Comments, Lessons Learned, Recommendations and Conclusions

Aerial Photography

CO USS Essex comments and recommends

1. The importance of photographing target areas has increased prodigiously as our progress carries us into enemy territory where little or no organized aerial reconnaissance is possible.

2. Because of the above, each operation order included instructions for obtaining aerial photographs of stipulated types. Emphasis, except for shipping, is shifting from damage assessment to reconnaissance photos.

3. In addition to photographic missions, each ship's schedule calls for a specified number of VF assigned to one of the following:

1. Sweeps or Strikes.

2. CAP or jacks.

3. In readiness on deck.

With recent trend in attacks by Japanese planes, an increase in (b) or (c) is vital to the safety of our ships. Of course, such increase in (b) or (c) can be made only by reducing the number of VF in (a).

Air Support

CO USS Santee recommends

Finally it is believed that the presence of night fighters over the disposition during the critical period between the return of the dusk Patrol and the time when enemy harassing planes may be expected to secure for the night would contribute materially to the safety of the ships and to the rest and comfort of all hands, a prime essential to continued efficiency in operations in active combat areas.

CTG 77.4 comments and recommends

1. It is strongly recommended that for future operations in the vicinity of large land masses at least one carrier group be specifically detailed to make numerous daily sweeps in force on any operational fields within a radius of 300 miles. Night fighters can also be used to cover all approach routes from major bases to the closer staging points and get replacement planes as they fly in at night. Large groups of planes should never be permitted to arrive within striking distance of our invasion forces.

2. It has also been forcibly proven that land-based air should be prepared to take over these same duties as soon as it is humanly possible to have an operating strip ready and servicing supplies put ashore. These planes should be brought in in force to include day and night fighters. Control of the air within a substantial radius of our forces must be obtained and maintained.

3. To maintain a large CAP over the target it is necessary for the carriers to take a position close to the objective area. This is necessary first, to reduce the non-productive portion of the flight, i.e., the flight time to and from the target, to a minimum; and second, to make as much fuel as possible available for combat. This means scheduling short flights at short distances from the target. This continuous turning into the wind to launch or land locks the carrier to one small area from which she cannot escape. During the recent operations aircraft repeatedly headed directly for the formation from distances of 70 to 90 miles with what was, apparently, a full knowledge of our position. Although frequent interceptions were made, lack of an accurate knowledge of altitude permitted many enemy planes to get in to sight contact of the ships without interception. The technique of using more planes in depth and breadth is necessary. The shotgun vs. rifle. The CAP should be reduced as soon as possible after the initial landings are made and the VF released thereby should be used in striking all enemy air fields within 200 to 250 miles from the objective area.

4. Support aircraft should not be used to attack ground installations except in the immediate vicinity of the advancing troops. Water-borne and aircraft targets are the profitable targets for support aircraft.

5. Search planes of patrol squadrons should move in on the first day. These searches must be dense enough so that negative information from them has some value. Incomplete search created an extremely critical situation on the 25th of October (East Long. date).

6. Night fighters are essential to support operations. Immediate steps must be taken to provide a capable night fighter for CVEs. The FM

would be ideal if the technical problems of installing a radar can be solved quickly. The TBM is the next best bet, but poor fire power, slow speed and low rate of climb make it of limited usefulness. Numerous successful night landings were made with the F6F on the Sangamon Class ships during the operation but F6F are not recommended for routine night fighter operation on CVEs of the Kaiser Class. Night fighters must be provided for Support operations and should be embarked in the CVE, that is, the Attack Forces should not be dependent for night fighters on ships from another force.

7. The absolutely primary and first objective of future landing operations, now that we have reached the areas within range of the entire shore-based air force of the Empire, must be usable air fields. Absolutely nothing must be allowed to interfere with the work of making them usable at the earliest possible moment. Carrier aviation is the only truly flexible and mobile type of aviation. It can be depended upon to achieve strategic as well as tactical surprise. This mobility, however, is bought at the price of vulnerability. As soon as a field is available, a sufficient number of VF from the carriers should be shore-based for CAP duty until regular land-based aviation (Marine or Army Air Corps) can be moved up. Gasoline, oil, aircraft ammunition and spares should be moved ashore the first day, and the carriers should be withdrawn to a distance and strike enemy fields. To maintain 1 VF in the CAP requires 3 VF on board ship. The distance involved and launching procedure make rapid reinforcement in case of raid an impossibility. Each two planes shore based can provide a far more effective combat air patrol over the objective than each three planes aboard ship. In addition, the ships themselves need a strong CAP for their own protection. This CAP over the carriers does not directly contribute to the safety of the ships overhead. Sixty planes ashore are actually more effective than the total CAP furnished by all the escort Carriers during the recent operation.

Ammunition

ALLOWANCE

CO USS Denver comments

1. This engagement was entered with only 1200 six-inch AP projectiles. The number is the normal loading for this class cruiser for fire support missions and is set by higher authority. In addition, 1120 HC projectiles remained out of a total of 2675 on board at original sortie. The 1200 AP represent a firing time of not over 15 minutes, either in rapid continuous or rapid salvo fire at normal battle range (12-18,000 yards). It is apparent that, in an area in which enemy surface action is highly probable, such ammunition loading is hazardous. It is therefore recommended that when a ship of this class is loaded for a fire support mission involving possible surface action an additional 1000 AP projectiles be loaded without powder to provide a reserve for such contingency.

2. The need for this additional AP was forcefully felt when reports were received after this action that four enemy battleships, eight heavy cruisers, and several destroyers were eastward of SAMAR engaging our CVE's, this ship having 113 AP projectiles remaining on board, and there being little in the area even if time had permitted replenishing. It is considered entirely possible to find space for at least 1000 AP projectiles inside the barbettes of the turrets on the Third deck in the present bomb magazine (A-424-M), and ordnance store room (C-602). The additional weight would be 65 tons or one inch in draft. After the engagement Denver went alongside S.S. Durham Victory to replenish ammunition and found that there were only 1100 six-inch AP projectiles in LEYTE Gulf. These were divided between this ship and Columbia.

The dangers of meeting a fresh enemy after we have expended our ammunition in bombardments, or of having to meet a second group after we have expended our ammunition on a first group, must be given constant consideration by all responsible officers. Light cruisers, especially the 6" turrets, are notoriously "ammunition hungry." Loading a ship for a joint bombardment and surface action might be compared to harnessing a horse for a plowing job with the expectation that at any second he would be expected to stop plowing and with the same trappings enter the Kentucky Derby.

Gunnery Officer, USS Maryland, comments and recommends

The present allowance of 25 AP projectiles per gun for amphibious operations is dangerously low in the event a surface action occurs. By increasing this allowance to 40 AP per gun and by carrying an additional 10 full charges per gun to be used with HC projectiles, the ship will have 50 rounds per gun for long-range fire. The extra

full charges would be available if long-range bombardment were required.

CO USS Sangamon comments

The retention of 1000-lb. AP bombs in the allowance for ships of this type is strongly recommended in the event major surface ships are encountered in future operations. On 500-lb. SAP bombs were retained aboard for this operation when 1000-lb. AP were desired on three missions against enemy capital ships.

ComBatDiv 3 comments

Commander battle Line would like to point out that the use of the older battleships in bombardment and fire support groups has gradually led to reduction in the amount of armor-piercing shells and service charges on board to a point which was extremely embarrassing in this action and is likely to be more so in the future unless steps are taken immediately to correct the situation.

ComBatDiv 4 comments and recommends

1. Performance of the ordnance installations of the West Virginia left nothing to be desired except some improvements in her ammunition carrying capacity. At the end of the action -- a little over nine minutes -- half of the ammunition suitable for heavy targets was expended. This immediately proved a matter of concern as other heavy enemy ships were reported to the eastward.

2. To overcome this situation to a certain extent, as well as to provide means of bombarding from long range if the support ships could not enter SAN PEDRO Bay prior to the arrival of the transports, the Division Commander had changed the powder charges in both the West Virginia and Maryland prior to departure for LEYTE, providing 100 rounds of service charges for high capacity projectiles in the Maryland and 90 rounds of service charges for high capacity projectiles in the West Virginia. These could have been used against heavy ships, but, of course, would only have had topside destructive effect. Nevertheless, they could have been fired at long range.

CTG 77.2 comments and recommends

1. The combatant forces in LEYTE GULF were assigned sufficient A.P. to handle what had heretofore been considered normal needs for a bombardment ship. This averaged an ammunition loading of about 25 percent A.P. and 75 percent H.C. The A.P. Was to be used, in part, for knocking out tough enemy installations which the H.C. was ineffective against, and, in part, as a possible reserve for use against enemy raiders. Prior to this operation this loading had been ample for all purposes.

2. However, it was clearly inadequate for the LEYTE Operation in that the danger from enemy surface forces was not only high, but actually became a reality in the Battle of SURIGAO STRAIT. Here the shortage of A.P. ammunition was so keenly felt as to seriously affect the tactical considerations of the action. It became necessary to allow the enemy to come into relatively close range before opening fire. This brought own surface forces within range of Japanese torpedoes and also well within range of Japanese major guns. The fact that neither these guns nor torpedoes were effectively used by the enemy in no way diminished the danger to own forces imposed by this range limitation.

3. It is therefore strongly recommended that in future operations where bombardment groups are subject to attack by heavy enemy surface forces, provisions be made for increasing the allowance of A.P. on reload to about 50 percent and that provisions be made for rapid replenishment of both H.C. and A.P. from ammunition ships, either brought into the area with the bombardment groups or ordered into the area at the earliest opportunity thereafter. Ammunition ships were made available on A+2 Day in this operation, but this was a little too late to be fully effective because of several factors discussed under "Ammunition Ships", page 78-51.

4. The A.P. allowance of the heavy ships was but 20 to 30 percent of the normal allowance; the remainder of the allowance being taken up with H.C. Of this 20-30 percent, a percentage, varying for the different ships, had been expended for bombardment purposes. Thus the amount of A.P. on board the battleships on the night of the battle was a disturbing element. In addition to the above 20-30 percent of A.P., there remained approximately 12 percent of the H.C. projectiles with their reduced charges, and about 40 percent of the 5" Mark 18 allowance. The destroyers had expended all but about 20 percent of their 5" Mark 18 allowance. It is therefore evident that unusual attention to the conservation of ammunition was necessary and that had the action been prolonged a shift in type of main battery ammunition would have been required.

DISPOSITION

Executive Office, USS Pennsylvania, comments

The ammunition available, while limited by prior bombardment expenditures, was disposed to insure adequate access to the necessary types.

EMPTIES

Executive Officer, USS Pennsylvania, comments

Request was made upon the Group Commander for an LCT or other suitable means of disposing of bombardment empties. This was considered particularly important inasmuch as the 5" empties occupied a large portion of the boatdeck and thus constituted quite an unnecessary missile hazard and would further present a considerable handicap to traffic in this area and to any fire fighting effort that might prove necessary. There were evidently no facilities available for this purpose as there was no response to this request.

