Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER II
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR CROSS-CHANNEL
(OVERLORD) OPERATIONS

		Page
PART I	Early Plans for Cross-Channel Operations.
A	Introduction: British Planning 1940-1941.	51
B	Combined Planning, January-June 1942.	58
C	Preliminary Cross-Channel Plan: ROUND-UP 1943.	65
D	Plan for Sacrifice Operation: SLEDGEHAMMER 1942.	70
E	Build-up of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom (Operation BOLERO)	72
PART II	The OVERLORD Plan: Cossac Appreciation and Outline, 1943.
A	Casablanca Conference Decisions: January 1943.	79
B	Cossac: Functions and Organizations.	83
C	The Cossac Appreciation and Outline Plan for OVERLORD, July 1943.	89
PART III	OVERLORD and ANVIL: Planning the 1944 Grand Assault
A	Quebec Conference Approval of OVERLORD, August 1943.	98
B	Plans for Landings of the French Mediterranean Coast (ANVIL Operation)	102
C	Strategy and Logistics of 1944 Amphibious Operations	105
D	1944 Modifications of OVERLORD and ANVIL Plans: December 1943-March 1944.	110
PART IV	Air Operations in Relation to OVERLORD
A	Cossac Plan for Air Operations	120
B	Plans for Combined SICKLE-POINTBLANK Air Operations	123
C	Coordination of U.K. and Mediterranean Air Operations - 1943.	126
D	OVERLORD Plan for the Air Offensive in 1944.	128
PART V	OVERLORD Cover and Deception Operations
A	COSSAC Cover Plan.	134
B	British and Combined Organization for Cover and Deception Operations.	137
C	OVERLORD Cover Plans: JAEL and BODYGUARD.	139
D	Outline of OVERLORD Deception Operations.	145
E	Operation VENDETTA (and ZEPPELIN) in the Mediterranean (ANVIL)	149
F	Operation FORTITUDE (and TINDEL) in Relation to OVERLORD in North Europe	151
G	Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH (in Relation to NEPTUNE) Pas de Calais Threat.	156
H	Organization of the Radio Deception Operation.	162
I	Results of Cover and Deception Operations.	166

CHAPTER II

PART I
PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL
(OVERLORD) OPERATIONS

A. EARLY PLANS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS.

Introduction: British Planning 1940-1941. Detailed planning for cross-channel operations of the combined Anglo-American armies formally began early in 1943 in accordance with decisions taken at the Casablanca Conference. In the previous Chapter, reference has been made to the strategical decisions taken at the first Anglo-American War Conference (the Arcadia Conference), held in Washington, 22 December 1941-14 January 1942. Long before this date, however, British Planning staffs had been at work preparing preliminary studies of the operations that would be necessary to land armies on the Continent to defeat the German forces. In British strategy such an operation was envisaged in the final stage of war operations in the European theater.

2. From the time the British expeditionary forces were successfully evacuated from Dunkirk, at the end of May 1940, the British staffs had had in mind the eventual return to the Continent. Such an operation would involve larger scale amphibious operations than had yet been undertaken. The experience of the British in landings in Norway in April 1940, had clearly indicated the major problems that would be confronted in the planning and preparations of such amphibious operations. Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and Defense Minister had set the British Joint Planning Staffs to work in May 1940 to implement the strategic concepts of the British War Cabinet. Even in that darkest moment of the war, this planning envisaged ultimate victory. The immediate strategy imposed, by the World situation at that time on the British High Command, was inevitably the defensive. In statements on long-range British intentions presented to the American Staffs in the Summer of 1940, definite provisions had been included for the ultimate return of British armies to the Continent.

3. During the period 1940-1941 the organized war cabinet, with Dr. Churchill as Defense Minister, as well as Prime Minister, reinforced the Chiefs of Staff Committee and undertook to establish unity of command for future operations, and as a first step in July 1940 the Prime Minister asked Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, who had organized and conducted the

brilliant operations at Zeebrugge in World War I, to serve in the new post, then being created, of "Director of Combined Operations".¹ This new combined Operations Organization was charged not only with the organization and training of "Commando" Striking Forces for raids on German-held Europe, but also with the joint planing of amphibious operations. Such operations necessarily involved the employment, under unified command, of specially trained units of sea, land and air forces. Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, has himself described the problems and difficulties that were encountered in the planning and conduct of small-scale Commando amphibious operations in 1940-1941. The Combined Operations Staff, formed at this time, working with the "Combined Commanders Committee" initiated the planning and preparations for cross-channel operations which preceded the development of the OVERLORD plan.
4. In the summer of 1941, when plans officers of the Staffs of the U.S. Special Army and Navy Observers in London began to work regularly with the British Joint Planing Staffs, initial work was done on "ROUND-UP" plans for landings on the French channel coast. These plans, like the later OVERLORD plan, are rightly associated with the name of Lieutenant-General Frederick E. Morgan. After thirty years in the British Army, Morgan had served as a Colonel commanding troops, with the British Expeditionary forces in France and Belgium in 1939-1940. He was among those responsible for the organization of the retreat from Dunkirk. In the spring of 1941, as a Major-General commanding the British Army Defense Forces in the Devon Command, Morgan devoted his main attention to preliminary planning for the return of British Armies to France. Plans for a cross-channel operation soon came to be called "the Morgan Plan". Many senior officers of the various British forces were consulted as these plans developed. Among them were Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, RN., then Vice-Admiral in Command of the Dover Station, and Captain (later Vice-Admiral) Lord Louis Mountbatten, who succeeded Admiral Keyes as Director of Combined Operations in October 1941. Admiral Ramsay had already begun in 1941 to study the naval and amphibious aspects of such a cross-channel operation.

