Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

THE NEPTUNE ASSAULTS

PART I
CONDITIONS FOR THE ASSAULT

A. Reasons for Success of NEPTUNE Operation.

1. The assaults were launched within the elaborate framework of defense and support described in the two preceding chapters. But although these defenses materially reduced the hazards of assault and eased the difficulties inherent in establishing a bridgehead ashore, the attack was bitterly contested and the success of the invasion was achieved primarily by the determined gallantry of the assaulting forces, particularly the soldiers. On the Naval side, the assault movement and the landing went fundamentally according to plan, "not necessarily because it was a good plan", said Admiral Ramsay, "but because every single individual taking part had confidence in it and was determined to achieve his objective".¹ Only a few matters of general interest, apart from the particular adventures of the Task and Assault Forces stood out: a - the weather, b - effect of surprise, and c - the immunity of Allied shipping from attack.

2. The weather was bad, both for the passage and for the landings.² Despite the bad weather, however, nearly all vessels made the crossing in time. All the assaults hit the beach within a few minutes of scheduled time. "In general the weather had the following effect upon the assaults:
   1. Many of the troops suffered severely from sea-sickness.

   2. Some L.C.T.s, either through engine trouble or overloading, were forced to drop astern of their groups. In particular the L.C.T. (Armoured) were badly affected, many of them failing to carry out their role in the close fire support plan.

3. Difficulty was experienced in the lowering of L.C.A., and L.C.V.P., and some has a most unpleasant passage ashore, a few failing to arrive.

4. Considerable damage was inflicted on the smaller types of landing craft, some of which "broached to" on beaching.

5. The operation of DD Tanks did not go according to plan.

6. Many of the small craft, such as the L.C.A. (H.R.) and Rhino tows, which were forced to rely on towing, failed to arrive."¹

B. The Effect of Surprise.

3. Almost complete surprise was achieved. Admiral Ramsay has described this unexpected success as follows:

   "There was an air of unreality during the passage of the assault forces across the Channel curiously similar to that on D minus 1 in HUSKY as our forces approached Sicily. The achievement of strategical surprise was always hoped for in NEPTUNE but was by no means certain, whereas that of tactical surprise had always seemed extremely unlikely. As our forces approached the French coast without a murmur from the enemy or from their own radio, the realization that once again almost complete tactical surprise had been achieved slowly dawned. This astonishing feat cannot be explained by any single factor and must be attributed in part to all of the following: the cover and deception plan; the high degree of air superiority attained by our Air Forces, which drastically reduced the enemy's air reconnaissance; the bad weather which caused the enemy to withdraw his E-boat patrols to Cherbourg; and finally the radio counter-measures employed by our forces,

which coupled with the diversions against the Pas de Calais and Cap D'Antifer, left the enemy in doubt as to the points at which we would land even when he had become aware that the invasion was in progress."¹

4. But whatever were the causes, the Germans were certainly surprised. On the night of 5/6 June nothing particularly disturbed the normal routine of the German Naval Group Commander West, Admiral Krancke, until well after midnight. At about 1 a.m. on the morning of the 6th, he was informed that the B.B.C. had broadcast an announcement on the European Service that the invasion would be launched very soon. Admiral Krancke assumed that it was "hardly likely that the invasion would be announced in advance over the radio", and made no further special dispositions of his forces. At 0130 the paratroop landings near the Orne were reported to him. This induced him to put his MTB's and his Western Defense Forces on notice, but still did not consider a large scale landing probable. At 0209 large vessels were reported to seaward of Port-en-Bassin.² This, together with further reports of airborne landings, at last persuaded Admiral Krancke that a sizeable operation was in progress. But the resources at his disposal to arrest the avalanche descending upon him were pitifully small. He issued the following instructions:
   1. Vessels of West Defense Force to patrol coastal waters;

   2. "Landwirt" submarines³ to be in immediate readiness;

   3. 8th Destroyer Flotilla (Narviks) to move from Royan to Brest;

   4. 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla from Le Havre, to reconnoitre in Port-en-Bassin to Grand Camp Ares; This was later changed to the Orne estuary;

5. 5th and 9th Motor Torpedo Boat Flotillas from Cherbourg to patrol off Cap Barfleur and west of Cap de la Hague respectively.¹

The next day the German Naval Staff excused its unreadiness for the landings by reporting: "By beginning the invasion in such unsuitable weather, the enemy overthrew all calculations."²

C. The Normandy Landings

6. "Perhaps one of the most notable features of the assault phase was", according to Admiral Ramsay,³

