started to move swiftly. In accordance with plan, our own aircraft streaked low across the eastern flank at about this time and laid a most effective smoke screen to shield the Force from the heavy batteries at Havre. Unfortunately, three German torpedo boats took advantage of this to carry out a torpedo attack, and though engaged by the bombarding squadron, were able to make good their escape in the smoke.¹ Two torpedoes passed between H.M.S. Warspite and H.M.S. Ramillies, and at 0530 one hit H.Nor.M.S. Svenner close on the port beam of H.M.S. Largs. Another torpedo was seen approaching H.M.S. Largs; her engines were put emergency full astern and the torpedo passed a few feet ahead of her. It then came to rest and sank just short of H.M.S. Virago. She had, however, seen H.Nor M.S. Svenner's signal "TORPEDO PORT", and with the remainder of the starboard division of bombarding destroyers waiting stopped in a group, went emergency full ahead.²

The Svenner had apparently been hit immediately under her boiler room. There was a burst of steam amidships and her funnel fell aft as the whole ship lifted out of the water. She broke her back and sank rapidly; the greater part of her ship's company were picked up.
65. The Warspite followed the enemy in by Radar and opened fire at 14,000 yards; she reported one torpedo boat sunk. The Mauritius, Ramillies and Arethusa also opened fire, the former claiming one trawler sunk and one damaged.¹ After this mauvaise quart d'heure things quietened down; the L.S.I. of Force S anchored in the lowering positions in accordance with plan, and the convoys began to arrive.²

66. The fire from the enemy's coast batteries was singularly ineffective. In "Gold" area, Longues battery opened fire on Bulolo at 0557; no hits were obtained, and the battery was silenced by the Ajax by 0620.³ The two main batteries opposing Force J were neutralized during the assault and subsequently captured before they could interfere with the shipping. In "Sword" area the fire from the

batteries east of the Orne was directed mainly against the bombarding ships; the Warspite shifted berth after being straddled by shells from the Benerville battery, but received no damage.¹ By 0930 the main enemy batteries had been silenced, though they required periodic attention throughout the day; the Ramillies, for example carried out eleven shoots at Benerville with considerable observed success. The cruisers of Force D fired on the batteries assigned to them as occasion demanded. As the day wore on, the beaches and anchorages were subjected to an increasing fire from mobile guns in the woods south of Franceville which proved most difficult to locate and engage -----.
67. Meanwhile, the Assaulting Flotillas had started on their passage to the beaches. The weather at the Lowering position - wind W.N.W., Force 4, with a short steep sea - somewhat impeded the lowering and loading of the landing craft, but despite this the "marriage" of the minor craft from the L.S.T. with their various major craft was completed successfully, and in general the flotillas got away on time. The detailed organization of the Assault Groups varied in the several Assault Forces, depending as it did on the type of assault intended, the physical characteristics of the beaches, the nature of the defenses, and so forth.----- Destroyers proceeded in on the flanks of the first wave of the assaults, giving direct close support fire, while B.Y.M.S. swept the waters ahead of them. The "Hunts" closed the beaches as near as possible, while the "Fleets" anchored between three and four thousand yards to seaward. Pre-arranged targets were engaged accurately and effectively till the landing craft had touched down, after which fire was shifted to strong points on the flanks and inland as opportunity offered. In "Sword" area, Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian in the Scylla - after engaging pre-arranged targets in Ouistreham till 0705 - closed to within 5,500 yards of the beach and intensified the fire on the beach defenses till a minute before the touchdown.

68. The deployment and approach of the flotillas was admittedly not conducted with the precision of the later rehearsals. The weather allowed craft but little margin of speed to adjust the errors of timing which had inevitably crept in during the night cross-channel passage; nevertheless, the landings all took place within 15 minutes of the scheduled times¹ and except in "Utah" Area at the correct positions on the beaches, which in most cases were identified without difficulty.² In area "Sword" and "Juno" the lights of submarines X.23 and X.20 - which had up to that time spent 64 hours dived out of 76 hours at sea - were readily picked up by the approaching flotillas and provided a useful check on their position. The leading groups approached the beaches unopposed until about 3,000 yards off shore. Even then fire was desultory and inaccurate, except in "Sword" area, where Landing Craft sustained damage from mortar fire.- - - -

B. The Assaults - General Narrative

69. From the naval point of view the assault was carried out in every main essential as planned. Contrary to expectation, tactical surprise was achieved in every sector save one, thereby greatly easing the problem of getting ashore. This phase of the operation was further facilitated by the strange immunity enjoyed by the Allied shipping lying in the anchorages from interference either by coastal batteries or air attack.³