5. When Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had their first meeting with President Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff at the historic "Atlantic Charter" meeting in Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, the "ROUND-UP" Plan was already in existence. After 'Pearl Harbor' when Churchill, with

the British Chiefs of staff, went to Washington for the first Anglo-American war Conference, a more detailed plan for the operation "ROUND-UP was presented. This plan involved an operation from south-eastern England to the French and Belgium Channel Coasts, the question of the exact landing area being left for later decision.¹
6. The discussions of this "ROUND-UP" plan in 1941-1942, like the early discussions in 1943 of the later "OVERLORD" plan, revealed a fundamental divergence between American and British strategical concepts. It was obvious to the Chiefs of staff, when they met in the Arcadia Conference, that the Allies in 1942, would be on the defensive in all theaters. The situation then confronting the combined Anglo-American forces was ably described in Mr. Churchill's address to the American congress, and in his later address to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. The program which Mr. Churchill then presented had been discussed in detail by the British Chiefs of Staff in Staff Conferences in December 1941.

7. The Prime Minister had himself prepared for the discussions in Washington a note on "The Future Conduct of the War". In presenting this to his military advisors he explained that: "he thought it important to put before the peoples of both the British Empire and the U.S. the mass invasion of the continent of Europe as the goal for 1943. He thought, in general, the three phases of the war could be described as:

   1. Closing the Ring;

   2. Liberating the Populations;

   3. Final assault on the German citadel".²

8. In the discussions which followed, the Prime Minister suggested the main points which he thought should be emphasized in the forthcoming discussions with the Americans. These points were:

   1. A concerted U.S. - British effort to re-establish "our Naval position in the Pacific as soon as possible, and restore positions in the Far East which may fall into enemy hands";

   2. The despatch of U.S. forces to Northern Ireland (3 Infantry Divisions and l Armoured Division) to release trained British troops in the United Kingdom for overseas theaters;

   3. The bombing of Germany by U.S. Air squadrons (initially at least six squadrons) to be based in the United Kingdom;

   4. The United States to take the lead in occupying North Africa (initially with a force of 25,000 men to be built up to a total of at least 150,000 in 1942);

   5. The United States should leave the largest possible number of destroyers in the Atlantic for cooperation with the Royal Navy in convoy escort, and anti-submarine duty;

   6. The United States should help the Royal Navy by providing auxiliary aircraft carriers, and by assigning the highest priority for providing the aircraft required for equipping Royal Naval carriers. ¹

9. The specific proposals thus presented by the British delegation at the Washington Conference were based on the strategic concepts developed by the British War Cabinets and the British Chiefs of Staff from May 1940. These had already been defined in the "General Strategy Review" communicated to the President and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the Argenten Conference in August 1941. In

this review it had been made clear that:

"So powerful is the German army that even if the Russians are able to maintain an eastern front, it would still be possible for them to face us in the West with forces which in the present state of German efficiency and morale we should be unable to overthrow. We must first destroy the foundations upon which the war machine rests - the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it and hopes of victory which inspire it. Then only shall we be able to return to the Continent and occupy and control portions of his territory and impose our will upon the enemy.

The methods we intend to employ are:

1. Blockade

2. Bombing

3. Subversive activities and propaganda.---

We believe that, if these methods are applied on a vast scale, the whole structure upon which the German forces are based, the economic systems, the machinery of production and distribution, the morale of the nation, will be destroyed, and that, whatever their present strength, the armed forces of Germany would suffer such a radical decline in fighting value and mobility that a direct attack would once more become possible.

When that time will come no one can with accuracy predict.It will depend largely on how well we are able, with American assistance, to keep to our programme of Air Force expansion and to obtain and protect the necessary shipping.

It may be that the methods described above will by themselves be enough to make Germany sue for peace and that the role of a British Army on the Continent will be limited to that of an Army of Occupation. We must, however, be prepared to accelerate victory by landing forces on the Continent to destroy any elements of the German forces which still resist, and strike into Germany itself.

"We do not foresee vast armles of infantry, as in 1914-1918. The forces we employ will be armored divisions with the most modern equipment. To supplement their operations the local patriots must be secretly armed and equipped so that at the right moment they may rise in revolt ----

The intervention of the United States would have a dramatic effect on the certainty with which we could contemplate success and the date by which we could expect it. Blockade would benefit by the heightening of control at source, forces might be available either to assist Weygand (i.e., in North Africa) or to act against Vichy, the American bomber effort would increasingly swell the air offensive against Germany, and in the final phase, American armored forces would participate"---¹

10. At the first meeting of the American and British Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 24 December 1941, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, in response to questions from Admiral Stark, outlined British views concerning the size of the forces which the United States would send to Europe. For example:

    "from a preliminary study ........ of the landing of armies on the Continent of Europe, it seemed that 15 to 17 Divisions, including armored Divisions, would be the maximum forces which could be landed and maintained if the operations were to take place toward the end of 1942 or early 1943. Later on it might be possible to increase these forces up to forty (40) Divisions.....