   "the inability of the enemy to disturb the tranquility of our shipping lying in the anchorages either by coastal batteries or by air bombardment. This was mainly due to the effectiveness of our counter-battery fire and the pre-H hour bombardments, and perhaps in part to the poor quality of the troops, who manned the C.D. batteries. On the other hand, there was no doubt of the quality of the enemy field troops who stubbornly manned various strongpoints and the mobile field batteries which were sited to dominate the beaches themselves. The siting of these positions so as to be invisible from seaward, prevented them, however from effectively attacking approaching shipping, or being themselves satisfactorily engaged by direct

fire from seaward."¹

7. From the naval point of view, under water beach obstacles turned out to be "the greatest enemy in the assault".² The combination of bad weather, obstacles and teller mines attached to obstacles, accounted for an estimated 50% of the casualties to landing vessels. This in turn adversely effected LCT and LCI availability for the build up.³ The leading elements of all forces touched down within 15 minutes of scheduled time. But "from H hour onward the landing of the Assault and Reserve Brigades fell behind schedule. This was due to our inability to gain exits.⁴ ... There was some delay in getting the beach signs up on Force G and Force S beaches (whilst the battle which raged on OMAHA beach made any form of control almost impracticable), and hence craft often had little idea where to beach. In general, partly by recourse to drying out; L.C.T. and L.C.I.(L) of the Assault Forces were cleared by 1500. The unloading of L.S.T., however, did not proceed so expeditiously. The loss

of Rhino tows on passage, and the difficulty of marrying Rhino to L.S.T. in the bad weather, were mainly responsible; but some casualties did also occur to the Rhinos on the beaches."
8. A birds eye review of the operation might perhaps give the impression that the landings were easy and unopposed assaults. But this impression would be far from true. In point of fact, the crossings were difficult and dangerous. The attacks themselves were met with determined opposition, on every beach, except possibly at UTAH. A detailed account of the assaults of the Western Task Force follows in the next section, and a description of those by the Eastern Task Force, as recounted by an Admiralty Historian, is given in Section 4., chapter IX.

PART II
WESTERN TASK FORCE: FORCE U.

A. General Situation, Western Task Force.

9. The Western (US) Task Force had, on the whole, a more difficult time in NEPTUNE than did the Eastern. Several factors contributed to this:
   1. The bad weather and the postponement severely affected the W.T.F., especially Force U, both because it had a longer journey to make, and because many of its convoys were at sea when the postponement order was given;

   2. The transport areas of the W.T.F. were located several miles further to seaward, than those of the E.T.F..

   3. Beach obstacles were particularly difficult at OMAHA beach;

   4. The terrain at OMAHA beach was more difficult than elsewhere;

   5. The pre H-hour air bombardment , scheduled for the OMAHA sector, was not delivered.

   6. By mischance, and unknown to allied intelligence, a first class German Field Division was conducting manoeuvres in the OMAHA area at the time of the landings, and its pressure greatly impeded the advance of the "O" landing force.

   B. Assault Force U.: Organization and Assembly.

   10. Force U's assault, which had been expected to be the most bitterly contested landing of all,¹ turned out to be the least opposed and most successful. Force U's part in the invasion was characterized by:
       1. an exceedingly difficult crossing;

       2. the achievement of complete surprise;

       3. a slightly opposed and highly successful landing; and

       4. considerable trouble with minefields.

11. The task of the Assault Force U was to land elements of the VII Corps, U.S. Army, in the Adeline sector of the coast of Normandy, to support the landing and subsequent army operations. This was achieved by Naval gunfire, by establishing and operating a Ferry Service to unload ships and craft of follow up convoys and by coordinating the siting and construction of a craft shelter off the beach. To accomplish this task, Commander Assault Force U, Rear Admiral D.F. Moon, U.S.N. had under his command approximately 865 ships and craft.¹

12. Assault Force U was organized in 16 Task Groups, as follows:

    (a) Landing Force	125.1	Major General Collins, U.S. Army VII Corps, Major General Barton, U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division and attached units.
    (b) Shore Party	125.2	1st Engineer Brigade - Brigadier General Wharton U.S. Army
    (c) Force Flagship	125.3	U.S.S. Bayfield, Capt. Lynden Spencer, USCG.
    (d) Green Assault Group	125.4	Cmdr. A.L. Warburton, USN in LCM 530. 1 APA, 1 LST(L), 15 LST, 23 LCI(L), 1 LCH, 69 LCT, 26 LCM, 3 RHF, 1 PC, 2 LCC
    (e) Red Assault Group	125.5	Comdr. E.W. Wilson, USNR, in LCH 10. 2 APA, 15 LST, 22 LCI(L), 1 LCH, 83 LCT, 25 LCM, 2 RHF, 1 PC, 2 LCC.
    (f) Escorts	125.6	7 D.D. 3 A/S Trawlers, 2 Corvettes, 7 PC, 7 SC, 4 ML, 3 970 ML's.
    (g) Support Craft Group	125.7	Lt.Comdr. L.H. Hart, USNR, in LCE 209, 4 LCG(L), 5 LCT(R), 12 LCS(S), 4 LCS, 8 LCT(A), 16 LCP(L).
    (h) Bombardment Group	125.8	R.Adm. M.L. Deyo, USN, in USS Tuscaloosa, 2 CA, 1 OBB, 1 BM, 2 CL, 1 OCA, 1 FG, 8 DD.
    (i) Minesweeper Group	125.9	Comdr. N.H. Brown, RN, (in HMS Shippigan), 16 MS, 11 AM, 18 YMS, 9MHS, 8 ML, 8 Danlayers, 3 RDML Miscellaneous units as assigned.
    (j) Far Shore Service Group (NCIC-UTAH)	125.10	Capt. J.E. Arnold USNR, 2 LHK, 14 Pontoon Causeways, 8 Blisters, 2 Warping Tugs, 1 Repair Barge, 1 LCH, 6 RHF, 22 LCM(3), 36 LST (2) 1 ARL, 8 LBK, 5 Fueling Trawlers, 20 LBO, 3 LBW.

