Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

Part III. Western Task Force Assault Force O.

A. Organization and Assembly.

30. The experiences of Assault Force O were quite the opposite from those of Force U. The cross channel passage of Force U was seriously deranged by the weather and postponement; Force O crossed the channel with little difficulty. U's landings were protected from the weather, by the lee of the Cotentin Peninsula; O's landings were seriously hampered by the heavy seas. The enemy interposed little resistance to U's landing but bitterly and efficiently contested O's. U suffered heavily from enemy mines, but very little from enemy shell fire; O was almost immune from mine damage, but heavily engaged by gunfire on and near the beaches.

31. No better description of Force O's operations can be given than that contained in the report of the Assault Force Commander, Rear Admiral J.L. Hall, USN.¹ "The task of Assault Force O was to land assigned elements of the V Corps U.S. Army, in the Vierville-Colleville Sector of the coast of Normandy, and to support the landing and subsequent Army operations by Naval gunfire, by establishing and operating a Ferry Service to unload ships and craft of follow-up convoys, by coordinating the siting and construction of port facilities off the beaches, and by exploiting the facilities of small ports in the CARENTAN Estuary. To accomplish this task the Command Assault Force O had under his command.... (approximately 1,500) ships and craft....²

(A continuation of the footnotes on page 507)

32. The ships and craft together with the Army forces assigned to Assault Force O, were organized into.....(thirteen) Task Groups.... as follows:

    a. Landing Force	124.1	Major General Huebner, USA 1st Inf. Div. (less 26th RCT., plus 115th & 116th RCTs of the 29th Inf. Div., plus 2nd & 5th Ranger Batts) Reinforced.
    b. Shore Party	124.2	Brigadier General Hoge, USA 2/3ds 5th Engr. Special Brigade; 2/3ds 6th U.S. Naval Beach Batt; 1/3ds 6th Engr. Special Brigade; 1/3d 7th U.S. Naval Beach Batt.
    c. Assault Group O-1	124.3	Capt. Fritzsche, USCG. 2 APAs; 1 LCH; 1 LSI(L); 6 LSTs; 5 LCI(L)s; 53 LCTs; 18 LCM(3)s; 2 PCs; 2 SCs; 2 MLs; 2 LCCs.
    d. Assault Group O-2	124.4	Capt. Bailey, USN. 2 APAs; 1 LCH; 1 LSI(L); 6 LSTs; 17 LCI(L)s; 54 LCTs; 18 LCM(3)s; 4 PCs; 2 MLs; 4 SCs; 3 LCGs.
    e. Assault Group O-3	124.5	Captain Schulten, USN. 3 XAPs; 1 LCH; 12 LSTs; 11 LCI(L)s; 39 LCTs; 1 LSD; 3 PCs; 2 MLs; 3 LSI(S)s; 3 LSI(H)s; 1 LCT(5); 2 MLs.
    f. Escorts	124.6	Captain Sanders, USN. 12 US DDs; 3 Hunt DDs; 3 US DE; 2 OODs; 6 SGBs; 2 Frigates; 3 A/S Trawlers; 9 PCs; 6 SCs; 5 MLs (970) 7 MLs; 2 HDMLs; 7 MTBs.

g. Gunfire Support Craft	124.8	Captain Sabin, USN 1 LCH; 7LCFs; 5 LCG(L)s; 9 LCT(R)s; 28 LCP(L)s; 8 LCT(A)s; 10 LCT(HE)s.
h. Bombardment Group	124.9	Rear-Admiral Bryant, USN 2 BBs; 3 CLs; 9 US DDs; 3 Hunt DDs
i. Sweeper Group	124.10	Commander Cochrane, RN., 9 MSs, 3 Danlayers; 4 MLs; 8 BYMS; 9 MMs.
j. Far Shore Service Group OMAHA		1 Accom. ship; 1 ARL; 12 LCMs; 8 LCI(L)s; 4 LCH; 72 LCT(5) and (6s); 20 RHF's; 139 LCM(3)s; 72 LBV(2)s; 182 LCVPs; 9 Fuel Trawlers; 16 LBEs; 26 LBCs; 5 LBWs; 2 LBKs; 1 Pont Drydock
k. Dispatch Boats	124.12	1 US PT; 9 Disp. Boats.
l. Rescue Vessels	124.13	15 USCG Cutters.

33. "The Landing Force was composed of elements of the V Corps, U.S. Army (Major General Garow, U.S. Army commanding) and included the First U.S. Infantry Division, Reinforced, less the 126th Regimental Combat Team, plus the 116th Regimental Combat Team, the 115th Regimental Combat Team, and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions. This Force was supported by a Shore Party consisting of two thirds of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade, one third of the 6th Engineer

Special Brigade, and the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group Commander and Staff. Also included in the Shore Party were two-thirds of the 6th Naval Beach Battalion and one-third of the 7th Naval Beach Battalion. The remainder of the V Corps, and the remainder of the Engineer Special Brigade Group, and of the 6th and 7th Naval Beach Battalions comprised the Landing Force and Shore Party of Force B, which landed on the same beach as Force O. - - - - - - -"