70. To this extent the operation proved easier than had been expected, but it would be a great mistake to suppose on that account that the assaults were easy or unopposed landings. The enemy troops manning the coast defense batteries may have been of inferior quality, but there was no doubt as to the quality of the field troops manning the various strong points and the mobile field batteries which dominated the beaches. These put up a most stubborn resistance; their fire, in combination with a heavy surf on the beaches and extensive obstacles called for endurance and seamanship of the highest order in the handling of the landing craft, and the exits from the beaches were only secured by the assaulting troops after a desperate struggles.¹

71. The weather predictions were on the border line for "swimming" DD - tanks;² the decisions as to launching them varied in different sectors, but in all cases they arrived on shore late and after the first landing craft

had touched down.¹ After beaching, they met with varying success; for example, in the Sword and Utah areas they were of great value; on Omaha beaches they were quickly knocked out.² The initial landings were made by the Americans in the Western area at about 0630, the British landings in the Eastern area following about an hour to an hour and a half later. On most beaches obstacle clearance presented greater difficulties than had been anticipated. The weather preceding D-day had tended to build up the tide, and the surf and the large number of landing craft arriving on the beaches prevented work in the water. Except in the Utah beaches but little clearance could be effected during the initial assaults. Major craft smashed their way through the obstacles at high speed, while the L.C.A. threaded their way between them.³
72. By the end of the forenoon all the beaches in the Eastern area had been secured with the exception of one in Gold area, and the landing of the Assault and Reserve Brigades other than elements arriving in L.S.T. had been completed by about 1500.⁴ The first of the return convoys of empty landing craft were sailed from area "Juno" at about 1300 and from then onwards there was a steady stream of landing craft sailing from all areas.⁵ Some account of how each assault force fared will be found in the ensuing Sections.-----

C. Force G.¹ GOLD Area.

73. Gold Area - the western area of the British assault area - extended from Port en Bessin to the mouth of the River de Provence. It was divided into 4 sectors, the two eastern most - Jig and King - being chosen for the initial assaults. Port en Bessin and the western sectors were to be dealt with later.

74. H-hour for Force G was 0725 - 55 minutes after the planned time of the American assault in Omaha sector to the westward and 10 minutes before that of Force J's assault to the eastward. Assault Group G.1., commanded by Captain Farquhar, R.N., in HMS Nith, landed the 231st Infantry Brigade (Brig.Sir A. Stanier, Bt.) in Jig Green beach, east of Asnelles, and Group G.2., commanded by Captain Ballance, R.N., in HMS Kingsmill, the 69th Infantry Brigade (Brig.Knox) on beaches King, Red and Green, opposite Ver-sur-Mer. Following them, Group G.3, commanded by Act. Captain G.V.M. Dolphin, R.R. in HMS Albrighton carried the Reserve, consisting of the 56th Infantry Brigade (Brig. Pepper) and the 151st Infantry Brigade (Brig. Benier). The decision as to when and where the Reserve Brigades should land was retained by the G.O.C., Northumbrian Division embarked in HMS Bulolo.

75. The timing of the assaults in both sectors was extremely accurate.¹ Both Deputy S.O.A.C.s, in consultation with the military officers embarked, decided that the weather was too rough for the successful launching of their DD tanks² and their L.C.T. were beached just after the L.C.T. (AVRE). The obstacle clearance units were thus the first to set foot on shore, where they worked for a time virtually unsupported. The obstacles were considerably thicker and heavier than had been expected and the tide was higher; in consequence, little clearance could be effected at this time.

76. Considerable damage to landing craft was sustained from mines fixed at the top and bottom of posts. In addition, there was reluctance in the heat of the assault to use kedge anchors, and this in the surf, caused many craft to broach, fill with water and so encumber the beaches. Strong resistance was met with at Le Hamel and La Riviere, both which had enfilading positions covering the beaches. The former kept up its fire on Jig sector till late afternoon and it was not until about 1600 after a concentrated close range bombardment by L.C.G., L.C.F, and destroyers, that the village was captured by the 1st Hants., attacking from the west.³

77. No. 47 R.M. Commando landed on Jig Sector at 0930 and in doing so lost all but two of their L.C.A. and much equipment including all their wireless sets. This did not deter them from achieving their object - the capture of Port en Bessin - but all contact was lost with them till the afternoon of the following day. Shortly before the landing of No. 47 Commando, the Scylla, wearing the flag of the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force, arrived in "Gold" area. After giving direct support to the assault in "Sword" area, Admiral Vian had proceeded along the front keeping about two miles from the shore in order to judge the progress of the landings. Finding fighting on the "Gold" beaches still going on, the Scylla fired 40 rounds at Arromanches at a range of about 8,000 yards between 0924 and 0931, being herself intermittently - and ineffectually - engaged by shore batteries; she then returned to the eastward and anchored in the "Sword" area. The Reserve Brigades were sent in at 1050 and 1120, and the G.O.C. of the Division landed at 1205. Later in the day the G.O.C. 30th Corps arrived in the BEAGLE and boarded the Bulolo about 1900. He went ashore later in an L.C.F. (P), though there was a heavy sea then running in the anchorage.