(k) Sea Rescue Group	125.11	Comdr. Stewart, USCG, T5 10 Coast Guard Cutters
(l) Follow-up Convoy Group	125.12	Comdr. W.S. Blair, USNR. 25 LST.
(m) P.T. Boats	125.13	R.R. Reed, USNR. 13 P.T.
(n) Special Task Groups	125.14	Lt.Comdr. H.M. Ness, RNVR. 7 HDML
(o) Combat Salvage and Fire Fighting Unit "U"	122.3.2	Lt.Comdr. M.L. McClung, USNR. 2 AT, 1 ATR.
(p) Causeway Construction Unit	125.15	Lt.Comdr. Bains, USNR

13. The Landing Force consisted of the reinforced 4th Infantry Division (Major General R.O. Barton, U.S. Army, Commanding) of the VII Corps U.S. Army (Major General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army commanding.) This Force was supported by a Shore Party consisting of 1st Engineer Special Brigade (Brigadier General Wharton, U.S. Army commanding), to which the 2nd U.S. Naval Beach Battalion (Comdr. J.F. Curtin, USNR) was attached. The assault plan provided for the 4th Division to land, in column of regiments of a two battalion front; the 1st Battalion, of the 8th Infantry Regiment, landing on Tare Green Beach; and the 2nd Battalion, 8t Infantry, on Uncle Red Beach. At the same time, Rangers were to storm the Isles de St. Marcouf and to capture the heavy batteries which were thought to be located there; which, by reason of their very close proximity to the U approach channels, transport area, boat lanes and anchorages, might have caused serious loss to the force.

14. Force U was loaded and assembled at nine different ports; Salcombe, Dartmouth, Brixham, Yarmouth, Portland-Weymouth, Poole, Torbay-Torquay, and Belfast. Loading and assembly was completed by the evening of 2 June. LST's LCIs and virtually all escort craft had to be employed continually during the ten days prior to the sortie for towing and escorting to the assembly ports, a great number of barges and other tows needed in the assault, and for escorting craft to loading ports. Despite this additional burden and the late arrival of craft, only two British LCT's of all the craft assigned Force U were unable to load and sail.

15. For the movement from the assembly point to the Assault area, Force U was organized into twelve convoys. Most of these were made up of three or four sections which sortied from different ports and were required to make a precise rendezvous at sea. Since the disposition of each ship in every convoy was based on the beach it was to reach, and on its position in the sequence of landing, convoys had to be re-arranged at sea after making rendezvous.¹

16. Force U was required to steam much further from sortie ports to the Assault Area than other Assault Forces.

This necessitated sailing slow convoys as early as H minus 34 hours. The three sections of U-2 accordingly put to sea between 1500 and 2100 on June 3rd. It was not until 0415 on the 4th that the Supreme Commander decided that the operation would be postponed, not until 0515 that the information was transmitted to forces at sea. All convoys, except U-2A, received the postponement order and reversed course in accordance with the postponement plan. U-2A, however, continued vigorously in the direction of France. By 0900 on the 4th it was 25 miles south of St. Catherines Point. Admiral Moon despatched U.S.S. Forrest, a destroyer, and CinC Portsmouth a Walrus aeroplane to turn U-2A back. Had this not been done, it was possible that the Force would shortly have been detected by the enemy's radar and this would most probably have increased his vigilance for the next few days.
17. The postponement necessitated back tracking the three U-2 convoys for 12 hours. About 250 LCT's, Gunfire Support craft and other small vessels which would have become dangerously short of fuel had they remained at sea for another 24 hours, were diverted into Weymouth Bay. Throughout 4th June, great anxiety was felt as to whether Force U could reform and be in a fit state to go forward with the operation, should the decision be taken to assault on June 6. Of the U.S. Naval Commanders, only Rear Admiral Hall was at the scene of the difficulty (Portland-Weymouth Bay) and his flagship, U.S.S. Ancon, alone remained on the telephone. U.S.S. Augusta, (flagship of Rear Admiral Kirk), U.S.S. Bayfield, (flagship of force commander, Rear Admiral Moon) and U.S.S. Achernar (H.Q. ship of General Bradley) were in Plymouth Sound ready to sail. This made inter communication impossible. The senior Army and Navy officers held meetings ashore in Plymouth during the day. It was thought that Force U would have to return to Devonshire to reform, but, "when it was pointed out that this would almost certainly result in the postponement of the Operation to the next moon period, Rear Admiral Kirk, with characteristic verve announced his readiness to proceed".¹

