Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER V
NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

PART I
U.S. NAVAL PREPARATIONS

A. COMNAVEU Organization and Action

1. Command of all Naval Forces in Europe was vested in Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Commander 12th Fleet and Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe (COMNAVEU)¹ The origins of COMNAVEU run back to the first World War. Admiral William Sims, U.S.N. then occupied the post of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters, Commander Harold R. Stark, served on his staff as Flag Secretary. Between wars the command went into abeyance, but a U.S. Naval authority in Europe was revived in London, in 1940-1941, under the title of "Special Naval Observer" (SPENAVO). The specific functions to be performed by Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, as SPENAVO, were defined in orders issued by C.N.O., 5 April 1941, based on the A.B.C.-1 agreement of 27 March, 1941. The instructions then issued to Vice Admiral Ghormley envisaged, in fact, his later designation as "Commander U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe", in the event of U.S. entry into the war.²

He occupied the post of SPENAVO, from August 1940 until 17 March 1942, when he was designated "Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe" (COMNAVEU).¹ He was relieved by Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., who assumed this command 29 April, 1942.²
2. Preparation of bases ashore in England, to serve U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters, may be traced back to 1941 - before American entry into the war. In that year, by arrangement with the British Government, and under Lend Lease financing, construction of naval and air bases in the United Kingdom was begun. The two principle ones were Base I at Londonderry in Northern Ireland and Base II on the Clyde at Rosneath, Scotland. These bases were originally intended for R.N. use, but were to be later used by the U.S. Navy as points from which U.S. Naval escort forces engaged in defense of the transatlantic and Russian convoys could be supported. In 1942, when the ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER projects for a cross channel invasion were being considered, direct control of these two bases was taken over by the U.S. Navy. On July 16 a small amphibious force, the "Advance Group Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet", under the command of Rear Admiral A. ?. Bennett, U.S.N., was formed and stationed at Base II.³ This force was transferred, October 1942, to U.S. Naval Forces in Europe as "U.S. Amphibious Forces, Europe".⁴

3. When it was decided to undertake landings in North

Africa instead of France, Rear Admiral Bennett and the greater part of his command was assigned to TORCH, and in due course went to Oran, Algeria. Effective 10 October 1942, the residue of this force, under the commander of J. O. Huse, U.S.N. was detached from the Atlantic Fleet and assigned to COMNAVEU, with the name Amphibious Forces Europe (PHIBSEU).¹ Base II was later returned to the British (31 January 1943). From October 1942, until OVERLORD preparations were begun in earnest, PHIBSEU remained as a small technical organization associated with the British Combined Operations Headquarters.
4. During 1943, when plans for OVERLORD were being developed the status of COMNAVEU in the fleet organization of the United States Navy went through several changes. Before 15 March 1943, his status in the U.S. Fleet organization was that of Commander Task Force 99, of the 9th Fleet, which was under the direct command of Admiral King.² On 15 March 1943, TF 99 was redesignated TF 92.³ On 15 August, the 9th Fleet was redesignated 11th Fleet, still under the direct command of Admiral King, and TF 92 was redesignated TF 112.⁴ On 16 September, Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed COMNAVEU to assume responsibility for the logistic support of all U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. He also required all authorities (the Royal Navy, the U.S. Army and all others) to make demands for U.S. Naval resources (vessels, equipment, personnel, etc.) for use in the European Theater on COMNAVEU, who was to screen all demands, to determine whether there was a real requirement for them, to arrange to meet requirements from local U.S. or British resources if possible, and if not, to submit demands to the Navy Department.⁵

B. Twelfth Fleet and Task Force 122

5. The Fleet Organization 7th U.S. Navy was revised in September 1943. The U.S. Twelfth Fleet was established, from 1 October 1943, to include all U.S. Naval Forces in Northwest European waters. Admiral Stark, as COMNAVEU, was designated, Commander Twelfth Fleet¹. The commander was made responsible for:

   1. Making the preparations in England for the reception and maintenance of the enormous U.S. Naval Forces which were to be sent over;

   2. Providing for the vast logistic and administration support which these forces would require while in England;

   3. Organizing and training U.S. Naval Forces in a manner which would meet the requirements of the Operational Plan;

   4. Supervising the formulation of the operational plan, to be drawn up by a combined British and U.S. Army, Navy and Air planning organization, to exploit to the full the capabilities of the U.S. Navy and to preserve the essentials of the standard organization and methods of the U.S. Navy, without which its full capabilities could not be realized;

   5. Delivering the U.S. Naval forces fit and ready to the Supreme Commander on the eve of D-day;

   6. Providing for the upkeep and maintenance and for their logistic and administrative support, during and after the operation, and

   7. Determining when they could be withdrawn from OVERLORD service to the other theaters where they were urgently required.