B. OMAHA> Beach: Plan for the Assault.

34. The terrain¹ in the area where Force O landed was of great natural defensive strength, augmented by the addition of many strongly protected and cleverly concealed gun emplacements, machine gun nests, and pillboxes. Slit trenches were dug for defending rifleman, and tank traps and anti-tank ditches intervened between beaches and road exits. In addition, there had been installed in the tidal area, between high and low water, several rows of underwater obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedrons, Element "C", and pole ramps all inter-connected by barbed wire and thickly sown with mines. The obstacles actually encountered were much more numerous than Intelligence Reports had indicated. The artillery and machine guns were

generally sited for enfilading fire along the beaches. In some cases they were completely concealed from a direct view from seaward by concrete walls covered with earth which extended well beyond the muzzle of the gun. This acted as a blast screen and prevented them from being located by the dust raised near their muzzles, so that when used with flashless, smokeless, powder, and without tracer bullets, as they were in defense of OMAHA Beaches, they were exceedingly difficult to detect. These walls, of course, restricted the arc of train of the pieces, but apparently the defenders had accepted this in order to obtain concealment. As a result of this arrangement of gun positions nearly all of the defensive fire was delivered on the beaches themselves or on craft within some two thousand yards of the beach. Several officers noted the fact that craft inshore might be under heavy fire, but those further out were comparatively free from molestation and scarcely a shot fell more than four thousand yards from the beach. The presence of construction materials and more barbed wire indicated that improvement in the defense was in progress. From prisoners captured it appeared that there were four regiments either actually manning these defenses or taking part in the defense of the beach area. One of them was a coastal defense regiment of the type rated only fair in combat efficiency. The other three, however, belonged to the 362nd Field Division of the German Army, and such troops are generally rated among the best in the world.
35. To overcome these defenses.....the Landing Attack Plan¹ was as follows:

    "The 16th RCT attacked on the left on beaches FOX GREEN and EASY RED with two Battalions in assault and one following. The 116th RCT attacked on the right with two battalions in assault and one following, on Beaches EASY GREEN, DOG RED and DOG WHITE; the other landed three companies in column on Beach DOG GREEN. Nine of the twelve companies of the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions landed on Beach DOG GREEN, while the remaining three Ranger Companies landed on the POINTE DU HOE in Sector CHARLIE to capture an enemy battery located there which threatened the Transport Area. The 16th RCT landed immediately

after the 16th RCT on the same Beaches. The Rifle Companies of the 115th embarked in LCI(L)s were to land on call on the same beaches as the 116th unless otherwise directed.

The landing was preceded by a 40-minute Naval bombardment at previously designated targets. ¹ A bombing attack was scheduled for delivery between H-30 minutes and H-Hour. This, however, failed to materialize. In addition to the bombardment by naval gunfire from supporting ships and craft, tanks embarked in LCT(A)s fired on targets of opportunity during the last 3,000 yards of their approach to the beach, and 105 mm. SP artillery embarked in LCTs likewise fired during their passage through the boat lanes. LCT(R)s and LCS(S)s were scheduled to deliver a full discharge of rockets immediately prior to the "touchdown" of the infantry. The fire of the gunfire support craft, and of the destroyers close inshore where they could observe the actual landings, was to continue until such time as the advancing troops were actually endangered by it, instead of being lifted at a pre-arranged clock time. In general, no equipment or troops were scheduled to land between the arrival of the demolition parties at H plus 3 minutes and H plus 30 minutes. The whole plan of assault, therefore, might be described as follows:

"to destroy enemy defenses and cover the shoreward progress of the landing assault waves and air bombardment to land a wave of infantry preceded and supported by tanks to storm the enemy beach defenses, and cover the operations of the combat demolition parties while the latter were engaged in clearing lanes through the obstacles in the tidal area; and as soon as the lanes were open, to follow through with successive waves of infantry, artillery, motorized equipment and stores, in order to reduce the remaining enemy defenses and seize the beachhead."

C. Assault Force O: Organization and Assembly.

36. Force O was assembled at five ports: PORTLAND, POOLE, EXMOUTH, FALMOUTH and BELFAST. With the exception of the escort and control vessels and some of the minor landing craft destined for POOLE, the assembly was completed 30 May 1944.¹

All ships and craft were loaded at the assembly ports indicated above, except 12 LCI(L)s carrying Rifle Companies of the 115th Regimental Combat Team, which were loaded in PLYMOUTH, but sailed from PORTLAND, and 16 LCTs carrying DD tanks, which were loaded at TORCROSS in START BAY, but likewise sailed from PORTLAND. The loading was smooth and uneventful except for the necessity to make several substitutions involving a shift of loads in LCTs. This was occasioned by casualties to the craft, two of which were due to enemy action. They were the result of damage from mines dropped in the harbor during an air raid on the night of 27-28 May. All loading was completed by the evening of 3 June.
37. For the movement from the assembly port to the Assault Area, Force O was organized into five convoys, designated Convoy Group O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4, and O-5, respectively. Convoy groups O-1 and O-2 were Assault convoys, O-3, O-4 and O-5 follow-ups. 5th June was originally designated as D-Day. On the night of 3-4 June, the weather was clear, but with a rising wind. Convoy O-2 got away from the PORTLAND-WEYMOUTH area, and from POOLE shortly after midnight as planned. After it had been underway for several hours, orders were received postponing D-Day 24 hours. Immediately the pre-arranged postponement signal was sent to the Convoy Commander by radio, and in addition, destroyers were dispatched to notify him in case he failed to receive the message. Upon receipt of the delaying order, Convoy O-2 reversed course and returned to port. A large landing craft convoy of Force U, which had likewise started for the Assault area, was unable to beat it's way back to westward against the wind, which had reached near gale force, and was forced to rake refuge in PORTLAND HARBOR and WEYMOUTH ROAD. From the arrival of these ships and craft of FORCE U until their departure the following morning, the efforts of this Command were chiefly absorbed in getting them re-organized and underway on time. The only sheltered berths available were so located as to require their crossing the track of Convoy O-2, which had to sortie at about the same time. This resulted in some interference with Convoy O-2 in the sortie during darkness, but not enough to cause serious delay.