18. The decision to carry on with the operation was telephoned through to Plymouth at 2130, June 4. "Admiral Kirk

and the Generals returned to their ships, but Admiral Moon and his Chief of Staff were faced with the frightening knowledge that about two hundred and fifty gunfire support craft, LCT and other similar craft were still entering Weymouth Bay after their abortive sortie from ports in the Plymouth Channel the day before, that some had to be refueled, that all had to restart for the operation the same night, and that these small craft would have to cross the track of the convoys of Force 'O' leaving Portland at about the same time. Fortunately Admiral Hall in the U.S.S. Ancon was still on the telephone and he and the staff of the Flag Officer-in-Charge, Portland somehow achieved the impossible, with the result that Force 'U' made their assault at the right time."¹
19. The little craft of convoy U-2 began their sortie from Weymouth Bay at about 0100 on June the 5th, some 4 hours after they had entered. Miraculously they had been refueled and reformed. Only 8 or 9 vessels failed to proceed in station on the new schedule. By the time they reached Normandy they had been at sea continuously for over 70 hours. At 0930, Rear Admiral Moon in U.S.S. Bayfield and the Plymouth sections of Convoy U-1A cleared Plymouth, with the U.S.S. Augusta and U.S.S. Achernar in company. As they passed down the British coastal channels, they were joined by the Belfast section (bombardment group), and by the Dartmouth, Torbay, Weymouth and Poole sections. The passage to the assault area was uneventful. Swept Channel No. 1 which was found to be well marked, was entered with little difficulty at 2245. At 0229 June 6th Bayfield anchored with the rest of the convoy in the assault area, 22,500 yards off Utah Beach. By 0430 only one hour behind schedule, all sections of Convoy U-2 had arrived and taken up their assault stations.

D. The Assault on UTAH Beach

20. The position of Force U on the westernmost of the assault forces, had caused it prior to arrival in the assault area to suffer most from the bad westerly weather; the same fact (viz, being on the extreme west) had the result that, during the assault, Force U suffered least from the heavy weather, as it was then in the lee of the Cotentin Peninsula.

At the time of the deployment for assault, the wind was at 18 knots from the west, with a moderate sea, good visibility, a high cloud ceiling and the sky only slightly overcast. For the development, assault LST's towing RHF's were phased to arrive at the Transport Area simultaneously with transports, but by different channels. The early arrival of LST's was based upon two considerations.
1. Navy Demolition Units and their munitions, which were to hit the beach in the earliest waves, were brought over in LST's, to be landed in LCVP's, from the LST's;

2. additional LCVP's, from LST's, were required for lift of Assault elements from APA's. Immediately astern of the LST's were
   1. the LCT's carrying DD tanks,

   2. the Fire Support Craft and

   3. the LCM's, part under tow, the rest under their own power.

The next unit to arrive was the convoy of LCT's organized in tow sections, one for RED beach and the other for GREEN beach. These anchored immediately to seaward of LST's, with units assigned to early waves nearest LST's. The final Assault Units to arrive were the LCI(L)'s which arrived at H-hour, those for RED beach anchoring to S.E. of APA's, those for GREEN beach to N.W. of APA's.

21. The ships in the transport area were completely free of interference from enemy batteries. The LCVP's and LCA's, of the first waves, were loaded from the transports and marshalled without difficulty. All except DD tanks started on their journey to the line of departure on time. The journey toward the shore was almost completely free of enemy interference. The assault landing craft were to have been guided and shepherded to the line of departure by two control vessels in each sector. Unfortunately, Red Secondary Control vessel (LCC 80) was disabled by fouling her screw before the assault waves left the transport area. Red Primary Control Vessel (PC 1261) none the less took the assault wave in. But at H minus 35 minutes, when still 7,000 or 8,000 yards from the beach, she too became a casualty.¹ This left the Red assault formations without any control vessel at all. As they had no

reliable means of beach identification, the situation might have become very serious. At this juncture Green Primary Control (PC 1176) observing the situation in the Red sector, detailed her own Secondary Control (LCC 60) to shepherd the Red assault waves in.
22. The pre-assault naval and air bombardment was delivered according to plan. Naval gunfire was so successfully placed on targets threatening the landing that only a few craft were lost from hostile shelling.¹ Active enemy batteries were destroyed or neutralized by effective naval gunfire which was later controlled by observers who landed with the early Assault Waves. The drenching fire of the rockets of the LCT(R)'s and the fire of the LCO's and LCS effectively played their part in the initial landings.