    The general idea was that it would not be possible to undertake land operations on a large scale in Europe until the Germans showed signs of cracking, and then the governing factor in the size of the forces to be maintained would be transportation and maintenance.".²

11. The consensus of opinion in the later Staff discussions in Washington was expressed in a memorandum presented to the President and to the Prime Minister on American-British strategy. In this paper, under the heading "Development of Land Offensives on the Continent", the following statement was made:

    "It does not seen likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian Front, will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing-down process .... to conduct limited land offensives".

    In 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out."¹

B. COMBINED PLANNING, JANUARY-JUNE 1942.

12. The American staffs, in December 1941, were influenced by traditional offensive doctrines, implicating the strategic concepts expressed by them at the Arcadia Conference, and at subsequent meetings. Moreover, the American war production program was already well advanced. Hence the U.S. Staff representatives knew the great striking force which American man-power and industrial production would make available, when American Armies could formed, trained and equipped with the most effective offensive weapons. The American military leaders were, therefore, committed to an offensive strategy which would involve a maximum concentration of armed forces, at the earliest possible moment, in that area in which decisive military victory could most quickly be achieved. This strategy was up-held by the American Chiefs of Staff from the time of their first meetings with their British colleagues, in the informal staff conferences which began in 1940, and which led to the ABC-1 Agreement of 97 March 1941. The same views were emphatically expressed by General Marshall in the subsequent American-British conferences, and at meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

13. General Marshall's views had already found expression in the Joint Army-Navy Board "Comment on 'General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff'" (30 September 1941). This "Comment" extended and developed the definition of the "principal Offensive Policies Against the Axis Powers", contained in the ABC-1 Agreement (27 March 1941). It was pointed out

    "that military operation, to be effective, should be directed against specific and concrete objectives and that care must be exercised to avoid diffusion of effort ----"

14. In criticising the British strategic concepts, the Joint Board had referred especially to the -

"offensive employment of land forces ---. The 'Review' (of the British Chiefs of Staff) does not envisage the offensive use of such force on a sufficient scale, either in operations designed to break down the German military power, or in the final operations designed to accomplish the complete defeat of Germany.

The Joint Board agrees that no clear decisions are now (September 1944) possible as to major land offensives against Germany. The Joint Board holds the opinion that --- plans should be made for equipping and training for offensive use land task forces of the British Commonwealth and possible allies, for eventual use wherever land offensives may ultimately appear to be profitable."¹

15. In this same "Comment", the Joint Board had noted that the British Chiefs of Staff had given only minor attention to

    "possible operations by land forces. Except in the case of Russian, the principal strength of the possible enemies of Germany is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may greatly contribute to victory. The opinion is held that dependence cannot be placed on winning important wars by naval and air forces alone. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies."²

16. General Marshall was ably assisted at the Arcadia Conference in his advocacy of immediate planning for the strategic offensive by land forces, by the new appointed Assistant Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, Brigadier-General (later General of the Army) D.D. Eisenhower. At this Conference Eisenhower strongly emphasized the necessity of the complete pooling of Anglo-American resources in the war, and of the establishment of a combined Command system to undertake, as soon as possible, cross-Channel operations which would bring Anglo-American forces in contact with the full power of the German armies.

17. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization, established in January 1942, immediately organized a Combined Planning Staff to review possible operations in 1942. General Eisenhower, appointed in February 1942, Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the War Plans Division, participated in these early planning activities. From the first he was convinced that American forces should be sent as quickly as possible to the British Isles, in preparation for the early undertaking of cross-Channel operations. With control of the seas assured, both Eisenhower sad Marshall were convinced that Anglo-American forces could cross the Channel as soon as air supremacy could be obtained in the landing area. Eisenhower therefore began the preparation of plans for such an operation. A first draft was completed and presented to General Marshall on 22 March, 1942. After discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, General Marshall decided that the strategic concept of this draft plan was sound, as a basis for further discussions with the British staffs. It was then arranged that General Marshall, accompanied by Mr Harry Hopkins as personal representative of President Roosevelt, should proceed immediately to England for conference with the British Chiefs of Staff and with the Prime Minister.

18. At the meetings which followed in London, the combined Chiefs of Staff reviewed the over-all war situation and discussed the detailed strategic plans to be developed for operations in 1942 and 1943. General Marshall strongly urged that all available forces, British and American, be concentrated in England to prepare for a full-scale Cross-Channel offensive in May 1943, or as soon thereafter as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, maintained that it would be a mistake to hold British and American forces unemployed in England for at least twelve

months as this would give Germany a free hand against Russia. The British favoured the immediate use of forces, as they became available, for offensive operations in order to divert German forces from the Eastern front. The British believed this could be achieved by as rapid an increase as possible of the air offensive against Germany from bases in the British Isles, and by sea and land operations in the Mediterranean. The British pointed out, moreover, that if Russian resistance could, continue with offensive operations in 1943, and with simultaneous attack by American and British forces from the Mediterranean and from England, it might bring about a rapid defeat of Germany.
19. No agreement was reached at these London discussions in April 1942, on any definite to plan for later cross-Channel operations, but a plan was approved for the rapid build-up of forces in the United Kingdom (the BOLERO Plan). The British agreed that all possible British shipping should be diverted to assist in the transport of American air and land forces to the United Kingdom. It was also agreed that American Plans officers should work with British Planning Staffs in London to develop, as soon as possible, detailed plans for operations on then Continent.