D. Assault Force O: The Channel Passage.

38. Convoy Group O-1 cleared PORTLAND HARBOR on the afternoon of 5 June. The Ancon, guide, passed through the breakwater at 1400. Unfortunately, the transports of the convoy were headed away from the harbor entrance

riding to the fresh westerly wind, and the had trouble in turning inside the harbor and getting headed out. This delayed their taking station in the convoy formation, and it was not until 2000 that all of them were in position.
39. The movement of Convoy O-1 and O-2 to the Assault area was comparatively uneventful. In Convoy O-2, several of the LCP(L)s being towed had to be cast adrift and abandoned, and two LCT(A)s foundered, but the crews were removed in all cases. Convoy Group O-1 encountered one floating mine during daylight, which was avoided by an emergency turn signal. Four times between the entry into the approach channel and the arrival at the Transport area the guide had to reduce speed or stop entirely. Two of these delays were occasioned by interference from landing craft from Force U, which had been set to the eastward by the strong tidal currents, and were crossing Channel 3 from east to west in an attempt to regain position in their own approach channel. On both occasions the ANCON was forced out of the swept channel in order to avoid running through the craft convoys. The other two delays were caused by stopping of the Bombardment Group, which was immediately ahead of Convoy O-1. The second time this occurred, no further delay could be accepted, and Convoy Group O-1 passed the Bombardment Group and continued into the Transport Area, where the ANCON anchored in position, 49° 29' N., 00° 42' W., at 0251 D-day.¹ The remaining ships of Convoy Group O-1 and the landing craft of Convoy Group O-2 followed rapidly into their proper positions.

(A continuation of the footnote on page 516)

40. The weather at this time was unfavourable, but landing operations were possible. The sea was choppy with wind Force 5 from the south-west. The sky was partially overcast with visibility about 10 miles. Due to the wind and sea debarkation from transports into L.C.V.P.s was difficult. Fortunately, plans had been made to rail-load boats whenever possible, and those which could not be rail-loaded were loaded despite the unfavourable conditions. The trip of the L.C.V.P.s from the Transport Area 10 miles off shore into the line of departure in the face of fresh wind and choppy sea was neither easy nor pleasant. Nevertheless, they arrived at the line of departure in fairly good order. Due to the darkness and confusion in the Transport Area, the L.C.T. with demolition parties straggled considerably in their approach toward the line of departure. Two L.C.T.(A)s foundered before reaching the Transport Area. One L.C.T.(A) strayed to the Force U area and did not return until several hours later. Two more L.C.T.(A)s had gone so far to the eastward that they could not get back in time for their part in the initial assault wave. This, five of the 16 L.C.T.(A)s scheduled for the first wave were missing.

E. The Assault on Omaha Beach:

41. The pre-landing naval bombardment was carried out in accordance with the plan, but the air bombardment scheduled for delivery on OMAHA Beaches between H minus 30 minutes and H-Hour did not materialize for reasons unknown to the Force Commander. Its absence was felt severely when the landing commenced. During the naval bombardment the enemy made no reply of any kind. Several competent observers have stated that during this entire period only one shot was fired from enemy batteries ashore and this missed.

42. The order of landing of the first four waves on all beaches was: DD tanks between H minus 10 and H minus 5 minutes; L.C.T.(A)s carrying tanks and tank dozers for obstacle clearance at H-hour; a wave of infantry at H plus 1 minute; and demolition parties at H plus 3 minutes. DD tanks were to be launched from the L.C.T.s in which they were embarked approximately 6,000 yards off shore unless weather conditions prohibited, and were to proceed in their assigned beaches from that point under their own power. The decision whether to launch at 6,000 yards or to close to the beaches was left to the senior army tank officer and senior naval officer of the L.C.T.s of the two assault groups. Those on the left flank in Assault Group O-1, preceding the 16th R.C.T., were launched as planned. The sea conditions, however, were such that all but two or three of them foundered before they reached the shore. The

responsible officers on the right gauged the sea conditions more accurately and took their L.C.T.s in to a point where the DD tanks grounded as soon as they were launched. Therefore, all the DD tanks preceding the assault troops of the 116th R.C.T. reached the shore.
43. Information is not available as to the exact time of landing or the order of landing waves on all of the beaches. The first landings on EASY RED and DOG GREEN were made at 0635¹ and it is believed that the landing waves landed on the other beaches at approximately the same time. Due to the state of the sea, the loss of the DD tanks, the absence of the five L.C.T.(A)s and damage to other by enemy gunfire, the order of landing was somewhat mixed. Simultaneously with the landing and the cessation of the naval gunfire bombardment, the enemy commenced firing. This fire from artillery, mortars, machine guns and small arms was heavy and accurate and casualties were numerous. Many of the tanks which had reached the shore line were knocked out and losses to the infantry advancing shoreward through the obstacles, and to the demolition parties trying to clear lanes through them, were severe. A considerable portion of the equipment of the demolition parties was lost in the landing due to the surf. The limited time for working on the obstacles before there were covered by the rapidly rising tide and the devastating effect of the defensive fire further reduced the effectiveness of the demolition parties. Only five gaps were cleared all the way into the beach and three part way in, instead of the 16 planned. Most of these were inadequately marked. The result was that during the high tide immediately following the assault the only opening through the obstacles that was in use for a considerable period was one lane on EASY RED beach. ²