23. In conjunction with the pre-H-hour bombardment, Rangers attached to Force U stormed the Isles de St. Marcouf, which were thought to contain heavy batteries and which, due to their position (about 3,000 yards on the flank of the approach route and transport area), could have greatly handicapped the landing had they been hotly defended. Fortunately, the Rangers met no opposition and both islands were in their hands by 0725 (H plus 55 minutes).

24. As originally planned, the order of landing of the initial assault waves was to be as follows:
    1. two waves of infantry in LCVP's.

    2. Wave 1A of DD Tanks,

    3. Wave 3 of LCT(A)'s, and

    4. Demolition Units in LCVP's and LCM's landing with Wave 4 at H plus 17.

    Because of the urgency of the earliest possible attack upon the substantial beach obstacles, a late decision was made to move up 4 LCVP's with Navy Demolition Units, on each beach, from Wave 4 to Wave 2, thereby starting demolition work 12 minutes earlier . As a result Wave 2 on each beach totaled 15 LCVP's. As this number of craft was believed to be more than could be effectively controlled by a single Wave Commander, this wave was organized as two boat divisions. Whether because of the excessive numbers, or for other reasons, the actual number of

craft landing with Wave 2 on each beach was only 7 or 8. Other units from Wave 2 landed with later waves.
25. The early loss of the RED primary and secondary control vessels combined with smoke and dust produced by the pre-H-hour bombardment so obscured the shore line that the landing was made about 1,000 yards to the south-east of the scheduled landing place. This proved to be fortunate. The obstacles found were less formidable than those farther to the north. Nor were the hostile shore defenses as strong as those opposite the intended landing beaches. The waves had been trained to expect the possible loss of control vessels. Consequently the landings on RED beach carried on even though the control vessels were not functioning. The task of the Army and Naval demolition parties was successfully carried out. As the landing was made at a time when the tide left all obstacles dry, they were cleared off before they interfered with the landings.

26. The D.D. Tanks, which were scheduled to land at H-hour, simultaneously with Wave 1 or as soon thereafter as practicable, did not actually land until H-plus-20. This was due to late arrival in the Transport Area, inability to make up time because of slow speed, and the loss of one Primary Control vessel, it had been recognized in advance that precise timing of these units was uncertain and hence that no reliance could be placed upon their ability to land at any specified time. Their tardy arrival was therefore not seriously felt. Though late, nearly all of the D.D. Tanks were discharged and landed successfully. They supported the infantry with marked success. The landings on both beaches were orderly and according to schedule. The overwhelming fire power on the beach, prior to landings, had been so effective that losses of men and material on UTAH Beach were small. After the initial landings, debarkation proceeded rapidly and without serious incident. By 0750 (H-plus-60 minutes) the Isles St. Marcouf and St. Martin de Varreville were captured and cleared of obstacles. By 1030, the three transports scheduled for immediate return to England were unloaded and under way. By late afternoon, the 4th division was completely ashore, and the Follow Up Forces were being landed. By 6 o'clock in the evening, 21,328 men, 1,742 vehicles and 1,695 tons of stores had been landed.

27. While the assault was less difficult than had been anticipated, D-day for Force U was not altogether free of trouble. Enemy batteries, on the flanks of the UTAH area, which had remained very inactive during the landings, came to

life during the forenoon of D-day. From then until they were overrun by the army, they intermittently subjected the beaches and the Isles St. Marcouf to heavy shelling. This "frequent shelling of the beachhead was effectively neutralized by assigning each (bombardment) ship to probable targets and systematically delivering fire on them. As it was impossible to determine the location of the firing enemy batteries, this proved the best means of halting enemy fire against our own troops."¹ Unloading was disturbed by enemy shellfire but not substantially delayed. Only one ship was lost to enemy gunfire.²
28. Minefields were Force U's greatest enemy. As D-day advanced, it became obvious that an unsuspected mine field located in the Cardonet Shoals lay right across the boat lanes. As has been seen, it claimed the PC 1261 in the early morning. During the next few hours it sank LCT's 362, 597, and 777, and LCF 31. U.S.S. Corry (DD) struck a mine in the field at 0710 and sank at 0735. Shortly afterward the same fate overtook U.S.S. Tide (AM). On the 8th U.S.S. Meredith and Glennon both (DD's) were sunk by mines. U.S.S. Rich (DE), which was despatched to the rescue of Glennon, struck two mines and sank

promptly.¹ Throughout the remainder of the month, Force U continued to lose ships and craft to mines, which thus proved to be the most difficult of the enemy imposed obstacles with which Force U had to contend.² During the first 18 days, 144 ground mines and 77 moored mines were detonated or cut in the U area.³

29. By midnight of D-day, the U landing force had made contact with the first contingents of the 101st Airborne division and was rapidly advancing toward St. Mere Eglise to join the 82nd Airborne division. Force U's invasion, which had started out in the wretched Channel weather as the most difficult and hazardous of all, had turned out, on the Madeleine beaches, to be the least opposed and most successful of the 5 Amphibious landings.¹

