Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER VI
THE OPERATION BEGINS

PART I
DEVELOPMENTS DURING MAY 1944

A. The Naval Assault Forces

1. While the assault forces were rounding off the last stages of their preparation and training, the High Command was equally busy completing the last stages of overall preparation. In April and May, SHAEF, Headquarters 21 A.G. and ANCXF took up their battle headquarters on the Portsdown Hill just behind Portsmouth and on the coast directly opposite the "Assault Area".¹ Headquarters A.E.A.F. remained at Stanmore and Uxbridge.

2. NCWTF and NCETF hoisted their flags in their respective Flagships, U.S.S. Augusta at Plymouth and H.M.S. Scylla at Portsmouth.² The assault and follow up forces were then assembled:

   1. Force U at Plymouth

   2. Force O at Portsmouth

   3. Force S at Portsmouth

   4. Force G at Southhampton

   5. Force J in the Isle of Wight area

   6. Force B in Milford Haven and

   7. Force L on the Nore.

3. The large concentration of vessels and craft of all descriptions taxed the port capacity to the utmost. Bombardment forces and other large vessels schedule to arrive after H-hour were pushed further and further out to the wings until in the end they were assembled in ports of east and west England, of Scotland, and of North Ireland.

B. Enemy Reactions

4. This large concentration of assault forces in the southern ports was expected to provoke enemy reaction. It had been anticipated that, when the enemy appreciated the size and nature of the forces being concentrated against him, he would intensify to his utmost his efforts to cripple it. Minelaying, attacks on exercises, bombing and the employment of V bombs against assembly areas were considered especially likely. Enemy reaction was, however, slow and unexpectedly light.

5. Enemy naval activity in the Channel did increase from the end of April onwards. Force U had been attacked during exercise TIGER, on 8th April, but the Germans appear to have been ignorant of the real nature of their target. Their radio reported merely the sinking of two cargo vessels in convoy. The following night H.M.C.S. Athabaskan, which, with H.M.C.S. Haida, was covering the 10th Minelaying Flotilla operating off the Ile de Bas, was sunk in an engagement with Elbing class destroyers. One of the enemy was driven aground by the Haida.¹ The loss of the two L.S.T.s in Lyme Bay brought into "sharp focus", in the mind of NCWTF, the risks of attack from German E-Boats. On 28th April he proposed a pre-D-day bombardment of Cherbourg with naval forces including Battleships. This proposal seemed unacceptable to ANCXF for a number of reasons:
   1. It would involve unjustifiable risk of bombarding ships which, if lost or damaged, would reduce forces allocated to covering the assaults;
   2. Security would be endangered as the proposed bombardmant would indicate the possible locality of the assault;

   3. The E-boat menace could be adequately dealt with by existing weapons, if handled with more efficiency and altertness.

6. The number of E nad R-boats reported to be operating from Cherbourg and Le Havre increased regularly during May. Prior to May 20th, no submarines were known to be operating in the Channel, but on that date a U-Boat was sighted and attacked in the area between Ushant and Guernsey (49° 01'N., 4°09' W) and on the following night another U-boat was sighted in the Channel area. C's-in-C Portsmouth, Plymouth and Coastal Command accordingly put into force special defensive measures to preclude any sustained movement against NEPTUNE convoy routes.

7. In the six weeks before D-day, the enemy intensified his minelaying program off the South Coast of England, using aircraft on a larger scale than for over two years. He also employed two new types of mines. Minelaying was, however, confined to moonless periods. As the last week before invasion was in the new moon period, the mines laid were not beyond tha capabillties of the minesweeping resources of the Home Commands. "Had D-day been in such a period it is doubtful whether the Portsmouth channels could have been cleared in time. As it was, no interruption was caused and it was considered that the enemy missed a great opportunity in not still further extending this form of attack. That he did not attempt more was yet another result of the air auperiority we achieved before D-day."¹ Toward the end of May, some aircraft minelaying was combined with small scale night bombing attacks on south coast ports, but very few casualties were caused either to ships or personnel.