(A continuation of the footnote on Page 519)

44. At the request of the Commanding General, V-Corps, the Commander, Assault Group O-2, was directed at the H-hour to land troops of the 115th R.C.T. at H-plus 4 hours. Thus all the landing force embarked in Force O were committed from the beginning of the assault. After the initial waves, landing continued throughout the forenoon and afternoon of D-day. Due to the failure of the demolition parties to clear and mark gaps through the underwater obstacles, and to the heavy enemy fire, great difficulty was experienced in getting anyone or anything ashore. Some craft carrying infantry and elements of the shore party managed to land their personnel, but the bulk of the craft proceeding shoreward was stopped between the seaward row obstacles and the line of departure. With the strong tide, fresh wind and choppy sea this soon resulted in a mass of craft in which all semblance of wave organization was lost until the Deputy Assault Group Commanders arrived at the scene, took charge of the situation, moved the craft to seaward to give them more room, and reformed the waves as best they could.

45. In the meanwhile, most of the tanks which had reached the shore had been knocked out by enemy artillery fire or by mines, or were caught in the obstacles and flooded by the rising tide, and the personnel, both the assault troops and the shore party, were pinned on the beaches just above high water by enemy fire; few, if any, troops actually crossed the beach during the early hours of the forenoon. The supporting destroyers¹ and gunfire

support craft stood in as close to the beach as the depth of the water would allow and engaged all the defensive installations which they could locate. Despite this, however, little progress had been made prior to 1100 when there was still considerable machine gun fire, sniping, artillery, and mortar fire, on the beaches between the exits, the condition was critical. A number of enemy string points in the beach were still holding out and our troops were not able to move inland.²

46. The first encouraging news came at 1100 from a message to Commander, Transport Division THREE, intercepted by the Force Commander, to the effect that German defenders were leaving their posts and surrendering to U.S. troops. Shortly after that another message from a member of the V-Corps staff embarked in a DUKW near the shore line stated that the troops were advancing up the western slope of the exit from Sector EASY. By 1300 COLLEVILLE was taken, and by 1330 a general advance began up slopes of EASY RED and FOX GREEN beaches. By 1340 the beaches of Sectors EASY and DOG were clear of opposition except for artillery and mortar fire. At 1400 the Commanding Officer of the Engineer Special Brigade Group left the ANCON to set up headquarters on the beach.

47. Early in the forenoon reports had been received from the minesweepers stating that the sweep of the Transport Area and the channels for the Bombardment Group from the Transport Area to the 10-fathom curve had been completed with negative results. Because of this the Force Commander felt that the transports could close the beaches if necessary. However, in view of their prospective early departure from the Assault Area, it was decided that the delay caused by the movement of the ships would result in a net loss rather than a gain, and they were left in the Transport Area until they completed unloading and departed.

48. Landing of personnel and vehicles from transports and L.S.T.s continued throughout the afternoon of D-day. During this time the beaches were subject to enemy artillery and mortar fire which, while neither heavy nor sustained, was deadly accurate. The fires was obviously observed because enemy batteries would be silent until craft beached, when there would be a few quick salvos, usually right on the target. This artillery fire caused considerable loss and was doubly disturbing because neither enemy observes nor batteries could be located.¹ In fact, repeated requests

for U.S. vessels to cease firing on the beaches were made by personnel ashore and observers to seaward, who thought that it was our own ships firing into our own troops. Actually no U.S. ships were firing at the time the requests were made, and when they did fire they were firing at targets inland rather than on the beach. About 1430, Commander, Force B, with Convoy B-2, consisting principally of L.C.I.(L)s and H.M.S. Oceanway, stood into the Assault Area. Anchorages close to the beaches were assigned to this convoy and Commander, Force B, was directed to land the troops embarked in accordance with plan, using L.C.V.(P)s as necessary to unload L.C.I.(L)s. At the same time the Deputy Commanders of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3, were ordered to provide small landing craft to assist in landing of Force B.

49. Meanwhile the L.S.I.(S)s and L.S.T.(H)s which had carried the Ranger Battalions were sailed to the ISLE OF WIGHT, and information was received that the transports of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3, would complete unloading and be ready to sail by 1700. They sailed about 1800. By 1530, advance elements of the First Division and Twenty-Ninth Division staffs were setting up command posts ashore near the beach exits from Sectors EASY and DOG respectively, and ST. LAURENT was partially occupied in addition to the capture of COLLEVILLE. At 1540 the OCEANWAY was directed to close FOX GREEN beach and discharge her twenty (20) L.C.M.s carrying M.4 tanks, these tanks to be attached to the 16th R.C.T. This was completed by 1715. Convoy Groups O-3 and N-1 arrived together about 1600. Although information as to the actual loss of landing craft was meagre at this time indications were that a considerable number was sunk or badly damaged, and at 1700 the Force Commander requested the Commander, Service Force, to sail ARL-4 to the OMAHA Assault Area as soon as practicable. At 1715 the Commanding General, First Division and his staff left the ANCON to establish their headquarters on the beach. By 1730, except for sniping and the recurring artillery and mortar fire, hostile action against the Beach Area had ceased and the work of organizing the beaches for further unloading and progressing in orderly fashion.