EXPENDITURE

ComCruDiv 13 comments

1. The figures submitted herein indicate the ammunition expenditures of the ships of Cruiser Division THIRTEEN and Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED during the period they were attached to this group. Ammunition expenditure of other units is not available without delaying this report.

	5"/38 MK 18		5"/38 Mk 32	40mm	20mm
Santa Fe	138		98	571	954
Birmingham	221		4	3	0
Mobile	199		198	0	0
DesDiv 100		928		82	383
Total		1786		656	1337

2. Congestion of communication channels with essential traffic and the continuous air alerts and related maneuvering made the submission of routine ammunition reports a matter of relatively small moment; no dangerous depletion of ammunition existed in any ship during the operations.

CTG 77.2 comments

1. The Columbia was well handled throughout this action and her fire was highly effective. Attention is invited to the fact that upon conclusion of this action her ammunition was practically totally expended, but 53 A.P. and 200 A.A. remaining on board.

2. The number of salvos fired and the total number of main battery rounds expended by each ship of the battleline are as indicated below:

Name of Ship	Number of Salvoes Fired	Number of Rounds Fired
Maryland	6	48
California	9	63
Mississippi	1	12
West Virginia	16	93
Tennessee	13	69
Pennsylvania	0	0

IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE WEST VIRGINIA FIRED 16 SALVOS, 93 ROUNDS. THE SHIP'S REPORT STATES THAT OF THE 13 FULL SALVOS FIRED, EVERY SALVO WAS A STRADDLE. THIS PERFORMANCE IS ESPECIALLY OUTSTANDING WHEN CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

1. THE WEST VIRGINIA LEFT THE COAST WITH NEW EQUIPMENT, NEW OFFICERS AND NEW CREW -- THE GREATER PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS AND MEN HAD NEVER BEEN TO SEA BEFORE. ONLY TWELVE ENLISTED MEN HAD EVER HAD PREVIOUS TURRET EXPERIENCE. TWO OF THE TURRET OFFICERS HAD NEVER BEEN TO SEA BEFORE, THE THIRD CAME FROM SUBMARINE DUTY AND THE FOURTH FROM SMALL CRAFT. THREE MONTHS SHAKEDOWN AND SHE WAS A FIGHTING UNIT.

2. ALTHOUGH SHE HAD UP-TO-DATE RADAR EQUIPMENT, SHE HAD TRAINED HER MEN TO USE IT TO ITS FULL VALUE.

3. THE WEST VIRGINIA OPENED FIRE UNDER FULL RADAR CONTROL AND CONTINUED TO USE IT FOR EVERY SALVO.

4. THE TARGET WAS PICKED UP AT 41,000 YARDS AND TRACKED DOWN TO 22,400 YARDS BEFORE OPENING FIRE.

---

West Virginia was bombed, torpedoed, and sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Battle of Surigao Strait marked her first return to combat after being salvaged and reconditioned. The link above includes her specifications, history, and full Action Report for this battle. --HyperWar

CO USS Mobile comments

1. It was noted that at ranges over 15,000 yards, tracers on six-inch projectiles frequently burned out before reaching the target; this was especially observed when partial salvos were fired. It was also observed that when projectiles were passing through light clouds, red tracers were more easily followed than were orange.

2. Ammunition expenditure:

Six-inch Armor Piercing	245 rounds
Six-inch High Capacity	534 rounds

CO USS Hornet comments and recommends

1. The results of the fleet action on 25 and 26 October demonstrate that the only effective aerial weapons against Japanese battleships are armor-piercing bombs, preferably of at least 1600 lbs, or torpedoes. Torpedo planes loaded with 500-lb. bombs have little effect, and 1000-lb. G.P. bombs serve only to knock out AA and do some topside damage. Also; it is believed that the G.P. bombs tend to break up on impact, reducing the number of observed hits.

2. If firing is to be done by ships inside the screen, Mark 32 fuzed projectiles should be used because tests have indicated that while the damage to exposed personnel is considerable, the damage from fragmentation effect to ship's structure is negligible in comparison to that possible from a 5"/38 projectile fuzed with base-detonating fuze.

Ammunition Ships -- Loading of

CTG 77.2 comments and recommends

1. The governing considerations for the loading of ammunition ships are not known by this command, but it would appear as if the most important considerations should be the tactical situation which may confront the ships in the combat area. This requires that the strategical and tactical planners closely cooperate with the logistics planners, to the end that the ammunition ships sent to the combat area will be loaded for the ships of that area.

2. Such a condition unfortunately did not obtain in the case of the ammunition ships sent to LEYTE GULF -- the Mazama and the Durham Victory. The Mazama, which is a Navy ship, was not loaded with any 16" ammunition whatsoever, and the Durham Victory carried but 38 16" A.P. with associated service charges. It is true that the Durham Victory carried 1,000 rounds of H.C. 16"-45, but this ammunition is not especially effective against enemy heavy ships.

3. The distribution of ammunition did not appear sound in that nearly all of the heavy ammunition -- 6" and above -- was in the Durham Victory. This, coupled with the fact that she was a merchant ship, made unloading slow and difficult.

4. It is recommended for future operations that:

1. Ammunition be loaded to conform to the probable needs of the forces in the area to which the ammunition ship is to be sent, and

2. Only navy ammunition ships be sent into those forward areas where expedition of unloading is vital.

Anti-Aircraft Defense

CO USS Essex comments and recommends

1. It is recommended that full allowance of eighteen 40 MM quad mounts be installed at earliest opportunity, noting that the starboard bow has full coverage by only one 40 MM mount.

2. The latest mark and model of 40 MM director with radar appears to be a "sine qua non" of successful AA defense by aircraft carriers.

CO USS Hornet comments

1. The 20 millimeter battery is still of doubtful value at night except against targets which have been set afire and consequently afford a luminous point of aim. Against night targets they serve only to outline the ship and indicate a prize target to the approaching plane. However, heavy and accurate fire was directed against a FRANCES on the night of 13 October which had been previously set afire by a screening destroyer.

2. The protection afforded by not disclosing position by gunfire at night is still unquestioned. On the night of 12 October plots indicated that "Bogies" were attracted by gunfire from other groups. The group of which this vessel was a unit was not molested until late in the evening when a

plane approached in a direct line to within 6000 yards. Fire was opened with the after 5" battery of this vessel using Mark 32 projectiles and flashless powder. The "Bogey" then turned and increased range rapidly.

3. Communication with the automatic batteries remains poor. No audible cease firing system is installed in the 40 Millimeter battery. Telephone and flashing light control must suffice until completion of ShipAlt which provides for high decibel cease firing howlers, quadrantal telephones control and high frequency cease firing note in telephone circuits.

4. A loud speaker system similar to the 17 MC installed in the 5" battery is needed for dissemination of target information to the 20 MM battery. Additional telephones will be installed in the 20MM groups to provide a talker for each three guns until a better system can be devised.

ComCruDiv 13 comments

1. The anti-aircraft performance of the task group was satisfactory in general. Although we were approached by many aircraft repeatedly, the accuracy of the ships' gunfire is indicated by the enemy's prompt withdrawal in the majority of cases, and the successful destruction of at least three enemy planes by gunfire alone.

2. That the enemy aircraft were able to press home single-plane attacks on the afternoon of October 15 was only by the most brave and determined efforts of their pilots. It is believed that both of these planes were damaged during their approaches; the fact remains, however, that they were both able to drop their torpedoes, and that in the first attack the torpedo ran true and struck Houston.

3. The FRANCES that attacked Houston lost altitude slowly on retirement, crashing without flames or explosion some 8,000-10,000 yards outside the screen. The JILL that attacked Santa Fe winged over and it appeared that the pilot was trying to crash the bridge structure. It crashed at the very forefoot, hitting the water and cartwheeling into the bows, exploding violently.

4. Fire discipline and inter-ship gunnery communications were highly satisfactory, as evidenced by the tightness of the former and the relatively small volume of the latter required. With the unusual disposition necessitated by the tactical situation, excellent fire discipline was essential.

5. Full radar AA fire control in ships of the task group will continue to be unsatisfactory until installation of new equipment for better target elevation determination and pointer tracking.

CTU 38.4.2 comments and recommends

1. Another consideration, of course, in instant readiness to fire once a "bogey" is detected within gun range. Instructions issued by Commander Task Group 38.4 provided for this as follows:

Be prepared. Maintain weapons and equipment in the highest state of readiness that weather and sea conditions permit. In fair weather, keep gun covers of automatic weapons off, gun ports open and ammunition lockers undogged. Fifteen seconds is an acceptable standard during daylight for manned guns of 5" caliber or below to open fire in local control after the command 'Action Port (Starboard)' is given.

2. The methods of complying with the foregoing must rest largely with individual commanding officers. It is felt that the acceptable condition of readiness in the case of automatic weapons can be met by requiring that when operating in areas where air attack may be expected during daylight and dusk hours at least two forward bearing 20 MM's and two after bearing 20 MM's be maintained cocked with magazines mounted. Tests of wear on barrel springs have proved that negligible permanent set is thus caused. The best way to call the attention of other ships to an attacking plane is to fire at it. 40 MM guns should likewise be kept in the highest possible condition of ammunition readiness commensurate with safety.

Anti-Aircraft Disposition
(General Considerations)

1. The threat of the suicide bomber, which places the brunt of the anti-aircraft defense burden on the ship being attacked, has necessitated reconsideration of carrier task group AA disposition. Disposition 5-V, which proved so successful against torpedo attacks, has been found to provide inadequate protection against dive and glide bombers, and, more specifically, against suicide bombers.

2. Against torpedo attacks, which were the enemy's chief tactic against our surface forces for more than a year, the 5-V disposition, with all ships except carriers in the screen, provided maximum firepower against enemy aircraft. Planes

breaking through the screen were taken under fire by the carriers and continued to be targets of ships of the screen.

3. During the MARIANAS operation, however, the Japanese reverted to dive and glide bombing, with planes passing over the Screen at high level and diving out of clouds on carriers at high speeds. Against such attacks ships of the screen found their high firepower capacity virtually helpless as a protection for the carriers. The inadequacy of the standard AA disposition become even more apparent in the LEYTE operation when the enemy pressed his dive bombing with fanaticism, resorting to suicide dives against our ships.

4. During the sweep of the Philippines in September, groups of Task Force 38 attempted several variations of disposition 5-V in an attempt best to meet the threat of both torpedo and dive bombers. Task group 38.1 placed carriers on Circle 2 and cruisers and destroyers on Circle 7. This disposition later was modified to place the screen on Circle 4.

5. Task Group 38.3 used Cruising Disposition 5-R, with destroyers on Circle 9, battleships and cruisers on Circle 4. The group's AA disposition, calling for destroyers on Circle 5.5 and heavy ships on Circle 4, was not used.