8. The reasons for the German failure to react more effectively have been attributed to a number of causes:
   1. The effectiveness with which the allied air forces denied enemy air reconnaissance opportunities to observe preparations;
   2. Security measures which prevented serious leakages of information;
   3. Deception measures which confused his estimates of the situation and overcame the possible reports of agents;
   4. The constant protection afforded by allied naval and air forces;
   5. The fact that by that stage of the war German air and naval capabilities had been reduced to inadequacy.

C. Promulgation of Operating Orders

9. On 24th April, ANCXF issued his operation orders. These were callad Naval Order, Operation NEPTUNE (short title ON's), The ON's amounted to a total of 700 printed foolscap pages. The Administrative orders, ONAD's, required 100 more pages while ONCO's (Operation NEPTUNE Communication Orders) totalled another 200 pages. These orders, all together, made a book three inches thick. NCWTF, whose orders to the Western Task Force, ONWEST, were only 2½ inches thick,¹ was a little critical of the volume and detail of the ON's. The ON's were so arranged, however, that the parts concerning any one ship or command were comparatively small, and the large volume of orders, therefore, have caused no real difficulty.
10. The issuance of such a mass of orders at so late a date might very well have proved confusing. In anticipation of this difficulty ANCXF, since his first appointment, had made it an invariable policy to circulate all his plans and intentions as soon as they were known. A series of Planning Memoranda (XFPM issued from time to time from 27 November 1943 to the end of April 1944), the NEPTUNE NAVAL Plan (issued 18 February) and the ANCXF provisional orders (PON's issued 2 April) had been issued concurrently with planning developments. Hence the ON's, when issued 24 April 1944, contained no surprises and required no important action to be taken that was not already known.

11. Both ANCXF and NCWTF have commented in their reports on the fact that ON's dealt in detail with many matters, which in U.S. Naval practice, would normally be left to Force, or even Group commanders. ANCXF has pointed out that he had no desire to interfere with matters properly within the competence of lower echelons, but that the peculiarities of the situation in NEPTUNE, in which thousands of ships were to move in congested waters, using inadequate port facilities, and executing a closely integrated operation, required that all details should be carefully coordinated. To achive this required coordination, while

at the same time leaving his commanders as free a hand as possible, ANCXF employed the following methods:

1. He early stated his requiremensts and proposals in his planning memoranda;

2. Lower echelons were directed to submit objections and detailed plans;

3. Differences were ironed out at conferences;

4. Revised Planning Memoranda were circulated incorporating changes and details supplied from lower echelons;

5. The compiled results were incorporated in the PON's (Provisional ON's);

6. The process of raising objections, settling them in conference, filling in detail supplied from the plans of lower commands, was repeated;

7. Finally ON's were issued incorporating all materials assembled and coordinated in this way.
12. The ON's finally issued were thus in part ANCXF's directives, and in part an encyclopedic collection of the detailed plans of subordinate formations, fitted together so as to produce a coordinated whole.¹ While ANCXF did not believe that, under the circumstances, ON's could have been less detailed, he stated that he should have added a ship index, in which every commander could have quickly found, listed under the name of his ship or his command all sections of ON's of direct concern to him. No sooner were the ON's printed than a vast flood of ammendments and changes were proposed. These were due to the later assignment of additional vessels to NEPTUNE, to changes of H-hour and D-day, to changes in army and air plans, to proposed improvements in the naval plans and to the fact that some preparations, particularly those involving MULBERRIES, were falling behind schedule. While such changes were not confined to ON's, their comprehensive nature necessarily led to more ammendments than were required for other Naval orders.

13. The prospect of thousands of ships and authorities opening their orders on the eve of D day, only to find a voluminous book with a mass of later corrections to be made, before each commanding officer oould learn exactly what was required of him created grave concern. ANCXF therefore gave notice on 9 May that all plans and orders would be frozen as of 0900 on 12 May, after which date no further alterations in plans and orders would be allowed.