D. Force J:¹ JUNO Area.

78. Force J, operating in Juno area to the east of Force G, attacked in sectors Mike and Nan in the neighborhood of Courseulles, Group J.1. (Captain Pugsley, RN, in H.M.S. Lawford) landing the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the three western beaches (Mike Green and Red, and Nan Green) and Group J.2. (Captain Otway-Ruthven, RN, in H.M.S. Waveney) the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade on Nan White and Red beaches. Group J.3 (Captain Fanshaws, RN, in H.M.S. Royal Ulsterman) followed with the Reserves consisting of the 9th Canadian Brigade.

79. In order to ensure clearance over the outlying rocks of Nan sector,¹ H-hour for Group J.2 had been fixed as 20 minutes later than for Assault Forces G and S; for Group J.1 it was 10 minutes earlier than for Group J.2. Owing to the heavy weather and to several groups using the wrong channels...... the Assault Group commanders found it necessary to retard these times by ten minutes, bringing them to 0755 and 0745 respectively. As a result of these progressive postponements the assault craft beached amongst the obstacles instead of short of them. Despite strenuous efforts by the obstacle clearance units, clearance of the outer obstacles² was not practicable until the tide had fallen and considerable loss or damage was sustained from them and from the Teller mines, etc., attached to them. Nevertheless, the landing of the Assault Brigades was achieved with relatively light casualties, "thanks to the determination shown by the Commanding Officers and Coxwains of craft, to the clockwork precision of the supporting fire from H.M. ships, S.P. artillery, rocket craft, etc., and to the unexpectedly feeble effort of the enemy coast and beach defences.³

80. Submarine X.20 successfully marked the launching position for the DD tanks and provided a useful check on the positions of the leading flotillas.¹ Actually so far as the DD tanks were concerned she was not needed as the Deputy S.O.A.C.s of both groups decided not to attempt to "swim" the DD tanks in the existing weather and to beach them in their L.C.T.s with the AVRE groups. This was adhered to by Group J.2, where the AVRE touched down at 0805, followed by the Infantry at 0811 and the DD tanks a few minutes later, but in Group J.1, the Senior Officer of the DD tank group revised the decision and when about 1000 yards from the beach decided to launch the DD tanks. Some confusion ensued and they touched down between 0759 and 0810, and the AVRE - which had gone astray in the night ...... arrived six minutes after the Infantry, 30 minutes late on their deferred time.²

81. Very little shooting apart from some inaccurate mortar fire was directed on craft before the touch down. On the left, on Group J.2's beaches, it was not until the L.C.A. (H.R.) had fired their bombs that the defenses began to shoot at the craft. The opposition encountered on the beaches was moderate to heavy and included shell and mortar fire, close range weapons and small arms fire. Generally speaking opposition was heaviest in the center in Mike Red and Nan Green beaches. Sniping from the dunes and from buildings and churches close inshore continued throughout D-day and the night of D-day plus 1. Great credit is given by Commodore Oliver to the work of the bombarding forces, which proceeded "in complete accordance with the assault fire plan".³

82. The batteries at Beny-sur-Mere and behind Nan White were engaged by the Diadem and Kempenfelt. On the right the destroyers, Venus, Faulknor, Fury, Stevenstone and La Combattante engaged beach sector targets on Mike and Nan Green with direct fire at ranges down to 3000 yards; on the left Nan White and Red beaches were similarly dealt with by the Vigilant, Algonquin, Sioux, Bleasdale and Glaisdale. Seven L.C.G. (mounting 14 - 4.7" guns between them) and 8 L.C. Flak, gave close support with direct fire on the beaches at ranges down to 1000 yards, while four regiments of S.P. Artillery (who overcame the difficult weather conditions and carried out their shoots with remarkable accuracy) engaged pre-arranged strong point targets from ranges between 9000 and 1000 yards during the run in; these strong points were finally engaged by 6 L.C.T. Rockets - 4 per brigade front - during the touch down; the Rocket craft all covered their targets well. Unfortunately, a passing Typhoon met a pattern in mid-air and was destroyed.