20. In May 1942 combined planning staffs therefore began the work of crafting detailed plans for the various alternative operations then under consideration. These were:

    1. Operation IMPERATOR, a major raid scheduled for the summer of 1942 with the object of destroying aircraft and provoking an air battle.¹

    2. Operation JUBILEE, a major raid scheduled for the summer of 1942 against Dieppe ² (this was actually executed).

    3. Operation WETBOB, a small scale assault to capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula in 1942. ³

    4. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, a small scale "sacrifice" assault on Le Havre in 1942.

5. Operation ROUND-UP, a full scale invasion of France in 1943.

6. Operation LETHAL, a small scale assault to seize and hold the Brest Peninsula in 1943.¹

7. Operation HADRIAN, a small-mode assault to capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula in 1943.²

8. Operation CRUICKSHANK, a small scale-assault against the Low Countries in 1943.³

9. Operation TORCH, an opposed invasion of Northwest Africa in November 1942.⁴
21. General Marshall has himself described the results of his conferences in London in April 1942:

    "A general agreement was reached that the final blow must be delivered across the English Channel and eastward through the plains of Western Europe. At that time the Red Army was slowly falling back with the full fury of the German assault, and it was accepted at the London Conference that everything practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union, lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe, and a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean".⁵

22. During General Marshall's visit to London it bad been agreed that steps should be taken immediately to arrange for two special planning committees, one in Washington and one in London to prepare a maximum build-up of United States forces and equipment in the United Kingdom. Such forces would then be available for any operation that might later be decided upon, whether in accordance with one of the cross-Channel operations plans, or for operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Those two committees, called the "BOLERO Combined Committees", were charged with covering:

    1. Overall requirements of troops, equipment, and facilities.

    2. Allocation of forces and equipment.

    3. The determination of requirements for shipping, port facilities, concentration areas, and communications systems.

    4. The analysis of tine schedules for troop and cargo movements to the United Kingdom.¹

23. It was specifically provided that this committee was not to be responsible for planning any tactical operations. The London Committee was established under the British Chiefs of Staff as a single combined planning agency, with representatives of the U.S. and British Armies, Air Forces, Navies, Shipping authorities, and other Government services concerned. This committee was to work directly with the Washington Committee. It was to be specially charged with questions of port capacity and accommodations in the United Kingdom, while the Washington committee would be primarily concerned with production questions.²

24. On General Marshall's return to Washington, the next steps in planning cross-channel operations were further discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff with the President. It was decided that a group of staff officers should proceed to London for further discussions with the British services. General Eisenhower, General Mark Clark, General H.H. Arnold (U.S. Military Air Forces) Rear-Admiral (later Admiral) J.H. Towers (U.S. Naval Aviation). therefore arrived in London on 26 May 1942. President Roosevelt, in announcing this visit in a Press Conference,

emphasized the fact that the air offensive against Germany was not the exclusive topic of conversation. General Eisenhower and General Clark were chiefly concerned with further discussions of the possibility of planning cross-Channel operations for the begriming of 1943. This group returned to Washington on 3 June 1942, to participate in the Washington Conference attended by the Prime Minister and the English Chiefs of Staff. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commisar, visited London and Washington at the time to complete negotiations for the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, and for the U.S.-Soviet Lend-Lease Agreement, Molotov also strongly urged, both in London and in Washington, that the Western Allies should open a 'second front', by cross-Cbannel operations at the earliest possible moment, in order to divert German forces from the Eastern front.
26. General Marshall in commenting on the discussions at this Washington meeting, of possible future operations, such as "SLEDGEHAMMER", "ROUND-UP", and "TORCH", pointed out that:

    "During these discussions, the Allied situation in North Africa took a more serious turn, culminating in the loss of Tobruk. The discussions thereafter were devoted almost exclusively to the measures to be taken to meet the threat facing Cairo, Rommel's forces having been checked with difficulty on the El Alamein line. Further advances by his Afrika Korps, with its Italian reinforcements, and German successes along the south-eastern portion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the total oil supply in the vicinity of Abaden. It was a very black hour."¹

C. PRELIMINARY CROSS-CHANNEL PLAN: ROUND-UP, 1943.

27. The plan for Operation ROUND-UP went through a series of metamorphosis.¹ The central concept provided for an operation in two phases. The first phase would be a Cross-Channel Assault by combined British-U.S forces on the north coast of France, with British forces striking the Pas de Calais sector, and with U.S. forces assaulting selected beaches between Fecamp and Caen. A simultaneous assault on the Cherbourg Peninsula was also envisaged.

