Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

PART V
BRIEF REVIEW OF ROYAL NAVY PREPARATIONS

51. Royal Naval Commands employed so far as possible, their existing home organization for assembling, training, organizing and supporting their forces. The general plan was to organize the British assault and follow-up forces in the Home Commands, one Naval Command area to each force. Each assault force and the follow-up force was so organized as:

    1. to lift one assault division, plus such additional army divisions as the army commander required.

    2. to contain necessary fire support craft, communication sections, beach commander, and bombardment units.

    3. to permit sub-division into assault groups, each group being sufficient to lift one Brigade Group.

    4. Craft required for the Build-up, but not required for the assault, were also to be attached to the assault and follow-up forces.

52. The Admiralty designated the force commanders, their sub-commanders and staffs, and provided the naval units to be built up into assault forces. Landing craft were supplied as organized flotillas; other vessels and forces being supplied as individual units. These component elements as they became available were assigned to the command of the respective assault force commanders. The CinC of the Home Command, within which each assault force was stationed, provided accommodation, administration, discipline, fuel, stores, ammunition, repairs, maintenance, anchorages, berth, and general "logistic and administrative support". The assault force commanders exercised naval command over their forces, under command of the C's in C, Home Command, for day to day operations. At the same time they were responsible to ANCXF regarding broad policy.

During the assault, CinC Portsmouth, principally, and to a lesser degree CinC Plymouth, CinC Nore, and V.A.Dover, provided maintenance, repair, and also logistic and administrative support for the R.N. Assault Forces. ¹
53. An Admiralty narrative has described the formation and preparation of the Royal Navy assault forces as follows:

    "Of the five Assault Forces, Force "J" started its training with a decided advantage over the other four, its nucleus having been formed as far back as October, 1942, under Captain Hughes-Hallett, with headquarters at Cowes. In 1943 it took part in the landing in Sicily, after which it returned to the Isle of Wight, and was built up to lift a division. In November 1943, Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian was appointed to command Force "J" and training with the 3rd Canadian Division, which had started in September, was carried out during the winter. This included twelve assault and three ferry exercises, as well as several beach reconnaisances - the latter in the actual NEPTUNE area.

    During this training period there was another change in the command, Commodore G.N. Oliver relieving Rear-Admiral Vian on the appointment of the latter in February 1944, as Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force.

    Force "S", commanded by Rear-Admiral A.G. Talbot, was based in Scotland for its training. Headquarters were set up in October 1943 at Inverness, and training with the 3rd British Infantry Division commenced in December.

The training of this Force was seriously handicapped by the restriction in its assault training areas; not until the final exercise at the end of March, for example, could close support fire and the assault be practised at the same beach. Another great difficulty was the stormy winter weather of the Moray Firth, but this Rear-Admiral Talbot subsequently considered "a blessing in disguise". Putting aside the cancellation of exercises and losses of craft ¹ and personnel, the experience gained under these conditions stood them in good stead in actual operations.

Five full-scale exercises were carried out at Burghead, which from a hydrological point of view, closely resembled the beach which was to be assaulted in Normandy.

During most of this period the entire staffs of Force S, and the 3rd British Division were working together at Combined Force Headquarters in Cameron Barracks, Inverness, but the routine work in connection with the training was so intense that it was decided to seek a more peaceful atmosphere for the detailed planning of the operation, and from the month of March the Combined Planning Staff moved to Aberlour House on Speyside. The Rear-Admiral subsequently expressed the opinion that the results fully justified this step.

At the beginning of April, 1944, Force S commenced to move south to the Assembly Area (Portsmouth), an operation completed without incident by the end of the month. (Operation DOWNSTREAM)"

Force G started at a considerable disadvantage to the other two Forces, as it was not formed until 1 March 1944. Its task was to land the 50th (Northumberland) Division.

Commodore Douglas-Pennant established his headquarters (H.M.S. PURBECK) at the Royal Hotel, Weymouth, on 14 March ¹ and during the ensuing six weeks four Brigade exercises were carried out in the Studland area. In this connection, the Commodore subsequently remarked that the Army possessed an advantage over the Navy in that its Training Staff was almost entirely separate from its operational staff, thus allowing the latter to concentrate on planning the actual operation. "it is hardly an exaggeration", he wrote, "to say that they could devote little time to the operation until the beginning of May". ²

The disadvantage due to the shortness of the working up period was accentuated by the fact that the Headquarters Ship, H.M.S. BULOLO did not arrive in the United Kingdom till 17th April, and then required the fitting of extra communications. She was thus only available for the final exercise ("FABIUS"). The Commodore remarked that the collaboration of a Force Staff and the officers of the Headquarters Ship can contribute greatly to the success of an operation and regretted that the two did not have the opportunity of working together during the earlier exercises. ³

The Force was transferred from the Portland-Poole area to the Southhampton - Solent area on 28 April."

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Footnotes:

p.372 #1 ANCXF Report, Vol. 1, p.7, Admiral Ramsay concurred with the opinion expressed by Rear-Admiral Vian that 5 to 6 months is the ideal period for a force to work up in". ANCXF Report, Vol.1, page 56.)

p.373 #1 For the first three months there were no slipways or docks in the area to enable underwater repairs to be carried out to the craft and the weather prevented their being sent further afield. Rear-Admiral Talbot paid tribute to the Repair Staffs of the Northern bases under Captain J.I. Hallett, C.B.E., R.N., who "worked marvels by beaching the craft and working on them at low water".

p.374 #1 Commodore Douglas-Pennant arrived in London from India on 17 February and took over the Naval planning staff which was already carrying out preliminary planning with the Advanced Headquarters of the 30th Corps and 50th Division in a Combined Force H.Q. in London. the Advanced H.Q. of the 50th Division accompanied the Naval Headquarters to H.M.S. Purbeck.

p.374 #2 ANCXF Report, Vol. II, Report by Naval Commander, Force G, p.5.

p.374 #3 H.M.S. Bulolo had, however, already carried out the duties of Force Headquarters Ship at Oran, Sicily, and Anzio, and Commodore Douglas-Pennant subsequently stated that the experience gained by her ship's company in these operations was of great value.