83. Nine L.C.A. (H.R.) were assigned to each assault group. Of those belonging to Group J.1., all except one foundered or had to be cut adrift, apparently through being towed at too great a speed in the prevailing weather. On the left, all nine L.C.A. (H.R.) of Group J.2 reached their firing positions on time, - a fine performance, to return to the beaches. At about 0830, (H plus 45) No.48 R.M. Commando had landed on Nan Red from L.C.I. (S), whose wooden hulls suffered widespread damage from the beach obstacles by this time mostly submerged. Heavy casualties were suffered by the Commando from machine gun and mortar fire, as the Assaulting Infantry had passed straight through the beach without pausing to mop up, and some of the defenses sited to give cross fire were then beginning to come to life again.

84. Though the Infantry had got across the beaches quickly, there was some delay before exits were established. At 0941 Mike Red reported that the landing of the 7th Brigades' vehicles was held up by lack of exits and flooding inland; gradually one exit was got working satisfactorily by 1112. The 8th Brigade had less difficulty; the seawall was bridged on Nan White at 0650 and though congestion occurred periodically, two exits were in use on Nan Red and three on Nan White by 1040. An hour later (1140) the N.O.I.C. Juno (Captain Maud, RN) landed on Nan Green beach and set

up his advance Headquarters close east of Courseulles at about 1330. Advanced beach signal stations had been established promptly after the landings and were functioning efficiently.¹
85. By 1100, the leading army elements were reported to be half way to the divisional intermediate objectives; twenty minutes later the 8th Brigade reported that Tailleville, Banville and St. Croix-sur-Mer had been captured and that they were advancing. No. 48 R.M. Commando had by this time taken the Langrune coastal strip. The first craft of the Reserve Brigade group beached on Nan White and Red at 1133 and by 1150 the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was on shore. The G.O.C. Canadian Infantry Division landed on Nan White beach at 1310, and by 1400 the landing of second flight troops from the L.S.I. had been completed.

86. The first 12 L.S.T. had arrived at 1120 with the good news that all Rhinos had survived the bad towing conditions on passages,² but no beaches were ready to receive them till 1445. A limited number of L.C.T. started discharging where gaps existed in the beach obstacles at noon. Most of the beaches were heavily littered with stranded landing craft, but a flow of discharge could be maintained. At 1500 the D/S O.A.G., "Mike" Red, decided to beach the maximum possible number of L.C.T. on the falling tide and leave them to dry out; these had finished unloading by 1615. At 1715 H.M.S. Hilary and other ships and craft shifted inshore and took up berths in accordance with the prearranged berthing plan. - - - -. At the same time, the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force - who had been touring the beaches in a U.S. coast guard cutter during the afternoon - arrived in Scylla and anchored in "Juno" area in order to be centrally placed for a meeting of Flag Officers and Commodores which took place at 1800.³ The Scylla remained in "Juno" area till 2200, when she returned to "Sword" area for the night.

87. Group L.1 of follow-up Force L, with a further 13 L.S.T.¹ carrying the 51st Highland Division, and 21st Army Group headquarters; H.M.S. Northway, loaded with DUKWs; and 4 pre-loaded stores coasters had arrived as planned during the afternoon, but in spite of the growing accumulation of vessels, there was no sign of enemy air activity - apart from a few Red warnings - and in fact no air action took place over "Juno" area till 0150 next morning (7 June).

E. Force S² - SWORD Area.

88. Sword Area - the easternmost in the British Assault area - had been considered the most vulnerable to enemy attack, both from the heavy batteries in the vicinity of Havre and from light craft based on that port. For this reason very powerful bombarding forces had been stationed on its eastern flank. Actually, these forebodings proved groundless in the early stages; beyond the loss of H.Nor. M.S. Svenner and one L.C.I. (S), which was hit by shell fire and blazing from stem to stern, the opening stages of the assaults were unbelievably unopposed. The air was full of our bombers and fighters and the noise and smoke of our bombardment. The enemy was obviously stunned by the sheer weight of support we were meting out.³

89. The assault of Force S differed from the other assaults in that the 3rd Division was landed on a one-brigade front, whereas in the case of Force J and G each division was landed on a two-brigade front. The points chosen for the assault were in Queen Sector, northeast of Colleville-sur-Orne. Assault Group S.3, under Captain Bush, R.N., in H.M.S. Goatland was responsible for the initial landing of the 8th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Cass) on beaches Queen White and Red. Group S.2 (Captain Gotto, R.N., in H.M.S. Dacres) - the intermediate group - with the 185th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Smith) closely followed Group S.3, and Group S.1 (Captain Leggatt, R.N. in H.M.S. Locust) with the 9th Brigade (Brigadier Cunningham) formed the Reserve.