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Footnotes:

p.487 #1 ANCXF Report, Vol. I. page 56, para. 1.

p.487 #2 (1) During the passage the weather in the channel was: wind W.S.W. Force 5 veering W.N.W. decreasing in force at times but with strong gusts; waves were 5 to 6 feet in mid channel.
(2) During the assaults the weather off the Normandy beaches was; wind W.N.W. force 4; sea, moderate, waves 3 to 4 feet; sky fair to cloudy with cloud increasing.

p.488 #1 ANCXF report Vol. 1. page 57 para. 11.

p.489 #1 Admiral Ramsay further said: "Although the unfavorable weather caused difficulties and damage to craft off the beaches later, the advantages gained by surprise were so striking that your (SCAEF's) decision to go on despite the weather was amply justified. A postponement of one more day, e.g., till 7 June, would, in the event have proved disastrous owing to the conditions of sea off the beaches. The problems arising out of a postponement of 12 to 14 days to the next suitable period are too appalling even to contemplate." See ANCXF report Vol. 1 page 10 para. 55.

p.489 #2 Judging from the time, and number of vessels, the ten vessels reported must have been minesweepers from Force O.

p.489 #3 A group of 36 submarines based on the West Coast of France, earmarked for use against the Invasion.

p.490 #1 These flotillas left Cherbourg at 0445, but bad weather compelled them to return at first light.

p.490 #2 Admiralty NID 24/T 65/45 page 46. General Eisenhower's report comments on these matters as follows: "The weather was not the only circumstance surrounding the Allied landings which was contrary to the enemy's expectations. Apparently he had assumed that we should make our attempt only when there was a new moon and on a high tide and that in choosing the place of main assault we should pick the immediate neighborhood of a good harbor and avoid cliffs and shallows, dangerous waters. In point of fact, we assaulted shortly after low tide, when the moon was full; we landed away from large harbors and at some points below sheer cliffs; and the waters through which we approached the shore were so strewn with reefs and subjected to strong currents that the German Naval experts had earlier declared them to be impassable for landing craft."

p.490 #3 ANCXF Report Vol. 1 page 56 para. 5.

p.491 #1 In his report, Rear Admiral Hall commented on this point as follows: "From an examination of the beach defenses, and from the action of the defenders, it appears that the German defenses except obstructions were directed entirely against troops on or near the beaches and not against shipping or against boats until they were very close to the beaches. Casemated guns, pillboxes and machine guns were almost all sited to fire up and down the beach instead of out to sea. In many cases they were constructed so that they were invisible from seaward. All were difficult to detect. As a result, even though photographic reconnaissance was very thorough and usually correct, ships were unable to pick out all the positions in the areas assigned them. Further, the time available for pre-landing bombardment was not sufficient for the destruction of beach targets. German technique permitted the attacking units which got past the mines and underwater obstacles to get on the beach and then endeavored to wipe them out by the fire of automatic weapons and light artillery."

p.491 #2 ANCXF Report vol. 1 page 59, paragraph 21.

p.491 #3 Landing Craft losses during the assault were 131 LCT, 22 LCI(S), 21 LCI(L), 117 LCA.

p.491 #4 Admiral Ramsay went on to say, "the rate of landing will always be governed by the availability of exits. During planning, ANCXF's staff went to some pains to persuade Army opinion that it was utterly wrong to gauge what could be put ashore in the assaults by performance in unopposed exercises, in the hope that the Army would agree to phasing back a proportion of the L.S.T. to later convoys. If this advice had been accepted fewer L.S.T. would have sailed with the Assault Forces, which then would not have been encumbered with so many Rhino Ferries."

p.493 #1 See General Eisenhower's Report, p.30.

p.494 #1 The major units of this force were:

Battleships	1	L.C.I.	47
Monitors	1	L.C.T.	150
Cruisers	5	L.C.M. and L.C.C.	6
Gunboats	1	Minor Landing Craft L.C.A. & L.C.V.P. L.C.A. (HR), L.C.S. (M) L.C.S.(S)	83
Fleet Destroyers	16
Destroyer Escorts	2
Frigate	2
Corvettes	2	Minor Support Craft	12
Patrol Craft	7	Landing Craft Flock	4
Trawlers (A/S)	3	Landing Craft Guns (L)	4
Motor Torpedo Boats	1	L.C.T. (A)	8
P.T.'s.	1	L.C.T. (R)	5
S.C's.	7	L.C.P. (L) Smoke	18
Coast Guard Cutters	15	L.C.M.	67
Motor Launches	7	L.C.M. (Salvage)	6
H.D. Motor Launches	3	L.C.V.P.	88
Fleet M/S	28	L.B.V.	36
Y.M.S. (BYMS)	16	L.B.O.	10
Dan Layers	8	L.B.E.	6
Mine Sweeping M/L	8	L.B.W.	2
APA, LSI, Hq. Ships etc.	5	L.B.K.	2
L.S.T.	30	Fueling Trawlers.	4

p.497 #1 The assembly points, convoy formation and timing of Force U is shown in the following table.