6. COMINCH provided, in establishing the Twelfth Fleet, that all U.S. naval Forces, assigned to OVERLORD operations, should constitute a Task Force of this Fleet. This Task Force would be under the command of one officer who would serve, during the operation, under the command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. In this way, COMNAVEU as Commander Twelfth Fleet, with all his navy functions as representative of COMINCH and the Navy Department (logistics, administration, naval mission in the U.K., area Naval Commander, etc.) would not be subordinated to a Combined Allied Operational Command. This was specified in the COMINCH order of 29 October 1943, directing the Commander, U.S. Twelfth Fleet to establish such a Task Force under Rear Admiral A.G. Kirk, U.S.N.¹ This Task Force was to include all U.S. Naval OVERLORD Forces and its commander was to serve under the operational control of ANCXF.

7. Prior to his appointment as CTF 122, Rear Admiral Kirk had been Commander of Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet and in this capacity he had served briefly in the Mediterranean as Commander of an Assault Force in the invasion of Sicily, under Commander 8th Fleet.² Rear Admiral Kirk assumed duty as Commander Task Force 122 or 10 November 1943. During the pre assault period, he and his staff, with headquarters in London, were engaged in developing the U.S. Naval part of the NEPTUNE plan and operating orders. In accordance with the broad plans of COMINCH³ and COM 12th Fleet the responsibility of preparing U.S. Forces was delegated to Commander 11th Amphibious Force,⁴ subject to this broad supervision by CTF 122 of the organization, preparation and training these Forces, in accordance with the ANCXF plan. He assumed direct command on the eve of the invasion, May 27, 1944.

C. Establishment of Eleventh Amphibious Forces

8. During the Mediterranean interlude the assembly of U.S. Naval invasion forces in the United Kingdom has come almost to a standstill. In May 1943, preparations for a cross channel operation were again set in motion, the CCS having agreed, at the Washington Conference, that the build-up of U.S. Amphibious Forces in England should be begun. In order to provide the Amphibious Forces required for the cross Channel assault, COMINCH, on 15 July, revived the moribund Amphibious Forces Europe,¹ redesignated it on 12 August 1943 the 11th Amphibious Force,² and assigned it to the command of the 12th Fleet. At that time the 11th Amphibious Force was little more than a name. The bases and shore organization to support the sea going forces were yet to be provided, as forces became available they were sent to England to be organized, prepared and maintained by the Amphibious Force Commander. COMINCH selected Rear Admiral John L Hall³ for the task of building up the U.S.N. Amphibious Force and to command it during Operation NEPTUNE.

9. In October, 1943, Rear Admiral Hall was designated COM 11th Phib. He was then commander of the 8th Amphibious Force (all amphibious forces in the Mediterranean), under Vice Admiral Hewitt, U.S.N. Commander 8th Fleet, and COMNNVNAW. In that capacity, Rear Admiral Hall had organized the U.S. Amphibious Forces engaged in the invasion of Sicily and Italy, had commanded the Central Assault Force during the Sicilian invasion, and had also commanded the U.S Assault Force at Salerno. In October, 1943, when he was designated to Command the 11th Amphibious Force, under Rear Admiral Hall was still engaged in the final stages of the Italian Assault. He departed the Mediterranean in November, arrived in Plymouth, England, on November 27th and assumed command the same day.⁴

10. Before the arrival of the Amphibious Force Commander and the bulk of the U.S. Naval sea going invasion forces, a vast amount of preparatory work was required, particularly in the matter of building bases and caring for the first trickle of landing craft arrivals. In early June, COMINCH directed that bases in Southwestern England should be acquired, where U.S. Naval Forces could be assembled, trained and prepared for the operation.¹ He required that while "command of U.S. Naval Bases for landing craft in the United Kingdom" was to be exercised by a U.S. Naval authority, "full use of existing (viz. British) facilities must be made in order that critical material may be conserved, and shipping space used to the best advantage.