90. Weather conditions were recognized as being unsuitable for swimming DD tanks, but it was decided to launch them at 5000 yards.¹ This decision was justified by events; of the 40 tanks embarked, 34 were successfully launched.² Two sank immediately and one was rammed by an overtaking L.C.T. (A.V.R.E.) the remaining 31 DDs touched down at about 0730 and did valuable work. Many of these had their engines swamped as their trip changed on beaching, but they maintained their fire until the rising tide drowned them, when the crews took to their dinghies and paddled ashore. It is estimated that the DD tanks knocked out three of four 75 mm. guns, four or five 50 mm and many 20 mm. These guns were completely defiladed from the sea, and destroyers were reporting them as neutralized or destroyed - since no flashes were visible - while in fact they were very much alive and only waiting for the first craft on which they could bear..... Aimed fire from enemy guns actually on the beaches, other than sniping from houses, is reputed to have ceased by H plus 20 (0745). Brigadier Prior-Palmer, commanding 27th Armoured Brigade, who was in the Headquarters craft of the leaving group of Assault Group S.3. reported that 23 of the DD tanks survived the beach battle.

91. The L.C.T. (AVRE) reduced speed to avoid overrunning the DD tanks, but they were almost immediately ordered by Captain Bush to proceed through them, and reached the beach just after H-hour (0725); all the AVRE tanks were landed by 0730, with the exception of those in L.C.T. 947 in which one Flail was hit by a mortar shell which detonated the bangalore torpedoes which it carried, killing Lt. Col. A.D. Cooks, the Commander of the 5th Assault Regiment, R.N., and putting two other tanks out of action. The Infantry touched down within 5 minutes of the AVRE. Opposition was slight and all troops were landed in knee-deep water at the correct place and with few casualties.

92. The obstacles were much as had been expected, and in general consisted of:

    1. Two staggered rows of Hedgehogs, 150 yards from the back of the beach.

    2. Two irregular rows of stakes, 200 yards from the back of the beach.

    3. Clusters of ramps, 250 yards from the back of the beach.

    Teller mines or shells were attached to all of the above. These devices were not as great an obstacle to the assault as had been anticipated but "they most certainly would have been if all craft had not been... instructed to drive their craft in at full speed for the last mile of the approach".¹

93. The L.C.T.(A) and L.C.T.(C.B.) had been late in leaving the lowering position, but made up time on the run in, and touched down on the flanks only five minutes after H-hour. Their tanks were landed successfully and expeditiously but two L.C.T.(A) on Red Beach were so severely hit that they became total losses. All craft fired in support during the final approaches; no opposition was met till about 3000 yards from the beaches, when those on the eastern flank came under fairly heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Only one L.C.T. Hedgerow survived the passage; she hit the beach almost immediately after firing her outfit, and her Commanding Officer reported that her pattern extended right up the beach, setting fire to one of the houses behind it.

94. On the beaches, considerable opposition was encountered, particularly by the East Yorke on Red Beach. At 0750 the Free French and A.O.4 Commando touched down; these suffered casualties from anti-tank guns and mortar fire before they got ashore. By 0906 two exits and been secured on White Beach , but there was considerable congestion due to shelling, wrecked vehicles and soft sand. The landing, however, was going well and the last groups of the Assault Brigade touched down at 0943 - only 18 minutes late on schedule. The Intermediate Brigade had to be held up to seaward for about 3 hours while the congestion on the beaches was dealt with and did not get ashore till about 1600.

95. Meanwhile the landing craft had suffered considerably. Although Captain Bush was able to report at 1153 "only 7 major craft destroyed so far" - a much greater number was crippled and "only got off by dint of grim determination and good seamanship. Indeed, the spirit in which these crews endeavoured to save their damaged craft in great difficulties of weather, obstacles, mines, mortar fire and crowded foreshore makes good reading. Many were caught by the tide and dried out but they continued firing their guns at snipers in the houses and at enemy planes which were now beginning to bomb and strafe the beaches in sneak raids through the low clouds".¹ These craft that succeeded in unbeaching stood by those less fortunate and a large number was hauled off, thanks to devotion to duty.