6. The disposition problem still is in a state of flux. Various recommendations have been made by ships of the fleet, and final decisions will be based on the following considerations:

1. What is the most dangerous form of attack?

2. What disposition will make possible the use of maximum firepower against the form of attack without unnecessarily weakening defense against other types of combined attacks?

7. It is apparent that as we move closer to Japan the enemy's fanaticism will increase. It also is certain that it increasingly will display itself in the form of determined attacks on our surface forces. That close in attacks are the most dangerous of any tactics yet undertaken by the enemy requires no elaboration. The ultimate AA disposition, then, must be the best possible defense against them.

8. As carriers will be the chief target of glide and dive bombers during attacks on carrier task groups, their firepower must be supplemented by that of ships of the screen. Bringing in heavy ships (battleships and cruisers) from the screen will serve that purpose, but has serious limitations. The arc of fire is limited by the presence of destroyers in the outer screen. And destroyers are so thinly dispersed that they are of little value in defending numerous important targets against torpedo attacks.

9. It is likely that a plan will be developed to meet the threat of dive or glide bombers by tightening the entire screen to bring enemy planes within range of heavy ships' automatic weapons. This may place ships of the screen on Circle 4, with carriers on Circle 2.5, or the screen on Circle 5 and the carriers on Circle 3.5, permitting a high concentration of fire against planes diving on carriers. Against torpedo attacks the screen could expand to Circle 5 with a minimum of confusion.

CO USS Alabama comments

1. C.T.G. 38.3's disposition 5-V, prescribed but not used during the operations, is felt to be subject to close examination. It puts the BBs and CLs on Circle 4, with DDs on Circle 5.5, equally spaced between the heavy ships. With this close spacing, the AA fire of the heavy ships is rather effectively blanked off by the friendly DDs of the screen, resulting in a reduction in the volume of fire of the BBs to some 25 percent of that available if the DDs were on the same circle, or were sufficiently far out to be beyond range of the 40mm and 20mm batteries.

2. The danger to friendly ships also presents a psychological hazard which must inevitably result in a further reduction of the arc of fire, especially at night when firing under radar control. All things considered, it is believed that an increased volume of fire (approximately 10 times greater) would result if the DDs were on the same circle. It is realized that the additional 1,500 yards affords some A/S protection, but is submitted that with the Japanese long-range 45-knot torpedo this protection is more theoretical than real.

CO USS Boston comments

1. In the 5-V disposition on which the task group (38.1) was formed at the time of the second and third attacks, the cruisers and destroyers were on the 3,000-yard circle, with one carrier at the center and three others on the 2,000-yard circle. This is considered too open a formation for effective gunfire support of the carriers by either the cruisers or destroyers, which was evidenced by the fact that the planes dive bombing the carriers were able to make their attacks without exposing themselves to gunfire from the screen at ranges less than 6,000-7,000 yards.

2. In order for the vessels on the screen circle to fire at all on these dive bombers, it was necessary for them to fire toward the interior of the formation, which was feasible in view of the relatively wide clear sectors existing in such a loose formation, but at best afforded only minimum and precarious opportunity to the gun support ships to assist the carriers in bringing the attacking planes under effective fire.

3. After these actions the task group commander modified the 5-V disposition to place the cruisers and destroyers on the 4,000-yard circle, with one carrier in the center and the other three on the 2,000-yard or 3,000-yard circles, which seems decidedly a more effective formation for gunfire support in an air attack on the carriers.

CO USS Mobile comments

Special cruising disposition 5-Roger was used in this operation, putting destroyers on Circle 9 and heavy ships on Circle 4. The anti-aircraft disposition prescribed, which would have stationed destroyers on circle 5.5, leaving heavy ships on Circle 4, was never formed. Adequate defense against low-flying aircraft presents a considerable problem in either disposition, particularly in regard to unmasking the batteries of the heavy ships inside the screen at night. In any case, the problem reemphasizes the necessity of furnishing heavy ships with full information on the screen axis and stations and on the exact order of destroyers in the screen.

CO USS Wichita comments and suggests:

1. The formation placing the screening vessels on Circle 7 eliminated a large percentage of the mutual support that might have been available had the cruisers and destroyers been on Circle 5. This would have reduced the defense against low-flying planes, perhaps, but would have been much more effective against dive or glide attacks.

2. It is suggested that if formation 5-V had a circle indicator post-fixed it would facilitate shifting from one screening position to another to offer the best type of defense against air attacks as the latter develop. For instance, in the engagement on 22 September if, knowing that the enemy was at high altitude, the OTC could have said "Form 5-V5", then the screen would have been in a better position to protect the carriers.

CTU 38.1.2 comments and recommends:

As originally directed by CTG 38.1, cruising disposition 5-V was formed with carriers on Circle 2 and cruisers and destroyers on Circle 7. During the morning attacks of 22 September the screen was unable to provide the carriers with any defense against dive-bombing attacks.

Because of the low ceiling, dive bombers were not spotted until they broke through the clouds above the carriers. These planes never came within range of the automatic weapons of the cruisers and destroyers stationed on Circle 7. Cruising disposition 5-V was modified later in the day, placing the cruisers and destroyers on Circle 4.

CTU 38.1.2 strongly recommends that cruising disposition 5-V be formed with carriers on Circle 2.5 or 3.5, and cruisers and destroyers on Circle 4 or 5, in order to enable cruiser and destroyer batteries to assist in the defense of the carriers against dive-bombing attacks and to provide a greater concentration of fire against any enemy plane which attempts to penetrate the screen.

Approach Procedure for Friendly Planes

CTG 77.5 comments:

1. Approach procedures using definite bearings, altitudes and recognition signals have been long prescribed but have rather fallen into disuse through our general control of the air and reliance on radar for identification of returning planes. However, in the action around the PHILIPPINES it became evident that some procedure had to be specified that would insure that friendly planes would approach the formation from a safe direction and in a friendly manner so as to not alert the batteries and be fired on by our own surface forces.

2. The general approach of the suicide bombers from directly overhead dictated that all friendly planes stay out of the cone over the ships and all patrols were ordered to remain away from right over the formation unless chasing an enemy plane. Also, all planes returning to the formation and letting down for a landing were directed to proceed to the sector away from the sun and approach with wheels down and at low altitude on a course of 270 in the morning and 090 in the afternoon, Thereafter, no friendly plane could be mistaken as making a hostile approach and all ships knew the direction from which to expect them. It greatly eased the confusion of many planes returning, some of them with IFF shot up, and not knowing whether or not enemies were among the friendlies.

3. Some such sort of a standard approach doctrine should be reestablished for all surface groups and not only will the doubt as to enemy or friendly be cancelled but our own planes will not be fired on by nervous gunners.

Assessment of Damage Inflicted by Air Attack

1. As stated in the PREFACE of this BULLETIN, the Japanese may have been sincere in their belief that their aviators had dealt a crushing blow to our fleet east of FORMOSA, which Tokyo was quick to claim.

CTF 38 comments:

The enemy was evidently misled by reports of the air action and believed he had inflicted heavy damage on our forces.

2. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet points out in his Pacific Fleet Secret Letter ISL-44 that the assessment of the damage inflicted by air attack is still difficult and susceptible of error. The following extract is quoted below:

AIR ATTACK ON SURFACE VESSELS.

10. The following excerpts are briefed from the report of an air strike by carrier planes in the early months of the war:

    One AP, 15,000 tons, ... ship sunk and burning. One AP, ... ship on fire and sinking when beached. One AP ... sunk and burning. One AP or AK ... Beached and probably sunk. One AP or AK ... sunk, resting on bottom in shallow water and listing. One CA, Mogami Class, ... ship blew up and sank. One CA, Kinugasa Class .. afire and headed for beach ... Believed sunk. One CL, Natori or Tenryu Class ... headed for beach ... Believed sunk. One AV, Kamoi ... damaged and stopped. One DD ... listing, afire, and sinking fast. Two DDs .. probably sunk. One PG set afire and severely damaged. One AM ... stopped and burning fiercely, probably sunk.

11. The sinkings as a result of this strike which were ACTUALLY CONFIRMED LATER, were as follows: Three cargo vessels, 4,000 to 6,000 tons; no naval vessels sunk.

12. The foregoing instance is cited, not as a criticism of the commanders or participants involved, but as well illustrating the wide differential that can exist between estimates made in the best of good faith and the cold facts later established. Considerable improvement in evaluating losses has been made since the foregoing action, but the assessment of the damage inflicted by air attack is still difficult and susceptible of error, due to the following causes:

    1. Inherent nature of an air strike which does not permit remaining in the vicinity to observe the fate of ships hit or believed hit.

    2. Duplication in observations and in claims of hits and sinkings, as a result of the number of planes participating and reporting.

    3. Over-optimism regarding the effects on a ship of hits actually made. There can be tremendous explosions topside, and yet the ship stay afloat and get home again.

    4. Over-optimism regarding the effects on a ship of near misses. Since a near

miss (if near enough) can do considerable damage, there is an understandable tendency to be liberal in calling near misses.
5. Over-valuation of fire and smoke on ships that have been hit. A small and possibly harmless fire can produce a great amount of smoke. Furthermore, there is ample experience showing that even ships which are on fire from stem to stern may nevertheless survive.

6. Over-valuation of ships "beached and sunk". If a ship is hit and is not certain as to the extent of the damage, it is quite logical for her to run into shoal water and beach herself lightly until the attack is over. It by no means implies her total loss.

7. Lack of familiarity with ships on the part of many pilots, which handicaps them in distinguishing types and tonnages and in estimating the seriousness of the damage or the probability of a ship sinking.
13. All of the foregoing factors must be recognized, and there must be no let-down in the effort to reduce to a minimum the errors they cause, since, as elsewhere emphasized herein, such errors are a direct hurt to our own tactics and strategy and a corresponding help to the enemy.

Attacking Planes

ComBatDiv 9 comments:

The enemy using fighters loaded with small bombs, changing their altitude on the approach, using cloud cover whenever possible was successful many times in getting past our intercepting fighters, with the result that a small number of attacking planes achieved an unusually high percentage of hits by diving directly onto the ships. Many countermeasures have been tried with varying success, but under conditions of poor visibility when operating comparatively close to large land areas this method of attack is the most difficult with which to cope.

Basing Aircraft Ashore

ComBatDiv 2 comments:

1. There were no air operations. Prior to darkness on 24 October 1944, ComBatDiv Two, anticipating a night action, requested and obtained permission to base VOS aircraft ashore, i.e., tied-up to LST's on the landing beach. Unfortunately, 2 Tennessee aircraft were victims of a night enemy air raid on the beach.

2. However, in spite of this unfortunate occurrence, the move of basing aircraft ashore is considered sound. BatDiv Two suffered loss of only 2 planes, whereas, had planes been retained on board ships the night of 24/25 October it would have been necessary to have jettisoned them when action became imminent, with a resultant total loss of six planes.

