Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER IV
NEPTUNE OPERATIONS PLANS

PART V
THE NAVAL PLAN

A. Outline Review Of NEPTUNE Operation

94. The outline of the naval aspects of NEPTUNE operation can be summarized under the following headings:

    1. Object: The object of NEPTUNE was to carry out an operation from the United Kingdom to secure a lodgement on the Continent, from which further offensive operations could be developed. The lodgement area, which was required to contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of 26 to 30 divisions, and to enable it to be augmented by re-inforcements at the rate of 3 to 6 divisions per month, was to comprise the Cherbourg and Brittany Peninsula including all that part of France lying westward of a line drawn from Caen to Nantes.

    2. Naval Objectives: The naval objective was the safe and timely arrival of the Assault Forces at their beaches, and the cover of their landing, and subsequently the support and maintenance, and the rapid build-up of allied forces ashore.

    3. The Broad plan of attack:

       1. To assault from landing ships and landing craft in the bay of the Seine between Ouistreham and Varreville, with 5 divisions attacking on an R.C.T. front, and also to attack shortly before H-hour on the flanks behind the assault beaches by airborne landings.

       2. To complete the landing of the first 7 seaborne divisions on the second tide of D-day and the first tide of D plus 1 day. Thereafter to build-up the forces at the average rate of one and one third divisions a day.

       3. Initial army objectives were the towns of Caen, Bayeux, Isigny, Carentan, and the airfields in the area, and immediately afterwards, the port of Cherbourg.

       4. Subsequently, the advance was to be made to the West and Southwest in order to capture the Brittanny ports to and including NANTES by D plus 30 to D plus 40.

5. The next main objective was to be to capture Paris and to clear the enemy from the whole of Southern France.
4. Command: The operation was to be a combined British and United States undertaking, by all services of both nations operating under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expedtionary Force, (SCAEF), General D. D. Eisenhower. Under him and excercising joint command were three service Commanders-in-Chief,
   1. Navy, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (ANCXF)

   2. Army, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, (as Commander 21st Army Group), and

   3. Air Forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Air C-in-C, AEAF)

   The attack was to be launched by a Western (U.S.) and Eastern (British) Task Force in adjacent sectors in the Bay of the Seine. Command of these task forces and of all subordinate formations was to be excercised in accordance with the principle of Unity of Command, which provided that, until the Army was firmly established ashore, command of army formations embarked was to be excercised by the appropriate naval commander.

5. Forces Taking Part: The Eastern Naval Task Force under Rear Admiral A. G. Kirk, U.S.N., with elements of the 1st U.S. Army under Lt. General O.N. Bradley, U.S.A., was to attack the western beaches of the Seine Bay as follows:
   1. Assault Force U, with the 4th division of the VIIth Corps, was to assault UTAH beach at Varreville.
   2. Assault Force O, with two R.C.T. of the 1st and two R.C.T of the 29th divisions of the Vth Corps, was to attack OMAHA beach at St. Laurent.
   3. Follow-up Force B, with 1 R.C.T of the 1st and 1 R.C.T of the 29th division and overheads, was to arrive in the OMAHA area on the second tide of D-day.

   The Eastern Naval Task Force under Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian, R.N., with elements of the 2nd British Army (under Lt. General Sir Miles Dempsey), was to attack the eastern beaches of the Seine Bay as follows:

4. Assault Force G, with the 50th division of the XXXth Corps, was to assault GOLD beach at Asnelles.

5. Assault Force J, with the 3rd Canadian Division of 1st Corps, was to assault JUNO beach at Courseulles.

6. Assault Force S, with the 3rd Division of the 1st Corps, was to assault SWORD beach at Ouistreham.

7. Follow-up Force L, with the 22nd Armoured Brigade of the 30th Corps, was to arrive in the British area on the second tide of D-day.

8. In addition, seven Commando battalions of Force J and two Ranger battalions of Force O were also to assault selected points along the beaches.
6. D-day H-hour: H-hour was to be 40 to 138 minutes after morning civil twilight and 3 to 4 hours before high tide. D-day was to be the first date in June of suitable weather when an appropriate H-hour occurred (viz June 5, 6 or 7 and June 18, 19 or 20). D-day was subject to postponement from day to day, up to two days, in each suitable tidal and lunar period. A decision would be made about the operation owing to weather. Should postponement until the next suitable lunar period (i.e. about 12 days) be essential, troops, but not vehicles, would be disembarked.

7. Program: The Assault, Follow-up and First Build-up Forces were to be preloaded and assembled on the South Coast of England between the Thames and the Bristol Channel. They were to proceed in escorted convoys along pre-arranged swept channels protected by air and naval covering forces. Airborne Landings were to take place shortly before H-hour behind the assault beaches on the flanks, an American Division landing in the South East of the COTENTIN Peninsula, near CARENTAN, and two British Brigades at CAEN and the River ORNE crossings.
95. The sea borne assaults were to be made approximately simultaneously at H-hour, i.e. between 0600 and 0830, depending on the day selected as D-day. Follow-up forces

were to arrive p.m. D-day. The first two build-up divisions, one U.S. preloaded in the Bristol Channel, and one British preloaded in the Thames, were to be sailed to arrive, half on D plus 1 and half on D plus 2. Thereafter the Build-up was to be maintained by daily sailings of Personnel and M.T. Ships and Coaster Convoys, and by a Shuttle Service of L.S.T., L.C.I. (L), and L.C.T., from ports on the South Coast, the Bristol Channel and the Thames. The Build-up was to delivery approximately one and one third divisions per day complete with equipment. In addition each division already ashore was to be supported by the delivery of stores at the rate of 600 tons per day per division. The assault was to be supported by a bombardment force of 7 Battleships, 2 Monitors, 23 Cruisers, 2 Gunboats, 75 Fleet Destroyers, 16 Hunt class destroyers and special bombarding craft. The majority of the destroyers were also to escort assault convoys. In addition, 165 Sloops, Escort Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes, and P.C's were allocated to the Assault Forces and early convoys as escorts. The approach was to be covered by 20 Destroyers and 60 Coastal Craft. Four A/S Support Groups were to operate in the approaches to the Channel. Distant cover was to be provided by the R.N. Home Fleet and special forces of C-in-C Western Approaches.
96. Two prefabricated harbors (MULBERRY A and B) were to be constructed, one in the U.S. and one in the British Sector. They would enable stores to be unloaded when the weather prevented discharge over open beaches. It was hoped to complete their construction by about D plus 10. Five craft shelters (GOOSEBERRIES) were to be formed by the sinking of 60 old ships, which would arrive on D plus 1 and D plus 2. These shelters were expected to form a lee for the Ferry Craft.¹