96. At 0930 H.M.S. Largs had shifted birth close inshore and at 1535 Rear-Admiral Talbot landed to see for himself how things were going. As he set foot on shore, seven Ju.88's attacked the beaches; mortar fire was continuous. More than 24 major landing craft were stranded. There was still much congestion at the beach exits - mainly caused by traffic blocks in the Ouistreham - Lion-sur-Mer lateral road at the back of the beaches; the resulting lack of transport had brought the unloading of ammunition from four dried out stores L.C.T. to a standstill. The Admiral remarked that 'people were obviously rather dazed and shaken. They were also very exhausted. But the N.C.I.C. (Captain Legatt, R.N.) and the Commander, 101 Beach Sub-Area, (Colonel Montgomery) who had landed at H plus 4 (1125) were competing bravely'.¹

97. On his return to the Largs, Rear-Admiral Talbot arranged for Commander T.I.S. Bell, at that time Naval Commander, Operations "Frog" and "Deer"² to become Chief Principal Beachmaster, and for Fleet working parties to be sent ashore the following day to assist in clearing up the beaches. Shortly after 2100, 6th June, the first 300 troop carriers and towed gliders, lifting reinforcements to the 6th Airborne Division started coming over Area "Sword", and landing on the right bank of the Orne some four miles south of Ouistreham. A further contingent flew over some 20 minutes later - 'a most impressive spectacle'. At 2250 orders were given to smoke out the anchorage in anticipation of a dusk air attack, which in fact developed half an hour later. Most unfortunately this attack occurred immediately prior to the arrival of the third and last wave of airborne troops.

98. Here was precisely the contingency foreseen by Admiral Ramsay - - -. Light ack-ack ashore opened up on some of the transport planes; certain merchant ships and L.S.T. in the anchorage joined in and, despite repeated signals to cease fire, at least two of the British aircraft were shot down. The Flagship of the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force, which was at anchor in "Sword" area at the time, was herself involved in this incident. Admiral Vian records that at one moment a Ju.88 passed down the side of the Scylla at masthead height; two minutes later two Dakotas passed over at 1000 feet. Visibility was good with a full moon and fortunately they were recognized; but, on the request of the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force, ¹ airborne operations of this nature were in future confined to daylight hours.²

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Footnotes:

p.534 #1 On the night of 5th/6th June, under the combined effect of wind and tidal streams some craft had to allow as much as 40° to make good and track desired.

p.535 #1 Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked.."that the decision of the Supreme Commander to launch the assaults under such conditions was correct one has never been questioned. An unfortunate doctrine had, however, been given full promulgation during planning, particularly in Army circles, namely, that fine weather and a calm sea were essential for the assault. In retrospect, with the experience of operation "Husky" still fresh in our minds, and with the knowledge of the fickleness of the weather in the Channel, this should never have been allowed."- - - ANCXF Rept.Vol.1, p.57.

p.535 #2 ANCXF Report, Vol.11, p.3, Report of NCETF. Rear Admiral Vian added - "It may probably be that the weather conditions had some part in what must ever be a matter for wonder that the embarkation, sailing and passage of the Force by any should have been carried through without so great a movement being detected by a well-equipped, prepared and determined enemy. That this should have been achieved is a lasting tribute to the admirable work of the Allied Air Force and the excellence of the cover plan." It is now known that the German meteorological officers had in fact informed the German Command that invasion would not be possible on the 5th of 6th of June on account of stormy weather which was expected to last for several days.

p.536 #1 H.M.S. Wrestler had done useful service during the night in rounding up stragglers and guiding stray groups into the correct channels. The Commanding Officer had appreciated that the importance of the punctual arrival of these groups outweighed the risk to his ship by operating in unswept waters". - - -
Commodore Oliver's report, p.4, ANCXF Report Vol.III.

p.539 #1 Rear-Admiral Vian subsequently remarked that the fact that it was not possible to stop the aircraft from laying smoke probably enabled the German torpedo boats, (who were accompanied by Trawlers) to make their escape, and recommended that in future direct communication between smoke laying aircraft and the unit being screened should be arranged.

p.539 #2 ANCXF Report, Vol.II, Report of NC Force S, pp.15,16.

p.540 #1 The attack was carried out by the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, 15 torpedoes in all being fired. According to the Germans only minor damage was sustained by the Torpedo boats; but the 15th Patrol Flotilla, stationed off Havre, "ran into heavy enemy fire" under which one vessel sank, after striking a mine.

p.540 #2 Rear-Admiral Talbot remarked that it was a pleasant surprise that the congestion anticipated with such large number of ships - mine-sweepers - destroyers - L.S.I. anchored or waiting in the lowering position, and the steady stream of Landing Craft steaming in two columns, one either side of the L.S.I. - was no problem at all.

p.540 #3 This battery came to life again later and was engaged by the Argonaut. It was subsequently found that 2 guns had been put out of action by direct hits with 6" shell through the embrasures. These hits must be attributed to chance, since the density of craters around the guns was not high. The remaining 2 guns were undamaged, though in one case the casemate had been hit. In all, 150 round of 6" (Ajax) and 29 round of 5.25 (Argonaut) were fired at Longues battery.