11. COMNAVEU had already conducted a survey of possible bases in Southwestern England, and by 28 July, 1943, had ear marked nearly all the locations which the U.S. Navy was to use.² On receiving instructions from COMINCH to go ahead with actual preparations, he soon completed negotiations with the British. In addition to agreeing on sites for U.S. bases, COMNAVEU obtained British agreement to a basic plan governing Anglo-American naval relations.

    1. The Royal Navy was to be the sole British authority with which the U.S. Navy would be required to deal. The U.S. Navy would state its requirements, the Royal Navy would take the necessary steps to provide them. The Royal Navy would requisition land or buildings, negotiate for the supply of labor or materials, let contracts and so on. In this way the U.S. Navy was saved an immense amount of trouble and frustration.

    2. In order to assure that U.S.N. assault and support forces would be required to deal with only one R.N. authority, ComNaveu secured an agreement from the Admiralty to enlarge C-in-C Plymouth's command area

to include all the major U.S.N. bases.¹
3. The C-in-C Portsmouth arranged that the bases acquired would be subject to U.S.N. command even though the R.N. provided them and a large part of their equipment and facilities.

4. COMNAVEU had arranged that, while the R.N. Home Commands would initiate and control the movements for ships in their waters, they would do so as required by the U.S. Naval Command.
12. These arrangements gave the U.S. Navy full freedom of action in the command, organization, training and support of their own forces, while at the same time they assured that local British resources would be employed to the maximum. On 28 July, Admiral Stark informed COMINCH that "the British (were to make) available to us (the U.S. Navy) nearly all the housing, office and ship facilities that we (would) need in Appledore, Falmouth, Fowey, Dartmouth, Salcombe, Teignmouth and Plymouth ----- (In addition) the Royal Navy (would) supply ----- about 65% of naval stores, port machinery, boats, moorings, etc., which we (would) require. The requests on the United States for material (would be) kept to an absolute minimum".²

13. In order to man the bases being prepared, and to provide care and maintenance for the craft which were beginning to arrive, COMNAVEU requested COMINCH to provide him with a suitable base maintenance organization. In response COMINCH established the Craft and Bases Component of the Amphibious force and sent it to England in advance of the arrival of the sea going forces and of the Task Force Commander. COMINCH outlined the functions which he intended this organization to serve as follows:³ "------

2. As a first step in the build up for operations and prior to the later appointment of a U.S. Naval Commander for a future operations afloat, a new command is established of "Landing Craft and Bases, Europe". (Short title - LANCRABEU)

3. For the present this command will be under your (COMNAVEU's) general administrative control and support. The officer appointed to command will perform additional duty as Commander, Amphibious Forces, Europe, until such time as relieved of this duty. -----

5. The subject command will be established about 1 September 1943, with a flag officer in command. -----

6. It is expected that a Captain or Commander under Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Europe (will act as officer-in-charge of each training establishment or base with a minimum of such other officers as required. -----

8. It is contemplated that the Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Europe, (short title - COMLANCRABEU) will perform the following tasks: (a) Command U.S. Naval Bases for landing craft in the United Kingdom. (b) Provide for the reception and effective maintenance of U.S. Landing Craft in the United Kingdom. (c) Establish facilities as required for use of landing craft during the training phase, for the mounting of any operation, and for the follow-up. (d) Act in liaison with British authorities in charge of British bases used by U.S. Landing Craft in the care and operation of such craft. (e) Act as Commander Amphibious Forces, Europe, until relieved. (f) During combat operations, it is not expected that Commander, Landing Craft Bases, Europe, will have a tactical command afloat. It is considered that the development of maximum efficiency of landing craft and bases will require the full employment of his time on the tasks involved.