Convoy No.	Composition	Assembly Port	Sortie	Speed	Arrd. off UTAH Beach
U-1A	1 BB, 3 CA, 2 CL, 4 DD.	Belfast	H-44 1030 3 June	12 Kts.	0229 5 June
	1 APA, 1 PT, 1 DD.	Plymouth	H-20 0930 5 June	12 Kts.
	2 LCH, 2 PC.	Dartmouth	H-17 1230 5 June	12 Kts.
	2 APA, 1 LSI, 2 DD.	Tor Bay	H-17 1230 5 June	12 Kts.
	1 BM.	Weymouth Bay	H-13 1730 5 June	12 Kts.
	2 USCGC.	Poole	H-15 1730 5 June	12 Kts.
U-1B	14 LCI(L), 2 YMS, 1 DD.	Plymouth	1500 5 June	11 Kts.	0730 6 June
	17 LCI(L), 1 SC.	Salcombe	1655 5 June	11 Kts.
	5 LCI(L).	Torquay	1815 5 june	11 Kts.
	4 USCGC.	Poole	2055 5 June	11 Kts.
U-2A(1)	1 LCI(L), 4 LCF, 4 LCT(R), 4 LCG, 8 LCT(A), 3 ML, 16 LCP(L).	Salcombe	1655 5 June	5 Kts.	0230 6 June
	16 LCT, 4 LCC, 50 LCM, 2 PC, 1 SC.	Dartmouth	1745 5 June	5 Kts.
	3 LCM (Salvage)	Portland	0430 4 June	5 Kts.
	1 DD.	Plymouth	1700 5 June	5 Kts.
U-2A(2)	1 LCI(L), 1 PC, 85 LCT, 1 SC, 51 LCT, 2 PC	Dartmouth	2058 3 June	5 Kts.	0330 6 June
	1 SC.	Brixham	1833 3 June	5 kts.
	1 PG, 2 DD, 5 YMS, 1 AT.	Plymouth	1515 3 June	5 kts.
U-2B	2 DD, 1 AT, 1 ATR.	Plymouth	1430 3 June		0200 6 June
	5 LST, 5 RHF	Dartmouth	1543 3 June	5 kts.
U-3	2 SC	Salcombe	0605 5 June	5 kts.	1430 6 June
	5 LST, 5 RHF	Dartmouth	0830 5 June	5 kts.
	11 LST, 1 RHF.,1 DD, 4 USCGC, 2 corvettes, 2 A/S Trawlers	Tor Bay	At Pt.D 1004 5 June	5 kts.
	4 USCGC	Poole	At Pt.F 5 June	5 kts.
U-4	9 LST.	Salcombe	1930 5 June	5 kts.	0900 7 June
	8 Pontoon Causeways	Salcombe	1930 5 June	5 kts.
	8 Blisters	Salcombe	1930 5 June	5 kts.
	1 Repair Barge	Salcombe	1930 5 June	5 kts.
	3 A/S Trawlers	Plymouth	1930 5 June	5 kts.
U-5	18 LBV.	Yarmouth	1630 5 June	4 kts.	1630 6 June
	20 LBO, 4 LBE.	Poole	1630 5 June	4 kts.
	3 LBW, 20 LCM	Poole	1630 5 June	4 kts.
	5 Fuelling Trawlers	Portland	1600 5 June	4 kts.
	2 ML.	Poole	1430 5 June	4 kts.
U-6	18 LBV, 190 ML.	Yarmouth	0530 5 June	4 kts.	1030 7 June
	4 LBE, 2 LBK, 2ML.	Poole	0500 5 June	4 kts.
UM-1	11 YMS, 8 MMS.	Plymouth	2400 4 June	8 kts.	0330 6 June
	11 AM.	Tor Bay	0632 5 June	8 kts.	0040 6 June
	6 PT.	Portland	1130 5 June	8 kts.	0330 6 June
UM-2	4 ML, 8 FM.	Plymouth	1715 4 June	8 kts.	0015 6 June
	4 Dan Layers, 7 HDML.	Plymouth	1715 4 June	8 kts.
	3 PT.	Portland	0400 5 June	8 kts.
UM-3	4 ML, 8 FM.	Plymouth	2300 4 June	8 kts.	2130 5 June
	3 PT.	Portland	1000 5 June	8 kts.

p.499 #1 ANCXF's report. Vol. 1 page 9 paragraph 30.

p.500 #1 Report of CinC Plymouth

p.501 #1 At first it was thought that PC 1261 had been hit by enemy batteries but as no shot was observed to fall in the area, and it was later discovered that the Cardonet minefield was located in that area it was concluded in the end that she probably struck a mine.