p.541 #1 Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian remarked - "The inability of the enemy on the eastern flank to find or hold the range may have been due to the Radar counter measure, which included "window" and R.C.W. balloons... planted in clumps to the north-eastward of the bombarding ships. Some of these balloons were seen to be engaged by shore batteries" - ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force P7.

p.542 #1 An exception was the Ranger landing at Pointe du Hoe which was 35 minutes late owing to an error of the control vessel in mistaking Raz de la Perce for Pointe du Hoe.

p.542 #2 Specialists Hydrographic teams in L.C.P.(sy) and U.S. scout teams in L.C.S. were provided to assist the Leading Headquarters Landing Craft.

p.542 #3 This immunity was attributed to the numbing of the pre-H-hour bombardment, Allied superiority in the air, counter battery fire and perhaps in part to the poor quality of the enemy troops manning the coast defenses.

p.543 #1 Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked that there was nothing but praise in the Reports of the Task and Assault Force Commanders "for the courage and devotion to duty on the part of the landing craft crews, just as the greatest admiration has been expressed by both navies for the magnificent bearing of the assaulting troops whom they put ashore. In short, the assault proceeded according to plan not necessarily because it was a good plan, but because every single individual taking part had confidence in it and was determined to achieve his objective." - ANCXF Report Vol.I, p.56.

p.543 #2 Rear-Admiral Hall remarked that "the so-called "Secret Weapon" of the invasion forces, the DD tank was no secret at all, except possibly to our own personnel. A captured document by General Rommel.... warned the defenders that when the invasion came the Allies would use all sorts of weapons, including an amphibious tank that actually would float with its body beneath the surface". ANCXF Report Vol.I, Report by NC, Force D, p.73.

p.544 #1

Force U:	Launched and landed successfully; reached shore H plus 20 minutes.
Force O:	Left flank: launched 6000 yards off shore; all but 2 or 3 foundered. Right flank: landed on beach; quickly put out of action by enemy fire.
Force G:	landed on beach just after L.C.T. (Avre)
Force J:	Group J2: landed on beach with LCT (Avre) Group J1: launched 1500 yards from shore; reached shore 15 minutes late (6 minutes after infantry).
Force S:	Launched 5000 yards off shore; 31 out of 40 reached shore 12 minutes late, and did valuable work.

p.544 #2 It has to be admitted that conditions could not have been less ideal for this novel weapon, but even so the consensus of naval opinion is that ordinary water-proofed tanks, landed on the beach in the normal manner, would have served the purpose equally well. Had the assault been conducted at dusk or in low visibility, on the other hand, DD tanks might have achieved a valuable surprise", ANCXF Report Vol.1, p.58.

p.544 #3 As soon as the tide started to fall, about 1330, and uncover the obstacles, beach clearance proceeded rapidly, and by midnight all sections of the beaches in use had been cleared.

p.544 #4 To achieve this a number of L.C.T. had to be dried as there was no room for their vehicles until the tide started to fall.

p.544 #5 No L.S.T. were sailed till the following day (7 June).

p.546 #1 Force G:
Commodore Douglas-Pennant, Broad Pendant in H.Q. ship H.M.S. Bulolo

Bombarding Force K:	Destroyers		Support Craft
Orion Ajax Argonaut Emerald Flores	Grenville Ulster Urchin Undine Urania Ursa Ulysses	Undaunted Jervis Cattistock Pytchley Cottesmore Krakowiak	3 L.C.G. (L) 8 L.C.T. (R) 4 L.C.S. (L) 7 L.C.F. 3 Regts. S.P. Artillery 16 L.C.T. (A)

L.S. and L.C. with troops of 30th Corps; 50th British Infantry Division Assaulting.

p.547 #1 Commodore Douglas-Pennant gives high credit for this achievement after so difficult a passage to the Senior Officers of the various groups.

p.547 #2 Commodore Douglas-Pennant fully concurred with this decision.

p.547 #3 Four factors favoured the resistance of this powerful position:

1. The 75 tons of bombs planned to be dropped on it fell in fields 3000 yards south; very low cloud caused this failure.
2. The 147th Field Regiment of S.P. Artillery were to fire on this target, but both their navigational M.L. and control L.C.T. fell astern due to the weather; their fire was therefore concentrated with that of the regiment on their left, one M.L. controlling both, leaving Le Hamel unfired at.
3. Le Hamel was engaged by 3 destroyers, but the enemy positions were protected against low trajectory fire from seaward.
4. No calls for fire were received from the 1st.Bn. Hampshire Regiment which was attacking the position, owing to the first and second in command becoming casualties soon after landing.

p.548 #1 Force J:

Bombard Force E Belfast (Flag R.A. Dalrymple-Hamilton) Diadem

Destroyers: Kempenfelt, Faulknor, Venus, Fury, Vigilant, Bleasdale, Algonquin, Glaisdale, Sioux, Stevenstone, La Combattante

Supporting Craft: 7 L.C.G. (L) 8 L.C.T. (R) 6 L.C.S. (L) 6 L.C.F. 4 Regts. S.P. Artillery 8 L.C.T. (A) 8 L.C.T. (H.E.)