Battle Damage--Lack of

CTG 77.2 comments:

1. The battle of SURIGAO STRAIT was characterized by the complete lack of battle damage incurred by any ships of this command, with the single exception of the destroyer A.W. Grant. When the size of the forces engaged is considered, such good fortune seems almost incredible.

2. It can be attributed first, to own battle plan which used torpedoes most offensively in the early period of contact and which used gunpower most effectively thereafter; second, to the failure of the Japanese to assume a suitable defensive disposition on the one hand, or to take any strong offensive action whatsoever on the other.

Bombs Effectiveness of Against Enemy Heavy Ships

CTG 38.3 comments and recommends:

1. A study of penetration tables for AP bombs shows that with dive bombing they could only penetrate about 3 inches of armor. Thus they are of little effect in damaging a BB. Practically all bombs used against the BB's in that battle were AP or SAP and it is believed they were being defeated by the armor and not getting even as much effect as a G.P. Instantaneous fused bomb would have obtained.

2. In order to obtain the penetration necessary to cause internal damage and holes in the bottom, some type of rocket is required. Rockets of a large size equal to the 1000 lb. A.P. Bomb should be developed with all possible speed. It is believed that rockets are the coming weapon of aircraft as they will be able to penetrate any armor that is practicable to install in a ship.

Carrier Searches

CTG 38.3 comments:

1. It is considered that "reinforced searches" are not warranted in that they dissipate planes that would otherwise be available for strikes after contact is made. It is considered that search planes should have no other mission that search, should avoid combat, and that they should not carry bombs. However, it is believed sound where practicable to have 1 VB accompanied by 1 VF to give it protection against enemy fighters encountered in seeking its information. When sufficient fighter types are available, a search team of two fighters is probably better still.

2. When carriers are beyond the coverage of own shore-based air searches, it is believed essential for security that carrier searches be made in all directions from which enemy carriers might approach within striking distance.

Carriers in Northern Enemy Force

CTG 38.4 comments:

The reason for the presence of the carriers in the Northern enemy force is not clear unless they were expecting the early return of their air groups from reservicing ashore, or, alternately, the arrival of replacement groups. Surely the number of carriers present was not necessary to maintain the combat air patrol in the numbers actually found over the fleet on the morning of the attack. Unless the expectation was as stated above, the enemy made a grave error in not sending back, at best speed during the night, those carriers denuded of their air groups. Certainly no circumstances more favorable to ourselves could be hoped for than those found on the morning of 25 October.

Casualty Drill

CO USS Hoel comments:

1. Previous to the engagement the gunnery officer had spent many hours in casualty drill. The ability of the men to cope with material and personnel casualties paid tremendous dividends. When it became necessary to shift from one type of control to another, the men grasped the new situation completely and knew just what was required of them. Replacement of casualties to the 5" guns is usually a problem. However, since all automatic weapons had been knocked out, these crews became available for replacement gun crews and damage control parties.

2. In a melee such as the ship experienced, identification of own and enemy ships becomes a major problem. The fact that the Hoel at no time, even while the guns were in local telescopic control, fire on friendly ships attests to the excellence of fire discipline. Local control practice cannot be stressed too strongly. Gun captains, pointers, and trainers must be drilled to perfection in this phase of training.

3. The fire control radar was shot away at the time that the main battery director was hit. Until this occurred, the fire was modified radar control due to poor visibility. When plot took control of the firing, SG radar ranges and bearings, gun number 2 relative bearings, and gunnery officer's estimate of target angles were combined to solve a target's course and speed.

4. The three remaining stations, guns number 1 and 2 and plot, maintained communications to the very last. Plot also maintained communication with combat and the bridge to the end. The gunnery officer's system and selection of commands, stressing brevity, was very successful. Commands can be short and at the same time complete. Such commands are a part of training and indoctrination and must be put into practice to cut down confusion. A damage control circuit outlet in plot, guarded throughout the battle, would have been of invaluable aid in gun repair as well as in hull repair.

5. Approximately 600 rounds of common and AA common projectiles, smokeless powder, were expended. Ten torpedoes were fired, all of which ran hot, straight and normal.

6. Of the salvos fired in director control (modified radar control), the fourth and fifth salvos were seen to hit. The first three are believed to have been short. The result of stable element controlled fire, using SG radar,

gun number 2 relative bearings and visual target angle estimates was very successful. Many hits were observed while this type of fire was in use. The target was at all times that enemy ships believed to be the most menacing. For this reason the target under fire was constantly being changed. The type of fire described seems to be effective enough to merit consideration and emphasis as a secondary method of control. Gun number 2 relative bearings were used to check the correctness of the SG radar target selection.

7. Since the gun captains of guns number 1 and 2 were both experienced in the use of local telescopic control, the results of this type of fire, employed when the SG radar was knocked out, were very accurate. The rate of fire was very high considering the conditions under which the gun crews worked.

CL(AA)s

CO USS San Diego comments:

The use of this class ship in the screen may have developed a feeling that the CL(AA) is an "overgrown destroyer" and handles like one. The Commanding Officer wishes to point out that the maneuvering characteristics of the class are similar to those of other cruisers.

Combat Fatigue

CO USS Hornet comments and recommends:

It is considered that the present schedule for relief of Carrier Air Groups must be accelerated considerably if operations are to continue at the rate that has been maintained since June 1944. Carrier Air Groups cannot maintain their efficiency for over three months at the present pace. This will become more apparent when Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT runs out of tactical targets and turns to strategical bombing on a larger scale. Pilots do not like AA fire, which is always accurate and intense to a degree depending upon the importance of the target. After periods of bombing shore objectives well defended by AA, there is a pronounced slacking off in drive and a tendency to take it easy. The curse of percentage of duds on take-off increases, which is one of the first signs of combat fatigue. It is recommended that consideration be given to the problem of accelerating readiness of replacement groups.

Combat Information Center

FIGHTER DIRECTION AND RADAR

CO USS Hornet comments:

1. In CIC, Fighter Direction Control still seriously interferes with the flow of information necessary for adequate ship and gunnery control. Plotting officers become preoccupied with the manipulation of the fighters and are further distracted by ever-increasing communications duties. At night when the value of the VFN is questionable, preoccupation with fighter direction at the expense of adequate information for ship and gunnery use becomes serious, especially when enemy aircraft approach at low altitudes, giving few or weak indications on the radar screen.

2. On the night of 13 October the low-flying aircraft attacking this formation were not detected at ranges less than 12 miles, partially because of preoccupation of CIC and search radars with a single VFN whom they wished to warn clear.

3. This problem is peculiar to aircraft carriers who are required to specialize in fighter direction. The solution may be to install a second CIC for ship and gunnery use with one or two air search radars and a surface search radar made available for this purpose.

THE SOLUTION IS PROPER TRAINING. SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT AND PLOTTING FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE. COMMAND SHOULD INSIST ON GETTING INFORMATION NECESSARY; IT IS THERE.

CTG 38.1 comments and recommends:

1. During the period of operations 2 October to 29 October, the enemy was being fought closer to his homeland and, as was to be expected, he fought with greater skill, ferocity, and determination than was noted in the months just previous to this time. As a result, fighter direction was employed extensively in the protection of our forces from attack and in denying the enemy information by destroying his snoopers. We have the situation in hand during daylight, but from dusk to dawn and during very poor visibility in the daytime we are still relatively vulnerable because our fighters cannot be brought to bear in large numbers on attacking enemy planes.

2. Following is a summary for the period 2

October through 29 October of the snoopers and raids, divided into day and night activities.

1. Day Activities.

   1. 9 raids plus 13 single bogies. (This does not include bogies tracked by this group but intercepted by another Group)

   2. All 9 raids were intercepted and all planes in the raids were destroyed or driven off with the exception of one JUDY that used cloud cover advantageously to come within the formation.

   3. Of the 134 single bogies 3 were destroyed by anti-snoop fighters without having been picked up by radar.

   4. 7 were intercepted by CAP fighters and all but one shot down. That one escaped in extremely bad weather after having been sighted visually three times at ranges of less than a mile.

   5. Three bogies, believed to have been enemy, were never intercepted because of weather, range, or poor technique.

   6. Total number of planes in all raids and snooping is estimated at 132. Of these 80 were shot down plus 11 probables.

2. Night Activities.

   1. Five raids plus 19 night snoopers.

   2. Night fighters shot down one plus one probable. Additional night bandits were shot down by planes (VF(N)) of other Groups and by anti-aircraft.

   3. On the night of 12 October the enemy came in high with search planes, enabling night fighters to take their toll, and the attacks were ineffective. On the nights of 13 and 14 October the enemy approached just as the day Combat Air Patrol was landing at dusk. The attacks were low on the water and there was very little warning. At 0100 on the 27th a high-flying snooper was picked up at 105 miles. The Independence was directed to launch night fighters. The bogey closed the force on a straight course until he was at 70 miles and then turned sharply away indicating that he had radar contact. The Bogey continued to snoop the force from 12,000 feet at distance of from 120 to 80 miles until the night fighter identified it as a MAVIS and shot it down 95 miles from the force. No further bogies were detected. It appears that if the enemy has good information on our location and can attack in strength with low-flying aircraft, the attack can be deadly. If, however, the enemy had to search for our forces with night snoopers, we stand a good chance of knocking down the snoopers with our night fighters and disorganizing the attack.

   4. Flagship CIC passed vital information to the battery control stations and released batteries or held fire for the Group. Over TBS 1 the ships in the Group were informed of the positions of the most dangerous bandits. CTG 38.1 issued this information for emergency maneuvers to give the low-flying attack the most difficult target angles.

3. On 15 October (one of the busiest days that any task group has had in fighter direction) a total of seven distinct raids attacked the group in weather that was most favorable for the attackers (7/10 cumulus clouds between 3,000 and 10,000 feet). Three of the raids split into two or more groups before being intercepted. The raids approached from 270 degrees of the compass. One low-flying torpedo attack was not intercepted until it was at 20 miles, another was intercepted at 35 miles and the remainder at 50 miles or beyond. The raids dispersed and turned away when hit by fighters in strength, but because of the cloud conditions, annihilation of the raids was rare. However, only one bandit, a JUDY, came within gun range of the formation and the crippled Canberra-Houston group only 40 miles away was spared attack by the timely interception of all raids on this day.

4. The enemy's use of search radar, window, and extremely well-planned and executed attacks was noted repeatedly during this period. The plot of Rad "7" on 15 October is reproduced on page 78-60 to show the deception used by the Nip.

5. On raid "7", sufficient fighters were available to counter move against every feint the enemy made. Thus the enemy was in the position of a fox pursued by a number of hounds. Had the situation been such that only one or two groups of fighters could be made available, it is very probable that the raid would have reached its objective without interception.

6. There is still vast room for improvement in currently unreliable radar performance; in tracking, particularly of multiple targets, and in presenting a complete radar picture on the plot.