50. In accordance with the request of the Commanding General, First Division, the 26th R.C.T. was landed in the early evening. All rifle companies of the regiment were ashore by 2100. Between 2320 and 2340 the air attack which had been anticipated all day was finally delivered. There were no radar warnings of the approach of the hostile planes and the first information of the impending attack was the sight and sound of an enemy plane which passed over the Flagship at low altitude. Only a few more planes came over, however, of which three were shot down. Several bombs were dropped in the Transport Area but caused no damage. This ended D-day.....".¹

F. The Battle on OMAHA Beach:

51. In conjunction with the main assaults on OMAHA Beach, three companies of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion attacked a German battery position on Points du Hoe in the Charlie Sector. This battery which was thought to contain guns of the heaviest caliber (six 155 mm. guns) was located on a high cliff dominating OMAHA Beach, the boat lanes, anchorages and approach channels. The assault was initiated by an especially heavy bombardment from the battleship U.S.S. Texas, between H minus 45 minutes and H minus 5 minutes. The Rangers were scheduled to land at Force "O"'s H-hour, (0630). The control vessel for the expedition, however, made an error in navigation, mistaking the Raz de la Parce for Pointe du Hoe, with the result that the Rangers were 35 minutes late in hitting their assigned beach. By the time they had landed (0705) the numbing effect of the bombardment had worn off and the enemy was alert and in position. ¹ Scaling the cliff proved to be a very difficult enterprise. Scaling ropes had got wet and many rockets failed to carry over the cliff. Many more did not anchor. The men scaling the few ropes which did hold were subject to incessant fire from enemy rifleman, machine guns and hand grenades.

52. The attack was in this precarious position, when U.S.S. Satterlee (DD) closed the Beach to 1500 yards and took the enemy under direct fire. With this assistance the Rangers gained the summit at 0930. In the course of the morning they fought their way through to the Vierville - Grandcamp Road, where they established a defense line. Here they remained until D plus 2, when at "about 1100 the 5th Ranger Battalion, which had landed on DOG GREEN Beach with the 116th Infantry and had been fighting its way steadily westward along the shore line, established contact with the survivors of the three Ranger Companies which had landed on the POINTE DU HOE to knock out the enemy batteries there. The latter had accomplished their mission, but had been hemmed in within a small area near the tip of the point where they had been under constant enemy attack for more than 48 hours. Repeated requests had been received from them for boats to evacuate wounded, additional ammunition and reinforcements. These requests had been passed to the Commanding General, V Corps, and boats to carry the reinforcements were offered. Gunfire support ships¹ were doing their best to help by delivering supporting fire as requested by the Liaison Officer with the Rangers, but their situation was desperate. Finally, on the afternoon of D plus 1, two boats from the Flagship with 25 additional Rangers, plus small arms ammunition, food, and medical supplies, landed on the POINTE DU HOE and delivered them to the group besieged there. On their way out, the boats evacuated the wounded."²

53. The enemy battery upon which all this heroism was expended was found to be empty. Allied Air and Naval Bombardment had destroyed one AA and three 155 mm. gun emplacements. It later developed that four other guns had been moved and emplaced in a lodge lane about a mile further south. Texas, using air spot, knocked out the new position during the morning of D-day.¹

54. While D-day ended with the Rangers in a perilous and besieged position, the situation on the principal OMAHA Beach was very much better than could have been predicted from the unpromising beginning in the morning. By six o'clock in the evening, 18,772 men, and 1,033 vehicles had been landed. The army had gained the tops of the cliffs and captured Colleville. Shortly after midnight (0045 of D plus 1) "the Commanding General, V Corps, informed the Force Commander that his line was generally along the road from Vierville through St. Laurient to about a mile south of Colleville, and that he intended to attack with the beachhead line as his objective." By noon on D plus 1, the Vth Corps had reached Bayeux-Carentan Road, its D-day objective, and advanced beyond it. The next day they advanced another three miles inland, and by D plus 3 they has established contact with the British 50th Division of Force G. On D plus 4, they made contact with the VII Corps from the U Sector.

55. Throughout the assault and build-up, Assault Force O was singularly immune from losses to German minefields. Though intelligence indicated that the approach channels and the transport areas lay in the middle of a mine field, and though both Force U to the west and Force G to the east suffered heavily from mine damage, "up to the time of the departure of the Force Commander....on D plus 22, no mines had been swept in the OMAHA area, and no ships had been mined there".¹ Except along the beaches, and the waters close in shore, Force O was equally immune from shell fire. By 1600 on D-day, losses to

ships and craft in Force O were:
1. sunk: LCT 294, and Despatch Boats 350;

2. damaged LST 375; LCI's 487, 553, 85; LCT's 2043, 210, 25 2041, 2037, 538,2307; Despatch Boats 320; LCA's 25, 418;
   and an unknown number of LCVP's.¹