B. Loading and Assembly¹

97. NEPTUNE Plans provided for the loading and assembly of the forces, as indicated below:

    1. The assault and follow-up forces and the first build-up divisions were to load and assemble as follows:-

       Force	Military	Loading Point	Assembly Point
       First Br.	Build-up Div.	Thames	Thames
       L	1 Brigade 2 Brigade	Tilbury Felixtowe	Southend Harwich
       S	1 Brigade 2 Brigades	Portsmouth Newhaven Shoreham	Newhaven and Shoreham and Portsmouth
       J	(3 Brigade (Commandos	Southampton Portsmouth	Southampton & Solent Portsmouth
       G	3 Brigades	Southampton	Southampton & Solent Spithead
       O	(4 R.C.T. (Rangers	Portland and Weymouth	Portland & Weymouth and Poole
       U	3 R.C.T.	Torquay, Brixham Dartmouth and Plymouth	Torbay, Brixham Dartmouth and Salcombe
       B	2 R.C.T.	Plymouth Falmouth and Fowey	Plymouth & Falmouth & Foway
       First U.S.	Build-up Division	Bristol Channel Ports	Bristol Channel Ports

2. Attached Forces were to be assembled as follows:-¹

   FORCE	ASSEMBLY PORTS
   Naval Covering Forces of Destroyer	Plymouth and Portsmouth
   Naval Covering Forces of Coastal For.	Dartmouth; Portland; Newhaven; Dover
   Landing Craft of the Ferry Service	Chichester; Langstone; Harbor; Poole
   Tugs; Salvage Vessels; Accommodation Ships; Maintenance Vessels	Ports between Flamouth and Southend
   Escorts and Minesweepers	With their convoys
   Western Task Force Bombarding Ships	Clyde
   Eastern Task Force Bombarding Ships	Belfast
   Blockships (CORNCOBS)	Oban
   Mulberry Units:-
   PHOENIX	Selseay; Dungeness and a reserve in the Thames
   BOMBARDON	Portland
   WHALE	Solent and Selsey
   Tugs	Portland and Spithead

3. Merchant Vessels were to be preloaded and assembled as follows:¹

   Type	Loading Points	Assembly Point
   Stores Coasters	89 Thames	68 Thames
   	12 Grimsby	55 Solent
   	104 Bristol Channel	82 Bristol Channel
   M.T. Ships	37 London & Tilbury	London and Southend
   	37 Bristol Channel	Bristol Channel
   Personnel Ships	6 Tilbury	Tilbury
   	9 Bristol Channel	Bristol Channel

   In addition, empty M.T. Ships were to assemble at Southend and Bristol Channel awaiting loading berths; 34 of these ships would arrive in the Solent on D-day.

C. Program of Assault and Follow-Up Forces

The Program of Assault and Follow-Up Forces, as laid down in the NEPTUNE plan, were as follows:-

1. The Approach: The five Assault Forces were to sail from their assembly ports on D minus 1, with the exception of Force U, which was to sail from Devon and Cornwall ports in the evening of D minus 2. Each British Assault Force would be divided into some 16 groups, in conformity with the order they were required in the assault area; U.S. Forces were each to comprise about four Groups, depending on the speed of convoy and the tide on which they were required to land. Groups of Forces O, G and J were to proceed to point Z (15 miles South of the Nab Tower) and thence to latitude 50°05' North. Forces U and S were to proceed toward Area Z turning southward to 50°05' shortly before reaching it. From 50°05' Forces were to be swept through the mine barrier and to the transport areas by 10 Flotillas of minesweepers.

2. Assault Timetable: H-10 hours. The leading minesweepers were to cross the latitude of 50°05' North and precede each Assault Force across the suspected enemy minefield to the transport areas which were 7 - 11 miles from the beaches. Ten channels would be swept and danned, two being allocated to each assault force.

   Hours
   H-6 to H-4	Minesweepers to pass the transport areas
   H-4½	U.S. Landing and Bombarding Ships to reach transport areas
   H-3½	U.S. L.S.T. to arrive as transport areas
   H-2	First British L.C.T. to arrive at lowering positions (transport area)
   H-2	U.S. L.C.A. (Wave 1) to depart from transport area
   Minutes
   H-103 H- 78 minutes	U.S. Waves 2 to 5 to depart from transport area.
   H - 100	British Landing Ships to reach lowering positions
   H - 45	D.D. Tanks leave departure line (4000 yards from beach)
   H - 30 to H	Bombardment by warships, and gunfire support craft to begin1
   H - 5	D.D. Tanks to beach
   H - H plus 50	L.C.V.P. and L.C.A. carrying infantry and obstacle clearing parties to beach. (preceded by L.C.A. (H.R)
   H plus 45	First L.C.I. (L) to beach
   H plus 60	First L.C.T. (Vehicles and Self-propelled artillery) land
   H plus 60 to H plus 3½ hours	L.C.T. and L.C.I. (L) beach.

3. Commandos and Rangers: Commandos and Rangers were to sail with the assault forces; their landings were to take place simultaneously with the Assault as follows:

   1. Five Commandos on the Eastern Flank to capture Ouitresham and to destroy crossings of the River Orne.

   2. One Commando west of Force J to mop up

   3. One Commando west of Force G to capture Port En Bassin.

   4. Two Ranger Battalions to secure Western Flank of OMAHA assault area, and capture the Isles de Margouf.

   5. Two Commandos were to stand by to destroy coastal batteries on the Eastern Flank on the night of D to D plus 1 if required.

4. L.S.T: U.S. and British L.S.T.s were to arrive at the transport area at H - 2 and H plus 4 respectively. They were to tow Rhino ferries which were to be used to discharge their vehicles. A proportion of the assault force L.S.T.s were to arrive on the second tide of D-Day. L.S.T.s were to beach only if the gradient proved favorable.¹

5. Follow-up Forces:² Forces L (British) and B (U.S.) were to sail from the Thames and Bristol Channel to arrive in time to unload on the second tide of D-Day. As discharge could not be completed on D-Day, a proportion of L.S.T. were to arrive with build-up convoys and to discharge on the third tide. Follow-up Forces comprised L.S.T., L.C.I. (L) and L.C.T., Force L was to be divided into five groups and Force B into three groups; the latter was to bring two causeways which were to form sunken roadways on the beaches to facilitate unloading. Twenty-four stores coasters were to arrive with follow-up Forces.

6. Subsequent Movements of Assault Ships and Craft:³

   1. L.S.I. were to return to U.K. in convoy as soon as they had been discharged and their L.C.A. and L.C.V.P. had been hoisted.

   2. L.C.I.(L), except those required to discharge personnel build-up ships, were to return to the U.K. to form part of the Shuttle Service.