CTG 38.1 Raid 7 -- 1525 15 Oct. 1944

7. Communications for the most part were not sufficiently reliable for fighter direction. In the case of the night fighters, communications were generally most unsatisfactory. Radio discipline is still lax in some air groups. Although the new pilots are the worst offenders, they only reflect the laxity displayed by their flight leaders and CIC personnel. Continued stress on the importance of radio discipline cannot be over-emphasized. The number of planes in the air on the same channels is continuously increasing. As the fighting gets tougher there are more important contact reports, more emergencies, and more instructions. Communication facilities have not been provided to the extent necessary to keep pace with the ever-increasing necessities of large scale air operations. Failure to provide the equipment and trained upkeep personnel will result in ship-air communications breakdown with consequent inability to intercept enemy aircraft. Such failure will inevitably result in more of our ships lost. Regardless of how good radio discipline is, it is obvious that a thousand stations on one circuit can only result in massed confusion.

8. The improper performance of the IFF system made the fighter protection less efficient than it might have been. Personnel training and the checking of both the airborne and ship-based equipment must be improved to prevent the useless chasing of friendly bogies.

SOME UNITS REPORT IMPROPER PERFORMANCE OF WHAT THEY HAVE AND ALSO DEMAND MORE AND BETTER MATERIAL TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. THE CRITICAL STABILITY AND WEIGHT CONDITIONS IN OUR SHIPS MAKE IT NECESSARY TO REPLACE OLD EQUIPMENT WITH NEW, AND IF THE NEW WEIGHS MORE, SOMETHING ELSE GENERALLY MUST COME OFF. THE QUESTIONS OF PROVIDING MORE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS, BETTER RADARS, BETTER IFF ARE UNDER CONSTANT STUDY.

ARE WE USING TECHNICIANS FOR WHAT THEY ARE TRAINED?

9. The confirmed use by the enemy of VHF jamming and, on the 22nd of October, of Mark III code 1 (Possibly 2 or 3) IFF is noteworthy. The system of anti-submarine patrol must be drastically modified in order to provide an opportunity to identify in time the sudden appearance of unidentified aircraft. It further means that returning strike groups must close up and prevent straggling when closing friendly ships. It will then be possible to detect bandit snoopers by their course and speed.

11. The absolute necessity for a DRT in CIC was demonstrated frequently. The Flagship has a DRT mounted vertically which serves well to keep personnel informed of the relative position of the land masses and especially the target areas and enemy operational fields. In the vertical position the DRT is still practical for determining the course and speed of surface units quickly.

12. Recommendations:

1. That in order to insure a higher percentage of interceptions under low visibility conditions, one VF(N) be included in the CAP from each Group.

2. That consideration be given to placing a radar marker on the night fighters similar to that used by fire-control parties. Such a device would make the VF(N) less likely to fade from the radars at medium ranges.

3. That when within range of enemy strikes VF(N) be used regularly to cover the dawn launch and dusk recovery.

GENERAL

CO USS Daly comments:

CIC operated smoothly, providing tactical information, solutions to torpedo and gunfire problems, and intership communications. Commanding Officer wore JA headset throughout the action, making much easier CIC's mission of supplying combat information.

CO USS Hutchins comments:

1. CIC did it. At no time was there any confusion as to targets. Several times the Commanding Officer feared he was firing on own ships and received a vociferous and offended negative from the Evaluator. When he asked for an identification he received even the Desdiv or Crudiv number. The Gunnery Officer was prevented from shifting to a friendly target only 20° from an enemy ship.

The Hutchins' CIC is the first below-decks CIC in the 2100-ton class. It is in the former Squadron Commander's cabin and has been expanded to take in the gun lockers and break locker. It

has recently been modified to serve primarily the needs of a Squadron Commander, one whole corner being built up for this with 12-inch PPI, etc.

3. The C.O. was delighted to find that in spite of the condition that this CIC was trained primarily to furnish a Task Group Commander information and communications, it simultaneously provided full gunnery and torpedo information to the ship. Close cooperation was received from the Squadron Commander in making this possible.

4. Many things were learned to better such a dual-purpose CIC. The Commanding Officer wore a telephone head and chest set on the JA circuit.

5. This Commanding Officer, who was instrumental as CIC officer on Comdespac Staff in placing CIC in this remote position from the bridge, believes, as all hands did then, that when space and time permit, all CIC's should be brought adjacent to the Pilot House in small ships. Neither space nor time was available for such a placement in the 2100 ton class in 1943, as yards and constructors told us. Space for proper internal arrangement of equipment remains the most important factor, and is satisfactory in this respect in the present 2100-ton Class standard CIC. This was demonstrated in the subject action and in the following three days of air attacks. However, if radical revision of the 2100-ton Class should ever become practicable, it is recommended that the actual combination of pilot house and CIC be considered as a solution for this class. No halfway measures would better the present arrangement.

CO USS Denver comments:

The work of all hands in CIC was smooth and efficient during the entire period. The action was fought after seven days of bombardment and enemy air attacks with the attendant long periods of Condition I and II. Radar operators and plotter might well have been exhausted but they did not appear so. Their work was entirely praiseworthy. The Commanding Officer considers that CIC kept him fully informed in all respects regarding the tactical situation.

CO USS San Diego comments:

The work of CIC in the use of radar navigation during sortie from ULITHI during very low visibility and darkness on October 3 was especially gratifying in view of the fact that it was the first time the ship had been forced to rely completely on radar for entering or leaving port. The practice run which had been made during the entrance on October 1 was of immeasurable value. Photographs taken of the scope are expected to be of assistance in the future.

Gunnery Officer, USS Maryland, comments and recommends:

1. Although this vessel has not in the past maintained a Gunnery Liaison Officer in CIC, this action has emphasized the desirability of placing a competent experienced officer in that position. This officer should be on the Main Battery control circuit, not for the purpose of paralleling the regular information channels from CIC, but in order to interpret the various tracks maintained there from a purely gunnery viewpoint and to act as a more direct link between Main Battery Plot and Control and the controlling officers in CIC.

2. The need for an improved CIC installation is again emphasized. The present location of CIC is considered ideal in that it is within easy access to the fire control tower and the conning tower. It is also adjacent to flag plot and is only one level below the navigation bridge. The advantages of its location, however, are offset by the disadvantages of its arrangement. The present CIC is located in two small compartments, neither one of which is large enough to contain all the equipment necessary to carry out its function as an intelligence center. Problems arising from such a situation are obvious and can only be remedied by consolidating CIC into one properly arranged compartment. It is recommended that a proper CIC installation be made during the first availability.

CO USS Essex comments:

CIC functioned as in previous operations insofar as method and personnel were concerned except in the following:

1. A great portion of the time the JS Information Circuit was manned in Flag Plot and in CIC by CIC and Fighter Director-trained personnel. With the ever increasing tempo of our combat days and the growing importance of CIC, the above was found necessary. During daylight the amount of information handled by CIC concerning searches, strikes, patrols, fighter direction, station keeping, etc., was tremendous, especially when operating with several other Task Groups. For these reasons, it takes highly trained personnel to handle the traffic successfully.

2. It has also become apparent that Combat Information must be centralized; i.e., a single responsible person on watch must evaluate. This evaluator might logically be the JS talker, though the latter function could easily prove a distraction.

3. Essex CIC is by no means complete physically or in personnel requirements. Steps have been taken to correct these deficiencies under existing conditions; however, it must be realized that a complete CIC is impossible until the adequate physical set-up is available.

CO USS Fanshaw Bay comments:

1. Enlisted personnel were organized into two teams of 12 men each. One of these teams plus the fighter director, radar control officer, and one intercept officer were on duty daily during flight operations. At general quarters and when this ship was assigned the visual fighter direction duty, the visual fighter director and a visual fighter direction team, consisting of four specially trained lookouts and one talker-plotter, were stationed on the searchlight platform prepared to take control of the CAP on an assigned frequency.

2. The Executive Officer acted as evaluator to the open bridge and flag plot at general quarters.

3. In addition to fighter direction, CIC performed the following functions:

1. Maintained a continuous plot of own and enemy air and surface units.

2. Kept flag plot, bridge, and gunnery advised of composition, ranges and bearings, courses and speeds of enemy forces as determined from information obtained via radars and VHF transmissions from own planes.

3. Advised flag plot and bridge of weather conditions, e.g. location and size of cloud formations and rain squalls, on basis of information obtained from SG radar and own planes.

4. Directed and coordinated air attacks against enemy surface units in accordance with instructions received from flag plot.

5. Maintained plot on retiring enemy surface units based on information obtained from all available sources and used same in vectoring air strike sent out by this and other units. This included Wasp and Hornet air groups (estimated 50 to 60 planes each), which were contacted on VHF when approximately 15 miles from this base on course 200°, apparently uncertain as to target location, and vectored to enemy fleet which then bore 340° -- 120 miles from this base. Second vector was given them by this ship when the air group left their original vector to attack crippled enemy cruiser with destroyer escort, dead in water bearing from us 335° -- 55 miles. Strike group was directed to proceed to enemy main body. At last report force had contacted the enemy. Communication was by VHF, relaying through local CAP stationed over this base at 10,000 feet.

6. Received and transmitted to flag plot information relating to attacks made and results of same.

7. Maintained up-to-date record of deck condition of all carriers of this unit and of number and type of planes airborne from each together with missions assigned.

8. Homed lost planes from this and other units and arranged for landing, refueling and rearming of planes participating in the attack.

9. Acted as clearing center for information regarding missing pilots and all other information relating to the action.

CO USS Sangamon comments and recommends:

1. The present CIC installation in this ship is woefully inadequate to handle the volume of aircraft and communication traffic when performing the duty of flagship of a force affording Air Support for a large amphibious operation. The deficiency exists not only in the matter of radar coverage but also in communications, both internal and external, and personnel.

2. Recommendations:

1. That Selector or toggle switches be installed at the important positions in CIC so as to allow access to all circuits from those positions, particularly radar circuits (21JS, 31JS).

2. That at the first navy yard availability, a thoroughly modern CIC set-up including internal communications systems be installed. During recent operations this ship has acted as an AGC insofar as carrier aircraft is concerned.

ComBatDiv 13 comments:

The operation of the Cabot CIC, and in particular the work of her intercept officers, was instrumental in the successful accomplishment of our mission.

ComBatDiv 4 comments:

From observation made on the flagship, the West Virginia, the CIC functioned very well. The position of own and enemy forces was known at all times and there was no doubt as to where to shoot. Continuous sweeps of the surface search radar presented the full picture to the Division Commander. Tracks of own and enemy forces accurate enough to determine who was who were maintained by reading bearing and range from the remote P.P.I. Fire Control Radars were coached on to the target and accurate tracking was done by using them.