Naval personnel casualties, dead, wounded, and missing, in Force O were 624.¹

56. Although by the end of D-day the spearhead at OMAHA Beach was well established, the battle fought to accomplish that result was much the most difficult of all the five assaults. The cumulative effect of many adverse factors had conspired to defeat or nullify the plans and preparations which had proved so successful on the other beaches. "The air bombardment of the beaches was not delivered, presumably because of the low cloud ceiling over the beach area just before H-hour. Sea conditions caused the loss of a considerable portion of the tanks and many of those that did manage to reach the beach were soon knocked out by enemy artillery and mines. The obstacles were more numerous than had been anticipated and casualties from enemy fire were heavy - so that demolition parties, despite a gallant effort, failed to breach the obstacles as planned. All of these reduced the assault to the most elementary form of amphibious attack; Infantry landing and attacking supported by Naval gunfire. A Deputy Assault Group Commander, in his report, attributed the success of the leading to three factors; (1) the gallantry of the crews of the landing craft who took the Army personnel into the beach; (2) the stark courage of the soldiers who worked their way shoreward through obstacles and enemy fire from artillery, mortars, machine guns, and rifles; and, (3) to the support provided by the Naval gunfire. These are fundamental factors which will always determine whether the assault succeeds or fails against strong resistance. All the rest are "trimmings", schemes of one sort or another to make it easier for the attacking rifleman, but in the last analysis, it is he and the floating batteries supporting him who win or lose the battle."¹

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Footnotes:

p.507 #1 The following account is an extract from the Report of NC Force O contained in ANCXF report vol. III page 3 to 8 para 3 to 17. A certain amount of material has been transferred from text to footnote.

p.507 #2 Major units were:

* After the L.C.T. (5 and 6)s completed their mission they became part of the Far Shore Ferry Service in both the U.S. and British Sectors. These L.C.T. (5 and 6)s were included in the Landing Craft listed above.

Transports	Landing Craft	Bombardment Ships
4 APA 3 XAP 2 LSI (L) 3 LSI (S) 3 LSI (H)	24 LST 91 LCT (6) 40 LCT (5) 2 LCT (4) 55 LCI (L) 4 LCH 5 LCC	2 BB 3 CL
Gunfire Support Craft	Escort Craft	Minesweepers
5 L.C.G. (L) 7 L.C.F. 9 L.C.T. (R) 34 L.C.P. (L) 8 L.C.T. (A) 6 L.C.T. (H.E.)	9 D.D. 3 Hunt D.D. 1 D.E. 2 O.D.D. 2 Frigates 6 S.G.B. 9 P.C. 5 970-M.L. 7 M.L. 2 H.D.M.L. 6 S.C. 3 A/S Trawlers	16 M.S. 4 M.L. 6 Danlayers 8 B.Y.M.S. 8 M.M.S.
Miscellaneous Ships and Craft
1 A.C.C. (Flagship) 1 D.D. (Relief Flagship) 1 L.S.D. 15 U.S.C.G. Rescue Craft 9 Dispatch Boats 1 P.T. (Dispatch Boat-Flag) 1 Accommodation Ship 1 A.R.L. 12 L.C.M. (C.R.U.)
Ferry Craft: *86 LCT (5 and 6), 20 R.H.F., 119 L.C.M. (3), 72 L.B.V. (2).
Service Craft:9 Fuelling Trawlers, 16 L.B.E., 20 L.B.O., 5 L.S.W., 2 L.B.K., 1 Pontoon Drydock

p.511 #1 This paragraph appears in Report of NC Force "O", Part V, Para. 10, given in ANCXF Report Vol. III, Pages 53 and 54.

p.512 #1 Report of NC Force O, Part I, Para. 7.

p.513 #1 Force O's bombardment force (bombarding Force C) was comprised of the following ships and craft:

Bombarding Force C.	Destroyers	Support Craft
Texas (Flag, R.A. C.F. Bryant) Arkansas, Glasgow, Montcalm (Flag R.A. Jaujard) Georges Leygues	Frankford, McCook, Carmick, Doyle, Endicott, Baldwin, Harding, Satterlee, Thomson, Tanaside, Talybont, Melbreak	5 L.C.G.(L) 7 L.C.F. 9 L.C.T. (R) 8 L.C.T.A. 8 L.C.T. (H.E.)

p.514 #1 Prior to sortie, the disposition of the Force was as follows:

a. At PORTLAND-WEYMOUTH:
4 APAs 3 XAPs 3 LSI(S)s 3 LSI(H)s 33 LCI(L)s 3 LCHs 24 LSTs 1 FDT 20 Rhino Ferries 147 OCTs 1 LSD 5 LCCs 15 USCG Cutters 3 DEs 1 PT 9 US DDs 3 Hunt DDs 7 MTB	6 LCM (CRU)s 19 LCM (NCDU)s 32 LCP(L)s 2 Br.ODDs 2 Fr.Frigates 7 PCs 4 SCs 3 ML - 970s 3 MLs 2 HDMLs 5 SGBs 18 MSs 6 Danlayers 8 MLs (Navigational Leaders for MSs) 8 BYMSs 9 MMSs 1 ARL 1 Accomodation Ship
b. At POOLE:
1 LCH 5 LCG(L)s 9 LCT(R)s 7 LCFs 17 LCM (NCDU)s 83 LCMs 6 LCM (CRU)s 8 Seaplane Tenders 72 LBV (2)s	20 LBOs 5 LBWs 16 LBEs 2 LBKs 9 Fueling Trawlers 2 ML - 970s 4 MLs 2 PCs 2 SCs
c. At BELFAST:
2 BBs 3 CLs
d. At EXMOUTH:
3 A/S Trawlers
e. At FALMOUTH:
1 Pontoon Drydock

p.516 #1 The position of the U transport area was 23,000 yards from the beach, and that of O was 20,000 yards. (see Report of NCWTF - contained in ANCXF Report Vol.III, page 99.) In his report Admiral Ramsay said:

"It was always the intention to make the "Lowering Positions" as near the beaches as it was thought the enemy long range coastal batteries would permit. In the Eastern Task Force area they were therefore established seven miles from the shore. The U.S. forces, however, preferred to select positions 11 miles from the Coast. Actually it was found that the LSI of the Eastern Task Force were not menaced by enemy fire, and the reduction of the length of the LCA trip to the beach must have been most welcome to the British troops in the unpleasant conditions that obtained.