   3. L.C.T. (3 and 4) were to return to the U.K. in groups to form the Shuttle Service.

   4. L.C.T. (5 and 6) and L.C.I. (S) were to remain in the assault area to form the Ferry Service.

   5. Major Support Craft were to replenish with ammunition in the assault area if required for further bombardment.

   6. Minesweepers were to sweep the assault area and widen the approach channels.

   7. Escorts were to be allocated to returning convoys.

D. The Build-Up for Offensive Land Operations¹

99. The landing of Allied Forces in France, subsequent to those carried in the Assault and Follow-up, was styled the Build-up. The whole build-up convoy programme was one of extreme complexity from the naval point of view, it necessitated the most careful timing in order to maintain the tempo of landing allied forces and their stores. The build-up plan was designed:

    1. To lift the maximum force in preloaded ships and craft by D plus 3;

    2. To produce thereafter a regular lift of approximately 1.1/3 divisions per day in daily convoys and the shuttle service, this avoiding a succession of loading and discharging peaks; and

    3. To delivery maintainance cargos at the rate of 600 tons per day per division.

100. The Build-Up was to be carried in: (1) a MERCHANT service, (2) a SHUTTLE service, and (3) a FERRY service:

     1. The MERCHANT service, was to be composed of some 1,256 vessels including M.T. ships and Coasters, Stores Coasters and ships, tankers, colliers, Libertys, Tugs and so on. The Merchant Service included:

        (a) Personnel Ships (L.S.I.s)	Sailing from PLYMOUTH, PORTLAND, SOUTHAMPTON, and NEWHAVEN.
        (b) M. T. Ships	Sailing from FALMOUTH, PLYMOUTH, SOUTHAMPTON, and the THAMES.
        (c) M. T. Coasters	Sailing from BRISTOL CHANNEL, FOWEY, PLYMOUTH, SOUTHAMPTON, POOLE, NEWHAVEN, THAMES and HUMBER.

     2. The SHUTTLE Service was to be composed of L.S.T.s, L.C.T.(3)s and (4)s, and L.C.I.(L)s sailing from PORTLAND, NEWHAVEN, and the ISLE OF WIGHT (convoy code words BLUESKY southbound, and STARLIGHT northbound) L.S.T.s working from THAMES were to join M.T. convoys.

3. The FERRY Service was to provide lighterage for unloading ships lying off the beaches. It was to consist of approximately 1,557 Landing Craft, Landing Barges, and Rhino ferries. A large number of D.U.K.W.'s were also to be employed. When tidal and beach conditions permitted L.S.T.'s were to discharge direct to shore.
101. Ports to the east of Southampton were to be used in the build-up for British troops and equipment, while ports to the west were reserved for American troops and equipment. Southampton was to be jointly used for stores. Convoys of M.T. ships and coasters were run daily, from ports in the East and ports in the West, to the Isle of Wight area to join convoys sailing from the Central Sector. Daily return convoys were to be run from France to the Central Sector (Isle of Wight area), and from there to ports on the wings with empty ships to be loaded in these sectors. The marching personnel of units loaded in M.T. ships in the Thames were to be carried in LCI(L) or personnel ships from Newhaven; those from units loaded at Plymouth and Falmouth were to be similarly carried from the East Devon ports and Weymouth. Otherwise, units were to sail together from the same hards or ports, even if carried in different convoys.

102. B.U.C.O. In order to control and coordinate the Build-up program, and to assure that special requirements or changes in the Army's plan could be met promptly, a body composed of representatives of the Joint Commanders-in-Chief, styled B.U.C.O. (Build-up Control Organization) was set up at the Combined Headquarters, Portsmouth. ANCXF in conjunction with British Ministry of War Transport and the U.S. War Shipping Administration was responsible for implementing the movements of ships and craft on decisions reached by B.U.C.O. Under B.U.C.O., two control organizations MOVCO and TURCO were responsible for implementing the cross channel movement plan.

103. T.U.R.C.O. To assist naval shore authorities in the quick turn round of ships and craft, inter-service bodies styled T.U.R.C.O's (Turn Round Control Organization) were set up at the Nore, London, Portsmouth, Newhaven, Portland, Cardiff and Dartsmouth. T.U.R.C.O.'s duties were to collect all ships coming in to find out their state, to supply them with their main requirements, to load and to sail the ships and craft, in convoys or groups, to fulfil the Military Plan.

104. M.O.V.C.O. To assist the rapid loading of vessels in accordance with authorized priorities, inter-service bodies called M.O.V.C.O's (Movement Control Organization) were set up at embarkation points. Their duties were to assemble the formations, equipment and cargo to be shipped at embarkation points and to direct embarkation so as to fulfill the Military Plan.

105. N.O.I.C's To control arrivals, discharge and departures of vessels on the far shore, naval authorities styled NOIC's (Naval Officers in charge) were to be established, at first in ships lying off the beaches and later on the beaches themselves.

106. The Numbers of Ships and Craft in the Build-up arriving in France up till D plus 3 and the estimated sailings from D plus 3 onwards are shown in the following attached tables.

E. Supporting Naval Operations

107. (1) Minesweeping¹ Minesweeping Operations were divised:
     1. To provide a safe passage for the assault forces to the transport area, then
     2. To provide wider channels from 50° N to the beaches for shipping in the build-up, and
     3. To sweep a channel, parallel to the beaches, which would be broadened until it would form a safe anchorage and patrol area.

     FORCES AVAILABLE

     12 Fleet Minesweeping Flotillas
     7 Motor Minesweeping Flotillas
     4 B.Y.M.S. Flotillas
     4 Groups of LL Trawlers
     

     3 or 4 danlayers and 2 M.L.'s were to be attached to each F.M.S. Flotilla.

108. 10. F.R.S. Flotillas were to sweep 10 approach channels or the assault forces from 50° N to the lowering positions and mark them with dan buoys. During the approach, contact with enemy patrols could be expected but as the following forces would be committed to a narrow passage through heavily mined waters, it was essential that flotillas maintain sweeping formation relying for protection on destroyers, which would be in the immediate vicinity.

109. During D-day and D plus 1 day, 4 channels about 2 miles wide were to be established by sweeping the water between pairs of approach channels. These channels were to be marked by ocean light-buoys.

110. Bombarding Forces operating on the flanks were each to be provided with a flotilla of Fleet Minesweepers which remained with the bombarding ships throughout the assault.

111. Permanent swept channels to W.T.F and E.T.F. areas, marked by ocean light buoys, were to be completed as soon as possible after D-day, the details being signalled by "Q" message.