CTG 79.11 comments and recommends:

The performance of CIC's of ships of DesRon 54 was very good to excellent. The need for more training in low visibility torpedo attacks with high relative speeds is indicated. The Monssen and the McGowan are the only two ships participating in the attack who have a remote PPI in CIC. Early installations on the other ships is desirable as it is a distinct advantage.

IDENTIFICATION BY IFF

CTU 38.4.2 comments:

1. Comment in enclosure (D) of Wichita's action report is in general concurred in. However, it must be admitted that the attack by the first group of planes on Franklin and Belleau Wood had many of the aspects of surprise. Although unidentified aircraft had been detected 35 miles to the westward about 15 minutes prior to the attack and CAP vectored to intercept, in a short time SK radar showed a "merged plot" and "bogies" were thereafter lost. Whether this was because enemy planes made their glides through null areas of the air search radars, or because they were merged with friendly planes (i.e., at approximately the same ranges and bearings) until too close to the formation for detection and identification by IFF in air search radars, is not clear. In any case, of the screening ships, only two (Wichita and one destroyer) were observed to fire on planes which struck Franklin and Belleau Wood, although other ships were in a position to have done so. Planes taken under fire by Wichita were first identified visually. Visual detection and identification was difficult in the first instance, however, since planes approached from direction of the sun.

2. This incident again emphasizes the obvious necessity for maximum alertness when there is reason to believe enemy planes have reached position inside the CAP. Experience has demonstrated that IFF in air search radars cannot be relied upon to distinguish friend from foe when planes are close to the formation. This is due largely to limitations of the equipment:

1. Planes within five miles are obscured by the light spot or "sun" in the center of the SK screen -- individual planes within this range are often difficult or impossible to distinguish.

2. In the range interval from five to twenty miles, if the bogey is within approximately five degrees in bearing and one mile in range of one or more friendly planes, the friendly plane's IFF will generally mask the "bogey." Consequently, within this range all "friendly" pips have to be constantly watched to instantly detect any "bogey" that may break away from them.

3. Alertness of all topside personnel, particularly lookouts and control personnel, and quick certain identification are thus often the key to successful A.A. defense. Despite sad experience and numerous directives, it would appear that too much reliance -- almost blind faith -- is still placed on radar and CAP. As has been pointed out on several previous occasions, though the performance of both is often outstanding, neither is infallible.

POSITION REPORTS

CTG 77.4 recommends:

A secure grid system, changing daily, for giving carrier positions and general use, should be promulgated.

RADAR

CO USS Haggard comments:

The value of radar in this action was not great. The enemy surface force could not be separated from our own surface and air units. The enemy plane was first sighted visually by an observant lookout. Again, it is clearly shown that too much reliance cannot be placed in radar and, in the final analysis, keen and alert lookouts remain a prime requisite.

CO USS Denver comments:

The search radar problem in this area, LEYTE GULF, was an extremely difficult one. Land and land echoes made undetected air attack highly probable and small vessels could have approached along the coast lines without detection by SG. In spite of this, however, the excellent air warning system and alert SK operation within the ship

gave early warning of the few bogies which approached.

CO USS Santa Fe comments:

The SK radar performed admirably at all times in picking up enemy aircraft at long ranges (30 to 110 miles) and tracking them in to the formation. In the case of high-flying aircraft such as dive bombers at 8,000 feet or more, it does not detect them after they get in to about 10 miles. Under these conditions dive bombers seem to be able to remain in the clouds over the formation for periods of 6 to 10 minutes without being detected by the radar. They are lost with radar and are able to make a surprise attack often unopposed and not fired upon until late in their dives.

CO USS Essex comments and recommends:

1. Essex, in controlling interception during the period of 10-29 October, used the PPI controlled interception exclusively and is definitely "sold" on the method. The intercept officer working from a 12" remote scope at no time was confronted with lack of information, as happens in the case of plotting board interceptions. Four or five times interceptions were completed successfully because information was available on the remote scope but not to the operators at the machine. Also, on three separate occasions interceptions were completed when no information was available at the final stage, but because the intercept officer saw the very last indication he was able to dead reckon both bogey and friendly and give accurate enough orders to complete the "Tallyho".

2. During this action period it was noted that "Snoopers" and "Shads" came in at four thousand feet or below and very high speeds (220 knots). Also, the large attacks came in high, stacked from fifteen to twenty-five thousand feet. These notations are for the daylight attacks. The group "day attacks" were not aggressive and several times twelve to sixteen "Hellcats" were able to hold at bay a forty to fifty plane attack.

At Formosa a torpedo attack developed on the formation as a complete surprise to Essex radar. This attack was very low on the water and escaped fighter interception. The enemy knows some of the limitations of our radar but it seems he cannot decide on the best type of attack. All of his attacks during the subject period show a definite lack of coordination and aggressiveness.

3. The night tactics used during this period were not greatly different from our previous actions. However, a few things were positively noted:

1. Each night "Shad" or "Snooper" flew a weaving course, varying the heading of his plane approximately 20 to 30 degrees -- thereby indicating that his airborne radar was probably fixed in the nose of the plane. This was also noticeable with the day "Snoopers". It is believed that the Japs "home" on our radar until they can fix our position with their airborne gear whose range is comparable to our ASB type.

2. This action showed renewed vigor in their night program. It was not uncommon for them to "Snoop" use from sunset to sunrise. However, their ability to coordinate and press home the attack has not improved over that at KWAJALEIN on 4 December, 1943, or at SAIPAN on 22 February, 1944.

4. The night attacks used "window" more during this action than before but, due to use of the remote PPI on the twenty mile range, this countermeasure was not too effective. It was possible to determine just when "window" was dropped and to determine immediately when a plane left the vicinity of "windows".

5. The cruisers and battleships very often alerted the Task Group with reports of enemy radar a minute or two prior to Essex radar's picking up the bogey. The most authentic reports were in the 150 to 155 megacycles band, which is known to be their airborne radar gear.

CO USS Fanshaw Bay comments and concludes:

1. Radar proved to be of little value in the air attack following the surface engagement. The SK screen was relatively clear at this time but the enemy aircraft came in low on the water until within a few miles of our formation. They were never seen on the SK screen, with the exception of one or two on retirement. Low-flying aircraft were occasionally seen on the SG screen at ranges up to 10 miles, but the plots were sporadic. With sufficient gain setting to spot them, side lobes from nearby ships nearly obliterated the echoes, rendering it impossible to obtain any satisfactory track.

2. It may be concluded from the foregoing that the enemy is fully aware of the limitations of our radar equipment. His attacks, as in this case, are designed to come in below the effective altitude of the SK radar and upon reaching a point close enough to the target to permit him to ignore radar detection (being within visual range), to climb to the altitude necessary to launch his suicide attack.

THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT LOOKOUTS MUST BE ALERT AT ALL TIMES --- IT IS NOT SAFE TO DEPEND ONLY ON RADAR TO PICK UP ENEMY PLANES.

CO USS Hornet comments:

1. Better radar equipment is urgently needed to combat night enemy aircraft attacks. The new Mark 12 Radar for 5" directors and Mark 17 Radar for 40MM directors now coming into production should increase the accuracy of gun pointing so that night targets can be picked up and fired at with a reasonable chance of hitting. During the period of 12 to 15 October 5 "Bogey" targets were tracked in approaching directly toward the ship at about 6000 feet altitude. Fire was opened at about 6000 yards with the 5" battery and although 4 of the 5 "Bogeys" turned away, no evidence of hits was obtained with "good solutions". Radar gear is needed which will permit tracking targets with accuracy approaching that of optical means, if success in night shooting is to be expected.

2. Anti-aircraft fire-control radars should be so equipped that friendly IFF indications can be detected by a system similar to that in use in search radars. On several occasions aircraft which have been picked up by FD radars but not by search-radars because of altitude or range limitations, have been tracked in heavy clouds or at night to well within range of attack only to be recognized as friendly when the aircraft came into view. The advantage gained by the ability to track aircraft by radar means will be nullified when friendly aircraft are in the vicinity until Bogey nature of the aircraft can be reliably determined by the fire-control radars.

3. Although on this vessel 40MM quads can be connected to the 5" fire-control system, inaccuracies inherent in the mark 4 Radar also make this method of control of dubious value for control of automatic fire. It seems better to rely upon the use of the Mark 14 sights for pointing the quads.

4. The Mark 4 FD Radars have proven very effective for tracking aircraft which have previously been picked up by search radars. The fire-control radars are coached on targets by the Gunnery Radar Liaison Officer in CIC from the plots on the large board. This system is preferred to that of designating train directly to the 5" directors from the search radars, because it permits the gunnery representatives to designate to each 5" director the target on which its gun can bear, shifting targets if course changes necessitate.

5. On the afternoon of 15 October a JUDY was tracked in from 22 miles in heavy clouds by FD Radar after having been detected by search radar and subsequently lost by that radar. As the plane approached this ship it was spotted in the clouds by binoculars and the battery was prepared to open fire. When it dove from a clear area nearby, the entire battery was ready for it and was able to develop an effective fire which caused him to drop his bomb 300 yards off the starboard beam and crash about six miles on the starboard quarter.

COORDINATION OF ALL USES OF RADAR IS ESSENTIAL. RADAR WILL GIVE ALL THE INFORMATION IT CAN WITHIN ITS DESIGN LIMITATIONS.

CO USS Suwannee comments and recommends:

1. The greatest difficulty in intercepting "bogies" was found to be the lack of altitude information. This was the result of the following factors:

1. Ships operating as close as 30 miles to large land masses resulted in the radar screen being blocked in bearing up to 180 degrees.

2. Failure of actual "fitting" fade charts in use, even though fade charts in use were constructed and based on many radar calibration runs.

2. The second serious problem presented during most "close-in" interceptions was the large number of friendly planes (singles and groups) in the area. Many "Tally-Ho's" were made on ASP planes and returning strike groups of this division and other carrier divisions in the vicinity; during this time, the "bogies" either faded or opened.

3. Recommendations:

1. There should be some type of SM radar on each carrier, or at least on one carrier of each division.

2. The carriers should operate at least 75 miles from large land masses.

3. Local CAP should be increased from 8 to 12 planes in the "bogey" area.

1. SP NOW AUTHORIZED AND BEING INSTALLED.

2. AND (C) COMMAND MUST KNOW WHAT LAND MASSES DO TO RADAR. AGAIN KNOW ITS LIMITATIONS AS WELL AS ITS CAPABILITIES.

ComCruDiv 12 comments:

In the virtually land-locked waters of LEYTE Gulf, enemy planes had a great advantage in being able to approach the objective area from north or west over large land masses. Ships' air search radars under these conditions were hard pressed to detect and track approaching raids. Frequently raids were detected over water west of LEYTE and then lost until sighted visually by the ships. It is not felt that this inability to track raids successfully over land is any reflection on the radar operation nor on the condition of upkeep. In some cases results were surprisingly good in spite of geographical handicaps. The general situation, however, does emphasize the weakness of present ship-borne air-search radars when ships are compelled to operate in close proximity to large land areas.