"It is worthy of note that the A.P.A. of the Western Task Force reached their lowering positions at 4½ hours before H-hour. This was at least 1½ hours earlier than the arrival of the L.S.I. in the British area. This was necessary:

1. because of the longer distance from the lowering positions to the beach, and,
2. because these ships have a larger boat carrying capacity than the average L.S.I. and more time is therefore required for the "lowering" and marshalling of the Assault craft.

Although one can fully sympathise with the decisions of the U.S. Forces, in the light of events it was unfortunate that the A.P.A. did not anchor closer, and it is considered that immunity from coastal batteries should not be given undue weight in the selection of the lowering positions, especially when adequate naval counter battery fire is available."

Rear-Admiral Hall commented on the great distance from the transport area to the beaches as follows:

"Information from Intelligence sources indicated that there were extensive minefields outside of and probably in the Bay of the Seine; in fact, on the basis of the best information available, it appeared that part of the channels leading to Force O's Transport Area and the Transport Area itself lay in a minefield. The location of the Transport Area in such a spot rather than further inshore in water which was thought to be clear of mines was dictated by the desire of the Force Commander to keep Transports of the Force out of range of two enemy heavy batteries ashore. As matters turned out, neither the mines nor the batteries proved dangerous, and the Transport Area could have been moved in to half its actual distance from the shore with impunity. (See Report NC Force O, Part V, Para. 17A, contained in ANCXF Report, Vol.III, Page 65.)

p.519 #1 H-hour for Force O was 0630.

p.519 #2 In part V. of his Report NC Force "O" further described the situation with respect to obstacles as follows:

"When it first became apparent that obstacles in appreciable numbers were appearing on the OMAHA Beaches, special plans for breaching them were devised jointly by the V Corps and the Eleventh Amphibious Force and submitted to C.T.F.122, and the 1st U.S. Army, respectively. It was not until the latter part of April, however, nearly a month later, that approval of these plans was obtained, and troops made available for the special training necessary to their execution. Briefly, the plan called for demolition teams consisting of both Army and Naval personnel landing immediately after a wave of tanks and a wave of infantry, and opening gaps through the obstacles using demolition charges and tank dozers. The time of landing was calculated so that, theoretically, the demolition parties would have a minimum of twenty minutes before the rising tide reached the bases of the seaward band of obstacles; all of which were believed to be uncovered at low tide. This was decided because it was believed to be impossible to remove obstacles actually underwater in any quantity within the probably time available in an assault; this without even taking into consideration the interference from enemy fire. The Force Commander would have preferred to land at low tide or even one hour before low tide in order to have allowed the demolition parties more time to deal with the obstacles and to afford some leeway in the event that landing was delayed. Unfortunately, in this respect the requirements on the OMAHA Beaches conflicted with those on the British Force J Beach, where it was believed necessary to have a minimum of nine or ten feet above the low water mark in order to permit the landing craft to pass over rocks offshore. To allow each Force to have attacked at its most favourable state of the tide would have meant widely staggering the time of H-hour, and might possibly have required major changes in the plan because of the minesweeper problem and the limited period of darkness at this time of the year. Therefore, a limit was placed upon the difference between the earliest and latest time of landing of the several assault forces, and the time chosen for Force O was the earliest permitted. Whether or not the demolition parties could have breached the obstacles as planned had the landing been made at or before low water instead of on a rising tide is problematical. As it was, the Navy demolition parties suffered 41 per cent casualties, and it is understood that the Army demolition parties casualties were about the same. Had they worked for a longer period exposed to enemy fire, it is possible that they might have been virtually annihilated, and still not have accomplished their mission"

(See Report NC Force "O" as given ANCXF Report Vol.III, Page 54, Par. 10A.)

p.521 #1 In Section V of his Report, NC Force "O" further described the situation as follows:

"The assault sections of both the 116th and 16th regiments were held up on the beaches by enemy mortar, light artillery, automatic weapons, and small arms fire. This fire was being delivered from strong points located at the top of the cliffs and bluffs, overlooking the beaches and from mortars a little further inland. Although Shore Fire Control Parties were landed at H plus 30 minutes, they were in many cases unable to set up their equipment because of casualties and enemy fire.

At this juncture the destroyers Carmick, Doyle, Mccook, Thompson, Frankford, Harding, Emmons, and Baldwin, and the three British Hunts, Melbreak, Talybont and Tanatside, closed the beach and took under fire many of the enemy positions. Their fire was directed in part from the ships and in part from Shore Fire Control Parties which managed to set up communications. Two much credit cannot be given the destroyers which participated in this bombardment. Lacking complete knowledge of their own troops' positions, and hard pressed to pick out enemy positions, they closed in some cases to within 800 yards of the beach. Position after position was taken under enemy fire. It is certain that they destroyed many of the enemy positions, and it is probable that without their assistance the casualties on the beach would have been considerably higher. Heavier ships joined in the fire but for the most part fired with airspot at targets designated by the S.F.C.P.s or planes".