28. Development of subsequent phases of the operation would depend on the seizure of sufficient aerodromes and the acquisition of the major ports of Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg, which were to be made operative at the earliest practicable date. Based on successful completion of Phase I and assuming that the full number of divisions would be available, Phase 2 was to be carried out in two broad stages:

    1. The capture of Paris and

    2. The capture at Antwerp.

29. The plan provided for a widely dispersed attack, on the suggested target date of 1 April 1943, by 36 reinforced divisions, (20 British and 16 U.S.) with 6 divisions in assault and 10 divisions in follow-up or early build up. ² The assault was to be supported

[Page 66 is an extension of footnotes from Page 65]

by:

1. 6,652 Aircraft

2. No heavy bombarding ships

3. Six old cruisers, 1 gunboat, 25 destroyers and 48 fire-support craft. ¹

Assault lift was to be provided by approximately 1,788 major assault craft and ships. ²

30. The operation was to consist of four simultaneous assaults:

    1. An attack by two British Infantry divisions against two beaches in the vicinity of Boulogne; to be followed up by 5 divisions, arriving over a period of 18 days. The object was to secure a beachhead, make a juncture with the U.S. forces in the Seine area and thereafter to advance on and capture Antwerp.

    2. An attack by two U.S. reinforced infantry divisions against two beaches between Le Havre and Fecamp (north Seine sector) to be followed up by one infantry, one armored division and 1/3rd of a tank division. The object was to capture Le Havre then to advance north and eastward, making a juncture with British forces, and thereafter, in conjunction with U.S. forces further west to capture Rouen and later Paris.

    3. One reinforced U.S. Infantry division (3 RCT), followed up by one infantry and 2/3rds of a tank division, were to attack the Normandy beaches astride the Caen-Ouistraham Canal. The object was to secure the Caen aerodromes, converge on the Seine, joining the northern U.S. forces near Rouen, and thereafter to envelope and capture Paris.

4. One and 1/3rd infantry and commando divisions with a follow up of 2/3rds of an infantry division were to attack the south-east beaches of the Cherbourg Peninsula with the object of seizing and holding the Port of Cherbourg and the whole Peninsula. The remainder of the 36 divisions were to come in gradually and thereafter 2 divisions a month were to arrive direct from the U.S.
31. This was general outline plan of the operation (ROUND-UP in 1943), which was discussed by the CCS in July 1942, as the alternative to the North African invasion (TORCH in 1942). When the decision was then made to abandon ROUND-UP in favor of TORCH, the likelihood of success in ROUND-UP seemed dangerously speculative. German forces were stretched but they had not suffered serious defeat. They held an estimated 25 divisions in France. ¹ Italy was still in the War. The Italian and French navies still demanded surveillance. As long as use of the Mediterranean could be denied to the Allies, Germany was not required to disperse forces in defensive positions along the Mediterranean seaboard. Germany's submarine campaign was then at its peak and the rate of allied shipping losses still greatly exceeded the rate of new construction. ² The speed and reliability of the build up of allied reinforcements from the U.S. was still dubious.

32. The German airforce was heavily engaged in the east but its striking power had not yet begun to decline. Allied air forces employed for ROUND-UP would be operating at extreme ranges over a widely dispersed front. The Allies, far from having the overwhelming air superiority required for an amphibious assault, would therefore probably have not even had parity of air strength in the area of operations. From the assault lift point of view, ROUND-UP forces were scheduled to assault with 6 divisions (one more than in OVERLORD) but with about 2/3rds the lift. Thus, the weight of assault, and the follow-up which could be delivered, fell far short of the density and speed achieved in OVERLORD. The planned cross-Channel build up was far slower than that later employed for OVERLORD. Hence, there was a much greater chance that the Germans could concentrate their forces for defensive action before the Allied spearhead was firmly established ashore. Moreover, as the assault was to be dispersed over a wide area, the Germans

would have been able to concentrate their forces to defeat the four small Allied spearheads in detail. Finally, the weight of bombardment, which Air and Naval forces could deliver against beach defenses, immediately before H-hour, was minute in comparison to that actually employed in OVERLORD.

D. PLAN FOR A SACRIFICE OPERATION: SLEDGE-HAMMER 1942.

33. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was a plan for an attack to be launched before September 15, 1942, against Le Havre. The assault was to be made by one British division, one British airborne brigade, and three American airborne battalions. The assault was to be built up to a total strength of 8-2/3 divisions (6-1/3 British and 2-1/3 U.S.)¹

34. General Eisenhower has described the SLEDGEHAMMER Plan as follows:

    "The SLEDGEHAMMER conception was not initiated upon a probability of a tactical success, but rather upon the possibility that general emergency conditions might arise requiring a 1942 attack against the western coast of Europe with the purpose either of taking advantage of an unusually favorable opportunity or of supporting, indirectly, the Russian front. Only the latter of these contingencies need be considered. SLEDGEHAMMER springs from the obvious fact that ROUND-UP will be a feasible operation, only in the event that the Russian Army is in the field next spring as an active fighting force.
    ----

    It is difficult to give an estimate of probabilities (of success). Lack of suitable landing craft limits the initial landing to a total British-American force of approximately one division. Aircraft operating from England can support the operation only at reduced efficiency. Difficulties in maintenance are obvious. The danger of early defeat by enemy forces in France, even assuming a successful landing of the landing division, is always present. I personally estimate that, favored by surprise, the chances of a fairly successful landing by the landing division are about 1 (chance) in 2, or finally

"establishing a force of 6 divisions in the area with supporting air and other arms, about 1 (change) in 5. Later probabilities would depend largely on intensity of German reaction, and our success in developing and maintaining Le Havre as a workable port.