LS. and LC with troops of 1st corps; 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and No. 48 R.M. Commando assaulting.

p.549 #1 At a fairly late stage in the planning these rocks were reported to dry at 5 feet instead of 3 feet as previously supposed. Actually the original estimate proved to be more accurate.

p.549 #2 Fortunately the obstacles on these beaches were less formidable and more widely spaced than had been expected, and did not impede the beaching of landing craft to any serious extent. Most of the losses occurred during retraction after the initial landings.

p.549 #3 ANCXF Report II, Report by Naval Commander, Force J, p.6.

p.550 #1 X.20 later closed the Hilary by whom she was cheered at 0910, and was then towed back to Portsmouth by the trawler Darthema as planned without incident.

p.550 #2 S.O.A.C. 1 was ordered by the Force Commander (after consultation with the G.O.C.) not to wait for the AVRE.

p.550 #3 ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by Naval Commander, Force J, p.7.

p.552 #1 The times at which these stations were reported in action were:

0823, Mike Green; 1004, Nan Red;

0831, Mike Red, Nan Green; 0850, Nan White;

p.552 #2 The next group of L.S.T. to arrive (Group 333 at 1615) were not so fortunate, losing 7 tugs out of 11 and 1 Rhino out of 3 on passage.

p.552 #3 A meeting of Flag Officers and Commodores was held daily throughout the operation at 1800, unless otherwise ordered.

p.553 #1 U.S. L.S.T. 981 had been mined on passage some eight hours previously, and left behind.

p.553 #2 FORCE S:

Bombarding Force D	Destroyers	Support Craft
Mauritius (Flag R.A. Patterson) Warspite, Ramillies, Roberts, Arethusa, Frobisher, Dragon, Danae	Saumarez, Kelvin, Scourge, Virago, Scorpion, Verulam, Swift, Middleton, Serapis, Eglinton, Svenner, Slazak, Stord.	3 L.C.G. (L) 5 L.C.T. (R) 3 L.C.S. (L) 4 L.C.F. 3 Regts. S.P. Artillery 8 L.C.T. (A)

L.S. and L.C. with troops of 1st Corps; 3rd British Infantry Division and Commandos Assaulting.

p.553 #3 ANCXF, Report Vol.III, Report by Naval Commander, Force S, P.16

p.554 #1 Rear-Admiral Talbot expressed the opinion that "the courageous decision to launch these tanks and their gallant swim will be found to have been a decisive factor in the success of the assault". ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report of NCFS, p.19.

p.554 #2 The leading tank in L.C.T. 467 slowed in its tracks and tore the canvas surround. It was accordingly decided to beach the L.C.T. Rear-Admiral Talbot regretted that the damaged tank was not jettisoned and the remainder launched, since "the main function of the DD tank is to provide close support fire at H-hour and immediately after it". These DD tanks did not get ashore till 0805, thereby depriving the Army of the fire of 4 guns at the most critical period of the assaults.

p.555 #1 ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by N.C. Force S, p.21.

p.556 #1 Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked - "All Naval Commanders have remarked that some form of shallow draught tug to clear damaged craft from the beaches is a very urgent need...." ANCXF Report Vol.1, p.59. ANCXF Report Vol.11 Report by N.C. Force S, p.22.

p.557 #1 Assistant Beachmasters and their parties had landed with the Assault Infantry at H-hour, and suffered proportionally heavy casualties. The D.N.O.I.C. (Acting Commander Nicholl) who landed shortly afterwards was also wounded.

p.557 #2 Operations "Frog" and "Deer" were Commando landings designed to destroy the battery at Houlgate or Benerville along the coast to the east of the Orne. Neither battery, however, had given any sign of life since early morning, and as the weather was unsuitable for reembarking the Commandos on that part of the coast, both operations were cancelled about 2030, 6th June.

p.558 #1 ANCXF Report, Vol.II, Report of N.C.E.T.F. pp.20 and 21.

p.558 #2 This is the end of the extracts taken from the Admiralty narratives of the RN side of the NEPTUNE assaults.