112. After the fall of CHERBOURG channels were to be swept from Cherbourg to the NEEDLES, and to the northeastwards.

113. (2) Bombardment¹ The following ships were to form the bombarding forces:

     6	Battleships (plus 1 reserve)	75	Fleet Destroyers
     2	Monitors	16	Hunt Destroyers
     23	Cruisers	2	Gunboats

     115. Battleships and Cruisers were to assemble in the Clyde (Eastern Task Force) and Belfast (Western Task Force) and were then to proceed to the Assault Area independently with attached minesweeping Flotillas and a destroyer and frigate escort. The majority of destroyers were allocated as escorts to the Assault convoys during the approach.

116. Bombardment was to be carried out under the orders of the Assault Task Force Commanders, commencing about 40 minutes before H-hour, with the following objects:

     1. To neutralize coastal defence and inland batteries, especially those capable of bringing fire to bear on the approach channels and transport areas.

     2. To destroy beach defences during the final approach and assault.

     3. To support the Army after the assault by engaging hostile batteries, enemy formations, or defended areas.

117. When no longer required for bombarding, destroyers were to be used by Task Force Commanders for the defence of the Assault Areas.

118. Bombarding ships were to return to Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Portland, to replenish ammunition; about two outfits per bombarding ship were to be held in immediate reserve. Spotting for indirect bombardment was to be carried out by:

     1. Single Seater Fighter Aircraft, of which 104 were available on D-day (see Air Section).

     2. Forward Observers Bombardment (FOB), of whom 40 were to land with military formations to work with the Eastern Task Force.

     3. Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP's) of whom.... were to land with each U.S. Assault Battalion.

     4. Air Observation Posts (Piper Cubs) which were to be employed inthe later stages through FOB's and SFCP's.

     Bombarding Ships were allocated as follows:-

Assault Force	Bombardment Force	Ship
Eastern Task Force
S.	D.	Warspite Ramillies Mauritius (C.S.2.) Arethusa 10 Fleets	Frobisher Dragon Danae Roberts 3 Hunts
J	E	Belfast 7 Fleets	Diadem 4 Hunts
G	K	ORION AJAX D.S.FLORES 9 Fleets	ARGONAUT EMERALD 4 Hunts
E.T.F. Reserve		Rodney	Sirius
Western Task Force
O	C	Texas (R.A.Bryant) Arkansas GLASGOW 9 U.S. Destroyers	F.S.Montcalm(Flag) F.S.Georges Leygues 3 Hunts
U	A	NEVADA Erebus Tuscaloosa (R.A.DEYO) Enterprise 8 U.S. Destroyers	QUINCY Hawkins Black Prince D.S.Soemba
W.T.F. Reserve		Augusta (NCWTF Flag) 5 U.S. Destroyers	Bellona

Notes:	(i)	NELSON was detailed as spare battleship
	(ii)	SHEFFIELD and SIRIUS were detailed as spare cruisers
	(iii)	A further 12 U.S. Destroyers were to be kept in reserve being employed in other duties meanwhile.

(3) Diversions¹ Three diversionary operations, supported by air sorties, were to be carried out by 32 H.D.M.L's and 6 Pinnaces, at the same time as the assaults. Troops were not landed. The threat was to be established by Radio Counter Measures, the use of smoke and sonic warfare.
119. The object was to contain enemy reserves and to draw off enemy naval forces from the assault convoys. The operations were:

     Operations	Force	Location
     GLIMMER	28 H.D.M.L.	Pa de Calais Area
     TAXABLE	6 Pinnaces	Bruneval-Fecamp on a 14 mile front
     BIGDRUM	4 H.D.M.L.	East of Barfleur

     Operation BIGDRUM was intended to screen and divert the attention of enemy radar stations on the Cherbourg Peninsula from the approaching assault forces.

     (4). Covering Forces² C-in-C Home Fleet, C-in-C Western Approaches and C-in-C Plymouth were to provide distant cover, outside the English Channel, under the general direction of the Admiralty.

120. Within the English Channel, cover against destroyers, small surface craft and U-boats was to be given by four divisions of fleet destroyers and by Coastal Forces (under the control of Commanders-in-Chief, Plymouth and Portsmouth and V.A. Dover), operating outside the Assault Area.

121. A further four U.S. Destroyers provided cover for the exposed flanks of Western Task Force convoy routes.

122. Four Anti-Submarine Support Groups, each consisting of five Destroyers or Frigates, were to operate within the Plymouth Command in support of NEPTUNE.

123. Air operations by Coastal Command, including a system of patrols of the Western Approaches and in the Channel known as the "CORK", are described in Chapter VII.

124. Destroyers and Coastal Forces were to be based and attached to Home Commands as follows:

     Command	Base	Type	Number
     Dover	Portsmouth Dover Newhaven	Destroyers Small M.T.B. Large M.T.B.	4 23 8
     Portsmouth	Portsmouth Isle of Wight	Destroyers Small M.T.B. Large M.T.B.	4 20 8
     Plymouth	Plymouth Dartmouth	Destroyers Small M.T.B. Large M.T.B.	8 20 8
     TOTALS: 16 Destroyers and 83 M.T.B.'s

     A maximum of 50 per cent of Coastal Forces was to be Operational each night.

     (5) Defence of the Assault Area¹

     Responsibilities: (a) ANCXF was responsible for coordinating the defence of the assault area from attack.
     (b) Task Force Commanders were responsible for the defence of their own forces from Landward attack and attack by enemy craft which might penetrate the outer defence lines.

     Close Cover: In the Channel, to guard the flanks of assault area, close cover was provided by 8 Fleet destroyers and 24 M.T.B.s from Portsmouth Command and by 4 Fleets and 39 M.T.B.s from the Dover Command.

     Continuous Air Cover was to be maintained over the Assault area by day and night. Coastal Command was to maintain continuous patrols in the S.W. and Eastern approaches to the Channel to give early warning of, and protection from, enemy surface forces and U-boats.

125. Forces available for the defence of the Assault Area by Task Force Commanders were:
     1. Bombarding warships.
     2. Escort vessels waiting for return convoys.
     3. Minesweepers.
     4. A/S Trawlers.
     5. M.L.'s, H.D.M.L.'s., M.T.B.'s, L.C.G.'s, and L.C.F.'s.
     6. Eagle ships for A.A. Defence.
     7. Smoke making trawlers.

126. The Task Force areas were divided into sub-areas for defence purposes. The Inshore sub-areas were given lettered defence lines spaced half a mile apart running parallel to the coast. The orders and policies for the defence of the Task Force areas were given code letters. Each method of defence in each order was given a number. This scheme enabled Task Force Commanders to order quickly the appropriate defence measures for a particular set of circumstances.

     A Duty Destroyer Division and Guard Destroyers were to be detailed in each Task Force area. They would be available for defence purposes by day, and patrol near the static defence lines by night.

127. The primary defence of the anchorages against surface attack at night was to be by static night defence lines of anchored or slowly patrolling minesweepers, LCG's, LCF's, and PC's. MTB's and PT's were to patrol on the east and west flanks of the assault area.