But we do not forget the prize we seek is to keep 8,000,000 Russians in the war.

The decisions that must be made are:

1. Is the Russian situation sufficiently desperate to justify an operation whose minimum cost would measured in a great reduction in our readiness for 1943 ROUND-UP?

2. Would a reasonably or partially successful SLEDGEHAMMER help the Russians effectively?

If both these questions are decided in the definite affirmative, SLEDGEHAMMER is a practicable operation and should be launched at the earliest possible date, in spite of the relatively bleak outlook of eventual success. If either question is answered in the negative, we should not conduct SLEDGEHAMMER, but should:

1. redouble our efforts to build up ROUND-UP.

2. if the Russians are defeated this fall, go immediately on the strategic defensive in the Atlantic and begin to build up an offensive against Japan."¹

E. BUILD-UP OF U.S. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (OPERATION BOLERO.

35. A major step in preparation for a cross channel invasion was the establishment of the program for transporting U.S. troops and material to the United Kingdom. The BOLERO build-up program was originally approved in order to establish a sufficiently large force in England to launch ROUND-UP in 1943. The plan was so soundly conceived that it was capable of supporting almost any offensive action in Europe which the CCS might approve.¹ American forces, equipment and supplies, sufficient to launch ROUND-UP 1943, would in fact have been available in time in the U.S., but that they could not be moved to Europe unless the British could provide 60% of the required shipping.²

36. A study was made early in 1942 of the availability of British shipping for the BOLERO build-up. At the time of General Marshall's visit to England, British shipping was fully employed and its future employment was scheduled for many months to come. The major uses of British shipping were:

    1. Moving war material from the U.S. and the U.K. to Russia.

    2. Moving war material from the U.S. to the U.K.

    3. Moving food and other goods for the civil population from the U.S. to the U.K.

    4. Moving U.S. troops and military cargo from the U.S. to the south-west Pacific.

    5. Moving British reinforcements to the Middle East.

    6. Moving British reinforcements to the Burma-India Theater.

37. The British could not take on the burden of moving U.S. forces to England without curtailing some of the above commitments. In their opinion, reduction of shipments to Russia was totally unacceptable. Reduction in the scale of movements of reinforcements to Burma and India was also unacceptable, unless the United States could undertake the task of defending the sea approaches against Japanese seaborne attack. If this were done, they estimated that they could arrange the movement of 50% of the U.S. requirements in the 10 months between June 1942 and April 1, 1943 provided:

    1. The U.S. Army would scale down its schedule of vehicles equipment and food to about 3/4th's of its standard.

    2. The U.S. Army would accept a minimum 2-months reserve of food stocks and equipment in England.

    3. The British Government would accept a reduction of 1-3/4 million tons in the United Kingdom import program for the 10 months involved.

    4. No unforeseen scale of shipping losses occurred, and no other major overseas movement were required, either resulting from disaster elsewhere or offensives in other theaters.¹
38. Tentative agreements were accordingly reached on this basis. The British agreed to carry 50% of the U.S. forces and material included in General Marshall's estimate, and United States shipping was to carry 40%. ² The U.S. Army was to accept the reduced scale of equipment, supplies and reserves, while the British agreed to reduce to about one half, their import program and also to reduce the scale of their reinforcements to India. General Marshall agreed for the U.S. Navy to undertake the protection of the Pacific areas involved. The U.S. Army was to be responsible for making forces available in America, while the British were to be responsible for their reception in England.

39. Two special BOLERO planning committees were formed, one in Washington and one in London. Each was composed of representatives of both the British and the American Army, Navy, Air Forces, shipping authorities, said other agencies. The

Washington BOLERO Committee, which was put under the Combined Staff Planners (a committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff), was authorized to outline, coordinate and supervise all plans relating to the movement, reception and maintenance of American forces. Plans evolved by the Washington BOLERO Combined committee were to cover:

1. Over-all requirements for an allocation of troops, equipment, shipping, port facilities, concentration areas, and communication systems.

2. Analysis of time schedules for troops and cargo movements to the United Kingdom, and

3. The allocation of naval escorts.

This Committee was not responsible for the preparation of operational plans.

40. The London BOLERO Committee which was put directly under the British Chiefs of Staff Committee was established so as to provide a single combined planning agency with which the Committee in Washington could deal directly for planning and information purposes.¹ The London Committee dealt primarily with questions of port capacity and accommodation, while the Washington Committee was principally concerned with production questions.²

41. Troop movements were begun under the BOLERO program in July 1942. Though curtailed in order to meet the requirements of TORCH and the Mediterranean theater, the BOLERO Plan and Committees continued to function throughout the war. After the decision to launch TORCH, the policy was adopted of limiting BOLERO shipments primarily to the transport of air forces and general cargo, so that when the time came to concentrate U.S. troops in Britain, supplies would be abundantly available.

