Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

PART VI
LOADING AND ASSEMBLY¹: NEPTUNE FORCES

54. The Assault and Follow-up Forces and the first Build-up divisions loaded and assembled as follows:-

    Force	Military	Leading Points	Assembly Points
    First Br.	Build-up Div.	Thames	Thames
    L	3 Brigades (including 22 Armored Brigade)	Tilbury Felixstow	Southend Harwich
    L	3 Brigades of 3rd Division of 1st Corps British Army	Portsmouth Newhaven Shoreham	Newhaven and Shoreham Portsmouth
    J	3 Brigades of 3rd Canadian Division of 1st Corps, Br.Army Commandos	Southampton Portsmouth	Southhampton and Solent Portsmouth
    G	3 Brigades of 50th Division of 30th Corps British Army	Southhampton	Southhampton and Solent Spithead
    O	2 R.C.T. of 1st Div., 2 R.C.T. of 29th Div. both of 5th Corps U.S. Army	Portland and Weymouth	Portland and Weymouth Poole
    U	3 R.C.T. of 4th Div. of VIIth Corps, U.S. Army.	Torquay, Brixham, Dartmouth and Plymouth	Torbay, Brixham Dartmouth and Salcombe
    B	1 R.C.T. of 1st and 2 R.C.T. of 29th U.S. Div.	Plymouth Falmouth and Fowey	Plymouth and Falmouth and Fowey
    First U.A.	Build-up Division	Bristol Channel Ports	Bristol Channel Ports

55. The loading and assembly of assault convoys was primarily an administrative job. Responsibilities were divided as follows:
    1. The C's-in-C Home Commands were responsible for providing the wharves, piers, and other port facilities required to load the ships.¹

2. The Naval Assault Force commanders and the army Landing Force commanders were jointly responsible for determining the army formations to be loaded in each vessel.¹

3. Assault Force Commanders, Landing Force Commanders, and C's in C Home Commands were jointly responsible for working out detailed loading schedules.¹
4. The army was responsible for deliverying its men and equipment to the right piers at the right time.
5. The C's-in-C Home Commands were responsible in accordance with the wishes of Assault Force Commanders, for assuring port availability, and for moving vessels so as to be ready to load and clear at the required times and places.

6. The M.W.T. and the W.S.A. were responsible for loading the numerous merchant ships, in the first Build-up convoys, but were required to make their ships available at the proper wharves and piers, at the time required by the movement plan.
7. A combined agency called Movement Control (MOVCO) was established, with representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Merchant Shipping Authorities, to coordinate movements by producing and executing the overall loading plan.
8. The Naval Assault Force commanders were responsible for developing the assembly plan for their own force.
9. The C's-in-C Home Commands, were responsible for providing suitable assembly areas and for moving vessels from their loading points into the appropriate assembly areas as required.
10. All ships were required to fill up with fuel water and lubricants before sailing to the loading and assembly areas, and to "top up" before sailing, the C's-in-C Home Commands being responsible for providing the fuel, water, and lubricants at appropriate points.
11. The defense of the areas in which NEPTUNE forces were berthed, loaded, and assembled, was the joint responsibility of local Army, Navy and Air authorities, who provided anti-aircraft defense and protection from enemy surface vessels and U-boats, while the Commanding Officer of each ship was required to use the armament of his own ship for its defense.¹

56. CTF 122 assigned to CTF 127 (ComLanCrabEu) the task of staging and mounting the operation of the Western Task Force.¹ CTF 127, working in conjunction with the local R.N. Home Command organization and the appropriate Army authority, drew up a detailed loading schedule, assigning all ships and craft a time and a place to be loaded.² He also assigned a U.S. Naval team under a "Loading Control Officer" to each pier, wharf, and hard, to control the loading of vessels. The Loading Control Officer had the responsibility for arranging that vessels were at the right loading point at the right time, that they were sent to their assigned assembly areas at the time required. The loading and assembly of all ships was uneventful and proceeded basically according to plan.³

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Footnotes:

p.375 #1 Except where otherwise noted the materials in this section have been taken from ON-4.