128. The main A/S defence was to be patrols of A/S trawlers and ML's round the anchorages. During the night the static defence lines would also give a measure of A/S protection.

129. In the event of attack by Walter Boats, a division of Coastal Forces was to be spread in the likely direction of approach and to listen with asdics. A second division was to be concentrated in pairs and to act as striking forces.

130. If W-boats were suspected in the anchorages, Task Force Commanders were to allocate forces to sweep across the suspected area dropping depth charges.

Opration ALERT (anti-human torpedo operation) was available to be brought into force.

Air Defence: Each force was detailed in "A.A. and Radar" guardship. Umbrella barrage was to be ordered by Force Commanders over shipping off the beaches if required.

Smoke: Assault Force Commanders were responsible for smoke defence in their own areas. Minesweepers and landing craft on the static defence lines were to assist in the smoke defence plan. Smoke from shore generators under Army Control were also available to be called for through N.O.I.C's ashore.

(6) Minelaying:¹ The object of the Minelaying Plan (Codeword MAPLE) was to assist in the protection of the bombarding and assault forces, against attack by E and R boats (particularly by those operating from LE HAVRE and CHERBOURG), and in the general protection of forces operation in the Channel.

Forces Taking Part were:

Fast minelayer APOLLO 1 ML Flotilla	from PLYMOUTH
3 MTB Flotillas	from PORTSMOUTH
2 ML Flotillas small minelay PLOVER	from DOVER
2 MTB Flotillas 1 ML Flotilla	from NORE
Heavy Bombers from Bomber Command

131. Mines: Special new types of ground and moored mines were to be laid, with a proportion of normal types to cloak the use of special types. The effective lives of mines was to be restricted to allow entry into CHERBOURG on D plus 3 and into LE HAVRE on D plus 14. Other minefields were to become safe at various dates after D-day. Minesweeping gear capable of dealing with the special mines was available in case it should become required necessary to remove allied minefields.

132. Minelaying Operations were divided into six phases: Phase I and II. Routine laying of standard mines in standard areas till D-24.

     Phase III (D-24 to D-3). Laying of special mines by minelayers and aircraft in the Channel and the North Sea. Special type mines were also to be laid by aircraft in the standard areas in Baltic, Kattegat, Heligoland Bight, Frisian Islands and Biscay ports after D-10.

     Phase IV (D-2 to D-1). Laying of special type mines only in the approaches to Le Havre, Cherbourg, Calais and Boulogne and by aircraft off Ijmuiden, Hook, West Scheldt, Chenal Du Four and Brest.

     Phase V (D-1 to D-day). Laying special type mines only by coastal forces off Le Havre, Cherbourg, Etretat and Britanny Coast.

     Phase VI. After D-day, as required.

F. Supporting Air Operations

133. Command:¹ The Air C-in-C A.E.A.F. coordinated all air operations from his H.Q. at Stanmore. The Commander Advance A.A.A.F. exercised technical control of the 2nd Tactical Air Force (Br) and 9th Army Air Force (U.S.) from UXBRIDGE.

     (2) Forces Available:

     		Squadrons	Aircraft
     8th & 9th Army Air Forces (American)	Day Bomber Heavy Day Fighter Bomber Medium Bomber Light Night Fighter	165 108 32 12 3	1,320 1,728 283 144 36
     R.A.F.	Night Bomber Heavy Bomber Light Day Fighter Fighter Bomber Night Fighter	72½ 18 59 18 22	870 216 708 216 264
     Coastal Command	Anti-U Boat Anti-Shipping G.R. Fighters Night Recce Air Sea Rescue	21 10 3 1 2	252 120 36 12 24
     F.A.A. (under Coastal Command)
     Air Spotting	Fighters	9	104
     	TOTAL	561½	6,518

The above figures do not include aircraft of Troop Carrier and Transport Commands, or photographic and Fighter Reconnaissance aircraft.

The figures include aircraft required for normal operations, such as the Air Defense of Great Britain.

(3) Fighter Protection: Normal fighter protection was to be given to all convoys. In addition, 5 squadrons were to patrol over the cross-channel routes at all times on D-day, and the same number were to be available as required thereafter.

134. A patrol of ten squadrons was to be maintained over the beaches and assault area.

135. Three Fighter Direction Tenders (converted L.S.T.'s) were to control patrols over the cross-channel route and assault area.

     (4) Coastal Air Operations: Patrols in S.W. and Eastern approaches to the English Channel were designed to give early warning of, and protection from, enemy surface force, U boats or W boat attack; air striking forces being employed to destroy any such forces located.

136. Anti-U boat patrols were to be carried out by 21 squadrons from 19 and 16 groups composed of Sunderlands, Halifax, Liberators and Wellingtons, and by the U.S. Navy Fleet Air Wing Seven. The anti-shipping strikes were to be carried on by 10 squadrons of Beaufighters, Swordfish and Albacores.

137. These Patrols were to provide a cover of 30 minutes density in the Area, from the Western limits of the St. Georges and Bristol Channels into the English Channel, up to a line between Lyme Bay and Aldernay. This area, known as the "CORK", was considered wide enough to prevent U boats, which passed through it submerged, from retaining enough battery power to be able to continue operating submerged, after traversing the CORK.

138. 3 Squadrons of Beaufighters and Mosquitos were to carry out reconnaissance and protection of anti-submarine patrols. One squadron of Wellingtons was detailed for night recconnaissance in conjunction with Coastal Striking Forces.

139. Squadrons of R.N. Fleet Air Arm Avengers and Swordfish were to provide close cover for the coastal convoys between Lynmouth and Portland and between the Nore and Beachy Head.

     (5) Smoke Laying: Two squadrons of Bostons were available to screen the flanks fo the assault area.

     (6) Minelaying by Aircraft: Aircraft of Bomber Command were to carry out routine offensive laying until D minus 10 and were to lay special type mines off Ijmuiden, Hook, West Schedlt, Chanal de Four and Brest.

     (7) Air Spotting: 16 Spitfires from No. 26 Squadron R.A.F. and 40 Seafires from No. 3 Naval Fighter Wing, operating from LEE ON SOLENT, were to spot for bombarding warships. Aircraft would operate in pairs, one spotting and one escort; their duties interchangeable.

140. In addition 3 Squadrons of Mustangs were to be available to carry out a minimum of 80 sorties up till 1200 D-day, after which they would return to their normal reconnaissance duties.

     (8) Air Bombardment: Heavy air bombardment of enemy coastal batteries, beach areas and defences were to be carried out shortly before the assault.

     (9) Expected Scale of German Air Effort: The total German Aur Force strength, on the Western Front on D-day, was estimated at about 1,515 aircraft, disposed in France, Belgium, Holland, N.W. German, with a small number in Norway and Denmark.