D. Landing Craft and Bases (LANCRABEU)

14. COMINCH, in approving COMNAVEU recommendations for the establishment of an amphibious base maintenance

organization in England, had designated Rear Admiral John Wilkes, U.S.N. as Commander Landing Craft and Bases, (COMLANCRABEU) under COMNAVEU.¹ In August 1943, Rear Admiral Wilkes formed a nucleus staff and, after consultations in the Navy Department, reported to COMNAVEU in London for duty 1 September 1943. He was immediately directed to assume control of existing craft, port organization and bases and to proceed with the establishment and commissioning of such new bases, and with preparations for such logistic support of amphibious forces as might be required. Admiral Wilkes established his headquarters at Falmouth, on 13 October 1943 - in view of the special relationships established with C-in-C Plymouth, Admiral Wilkes transferred this headquarters to Plymouth on 3 January, 1944.

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Footnotes:

p.338 #1 See Note 1; Part 6.

p.338 #2 CNO letter of instructions to Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, USN, Special Naval Observer, London, defined the functions of this post. In paragraph 3, it was stated:

"3. It is suggested that you officially inform the American Ambassador and the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee that, if and when the United States enters the war, you may expect orders as the Naval member of the United States Military Mission in London, and as the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in North Europe. In the latter office, you will have administrative responsibility for the United States Naval Forces in the United Kingdom and British Home Waters, as defined in Annex III of the Report of United States - British Staff Conference (ABC-1)".

p.339 #1 SecNav Despatch to SPENAVO 172019 March 1942.

p.339 #2 See letter from the President of the Unites States dated 18 March 1942. This established U.S. Naval Forces Europe and designated Admiral Stark, COMNAVEU. See also orders from the Secretary of the Navy 17 March 1942, SecNav.

p.339 #3 COMINCH Serial 00650 of 15 July 1942.

p.339 #4 COMINCH Secret Despatch 221650 September 1942.

p.340 #1 COMINCH Despatch 221645 of September 45; COMINCH Serial 001068 of 25 September 42; COMNAVEU Despatch 232031 of September 45; COMADGRAMPHIBANT Despatch 001415 of 15 October 42.

p.340 #2 COMINCH Despatch 192200 of 19 February 43; COMINCH Paper of 15 March 43 entitled "Revision of Task Force Numbers".

p.340 #3 IBID

p.340 #4 COMINCH Despatch 111312/12 of 9 August 43.

p.340 #5 V.C.N.O. Serial 0141812 of 21 September 1943; V.C.N.O. Despatch 161627 September 1943.

p.341 #1 COMINCH Serial 001915 of 9 September 1943.

p.342 #1 See Part 6; Note 2.

p.342 #2 COMINCH Despatch 111902 of 12 August 1943.

p.342 #3 Admiral Cooke's Memo to Admiral King of 7 October 1943.

p.342 #4 CTF 122 Op plan 1-43 Serial 0043 of 11 December 1943
CTF Op Plan 1-44 Serial 00164 of 18 March 1944.

p.343 #1 COMINCH Serial 001423 of 15 July 1943

p.343 #2 COMINCH Despatch 111902 of 12 August 1943.

p.343 #3 See Part 6; Note 3.

p.343 #4 V.C.N.O. Serial 0140212 of 25 June 1942; COMINCH Serial 001423 of 15 July 1943.

p.344 #1 VCNO Serial 0140212 of 25 June 43; and COMINCH Serial 001423 of 15 July 1943.

p.344 #2 Base II, Milford Haven, Appledore, Falmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Salcombe, Fowey, and Teignmouth (see ComNavEu Letter to COMINCH dates 28 July 43 and Landorab History Page 5).

p.345 #1 The northern shores of the Severn ----- the coast of South Wales --- was normally in the C-in-C Western Approaches Home Command. But in order to allow U.S. Naval authorities to deal with a single Home Command, the Plymouth area was temporarily extended to the latitude of Milford Haven.

p.345 #2 COMNAVEU Letter to COMINCH of 28 July 1943, see also LANCRAB History Page 5.

p.345 #3 COMINCH Serial 001423 of 15 July 1943.

p.347 #1 Bupers - 3-ARF,F915 - 28895 of August 1943 and Endorsement.