p.376 #1 It will be seen from sketch ______ that all the Assault Forces except form "U" were loaded within the confines of the Portsmouth Home Command. Force "U", follow-up Force "B", and the 1st U.S. Build-up Force were loaded within the confines of Plymouth Home Command, British Follow-up Force "L", and the 1st British Build-up convoys in Nore command.

p.377 #1 As between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy, responsibilities for loading were divided as follows:

1. The movement of personnel, vehicles, and supplies to ports (points) of embarkation as required by the Landing Force commander is the responsibility of the S.O.S. ETOUSA.
2. Personnel (1) the allocation of Army Units to ship and craft is the responsibility of the Army. The allocation should be made in consultation with the Navy to insure that the desired load and the loading schedules are practicable, and the craft suitable from a naval point of view. (2) The allocation to troop space aboard ship is the responsibility of the Army. The allocation should be worked out in consultation with the Navy to insure that it is within the capacity of the ship and that the troops are distributed to facilitate debarkation. (3) The embarkation of troops is the responsibility of the S.O.S. ETOUSA with agreement of the Naval representative.
3. Cargo-Vehicles. (1) The allocation of vehicles and supplies to ships for the Assault is the responsibility of the Army. The allocation should be worked out in agreement with the Navy in order to insure that the required capacity and battle trim of the ships is not exceeded and that safety precautions are complied with. (2) Priority for discharge of vehicles and cargo is established by the Army. (3) The stowage plan of cargo and vehicles is the responsibility of the Army. The stowage should be worked out in agreement with the Navy in order to insure that the capacity and battle trim of the ship is not exceeded and that safety precautions are complied with. (4) Loading is the responsibility of the Army, subject to overall supervision by the Navy and approval of the vessel's Commanding Officer, in order to insure that the capacity and required battle trim of the vessel is not exceeded and that safety precautions are complied with. (5) Stowage and securing of all vehicles and cargo is the responsibility of the Army, as directed by the Commanding Officer of the vessel. (6) The loading of cargo ships and/or craft is the responsibility of the S.O.S. ETOUSA.
4. Movement of vessels to and from berths, quays, or hards, is the responsibility of the navy.
5. Subsequent movement of vessels is the responsibility of the Navy. (See Kirk-Bradley Agreement, CTF 122 Serial 0066 of 23 February 1944.)

p.378 #1 The production of loading schedules was a very intricate job. In view of the large number of vessels which had to be loaded from a comparatively few loading points, it was necessary that these schedules should be worked out to a high degree of detail. After they had been prepared on an Assault Force basis they were combined into an overall 'Master Plan' covering the entire invasion force. The initial draft of this 'Master Plan' was set out ON 4, Appendix I. The final detailed loading plan for British Forces was set out in the War Office NEPTUNE Outline Movement Plan Q.M. (6) 101, of 24 April 1944. SEE ALSO "Landing Tables NEPTUNE FORCE "U" by VII Corps U.S. Army, "Landing Tables NEPTUNE Force "O" by V-Corps, U.S. Army, "Landing Tables NEPTUNE Force "B" by V-Corps, U.S. Army.

p.379 #1 Details of loading and assembly areas of each force are given in ON-4, Appx.1, and II.

p.380 #1 CTF 122 Op.Plan 2-44 Serial 00144 of 21 April 1944.

p.380 #2 CTF 127 Op.Plan 1-44 Serial 000847 of 15 May 1944. These loading and assembly tables were incorporated in the CTF Op.Plan 2-44 Annex E.

p.380 #3 The only major hitch which developed was that the Army found it hard to resist the temptation of overloading ships and craft. The planned loading schedules were carefully worked out on the basis of what each ship could carry and what the Army would require, but when the Army arrived on board it brought along considerably more weight than the agreed allowance tables permitted. The Allied Naval Commander in Chief thereupon issued a directive prohibiting this practice. (See ANCXF Report P.42 Para.69 and P.44 par. 89. The unwisdom of overloading was indicated in the case of LCT 2498 of Group U.2.A. which capsized and sank at 2300 4 June 1944, with 1e vehicles and 70 men aboard. The allotted load was 11 vehicles and 55 men. ANCXF Report P.45 Par. 96.