p.522 #2 At this juncture arrangements were considered to land a part of Force "O" through Force G's beaches. But, as will be seen, this proved unnecessary as the 1st Division fought its way off the beach by early afternoon. (See ANCXF report Vol.I, p.12, para.46.)

p.523 #1 "The Germans had an elaborate system of tunnels which it was not practicable to clear out at this time even had its full extent and nature been realized. Observers in these tunnels were able to spot for field artillery in the rear of the beaches with devastating accuracy. The Germans continued to hold their fire until L.C.T.s and L.C.I(L)s hit the beach and then opened up. Evidently their guns were registered on the beaches; in any even their fire was very successful. In addition to 88 mm. and 75 mm. fire the Germans used 200 lb. oil filled incendiary rockets. At least one L.C.T. was hit by one of these rockets just as unloading was commenced. The craft was totally destroyed. This artillery and mortar fire was very difficult to stop and continued with decreasing intensity throughout the afternoon of D plus 1 day. Fortunately in the later stages it was mostly directed against the Gooseberries and against the beach area in general rather than against specific L.C.T.s and vehicles on the beaches."
(See Report of NC Force O in Vol.III of ANCXF Report, P.58.)

p.525 #1 End of extract from Part I of Report of NC Force O.

p.526 #1 The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Texas, regretted that, owing to a lack of visual communication with the Rangers, he had not known of their plight at H-hour. Had he done so, the enemy could have been kept down by gunfire until the Rangers had scaled the cliff and over-run the area. The Commanding Officer U.S.S. Satterlee, also remarked "We should never have eased up enough to allow the enemy time enough to get out of their hiding places. This mistake can be attributed to two causes: lack of experience of the Commanding Officer in actual shore bombardment and overconfidence in the effectiveness of the air bombardment." From this experience the provisional lesson was drawn that "naval gunfire support should conform to the movement of the landing boats rather than adhere to a pre-determined schedule." (See Cominch P-006 June 1944.)

Rear Admiral Vian had made provision for this sort of contingency. His orders directed that "fire is not to be checked or shifted at the pre-arranged time of touchdown, unless the craft have in fact arrived at the beach". (See ONEAST 8, para 16.)

p.527 #1 Satterlee, Thompson, Harding and Boston (DD's).

p.527 #2 Report of NC Force "O", Part I, in Vol.III, ANCXF Report, Page 8, Para.18.

p.528 #1 Commenting generally on the use of Rangers and Commandos, Admiral Ramsay said "A daylight assault limited considerably the use which could be made of Commandos and Rangers, as the desire to achieve tactical surprise as far as possible prevented night landings before H-hour. On the British front Commandos were therefore landed during the assault to cover the ground on the flanks; in most cases they passed through the same beaches as the Assault Troops. On the U.S. Front some Rangers were landed on, and effected the early capture of the Marcouf Islands, whilst the remainder attacked the battery situated on Pointe de Hoe..... It was certainly unfortunate that these highly trained troops should have suffered heavy casualties getting ashore (i.e. during a period over which they could have little control). The difficulty in getting ashore bicycles, handcarts and the like from L.C.I. has been stressed many times before, but it is a hard lesson to learn"..... As regards LCT(S) "a high percentage of these lightly built craft were virtually thrown away and few in consequence were used as planned in the "Build-up" as ferry craft for personnel and as control craft. The battery at the Pointe de Hoe upon which so much effort was expended, was found to be unoccupied, the guns having been moved to an alternative position to the rear, and the Rangers, after a magnificent feat of cliff scaling, became isolated, and could only supported with the greatest difficulty."

From Naval Reports it is not possible to judge what these landings achieved, but the crux of the matter was that there were greater Ranger and Commando forces available than were really suitable tasks for them".
(See ANCXF Report Vol.1, Page 60, para.26, 27 & 28.)

p.529 #1 Report of NC Force O in ANCXF Report, Vol.III, page 65.

p.530 #1 During the first 22 days casualties to ships and craft of Force "O" were:-

1. ships: One lost; one damaged.

   U.S.S. Susan B. Anthony (A.P. 72) mined and sunk D plus 1 while en route from OMAHA area to UTAH area.

   U.S.S. Harding (D.D.625) Propellers damaged by under-water obstruction.

2. L.S.T.'s: 4 lost, 3 damaged.
3. L.C.I.(L)'s: 5 lost, 17 damaged.
4. L.C.T. (5 and 6) 13 lost, 78 damaged.
5. Small Craft: 23 L.C.M.'s lost; 130 L.C.V.P's lost.
6. Miscellaneous: 3 S.C.'s damaged; 2 U.S.C.G. Rescue Vessels damaged; 4 L.C.F.'s damaged.

The above figures include losses in the great storm of 19 to 23 June (D plus 13 to D plus 17) which proved almost as costly in ships and craft as the initial invasion.

p.531 #1 This is the figure for the first 22 days. The breakdown is as follows:

Total officers dead Total enlisted men dead Total officers wounded Total enlisted men wounded Total officers missing Total enlisted men missing Total dead, wounded & missing

12 95 41 272 16 188 ------- 624

The above figure included naval shore parties. Special mention should be made of the Naval Combat Demolition Units which struggled so bravely with the beach obstacles. NCDU losses were:

Dead Wounded Missing Total

24 32 15 71

(4 officers and 20 men) (3 officers and 29 men) (0 officers and 15 men) (7 officers and 64 men)

This was 41 per cent of their strength.

p.532 #1 Report of NC Force O, Part V, Para.10. Contained in ANCXF Report, Vol.III, Page 54.