ComBatDiv 4 comments and recommends:

1. Radar of both surface search and fire control types proved its worth on the night of 24-25 October 1944. The procedure used by the West Virginia for operating the surface search radars is recommended for all ships.

2. The great value of maintaining a continuous sweep with the surface search radar was proven again in this engagement. The remote PPI enabled anyone watching it to keep track of our forces and the enemy. Tracking can be done from the remote PPI well enough to keep a summary plot. Solving for enemy course and speed accurately enough for gun or torpedo fire is a fire control radar's job.

CTG 77.2 comments:

Radar fire control methods were according to doctrine. The targets had been reported early by our PT boats, and tracked by our destroyers, who reported their positions with reference to known landmarks. Hence the targets were picked up easily by fire control radars, and tracking was not difficult.

CTG 77.3 comments:

While on the subject of radar, fire distribution could have been more readily accomplished had the information available on the Mark VIII main battery radar been used. SG radar target definition is not sufficient at the long ranges involved in a battle like this. The mark VIII, with its expanded target area, even at the long ranges, can be of great help in this connection.

MODEL VF WILL HELP. DOCTRINE REQUIRES THE CIC TO USE THE INFORMATION FROM ALL RADARS. THIS INFORMATION BELONGS TO ALL HANDS AND SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM.

CTG 77.4 comments and recommends:

1. The radar installations on ships of the Sangamon Class were a constant source of anxiety as they could not pick up any planes approaching at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet and the range of radar interception was seldom more than thirty miles. Consequently, ships of this division had to rely on reports from others and fighter direction from the Flagship was not satisfactory. Ships had great difficulty vectoring intercepting fighters on the incoming bogies because there was nothing better than a guess as to altitude.

SC/SK CAN GIVE YOU A PRETTY GOOD GUESS.

It is imperative that the SP radar be installed on all CVEs so that the ever-increasing attacks from enemy land-based air can be intercepted and broken up at sufficient distances from our own forces.

2. As has been noted in each previous operation and during five different calibration runs conducted by the Division, there exists a high altitude deficiency in the SK radar installation of all the ships. This deficiency is not equal for all ships, the worst being the U.S.S. Sangamon, then in order of severity, the U.S.S. Chenango, U.S.S. Santee and finally the best coverage in the U.S.S. Suwannee. The experience of the U.S.S. Sangamon, being the worst, is as follows: Coverage up to 10,000 feet is average or above average and adequate. Two to four aircraft, at 8,000 feet can be tracked to a distance of 100 miles or better. Above 10,000 feet, however, there is a sharp decrease in range to a figure of 50 miles or less for several planes. Single aircraft are

difficult to discover at any range above 10,000 feet. A complete survey of the Sk radar antenna radiation is recommended at the earliest opportunity.

THIS MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO PERSONNEL RATHER THAN EQUIPMENT.

3. Because of the relatively short distance at which these carriers have been operating off land masses during amphibious operations, there is a consequent reduction in the distance during which altitude may be determined by "fades". (Usual operating ranges off land masses during the day have been between 20-50 miles). As such, it is imperative that some better means be provided (SP or other type of radar for at least one ship in the division or force) so as to be able to establish a good estimate of altitude if the "raid" is to be intercepted before it is over the force.

4. During the LEYTE Gulf operation, almost all "raids" were of the "Suicide Dive" type from altitudes of 10,000-15,000 feet or above. The problem of interception was intensified as it was not only necessary to intercept and disperse the "raid", but rather to destroy all aircraft before they were in a position to begin their dive. When interceptions were made at reasonable distances from the force, our pilots experienced no difficulty in destroying the enemy aircraft due to the lack of intelligent defensive tactics on the part of the "suicide pilots". The problem was quite difficult, however, as most of these "raids" were made by two to three aircraft rather than in large, easily detected groups. Only in one instance was there evidence that there were more than four planes at a time and the larger "raid" (perhaps 8-10 planes) as well as those of four was readily intercepted. Great difficulty, however, was experienced in picking up the high altitude sneak "suicide raid" by single or two planes. The fact of being close to land where there was a limited distance in which to pick up "bogey" indications, plus the lack of quick altitude information magnified the problem of "early interception".

5. Added to the above problems was the fact that our own aircraft were continually going back and forth to the beaches. In consequence, it was relatively easy for enemy aircraft in "small numbers" to time their attacks to coincide with the "strung out" return of our aircraft and come in undetected until relatively close to the formation. When they got in close they were difficult of detection due to the circling of "friendly aircraft" and a generally "cluttered" screen. There is some evidence that the enemy learned the sequence of our flight operations, as most attacks coincided with launching and landing operations. In this regard it is suggested that in the future flights do not return to the ship from the objective area until fully rendezvoused and "closed up" so as to present only one clearly defined friendly indication on the scope. Such practice would require alertness on the part of flight leaders to avoid single aircraft or small groups superimposing their indications upon friendly aircraft by flying at different altitudes, nearly at the same range.

6. Intense diligence and speed on the part of the radar operators is necessary so as to be able to check each indication for IFF in the short distance of their flight from the beaches to the ship, detect "bogeys", give clearly defined "fades" to determine altitude and decide how many aircraft there may be in a single "echo", or several "echoes", so that an intelligent decision may be reached in time to handle a successful interception and destroy the enemy aircraft before arriving over the formation.

7. All command vessels (CSA) and FDO vessels, and all CVEs must be equipped with an SM (or SP). A radar which can solve for altitude is essential. Raids must be detected and VF vectored out before the enemy formation has a chance to separate for the attack. All bogies must be intercepted. Once separated, the FDO problem become so difficult that an unlimited number of fighters is not capable of stopping a resolute and determined attack. Due to prevalent clouds at intermediate altitudes, the altitude of the raid must be accurately known or interception becomes impossible until too late. A "stacked" CAP is only a partial solution to the problem and CAP cannot always be made available in adequate numbers. Pending availability of SM radars, closer liaison and training in using destroyers FD radars to estimate altitude must be accomplished.

CONTROL OF OWN AIRCRAFT -- TO KNOW THEM AND SEE WHERE THEY ARE IS ESSENTIAL.

RADAR CONTROL LIMITATIONS

ComCruDiv 6 comments:

Evasive maneuvers of enemy cruisers were very effective and provided an excellent test of fire control parties and equipment. In general, performance of ordnance matériel was satisfactory. However, reports of limitation of radar control in both range and bearing are noted. New Orleans states that rangekeeper problem was particularly

difficult because bearing was dependent on radar train which "had its customary deflection weave". Wichita states that known lag in radar range line was a direct cause for the time required to sink the target. Also, as indicated in Wichita's report, the mark 8 Radar seemed unduly sensitive to shock of own gunfire, resulting in a very disappointing performance during the early phases of the night engagement. Improvement in reliability of fire control radars is considered to be a matter of importance and urgency.

ComCruDiv 13 comments:

1. With rapidly and radically maneuvering targets, the lag in full radar fire control in determining and correcting for changes in target course and speed is such that large errors are produced, particularly in deflection.

2. Fire-control radar still offers possibility of consistently "just missing" the target, which must be kept in mind in accepting heavy ammunition expenditures.

IS IT THE RADAR OR HOW IT IS OPERATED?

RADAR DECEPTION

CTG 77.4 comments:

1. The following is a description of events that occurred in the Flagships' CIC on 21 October 1944:

1. At 1830 bogey was reported at 040 -- 12 miles and a section of the Dusk CAP was vectored to intercept. There was a merged plot at 090 -- 5 miles with estimated altitude of bogey 350 feet. The CAP saw nothing and returned for landing.

2. At 1900 a U.S.S. McCord (DD 534) reported sighting one low-flying aircraft showing running lights.

   At 1927 bogey appeared 070 -- 8 miles.

3. At 1932 U.S.S. McCord again reported sighting of low-flying plane bearing 160° 3 miles. Bogey was tracked on the screen out to 20 miles on a westerly course, speed 120 knots.

4. At 1935 bogey picked up 350 -- 8 miles, tracked overhead and out to 170 -- 8 miles. Lookouts reported seeing and hearing nothing.

2. From this time until 2045 about 15 bogies were tracked, appearing north of the formation at 8 miles and disappearing south at 8 miles. Many of these passed over the ships, all of which reported the same indications. Various DDs in the screen reported having solutions on the bogies by Mark 4, estimating altitudes from 50 to 350 feet. The dubious part of the solutions was that they showed a southerly direction at speeds of 30-50 knots. Therefore, orders were given to hold fire.

3. The altitudes obtained from estimations of the SK and the Mark 4 solutions was constant and all contacts appeared and disappeared at the same range of 7-9 miles from the formation.

4. During this period the formation was on courses from 110° to 125° and the winds northerly. Afternoon wind readings had been surface 335°, 13 knots; 7000 feet 035°, 32 knots.

5. These bogies were some form of deception, possibly the type known as "phantoms", and were probably released by the single aircraft reported visually. The indications on the SK were very clear and appeared like aircraft echoes. Some ships reported their echoes were usually E-3, never reached saturation, and that the amplitude varied at a higher rate than aircraft echoes. Others reported echoes of 1/4 to 1/2 normal plane echoes with occasional normal ones.

6. It is fairly certain that the indications were not caused by "window" as single and definite echoes were observed. The fact that lookouts saw nothing despite a clear night with a bright new moon, the altitudes of 50-350 feet and the slow speed indicate the absence of mechanical or material devices such as balloon reflectors. Also the indications were picked up by the SG and appeared fuzzy and very similar to cloud indications.

7. The constant altitude, limitation of range, slow speed, and general downwind motion favor the explanation as being that of some form of "ionized" smoke or vapor.

8. The reality of the echoes and their similarity to aircraft indications confused the operators at first appearance. It was only after tracking them for a few minutes that their speed showed they were not aircraft.

9. The formation did not open fire. It is believed this form of deception has the purpose of causing ships to open fire at false echoes and thus reveal their position to the real bogey lying in wait. There was no evidence to indicate that there was more than one enemy aircraft present in the area.

RADAR EQUIPMENT

CO USS Trathen comments:

1. The negative bias transformer, T-2, in the modulation generator of the Mark IV radar burned out at the objective. This was a tender spare and the ship's force was unable to rewind this type of transformer. Emergency steps were taken to obtain the lost voltage from the Sugar George in the brief time it could be secured.

2. The burned out transformer normally supplies -850 volts dc to the distortion circuit of the modulation generator. A new source of -850 volts dc was found in T-602 of the Sugar George modulation generator power supply. This Sugar George transformer normally supplies -820 volts dc for the monitor scope and the duplexer tubes' "keep alive voltage". By disconnecting the monitor scope bleeder this latter voltage was increased to about -950 volts dc. This was led thru a 1 megohm dropping resistor and cable to the tap on the burned out transformer bleeder, this bleeder also being disconnected to prevent overloading T-602 in the Sugar George. A 45-volt "C" battery was used to give the -55 volt bias also obtained from the burned out transformer.