D. Security Problems and Measures

14. The problem of security was particularly acute during the last month. When ON's and other orders were issued on 24 April 1944, they were distributed in sealed envelopes, not to be opened until so ordered.¹ Senior commands which required information immediately were, however, authorized to open and study their copies. The day before ON's were to be generally opened and studied, SCAEF directed the impounding of private correspondence and the prohibition of private use of telephone and telegraph. All personel, army and navy, were "sealed" on their ships. Not until then were they "briefed" on their tasks and duties in the forthcoming operation.²

15. To obviate security risks that might result, if a large number of press correspondents disappeared suddenly from their usual haunts when mobilised shortly before D-day, a practice mobilization took place on 22 May. Approximately 80 correspondents, who were to be attached to the assault force, were collected, briefed on the need of security and sent by road to their respective ships for about 24 hours. When they disappeared again, just prior to D-day, the event could not provide precise information as the same thing had happened before.

16. Despite all precautions, some security breaches did occur. On 31 May, charts of the Bay of the Seine were prematurely issued to tugs. To avoid suggesting to the tug masters the exact area of the intended assault, they were subsequently issued with IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET charts of the Boulogne area. On 26 May and again on 29 May,

NCWTF issued despatches of comparatively wide distribution, from which it could be readily inferred that D-day was to be during the first week in June.¹ A curious point on security arose on 22 May when the Londen Daily Telegraph produced a cross word puzzle for which a remarkable number of NEPTUNE code words' formed the correct answer to clues.² While there were other security breaches, mostly caused by indiscreet talk wlth "un-bigotted" persons, the secret was kept. The arrival of allied forces off the Normandy beaches came as a surprise to the defenders.

E. Command Questions

17. During the last month the planned evolution of command proceeded according to schedule, except for two unexpected developments. The French Admiral d'Argenlieu, commanding all French Naval forces in British waters raised the question on May 17 1944 of having a French Naval Command, both over French ships taking part in NEPTUNE and over French Waters and Forts after the landings. Admiralty also "directed" on the same day that Rear-Admiral Jaujard, who had just arrived from the Mediterranean for this assignment, should assume command of the French division of Cruisers included in the Expeditionary Force. Neither ANCXF nor NCWTF, to whose force the cruisers had been assigned, had any operational requirement for such an appointment. On the understanding that Rear Admiral Jaujard should not, by virtue of his seniority, be considered to be interposed in the chain of command in the Western Task Force, he hoisted his flag in the Montcalm with the intention of transferring to the Georges Leygues at a later date.

18. The next day, 18 May, Rear Admiral Bieri, U.S.N. from Washington with orders attaching him to the staff of ANCXF. As no operational requirement for such an appointment then existed, ANCXF did not wish, on the eve of operations, to disturb staff arrangements already completed and functioning smoothly. Rear Admiral Bieri was therefore attached to the ANCXF future planning section at SHAEF, witht the title of Deputy Chief of Staff (U.S.).

F. Questions of Air-Navy Coordination

19. Naval authorities had experienced considerable difficulty throughout the entire planning period, through delays in obtaining from the Air Force detailed information regarding:

    1. Fighter protection

    2. The routing of airborne forces, and

    3. The air bombardment program.¹

20. The air plan, finally received on 18 May 1944, indicated that, contrary to previous understandings, the air force would not provide individual protection to naval units in any part of the assault area. At a meeting on May l6th, C-in-C AEAF explained that air protection was to be organized over the entire channel area on the principle of "unity of operation".² AEAF also proposed for the first time that an aircraft corridor should be established, in which Naval AA gunfire would be prohibited. This corridor, to be used by the airborne division attacking Caen, passed directly over the Force S lowering position and beach. A route farther to the eastward would have brought the aircraft over the strong German AA defenses of Le Havre. Admiral Ramsay agreed to the restriction of Naval AA fire provided:

    1. The corridor was moved so as not to be directly above the naval anchorages, and

    2. That Naval AA fire need not he restrained if the allied air movement coincided with an enemy air attack.³

21. When enemy troop movements on the Cotentin Peninsula on 26 May, the U.S. Air Force proposed to route the U.S. troop carrier air forces directly over Utah Beach and Force U anchorages, and to impose restrictions on Naval AA fire in that area. NC Force U and NCWTF protested strongly, but ANCXF decided that, the restrictions would have to be accepted, in the interest of the operation as a whole, provided the route were not directly above naval forces. It was almost impossible at that late date to inform the multitude of ships and craft affected, or to establish adequate measures of AA fire discipline".

22. Restrictions of air attack on enemy surface ships in the Channel, to westward of a line from North Foreland to Walcheren Fort (near Dunkirk), was imposed 27 May, on all aircraft except those of Coastal command. The restriction did not at first apply to a 10 mile strip off the French coast where enemy vessels were still plying. But on 29 May this area was also closed.¹

23. Another air problem was created by the Army's perplexity on how to take their air observation posts (these were tiny aircraft, Ansters and Piper Cubs used to assist in spotting for artillery) to France. On 5th May, and again on 38th May, the U.S. Army requested SCAEF to provide a naval aircraft carrier to ferry them over. Admiralty made H.M.S. Argus available for this purpose, but on 31 May the Army cancelled the requests, to the great relief of ANCXF who did not relish the prospect of a large and very vulnerable ship in the assault area. In the event, these small craft flew the Channel without difficulty, being led by a British Fleet Air Arm Walrus to their destinations.

G. MULBERRY Problems: Tug Shortage

24. It became increasingly apparent throughout April and May that MULBERRY program was falling behind schedule. Not only had there been delay in delivery of units, but the towing shackles on the MULBERRY units were poorly located, of a construction too light to stand the strain of towing, and towing gear had not been provided. All the riggers in the Chatham dockyards, when put to rectifying these deficiencies, managed to have the first units ready to sail by D-day. The place for assembly of MULBERRY

units, in readiness for towing across the channel, also caused concern. It was decided to "park" them by sinking them in shallow water near Selsey Bill, Dungeness, Peel Bank and Portland.¹ Parking operations rapidly revealed:

1. That the intake valves were too small to allow units to be sunk rapidly enough to be positioned accurately, and

2. That the pumping gear supplied by the War Office to refloat parked units was inadequate for this purpose, which made it necessary to seek a partial remedy for this difficulty by diverting salvage vessels to pumping out PHOENIX.²
25. The most acute MULBERRY problem was the tug shortage, which was never satisfactorily remedied. The target date for completing MULBERRY had, as a result, to be postponed. A special body, known as COTUG, was organized on the 24th May under ANCXF to deal with all NEPTUNE tug problems. There were not enough tugs in the country, however, to satisfy all Civil, Naval and Military demands for their services. As late as 31st May only 48 out of 72 large, and only 4 out of 44 small tugs located for towage of PHOENIX and WHALE units were available. On that date Admiral Ramsay directed that "the principle, that MULBERRY and construction constituted a vital part of the whole operation, must govern decisions as to the extent that tug assistance could be provided for other purposes".

H. Visits of Important Personages

26. The expeditionary forces were honored by a great many visits of Very Important Persons during the last month before sailing. Mr. Churchill and the Dominion Prime Ministers (excluding the Prime Minister of Australia) were shown NEPTUNE preparations in the Solent area on 13 May.