141. From these 1,515 aircraft, the close support force available in the NEPTUNE area was estimated at 590 consisting of:

     Long Range Fighter Bombers	Bombers	Single Engine Fighters	Twin Engine Fighters	Tactical Recce.	TOTAL
     320	65	120	25	10	590

     (1) MULBERRIES - Description:¹ MULBERRY was an artificial

harbor, erected primarily for landing stores off the beaches, in order to make the build-up independent of the weather.

MULBERRY A - American - at St. Laurant:

MULBERRY B - British - at Arromanches:

Both were were planned to be completed by D plus 18.

142. The breakwaters, which would enclose an area about 2 miles long by one mile wide, were to be composed of the following units:

     1. Blockships (CORNCOBS) - sunk in water up to 2½ fathoms.
     2. Concrete Casisson (PHOENIX) - sunk in water up to 5 fathoms. These were 200' long, 60' high and vary in size from 2,000 to 6,000 tons.

     3. Floating Booms (BOMBARDON) - moored in water up to 10 fathoms. These are 200 ft. long cricform floating steal structures which are moored end-on in a line forming an outer deep water anchorage outside the PHOENIX breakwater.
143. In the shelter of the breakwater, stores piers for unloading coasters and M.T. Piers for L.S.T. and L.C.T. were to be erected. The pier equipment, known collectively as WHALE, consisted of pierheads secured to the bottom by four vertical posts. The pierheads were connected to the shore by roadways supported by floating pontoons.

     Layout: The layout of the breakwaters consisted of:

     1. A shallow water area of about 12 blockships which would be placed by D plus 3 to give half a mile of sheltered beach to landing craft. (GOOSEBERRIES II and III).

     2. An area sited on the 5½ fathom line, in continuation of the GOOSEBERRY, composed of 40 PHOENIX to give shelter to 17 coasters at anchor or alongside piers.

     3. A line of about 25 Bombardons to seaward to give shelter to eight big ships (25 feet draught).

     4. The WHALE piers would lie inside the breakwater and would use the rocky foreshore on which landing craft cannot beach.

Towage: Towage was to commence on D-day from Selsey, the Solent, Dungeness, and Portland. Tows were not to cross latitude 50° North before noon on D plus 1. A special channel through the minefield was reserved for their passage. A regular flow were to arrive daily from D plus 2 to D plus 17.
144. 160 Tugs were allocated for this service.

     Erection: MULBERRIES A and B were to be composed of the same types of units, differing slightly in layout.

145. The number required was:

     	MULBERRY A	MULBERRY B	Total
     PHOENIX	39	45	84
     WHALE Pierheads	6	9	15
     Roadways and Misc. WHALE Tows	41	58	99
     BOMBARDON	24	24	48
     		TOTAL	246

     MULBERRY A was to include 6 Pierheads and three Roadways for both stores and L.S.T.

     MULBERRY B was to include 3 Roadways from 7 Pierheads for stores and 1 Roadway from 2 Pierheads for L.S.T. and L.C.T.

     Daily Capacity

     1. MULBERRY A (U.S.)

        D Plus 6 onwards	Vehicles	1400 vehicles to be landed daily dryshod
        	Stores	1000 tons daily over the beaches.
        D Plus 18 onwards		The port was to handle a daily minimum of 5600 tons.

2. MULBERRY B (British)

   Day	Stores		Vehicles over Piers
   	Daily Average	Maximum
   D plus 4 to D plus 8	1000 tons	1240 tons	-
   D plus 9 to D plus 12	3400 tons	4150 tons	1250 (from D plus 11)
   D plus 14 onwards	6000 tons	7340 tons	1260

Summary

This project consisted of some 400 units, aggregating a million and a half tons, averaging 35 heavy cross channel tows per day. It required the services of 160 tugs and involved 10,000 officers and men.

(2) GOOSEBERRIES¹ - Description: The GOOSEBERRIES were shelters, provided by sinking a line of about 12 blockships in 2½ fathoms. They were to serve two purposes:

1. To provide a sheltered beach for landing craft to use in the event of strong on-shore winds.

2. To provide a refuge for ferry service and other small craft in rough weather.
   There were to be five GOOSEBERRIES:

   No. 1 at Varreville	U.S.
   No. 2 at St. Laurent	U.S. (Part of Mulberry A)
   No. 3 at Arromanches	British (Part of Mulberry B)
   No. 4 at Courseulles	British
   No. 5 at Oistreham	British

   They were to be formed by about 60 blockships (approximately 12 in each GOOSEBERRY) which were all Merchant Vessels except H.M.S. CENTURION, D.S. SUMATRA, H.M.S. DURBAN and F.S. COURBET: The last named was to be towed across the Channel.

   The sinking of blockships was to commence p.m. D plus 1 and the GOOSEBERRIES were to be completed by D plus 3.

(3) PLUTO TOMBOLA AND AMATHEA¹

PLUTO was an operation that was to provide facilities for the supply of gasoline to the Expeditionary Force on the far shores. This was to be done in two ways:

1. By laying 10 pipes along the sea bottom (HAMEL or HAIS) from Sandown Bay to Querqeville. The pipelines were to be completed by D plus 75 and were expected to provide 2,500 tons daily.

2. By laying 4 short pipelines (TOMBOLA or AMATHEA) off PORT EN BESSIN for tankers to discharge direct to shore storage tanks from off-shore moorings. The four TOMBOLA pipelines to be completed by D plus 18, would enable a large tanker to discharge 600 tons per hours.

PLUTO Force consisted of:

2 Cable Laying Vessels	Capacity 100 miles of HAIS
1 Cable Laying Vessels	Capacity 30 miles of HAIS
1 Cable Laying Vessels	Capacity 15 miles of HAIS
1 Cable Laying Vessels	Capacity 25 miles of HAIS
6 Conum Drums2	Capacity 70 miles of HAIS
3 Ocean Tugs for towing Conum Drums
5 Cable barges (completing shore ends) capacity 1½ miles of HAIS
3 Trawlers for hauling out TOMBOLA lines
15 Accommodation barges, M.F.V.'s Motor Boats and harbor launches

(4) Buoy Laying³ Commencing on D-day, ocean light buoys marking the permanent swept channels were to be laid by 5 Trinity House Tenders working from the SOLENT area.

(5) Surveying¹ Two Surveying ships and L.C.F. (Sy) were to operate with the Trinity House Vessels and also with the assault forces, assisting in channel buoyage, Minor Port Surveys, locating and marking wrecks, beach surveys, planting GOOSEBERRIES and laying coast hauling off buoys.

(6) Moorings² Two net layers were to lay JANTZEN moorings, commencing at the first high water on D plus 1. These were a stern buoy and mooring used for hauling off Rhino Ferries and Coasters which beach, and for preventing them from breaking.