42. The BOLERO operation became the basis of a joint Army-Navy shipping program, as a result of a joint logistic plan which was adopted in March 1943.¹ The object of the plan was to insure coordinated logistical effort and procedure in each area of unified command (of which the European Theater was one),² in order that the personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, shipping and other services of the Army and Navy would be most effectively provided and utilised.

43. The Theater Commander (C.G. ETOUSA in the case of the European Theater) was charged with control of, and responsibility for all Army-Navy logistical services within the area under his command. He established an Army-Navy theater logistical organization which was required:

    1. to keep the Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S. Army and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, informed of future requirements;

    2. to supply items or services common to both the Army and Navy from a single agency;

    3. to establish a schedule of priorities of Army and Navy shipments arranged in a single list;

    4. to arrange on a joint basis storage and port discharge facilities at shipping destinations;

    5. to provide items from local sources if obtainable in his theater and to screen them out of requisitions submitted to supply agencies in America.

44. Based upon information supplied by the Theater Commander, Army and Navy seaboard agencies serving the Theater were charged with the necessary coordination to meet fully the combined requirements of both services with respect to:

    1. Allocation of shipping

    2. Loading of ships

    3. Routing of ships.

The progress of BOLERO shipments to the U.K. is shown in the following tables: ¹

		U.S Army Cargo Thousands of tons.	U.S. Navy Cargo Thousands of tons.	Monthly Total. Thousands of tons.
1942	monthly average.	70.2		70.2
1943	monthly average.	197.8	3.9	201.6
1944	monthly average.	392.1	20.9	413.0
1943	January	38.6	-	38.6
	February	20.4	-	20.4
	March	24.7	-	24.7
	April	60.8	-	60.8
	May	36.6	-	36.6
	June	176.0	-	176.0
	July	292.7	-	292.7
	August	324.3	1.3	325.6
	September	302.9	1.6	304.5
	October	395.4	12.6	407.9
	November	322.8	13.3	336.1
	December	378.1	17.5	395.6
1944	January	281.6	8.2	289.8
	February	233.7	22.9	256.6
	March	467.8	38.2	506.0
	April	496.4	60.1	556.5
	May	601.6	32.7	634.3
	June	635.9	23.0	658.9
	July	541.2	23.1	564.3
	August	353.8	25.4	379.2
	September	251.6	4.9	256.5
	October	331.3	4.7	336.0
	November	306.9	3.0	309.9
	December	203.9	4.3	208.2
1945	January	141.9	0.9	142.8
	February	117.1	0.8	117.9
	March	115.3	0.9	116.2

[Part of preceding table originally appeared on this page]

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p.53 #1 ROUND-UP J.P. (41) 1028 of 24 December 194.

p.53 #2 From the Report of Staff Conversations 1100, 18 December 1941; British Document C.R.8.

p.54 #1 Report of Staff Conversation 1100 19 December 1941 British Arcadia Conference documents. (Ghormley papers).

p.56 #1 Joint Board Document No. 325 (Serial 729) of 30 September 1941 contains the "General Strategy Review" by the British Chiefs of Staff, dated 31 July 1941.

p.56 #2 Report on the first meeting U.S. - British Chiefs of Staff, British Document CR15 of 24 December 1941.

p.57 #1 Memo U.S. - British Chiefs of Staff, British Document WW1, December 1941.

p.59 #1 Paragraphs 5-8 Joint Board No.325 (Serial 729) of 30 September 1941.

p.59 #2 Paragraph 9, Joint Board No.325 (Serial 729) Commenting on paragraphs 19 and 20 of the "General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff," dated 31 July 1941.

p.61 #1 See CC(42) 2; CC(42) 5; CC(42) 1st meeting; CC(42) 2nd meeting.

p.61 #2 Ibid.

p.61 #3 CC(42)63; CC(42)l0th meeting; CC(42) 11th meeting.

p.62 #1 CC(42)76; CC(42)103(final); CC(49)2(Final) LETHAL was originally called ARABIAN.

p.62 #2 CC(42)84; CC(42)99(final); CC(42) 16th Meeting;CC(42)1st draft 2/10/42.

p.62 #3 CC(42)66; CC(49)17th meeting of 20 November 1942.

p.62 #4 See Chapter I, Section 3, for reference.

p.62 #5 In the Biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, for the period 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945. (published by the War Department, September 1945).

p.63 #1 Document COS (42) 97 (O) of 13 April 1942.

p.63 #2 JPS 13th Meeting 24 April 1942; CCS 17th Meeting 28 April 1942 (Despatch 152217Z - 15 June 1943 JSM to Br.CoS).

p.64 #1 Biennial report of the Chief of Staff 1943-1945.

p.65 #1 ROUND-UP does not appear to have been reduced to one definite co-ordinated operational plan before TORCH was decided on. See ANCXF NEPTUNE Report -CB/004385A or Admiralty M.07980/44 of October 1944, p.24. For details of ROUND-UP plans see Operation ROUND-UP - 1943 - Provisional Assessment of Naval Implications Admiralty M.051404 of 16 July 1942; CPS 26/1 of 3 April 42; CPS 26/2D of 28th April 1942; JP(41)1028 of 24 Dec.41; and the following papers of the Combined Commanders CC(42)7; CC(42)11; CC (42)11; CC (42) 88; CC (42) 96; CC(42) 106; and CC (43) 3.

p.65 #2 Forces available were calculated as follows:

British Canadian Polish	20 Divisions
U.S.A.	16 Divisions with 2 division build-up per month from U.S. after April 1, 1943.