p.502 #1 U's bombarding group was Bombardment Force A which consisted of the following vessels:

Bombarding Force A.	Destroyers.	Support Craft
Nevada, Quincy, Erebus, Prince, Enterprise, Soemba	Fitch, Corry, Forrest, Hobson, Baldwin, Cherardi	4 L.C.G.(L) 4 L.C.F. 5 L.C.T.(R) 8 L.C.T.(A)

p.504 #1 Report of NC Force U, in ANCXF report vol. III page 51, para 3.

p.504 #2 In his report Rear Admiral Moon commented on enemy gunfire as follows: "The losses on the initial assault on the beach were small. This is attributed largely to emphasis placed upon heavy gunfire support and the effective work of the Bombardment Group in providing it. Intelligence indicated extremely heavy defenses against landings on Utah Beach. The 28 batteries defending Utah Beach consisted of 111 guns of medium to heavy calibre. Information obtained from air reconnaissance indicated that at least 75 per cent of these guns were effective at the time of the assault, despite extensive pre-D-day bombing. Examination of captured batteries indicates that approximately 50 percent of the guns were still operational after capture. The neutralization of these formidable batteries by the Bombardment Group was so effective that these batteries offered little opposition to either assault of follow-up. As a result, all landings of troops, equipment and supplies were accomplished with minor losses. In addition the Bombardment Group effectively supported ground forces on numerous fire call missions during the entire period."

p.504 #1 Admiralty Report on the German War Effort (NID.24/T65/45) contains, along with other materials, a translation of the "Headline Diary" of meetings and reports of the German Naval C's in C and with Hitler. Much talk of the new secret (pressure acoustic and pressure magnetic mines) appears during the months before invasion. It appears that the first use of these mines was in the Cardonet Bank in June 1944. It will be recalled that when first employed the allies had no means of sweeping them. Rear Admiral Moon, in his usual thorough manner, had assured the sweeping of those parts of the Cardonet Bank to be used by his forces, before sending them in. The rapid loss of these fine ships in swept waters distressed Rear Admiral Moon considerably.

p.504 #2 This is in marked contract to Force O which was almost completely immune from mine losses.

p.504 #3 From the date of the second sortie until NC Force U withdrew on D-plus-19, casualties to ships and craft of Force U were as follows:

Corry (DD)	6 June	Sunk	Enemy shellfire, or mined
Glennon (DD)	8 June	Sunk	Mined
Meredith (DD)	8 June	Sunk	Mined, or possible glider bomb.
Jeffers	7 June	Slight damage.	Enemy shellfire
Rich (DE)	8 June	Sunk	Mined
LCT 957	13 June	Sunk	Mined
LCT 362	6 June	Sunk	Cause undetermined, probably mined
LCT 597	6 June	Sunk	Cause undetermined, probably mined
LCT 777	6 June	Sunk	Cause undetermined, probably mined
LCT 486	7 June	Sunk	Mined
LCT 458	7 June	Sunk	Mined
LCT 447	15 June	Damaged	Near miss shellfire while beached
LCT(A)2310	7 June	Damaged	Shellfire
*A.M.56 (Osprey)	5 June	Sunk	Mined or torpedo en route to UTAH area.
AM 125 (Tide)	7 June	Sunk	Mined
PC 1261	6 June	Sunk	Enemy shellfire, or mined
LST 496	11 June	Sunk	Probably mined
LST 499	8 June	Sunk	Mined
LST 381	14 June	Damaged	Ran aground, causeway
MMS 297	17 June	Damaged	Acoustic mine
LST 292	17 June	Damaged	Damaged hull while beaching
MMS 229	13 June	Sunk	Mined
YMS 377	17 June	Damaged	Near mine explosion
SS Glenroy LSI(L)	17 June	Damaged	Near mine explosion
LCI 232	7 June	Sunk
*LCI(L) 219	11 June	Sunk	Bombed en route to Utah area
LCF 31	6 June	Sunk	Cause undetermined, probably mined
HMS Minster	8 June	Sunk	Mined
*Susan B. Anthony	7 June	Sunk	Mined en route to Utah area
SS Charles Morgan	10 June	Sunk	Bombed

* - Not in Assault Area.

p.506 #1 In his report, General Eisenhower has commented on Force U's assault as follows: "The American 4th Division (VII Corps) assault on the Utah beaches just west of the Vire Estuary, met with the least opposition of any of our landings. Moreover, an error in the navigation turned out to be an asset, since the obstacles were fewer where the troops actually went ashore than on the sector where they had been intended to beach. The enemy had apparently relied upon the flooding of the rear areas here to check any force which might attempt a landing, and the beaches themselves were only lightly held. Complete surprise was achieved and a foothold was obtained with minimum casualties although it was here we had expected our greatest losses. The airborne troops having seized the causeways through the inundated hinterland and prevented the enemy from bringing up reinforcements, the 4th Division struck northwest toward Montebourg, on the road to Cherbourg.