Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

PART II
PREPARATIONS OF BASES FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

A. Naval Bases and Training Areas In Southwest England: Relations With C-in-C Plymouth

15. The decision to mount the U.S. invasion forces in Southwestern England meant that the task of making British resources available for U.S. Naval use fell principally on the Plymouth Home Command.¹ C-in-C Plymouth began preparation for mounting a cross-channel invasion in 1942. This early beginning was the result of Admiral Ramsay's survey and report,² which indicated that Naval shore facilities in Southern England were utterly inadequate to mount an invasion. Until July 1943, when plans became sufficiently firm for Admiral Stark to begin listing specific requirements, C-in-C Plymouth's preparations were of a general nature and followed closely the lines laid down by Admiral Ramsay. With the arrival of ComLandCrab in the substantial beginnings made by C-in-C Plymouth were augmented to vast preparations through the joint efforts of the Plymouth Home Command and the LandCraBeu organization.³

16. Facilities prepared were of all types, including:

    1. Bases,

    2. Docking, lighterage, and other facilities for loading and unloading ships and craft

    3. Anchorages and berthing facilities

    4. Protections of ships and ship movements in the area from enemy air and naval action

    5. Repair and maintenance facilities

    6. Shore accommodation including hoising, office space, depot and storage facilities.

    7. Experimental stations and training areas.

17. C-in-C Plymouth had under his control all sailings and movements of ships and crafts in the area under his command. In general ship movements were planned to meet the desires of the U.S. Naval Commands while at the same time coordinating all such movements with operations of vessels engaged in routine movements in the area. Similarly, the C-in-C Plymouth, within whose command were stationed the bulk of all U.S. Naval Forces, was recognized as the authority to negotiate the acquisition of sites and property for use of U.S. Naval Bases. The appropriate U.S. Naval authority, usually COMLANDCRABEU, would inform C-in-C Plymouth of U.S.N. requirements, C-in-C Plymouth would make the arrangements, and the U.S. Navy would take possession and assume command. British labor and materials, so far as available, would be applied as directed by U.S.N. authorities. Labor and material not available in Britain were supplied from U.S. scources. During the sojourn of the U.S. Navy in the Plymouth Command, C-in-C Plymouth thus provided and COMLANDCRAB established and organized some 19 U.S. Navy bases and establishments of varying size.¹

18. Outside the Plymouth Command some 14 U.S. Naval Bases and authorities were established.¹ British resources, so far as they were employed, were made available through the C-in-C of the local home command on the same basis in the Plymouth Command.

19. The establishment of American bases with large staffs necessitated the provision of adequate living and office accommodation. Accommodation was also required for the crews of numerous Minor Landing Craft, and at a later date for the planning staffs of Forces "U" and "B". This was met by the requisitioning of houses and sites and the building of huts by the U.S.N. Construction Battalions (SEABEES). By the 1st June, over 22,000 U.S.N. officers and men were accommodated ashore in England. Of these 15,000 were stationed at ports in the Plymouth Command, about 8,000 were at Plymouth, 3,000 at Falmouth and 2,000 at Dartmouth). In addition some 2,700 were accommodated in the U.S. Naval Supply Depot at Exeter.²

20. In order to give the invading forces an opportunity to train for the real assault, suitable areas in Southwestern England were required of such a nature that realistic dress rehearsals including bombardment could be carried out. COMNAVUE, having surveyed a great many possible locations, requested an area in the vicinity of Appledore. The

flatness of the beaches and the other geographical features of this area closely approximated the characteristics of the designated points of assault on Normandy coast. After C-in-C Plymouth made the necessary arrangements, a training base was established and training begun in September 1943.
21. The Cabinet also authorized the Admiralty, in November 1943, to requisition an Amphibious Assault Training area at Slapton Sands for the use of American Forces. This area, about five miles aquare situated in Torbay on the Devon Coast was to be employed for the use of live ammunition, including heavy bombardment. It was a rich agricultural district containing many villages and a number of farms. The evacuation of the people, arranged by the Regional Commission was accepted in good spirit by the inhabitants. They left their home and means of livelihood realizing that their sacrifice was a necessary contribution to the success of the cross channel operation. The Admiralty delegated the Administration of the area to the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth. A U.S. Army Colonel, as Range Commandant, was installed in the area with a Range Party. To work with him, a British Naval Liaison Officer was appointed. The area was under the direct control of the Commanding General, 1st U.S. Army, who delegated his authority to the Corps Commander of whatever Corps happened to be training in the area at any given time. It was the latter's responsibility to coordinate Army and Navy practice programs. The first assault landing was made on Slapton Sands on the 2nd January.