(7) Salvage - British³ There were 10 groups of Salvage and Wreck Disposal Vessels, each group consisting of three vessels. Six groups were to arrive in the assault area by D plus 7 and to be operated by the Principal Salvage Officer (in Mulberry B depot ship).

U.S.⁴ The following maintenance and salvage units were to operate in the U.S. Sector:

	OMAHA	UTAH
L.C.M. (3) (salvage)	12	6
L.?.E's (British Craft)	16	8
A.R.L's (repair LST's)	1 (Adonis)	1 (Atlas)
Pontoon floats (repair)	1	1
475 ton pontoon drydocks	1	1
Accommodation Ships	1 (Wheelock)	1 (Robertson)
E-9 units (motorized repair teams)	2 (3 shift)	2 (3 shift)
E-10 units (landing craft maintenance teams)	1

These were to arrive progressively by D plus 7, to operate directly under the Assault Force Commanders until the NOIC's were firmly established ashore, and then to operate under the NOIC's.

(8) Rescue Tugs¹ were available at Plymouth, Portsmouth, Dover and Sheerness, to retrieve vessels in distress.

(9) Colliers, Oilers and Water Tankers² were to be included in suitable convoys to the assault areas. A reserve was retained in Spithead from D plus 3.

(10) Cable Laying:³ Six or more telephone cables were to be laid across the channel by ships of the British General Post Office.

(11) A Despatch Boat⁴ service of Motor Launches was to run 4 times each day between Portsmouth and the assault area.

(12) Ammunition Barges:⁵ Sixteen 1,000 ton barges were to be towed from Exmouth to W.T.F. area in three tows arriving on D plus 1, D plus 2 and D plus 3. Nine 300 ton barges were to be towed from Littlehampton to the E.T.F. area arriving on D plus 1.

(13) Sunken Causeways⁶ units were to be towed to the assault area by Tugs, L.S.T's abd Coasters arriving between D plus 1 and D plus 4. Five miles of causeways were provided.

(14) Minor Landing Craft⁷ units were to be sailed in groups for each assault force from Langestone and Poole to arrive p.m. on D day to augment the Ferry service.

(15) Coast Guard Cutters:⁶ 60 U.S. Coast Guard Cutters were allocated, 30 the W.T.F. and 30th the E.T.F. to assist in the rescue of personnel in distress at sea.

H - Chronological Order of Events¹

Day and Time	EVENT	REFERENCE
D - 6	C.O.B. I, II and II sail from Oban for assault area	ON 13 App. VI
D - 3	"X20" and "X23" sail from Portsmouth to mark Force J and S beaches	ON 7 P.5
D - 2 A.M.	First Coaster and M.T. convoys from Bristol Channel sail for I. of W.	ON 13 App. I
2000	American Assault Forces U2A and U2B from Dartmouth sail for UTAH beach	ON 7.
D - 1	"X20" and "X23" arrive off J and S Force beaches	ON 7 P.5
0700	O2a. O2B American Assault Forces sail from Portland for OMAHA	ON 7 App. I
1100	Assault Forces G1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 sail from Solent, for GOLD	ON 7
1200-2200	British follow-up Forces L1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 sail from THAMES for the E.T.F. area	ON 13 App. VI
1330-1400	British Assault Forces J1 and 2 (9th and 7th M.S.F) J 3, 4, 7 and 8 sail from SPITHEAD for JUNO.	ON 7
1500	American Assault Force U.1 sails from DARTMOUTH for UTAH	ON 7
1615	British Assault Force J14 sails from SPITHEAD for JUNO	ON 7
1740	14th and 4th M.S.F. commence sweeping No. 2 and 4 channels	ON 6 App. I
1830	18th and 7th M.S.F. commence sweeping No. 6 and 8 channels

Day and Time	EVENT	REFERENCE
1900	6th, 9th, and 1st, MSF commence sweeping Nos. 5, 7, and 9 channels	ON Appx I
1900	American Assault Force O.1 sails from Portland for OMAHA	ON 7
1940	16th and 31st MSF commence sweeping Nos.1 and 3 channels	ON 6 Appx. I
D - 1 1945	15th MSF commences sweeping channel No. 10	ON 6 Appx. I
2100	British Assault Force J 9 and 10 sail from SPITHEAD for JUNO	ON 7
2200	American Assault Force O.3 sails from PORTLAND for OMAHA	ON 7
2230	British Assault Forces G.15, 16, and 18 sail from SOLENT for GOLD	ON 7
2300	American Assault Forces O-3C?, U-3C sail from SOLENT for OMAHA and UTAH	ON 7
2300	"BIG DRUM" units detach from Force "U" Lat. 49°50' N.	ON 3 6 (C)
D-Day 0001	G.M.I., J.M.I., S.M.I., (M.L.C.) sail from LANGSTONE for GOLD, JUNO, SWORD	ON 13 App.VI
0200	2 Airborne Divisions land, 1 behind VARREVILLE-CRENTAN beaches and 1 at CAENE astride river ORNE.	ON.1 p.31
0330	6 H.D.M.L's (GLIMMER) cause diversion in PAS DE CALAIS 8 H.D.M.Ls (TAXABLE) cause diversion off BRUNEVAL and FECAMP	ON.3
0530	4 H.D.M.Ls (BIG DRUM) cause diversion off BARFLEUR. Heavy air bombardment of assault beaches. Bombardment by warships of bombarding forces. Assault forces and Support Craft approaching beaches.
0550 0555	D.D. Tanks and Assault craft touch down in OMAHA, UTAH, GOLD, JUNE and SWORD

Day and Time	EVENT	REFERENCE
H-hour	L.C.T.s, L.C.T.(AVRE), L.C.A.(HR), L.C.P.(L), L.C.H., L.C.T.(R), L.C.F. and L.C.G.(L) touch down in all sectors
0605 0700	L.S.I.(L) touch down in all sectors
0630	Commandos and S.S. with French troops assault OUISTREHAM and PORT EN BASSIN	ON 7 P.48
0700	L.C.I.(L) touch down in all sectors
0715	Commandos land west of Queen Beach and advance above ORNE
0730	L.C.T.s. (S.P.Artillery) touch down in all sectors	ON 7
1000	L.S.Ts and Rhinos arrive in all sectors	ON 7
1100 1900	"P" Tows sail from PORTLAND for assault area	ON 13
D-day 0700 1500	"D" Tows sail from DUNGENESS for assault area	ON 13
1300	L.S.Ts and Rhinos (J16 G18) arrive in JUNO and GOLD	ON 7
1500	American Follow-Up forces O4(a), U5(a) arrive E.T.F. area	ON 13 App VI
1600	British Follow-Up force L.1 (L.S.T., L.C.I. Coasters) arrive E.T.F. area	ON 10 App I
1700	American build-up convoys O4(b) U5(b) arrive in W.F.T. area. L.S.T. and Rhinos S.14 beach in SWORD	ON 13 App VI
1830	G.M.I., J.M.I., S.M.I. Groups of M.L.C. arrive in E.T.F. area British Follow-up Force L2 (L.S.Ts) arrive in E.T.F. area	ON 13