ARMY
United States:	British:
5 Armored Divisions 2 Motorized Divisions 7 Infantry Divisions 2 Airborne Divisions   in addition to: 18 Separate Tank Btns. 26 Tank Destroyer Btns. (HSP) 4 Corps Arty. Brig. 1 Army Arty. Brig. 2 Sep. 105 MM Hz Btns. (GHQ) 4 Brig. AA Corps, 26 AW Btn. Mob. 2 Brig. AA Army 14 Regts. AA (SM) GHQ	9 Armored Divisions 8 Infantry (New) 3 Infantry (Old) 1 Airborne Division 2 Paratroop Brigades
Air Corps Forces (U.S. and British)
Short range fighters 2,000 Long range fighters 688 Heavy and medium bombers 2,710 Light Bombers 534 Bomber and Fighter Recon. 240 Transport 480 _________ 6,652

p.67 #1 This compares with the 11,300 aircraft COSSAC expected to be available for OVERLORD and with 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23 cruisers, 2 gunboats, 74 bombarding destroyers and 242 gunfire support craft which were employed in OVERLORD.

p.67 #2 This compares with 2,327 major assault craft and ships employed in OVERLORD.

p.68 #1 By 1943 they had built this up to a strength of 41 divisions in France and the Low Countries.

p.68 #2 For details see Chapter 2, Sections 2 & 4.

p.70 #1 For details of the SLEDGEHAMMER Plan see CC(42) 1, CC (42) 17, CC (42) 21, CC(42) 23, CC(42)30, CC42 (43) CC(42)45.

p.71 #1 See Memorandum by General Eisenhower dated 17 July 1942, "Conclusions as to practicability of SLEDGEHAMMER."

p.72 #1 For details of the BOLERO plan and organization see CCS 72 of 16 May 1942. It will be noted that the code name BOLERO was originally linked with ROUND-UP the cross channel operation planned for 1943. When TORCH was executed the cross channel part of the plan was abandoned but the shipping program was continued under the name BOLERO.

p.72 #2 General Marshall asked the British to provide if they could, the shipping required to transport the remaining 60% of the U.S. forces and supplies before April 1st. If the British did not have sufficient shipping for this purpose they should provide as much transportation as might be available in order that the cross channel operation could be launched some time during the summer of 1943. The British Chiefs of Staff were entirely in agreement with the proposal that all possible shipping ought to be concentrated on the task of building up in England the greatest possible U.S. offensive force in the shortest possible time. For the purpose of planning and coordination they also agreed that the build-up should be based on the assumption that an invasion would be launched during April or May 1943. The British reached this conclusion from entirely different strategic consideration. In the British view Anglo-American action in 1942 and the early months of 1943 would be governed by the situation in Russia. If Russia were defeated, the Germans might attempt an invasion of England. The BOLERO program would supply American forces which would be invaluable to strengthen the defense of England. If Russia were holding, an invasion in 1943 might be possible and might turn the scales and bring about the most rapid defeat of Germany. If Russia were winning, a major invasion in 1943 would probably hasten the defeat of Germany. If Germany showed signs of collapse the Allies should get all possible forces on the Continent to assure her ruin before she had a chance to recuperate. A fourth consideration was that a strong American build-up in England coupled with an effective cover plan designed to cause the Germans to believe either that the Allies definitely intended to invade in 1942 or 1943, or that they were prepared to take advantage of any German weakening in France, the Low Countries, Norway or elsewhere by immediate occupation, would contain strong German forces away from the Russian front. A fifth consideration was that circumstances might arise in which some other operation in aid of Russia ought to be launched from Britain. In all five cases the build-up of large American forces in England would be most desirable. (CCS (42) 97 (O) of 13 April 42.)

p.74 #1 Annex to CCS (42) (O) of 13 April 1942.

p.74 #2 The remaining 10% of General Marshall's requirement could not be met at all.

p.75 #1 (CPS 26/2/D, 28 April 1942)

p.75 #2 JPS 13th meeting of 24 April 1942) (CCS 17th meeting 28 April 1942) See Despatch dated 1522172 of l5 June 1943 from Joint Staff Mission to the Chiefs of Staff.

p.76 #1 CominCh serial 1428 of 8 March 1943. This is a joint Agreement between Admiral King and General Marshall.

p.76 #2 See Chapter III for a discussion of Army and Navy Unity of Command in the European Theater.

p.77 #1 Statistical Digest Series E. No.50 of June 1945 (issued by Central Statistical Office, Office of the War Cabinet, London).