B. Repair and Port Facilities

22. The ports of Southwest England were very inadequately provided with docks and wharves suitable for loading and accommodating the numerous landing craft which were to sail from them for the invasion. To make good this deficiency Hards were constructed in sheltered

water in all the ports.¹ Construction was substantially completed by the end of November 1943. In order to provide berthing requirements for the many U.S. assault craft (on the even of D-day there were some 2,500 U.S. invasion vessels in the Plymouth Command) approximately 1100 moorings and the same number of anchor berths and berths alongside quays and wharves were specially

provided.¹

In order to repair vessels which would return from France with damage or defects beyond the capacity pf the light maintenance facilities at the Hards, four special maintenance bases for major landing vessels, five sets of landing craft grids and four maintenance bases for minor landing craft were constructed.¹

23. The Plymouth command, acting in accordance with the stated requirement of U.S. naval forces, carried out the normal duties of port director in arranging the movement, protection, escort, berthing, etc. of U.S. naval vessels within the command. He followed the principle always of using the establishment facilities of his command to give effect to the wishes of the commander 11th Amphibious Force¹

C. Arrival and Organization of Amphibious Forces

24. On 27 November, 1943, Rear-Admiral Hall assumed command of the 11th Amphibious Force relieving Rear-Admiral Wilkes who had served temporarily pending the arrival of the permanent commander. At that time the 11th Amphibious Force consisted of:

    1. The Landing Craft and Bases Organization.

    2. 235 Landing vessels, and

    3. A few miscellaneous special units (Shore Fire Control Parties, elements of beach battalions, and others).

    Although COMINCH had drawn up tables of planned arrivals of landing ships and craft in June, they were not scheduled to arrive in quantity until the bases for their reception and maintenance were ready and until the force commander was present to organize them for future duty. In December the amphibious forces commenced to arrive in quantity. By the first of June there were 2458 ships and craft in the 11th Amphibious Force, plus 35 temporarily associated destroyers, cruisers, and battleships of the Atlantic fleet.

These many vessels did not come to England as an organized amphibious force. Ther arrived as they became available, a single vessel or division, group or flotilla at a time. They were organized into an invasion force by the Commander, Eleventh Amphibious Force.
25. COMINCH had laid down an organizational framework into which the vessels to be supplied were to be fitted. This followed the standard U.S. Naval organization of Amphibious forces - 6 vessels to a division, 2 divisions to a group, 3 groups to a flotilla. The COMINCH directive also laid down the designation of flotillas, groups and divisions (viz L.S.T. Flotilla II, or L.C.I. Group 29, or L.C.T. Division 21), With a very few exceptions, no vessels were assigned in advance either to divisions, groups and flotillas or to the 11th Amphibious Force. Vessels to be sent to England direct from the United States were assigned their place in the organization by Vice Chief of Naval Operations, those sent from the Mediterranean or elsewhere were assigned their place by Commander 11th Amphibious Force.¹

26. Vessels arrived in the United Kindom, under orders to report to Com 12th Fleet for duty in the 11th Amphibious Force. On arrival, Com 11th Phib designated their position in the force organization, and assigned them to COMLANDCRABEU 11th Phib for assignment to bases and for logistics and administrative support. The latter, Commander in coordination with C-in-C Plymouth, provided berths, anchorages, shore headquarters, shore accommodation, repair and maintenance, and controlled their day to day movements. In addition LANDCRABEU supplied food, pay, medical treatment, spare parts, and all the other innumerable items involved in adminstrative and logistic support. He in turn drew his requirements direct from COM 12th Fleet.

27. In addition to the strictly amphibious forces (viz LST's, LCI's, LCT's, etc), nearly all other ships and special parties required for an amphibious assault were turned over to the 11th Amphibious Force to be organized, trained and supported. Included among these were the transports, most of the destroyers, the minesweepers, PT's, SC's, and various far shore groups, and in fact everything except the Battleships, cruisers and some of the destroyers. Even the latter were supported, so far as they required support in the U.K., by LANDCRAB, and their movements scheduled by him. By 1 June, there were 2458 ships and craft in the 11th Amphibious Force and 35 associated destroyers, cruisers and battleships, a total of 2493 vessels.¹

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Footnotes:

p.348 #1 Plans for SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were based on the principle of Americans in the West, British in the East, (see Chapter II, Section 1, for discussions and references). At the RATTLE conference the COSSAC planners agreed that this would be the best policy for OVERLORD (see Chapter II, Section 3, for details and references). The proposal was incorporated into the COSSAC plan (Cos (43) 416 (O) of 30 July 1943 Part II Paragraph 40, pages 10 and 11) and was given the final stamp of approval when the President, Prime Minister and CCS approved the plan (2nd Citidal meeting, Quebec Conference of ....August 1943).

p.348 #2 "Provisional Assessment of Naval Implications of ROUNDUP, 1943" Enclosure 3 entitled "Preliminary Forecast of Assault Stations for Naval Forces and Shipping Admiralty M.05404/42 of 16 July 1942.