Day and Time	EVENT	REFERENCE
2000	Force REGULATOR arrives in E.T.F. area American build-up Convoys O5(a),(b), U6(a),(b), U.B.1 and B.B.1 sail from POOLE	Op.DEER ON 13
2130	LSD arrive in E.T.F. and W.T.F. areas and return when unloaded British follow-up Forces B.1 and 2 arrive in E.T.F. area American follow-up Forces O3C and U3C arrive in W.T.F. area L.C.R.U. arrive in all sectors L.?.Os arrive in all sectors	ON 10
2200	G.M.S., J.M3 and S.M.3, groups of M.L.C. arrive in E.T.F. area	ON 13
2345	Desultory Bombardment of HOULGATE or BENERVILLE batteries	Op. DEER
2300 0700 D plus 1	"S" Tows sail from SELSKY for assault area	ON 13
D plus 1 0001	American follow-up Force U2 sails from KA?OUTH for W.T.F area.
0030	Commandos assault HOULGATE Battery, Operation DEER or Commandos assault BENERVILLE Battery, Operation FROG
0030	British follow-up forces L4 and 5 (L.S.T. beach in E.T.F. area	ON 13
0630	G.M.4, J.M.4, S.M.4 Groups of M.L.C. sail NAB for ETF area	ON 13
1000 1200	3 L.C.R.U. and 2 K-9 units arrive in assault area 12 Tug Units and 6 Units of sunken causeway arrive GOLD and JUNO American follow-up force B.3 and U.4 arrive W.T.F. area, 28 sunken causeways arrive UTAH and OMAHA 4 Large barges arrive for UTAH and OMAHA.	ON 14

D plus 1 1400	C.O.B.1(3) and (4) C.O.B.2(1)	arrive in Assault area and construction of GOOSEBERRIES commences	ON 13
1430	C.O.B.2(2)
1500	C.O.B.1(5)
1500	American follow-up Forces U6(a), U.B.1 (ammunition		ON 14
1500	B.B.I (9-300 tons ammunition barges arrive E.T.F. area		ON 14
1500	G.P.O. ships begin laying cable from CHRISTCHURCH BAY to LONGUES and from SWANAGE to QUERQUEVILLE
1600	American follow-up force O6(b) arrives in W.T.F. area		ON 13
1700	American follow-up firce O5(b) and U.B.1 (ammunition barges) arrive W.T.F. area.1		ON 13
D plus 2 0600	4 Hospital Carriers arrive in the Assault Area		ON 13
0600 1400	"P", "S" and "D" tows arrive in the Assault Area		ON 13
1200	U.B.2 (4-1000 ton ammunition barges) arrives W.T.F. area		On 13
1300	C.O.B.3 arrives in assault area2		ON 13
D plus 3 0600 1400	"P", "S" and "D" Tows arrive in the assault area.		ON 13

D plus 4	Daily build-up convoys sailing to and from Assault area should now be established. 58,000 MEN being landed daily 5,000 VEHICLES being landed daily.
D plus 9	First PLUTO units sail FROM Southhampton	ON 21
D plus 14	Concrete dock ready in MULBERRY B	ON 16
D plus 16	MULBERRY "A" should be complete	ON 16
D plus 17	Mulberry "B" should be complete
D plus 18	4 discharge points (TOMBOLA) at PORT EN BESSIN completed	ON 21
D plus 20	First pipe line (HAMEL) laid to CHERBOURG (250 tons daily)	ON 21
D plus 75	Ten pipe lines (HAMEL) laid (2,500 tons daily)	ON 21

Table of Contents
Previous Section ** Next Section

Footnotes:

p.304 #1. The materials in # A were taken from ON 1.

p.305 #1. ON-4

p.306 #1. ON-4

p.307 #1. ON-4

p.309 #1(1) Support Craft consisting of L.C.S.(L) (2) and (S), L.C.G., L.C.F., L.C.T.(R), (H.E.), (A) and (C.?), L.C.A. (H.R.) and L.B.F. will give support fire in addition to Bombarding Ships. (See Section VIII).

p.310 #1. Materials for # C to here were taken from ON-7

p.310 #2. ON-10

p.310 #3. ON-9

p.311 #1. Materials on the Build-up were taken from ON-13; See also NJC 1004 of 1 February 1944, Appx. R.

p.313 #1. ON-6

p.316 #1. ON-8

p.319 #1. ON-3

p.319 #2. ON-5; ON-11; ON-1.

p.320 #1. (1) CTF 122 Op Plan 2 - 44 entitled ONWEST - 2 of 21 April 1944, - text and Annex C. (2) British Assault Area Defence Orders (BAADO) of 30 April 1944. (3) ON-9

p.322 #1. O-2 and AFNP - Appx 17.

p.323 #1. ON-11

p.325 #1. ON-16

p.328 #1. ON-16

p.329 #1. ON-21

p.329 #2. Conum Drums were large floating drums round which the pipe was wound and which unreeled as they "rolled" across the water leaving a line of pipe behind.

p.329 #3. ON-14 Section A

p.330 #1. ON-14 Section B

p.330 #2. ON-14 Section D

p.330 #3. ON-14 Section E, and ON-14 Appx III.

p.330 #4. ON-14 Section E, and ON-14 Appx III, and Land Crab History Page 51 ff.

p.331 #1. ON-14 Section E

p.331 #2. ON-14 Section F

p.331 #3. ON-14 Section G

p.331 #4. ON-14 Section H

p.331 #5. ON-14 Section J

p.331 #6. ON-14 Section K

p.331 #7. ON-14 Section L

p.331 #8. ON-14 Section N.

p.332 #1. H-hour has been taken as 0600. Build-up convoys are referred to by self-evident letters ON13, Appx 9.

p.336 #1. During day: 50 hauling off buoys laid for coasters. Trots for BOMBARDON being laid. MULBERRY control ships and tenders arrived with E.W.C.I.A. and E.T.M.1 (ON 16)
Buoys 12A to 12G and No.14 laid (ON 17)
8 Blockships sunk in MULBERRY A (ON 16)
8 Blockships sunk in MULBERRY B

p.336 #2. BOMBARDON units are being connected up. MULBERRY H.Q. ships arrive with EBP2 and EWP1. PLUTO survey ships sail for PORT EN BESSIN. 14 Blockships sunk in each MULBERRY.