"On 15 May a meeting took place at 21 Army Group headquarters at which a general outline of the complete NEPTUNE plan was presented by each of the respective Commanders-in-Chief and the Task Force Commanders. Included in the audience were H.M. The King, the Prime Minister and General Smuts. Each of them addressed the assembled senior officers, of the three services concerned with the planning and execution of the NEPTUNE Operation. ANCXF outlined the Naval plan, while NCETF and NCWTF added details as to their respective forces. Army and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief and Force Commanders also described their plans and intentions. The Supreme Commander himself summed up the main features of the Operation. Great if sober confidence in the outcome of the Operation was evident throughout the meeting. The need for flexibility to meet events which might not go in accord with plans was emphasized by both Prime Minister and ANCXF"¹

27. On 24th May H.M. The King visited the Portsmouth area. After being met by Admiral Ramsay, he embarked in each of the three Force Headquarters ships of the Eastern Task Force, and witnessed Assault Landing Craft Flotillas steam past in formation. His Majesty afterwards embarked in the Royal Barge and proceeded past major landing Craft assemblies at Portsmouth and Southhampton, and Coastal Craft in Haslar Creek. The next day His Majesty visited Portland, where he was met by Rear Admirals Kirk and Hall, USN., and inspected ships and personnel of the Western Task Force, taking luncheon on board the Flagship, U.S.S. AUGUSTA.

28. On May 21st, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander, and on June 4th the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, paid ANCXF visits at Southwick House. Mr. Churchill and Field Marshall Smuts employed June 4th watching the E.T.F. loading.

Footnotes:

p.381 #1 ANCXF established his battle headquarters at Southwick House in Southwick Park on 26 April. Previously the premises had been an R.N. Navigational School with the name H.M.S. Dryad. The site was conventiently near the combined Headquarters Portsmouth at Fort Southwick. SHAEF and H.Q. 21 A.G. were under canvas in the woods surrounding Southwick House.

p.381 #2 U.S.S. Augusta arrived at Plymouth on 22 April, and on the 25th Rear Admiral Kirk (NCWTF) hoisted his flag in her.

p.382 #1 A.N.C.X.F. Report, Vol. I. Page 33.

p.383 #1 ANCXF Report, Vol.1. Page 9.

p.384 #1 By way of comparison ONEAST, NCETF's orders were about 3/8" thick.

p.385 #1 While ANCXF was critical of the detail and volume of ON's, he evidently found the necessities of the case compelling same, his own orders are equally voluminous and even more detailed. In fact he followed the similar procedure of having subordinates submit their intentions, of coordinating them, and then incorporating the results in his orders, ONWEST

p.386 #1 Unofficial reports have it that the staff of ANCXF concocted a document entitled "Naval Orders Operation OVERBOARD. American stupid equals British Most Stupid. These orders are so secret that they are to be burned before reading".

p.386 #2 Briefed personnel who became sick were sent to "sealed" hospitals. Despite objections by ANCXF, relatlves were allowed to visit them,

p.387 #1 NCWTF despatches 262345 May 1944 and 291341 May 1944.

p.387 #2 NEPTUNE, OVERLORD, OMAHA, UTAH, MULBERRY, WHALE and several others. Investigation by Admiralty N.I.D. resulted in the conclusion that this was purely coincidence.

p.388 #1 ANCXF Report Vol.I, Page 28 Paragraph 27. The production of firm AEAF plans was probably not expedited by the CCS delay in deciding on Air Force Command and the forces to be allotted to the AEAF (See Chapter III).

p.388 #2 ANCXF Report Vol. I, Page 36 Paragraph 30.

p.388 #3 Admiral Ramsay's doubts were based on experience during the Sicilian invasion when allied Naval AA shot down a great many allied troop carrier aircraft which passed over head during an air raid. As predicted the same thing happened on Sword Beach on the evening of June 7/8.

p.389 #1 See ANCXF Report Vol.1, page 39 Paragraph 52 and Page 42 Paragraph 68.

p.390 #1 These areas were chosen for security reasons, in order to prevent the Germans from guessing what they were or where they were going.

p.390 #2 ANCXF Report Vol. 1. Page 35 Paragraph 23.

p.390 #1 ANCXF Report Volume 1, Page 36 Paragraph 29.