p.348 #3 The following account of the preparation of bases and shore establishments generally has been taken in general from the NEPTUNE Report of C-in-C Plymouth and from "A History of the U.S. Naval Bases in the U.K." (COMPHISUKAY Serial 00385).

p.349 #1

Milford Haven Penarth Appledore Instow Falmouth St. Marwes Bugle

Fowey Saltash Calstock Launceton Plymouth Heathfield Dartmouth

Salcombe Brixham Teignmouth Newton Abbott Exeter Hawkerland Valley Tiverton

p.350 #1

Londonderry Rosneath Portland Weymouth Poole

Lymington Southampton Calshot Portsmouth Hedge End

New Haven Tilbury Deptford (Nore) Staines London

A full and excellent account of the U.S. Naval Bases and other establishments in the United Kingdom will be found in a History of the United States Naval Bases in the United Kingdom issued by Commander Amphibious Bases United Kingdom, Serial 00385.

p.350 #2 One requirement for shore accommodation was met when the Combined Operations Naval Training Establishment housed in the R.N. College at Dartmouth, was moved to the East Coast in December, together with its attached landing craft, and the college buildings turned over to the Americans for the accommodation of their personnel on 1st January.

p.352 #1 A Hard was a hard surfaced sloping causeway leading from a road ashore down the beach to a point well below the low water mark, and so arranged that a landing vessel could run its bows onto the Hard at any stage of the tide, open its ramp and load or unload vehicles by the simple process of driving them on or off. (It was in fact a simplified ferry slip.) The Hards were equipped with:

1. a pipeline for supplying vessels with fuel and water,

2. personnel for operating the Hards and their accommodation,

3. supplies, equipment, ammunition and light repair facilities for vessels at the Hards.

Hards were constructed at the following ports:

L.C.T. HARDS					L.C.T. HARDS
Brixham	1	4	Berths		Torquay	1	4	Berths
Dartmouth	1	2	Berths		Dartmouth	2	6	"
Plymouth	2	6	"		Plymouth	4	14	"
Falmouth	2	6	"		Falmouth	2	6	"
Helford River	1	2	"

The army proposed using open beaches which looked attractive to them on a sunny day, and saw little use for sheltered Hards.

p.353 #1 The table below shows the number of craft for which mooring were provided at the ports in the channel.

Ports	A.P.A.	L.S.T.	Major Landing Craft	Minor Landing Craft
Falmouth	5	26	99	128
Fowey	1	7	64	82
Plymouth		21	79	141
Salcombe		12	55
Dartmouth	1	14	96	166
Brixham		2	48
Torquay			12
Teignmouth				48

p.354 #1

1. LCT Slips were built at the following ports:

   Plymouth --- Dartmouth -- Salcombe -- Falmouth --

   Slips at Queene Ann's Battery Slips at Waddeton Slips at Millbay Slips at Silley Cox Yard.

2. Grids for major landing craft were constructed at Appledore, Falmouth, Fowey, Plymouth and Dartmouth in order to expedite repair work and hull examination which would not warrant slipping the craft at a maintenance base. The grids were operated principally by private firms, employing their own labor and equipment.

3. Maintenance bases for minor landing craft were established at Plymouth, (Calstock and Saltash), Falmouth, Dartmouth and Teignmouth. Suitable L.C.M. Slips or Trolleys were also constructed. L.C.M. Slipways were constructed at Plymouth, Falmouth and Teignmouth. At Dartmouth minor landing craft were placed on trolleys at the Hards and taken to the maintenance base Coronation Park nearby,

4. By invasion day maintenance facilities capable of dealing with 20% of the amphibious force (viz. some 300 vessels) at one time had been prepared.

p.355 #1 The only failure in the performance of these duties occurred at 0220 26 April when, as a result of C-in-C Plymouth having neglected to sail an escort (HMS SCIMITAR), an inadequately protected convoy of LST's engaged in an exercise were attacked by three German E-boats. Two were sunk (LST's 507 and 531) while a third (LST 289) was damaged. The casualties were 638 killed and 89 wounded. (See ANCXF War Diary of 28 April 1944.)

p.356 #1 COMINCH Serial 03003 of 24 September 1943. This directs COM 12th Fleet to make assignments of vessels not coming from the U.S. Com 12th Fleet delegated this responsibility to CTF 122 who delegated it to COM 11th PHIB. (See COM 12th Fleet Serial 03450 of 12 November 43 and CTF 122 of 13 December 1943.

p.357 #1 See Section 5 of this Chapter for details of (1) numbers of U.S. Naval vessels present in the U.K. by months, (2) The overall disposal of U.S. Naval OVERLORD Vessels before, during and after NEPTUNE, and (3) a case history of the movements and assignments of vessels.