3. Using T-602 in this manner eliminated the use of the SG monitor scope but the RCA oscilloscope normally provided with the Mark IV can be used in it's place. Knowing beforehand what to do, the Mark IV and SG would be back in operation in an hour. The operation of neither set was impaired.

ComBatDiv 3 comments:

1. The Mark 8 Fire Control Radar is so far superior to any type currently in use and the results achieved with it so satisfactory that no discussion is considered necessary other than to point out the urgent need for that type radar on ships equipped with older models.

2. The Commander Battle Line's flagship, Mississippi, is not equipped with the Mark 8. Full reliance was placed on the SG with which Mississippi CIC was able to present a clear picture of the movements of enemy and own forces throughout the engagement. However, the relative importance of two groups of pips appearing on an SG screen is not evident, nor is it always possible to tell by relative position.

3. Mississippi's lateness in opening fire and Pennsylvania's failure to open at all are attributed to both material and personnel. Both ships had difficulty identifying their target and obtaining an acceptable solution. Mississippi was able to fire at the end but Pennsylvania was not. Commander Battle Line believes that if these ships had Mark 8 Fire Control Radar they would have opened fire with the rest of the Battle Line. Maryland is to be commended for her speed in picking up her target from observation of West Virginia's fall of shot.

ComBatDiv 4 comments:

1. The tremendous advantages enjoyed by a vessel equipped with the FH type radar over those equipped with FC were forcibly demonstrated as between the Maryland and West Virginia. The latter ship had been tracking the target, at which she eventually fired, from a range of about 41,000 yards to 42,000 yards with perfectly definite target indications in range and bearing and there was no hesitation in opening fire. On the other hand, the Maryland with FC radars could, at the time the West Virginia opened fire, find no identifiable target until the range closed to about 22,000 yards. It appears probable that the leading enemy heavy ship which eventually became the Maryland's heavy target changed course at about the time the West Virginia opened fire and therefore presented to the Maryland's fire control radars a broadside target, as it was some minutes after the initial salvo of the West Virginia that the Maryland found a target and opened fire.

CTG 77.3 comments:

Radar again proved its great value, both in fire control and in detection and plotting of enemy vessels. The need for a separate remote PPI to be used by the summary plotter without interference was again demonstrated. The summary plotter cannot be interrupted in the use of the remote PPI if he is to keep careful and accurate track of friendly and enemy vessels.

RADAR SPARES

CO USS Ammen comments:

Radar: The Sugar George (Able) Radar, which failed the night of 20 October when the driver supply transformer (T101) Navy Type number 30888 burned out, was sorely missed. The SC-2 proved a poor substitute and, when a thorough search among all communication headquarters ships (AGCs) revealed that none had brought tender radar spares forward, the possibility of completing the operation without SG was faced. By a stroke of good fortune, a spare T101 transformer was located in and obtained from the Phoenix, which had the foresight to secure this one tender spare for her use in the event of a casualty such as ours. This casualty emphasizes pointedly how useless are tender spares to a ship in dire need of same when

there is no tender within a thousand miles of the vicinity. If tenders cannot accompany ships to forward bases with vital spares, it is considered urgent that provisions be made for some other ships to carry minimum needs until tenders reach the area.

STATION KEEPING

CO USS California comments and recommends:

1. During a night action station keeping is an obviously important function and must be performed by using SG radar ranges and bearings. In this ship, while cruising in a column formation, only the forward SG can be used in station keeping. This is true because the antennae of the after SG is lower than the forward super-structure, thereby making it impossible to range with the after SG on a ship dead ahead and within station keeping distance. Because the Bridge required frequent ranges and bearings to the ship ahead in column during the action in order to meet Commander Battle line's rigid station keeping requirements, it was most practicable to use the forward SG (in CIC) for station-keeping and for radar navigational fixes. The summary plot was maintained by use of a remote PPI. The after SG (in Auxiliary CIC) was used for searching and tracking. Ranges and bearings to the targets were passed to the DRT recorder and plotter in CIC over the 23JS sound power circuit. This set-up was satisfactory, but will prove to be a handicap to the evaluator in the event of more complicated action.

2. If the after SG antennae could be raised, auxiliary CIC could be used for station keeping while cruising in column. The forward SG could then be used for searching and tracking. In this way the Evaluator would have closer control of the tracking and interpretation of pips.

MODEL VF PPI AND CHANGE 50 TO SG WILL INCREASE ITS USEFULNESS. CIC SHOULD USE ALL RADARS TO GET ALL DATA.

Communications

CIRCUITS

CO USS Daly comments:

Considering the number of ships involved in this action intership communications were most successful. Proper use was made of tactical and maneuvering circuits. Circuit discipline was good even though many "repeats" were necessary due to extreme range between units of same force.

Gunnery Officer, USS Maryland, comments:

During this action no spotting planes were in the air. It is believed that great value to all battleships in the action could have been derived from the establishment of an interplotting room circuit between the plotting rooms of all ships. Transmitters normally used on the plane spotting circuit could have been utilized for this purpose, and it is believed that a free flow of information over such a circuit would have resulted in a better understanding of the developing situation on the part of all Plotting Room Officers, and, ultimately, a more successful action. It is believed that a policy for the establishment of such a circuit is being considered in the first draft of a battleship gunnery doctrine being drawn up by ComBatPac Gunnery Officer.

PLAIN LANGUAGE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION MAY BE VALUABLE TO THE ENEMY.

ComBatDiv 2 comments and recommends:

1. Preceding the engagement, during the engagement, and after the engagement, communications on all circuits within TG 77.2 functioned smoothly except as noted in following paragraphs.

2. Local Air Warning circuit (3115 kcs) was supposed to be PT boat primary voice reporting circuit. However, it was being used by everyone for all types of traffic. Use of this circuit by powerful ship stations in LEYTE GULF caused much interference when less powerful PT stations tried to make contact reports. This interference prevented rapid delivery of contact reports to OTC. Excessive repeats and relays were predominant prior to and during the engagement. Alertness of PT squadron commanders in relaying and repeating vital information is commendable.

3. It is recommended strongly that contact reporting circuit be used primarily for contact reporting and, if the situation justifies, a special circuit be used by stations assigned these duties and positive control be maintained thereon. It is further recommended, where distance and low-power radio equipment is a factor, that radio telegraph (CW or MCW) be used for contact reports instead of voice.

CTU 77.4.2 comments:

1. The establishment of a high frequency inter-Commander Support Air Circuit (2096 Kcs) for making routine aircraft reports and for the interchange of operational information between

the various CSAs and the Escort Carrier Unit Commanders, was extremely satisfactory. Formerly, this traffic was handled on the "Support Air Request" net and interfered seriously with communications between the CSA and the Air Liaison parties.

2. The "Radar Information Circuit" (142.56 Mcs) proved invaluable for intra-unit communications. It is strongly recommended that at least screen commanders be equipped to man this circuit. The inter-Fighter Director Circuit (37.6 Mcs) is subject to interception by the enemy during daylight hours. Transmissions on this circuit from other force were heard by this command over a thousand miles away on one occasion.

3. It is considered that a Task Group Common should be selected comfortably above the range of airborne and shipboard "DF" equipment. The Task Group Common designated (430 Kcs), was particularly dangerous, affording the enemy an opportunity to take excellent "DF" bearings from aircraft or surface ships. It is suggested that a Task group Common be selected in the two thousand kilocycle band.

4. Considerable difficulty was experienced in copying both "Bells" and "Manus" Fox schedules in the LEYTE Area. This was due in part to the antenna arrangement on Kaiser Class CVEs. The ship antennas have to be kept lowered throughout the day. Reception at the following time was particularly troublesome:

	Times (GCT)	Frequencies	Remarks
BELCONNEN	1930-2300	4050, 12170, 8430 Kcs	Unreadable
	0600-0900	4050 Kcs	Unreadable
MANUS	2000-2100	**8830, 17660 Kcs	Unreadable

**NOTE: It is believed that if "NTF" continued transmitting on 4415 Kcs. until 2100 GCT this condition would be corrected.

CTG 77.4 comments and recommends:

1. There is always the problem of insufficient VHF channels and "jammed' frequencies. It is true that a great deal more can be achieved in the way of radio discipline, but in an operation of the type being described, discipline is only part of the problem. In the first instance, one or two channels must be made available to the "objective" area for Fighter Direction, SAD, etc. This generally leaves two or perhaps three channels available to the carrier groups. In the present operation, the presence of three distinct carrier groups complicated the problem even more. Although the three groups of carriers did not interfere with each other, their air groups interfered both with the carriers and each other. The jamming of the fighter Director channel was particularly noticeable. There were many times when all three groups were giving vectors to their planes at the same time, with confusion of the fighters hearing vectors from all three controlling bases and the bases hearing acknowledgments from all the planes.

It is suggested that each carrier unit or division be assigned a definite frequency for the control of its own planes, differing from any of the usual four channel frequencies, and in addition have a common frequency for all the planes (channel #4) in the event it become necessary to join or interchange groups. It is believed that sufficient different crystals are now available to make this suggestion practicable.

2. There is also the necessity for a common rendezvous channel to be used for all administrative and rendezvous instructions, and pilots must be instructed to use this channel exclusively for such purposes.

3. At the present time, the four generally used VHF frequencies are so close together on the band that it is almost impossible to avoid interference between channels. This is particularly noticeable in channels #2, 3 and 4. Since there is a difference of only .72 mcs. Between the three channels, the elimination of this interference is difficult of accomplishment. Shielding, separation of leads and antenna should improve this condition. During the recent operation, channel #4 was assigned as fighter Net (carrier) and channel #3 was used as Radar Information Circuit. The interference between the two was so great that it was necessary to delay vectors when reports were coming in over the RIC or to miss important information from the other ships. The availability of a Radar Information Circuit for a force composed of ships having only one radar each is of vital importance. The presently established Radar guard plan and RIC in Cardiv TWENTY-TWO worked admirably and was of invaluable assistance to us in view of the flagship radar's high altitude void.

4. A more integrated system of internal communications for these ships' CICs is necessary, so as to allow the FDO and others to have access to the various circuits, particularly the radar circuits, without the necessity of changing phones or asking questions of plotters wearing sound-powered phones. This can be accomplished by the installation of Selector or toggle switches at the important points throughout the compartment.

5. There should also be installed some system of inter-communications between the various positions in CIC, such as feeding the various radio circuits through sound-powered phones so as to avoid the necessity of taking off phones to talk to various stations in the compartment and also to reduce the noise level.

6. A special bogey circuit should be set up.

7. Inter Commander Support Aircraft (ICSA) -- This circuit was an innovation in support aircraft operations and proved invaluable. It is probable that successful support air operations would have been impossible without it. This circuit should be retained in future communication plans.

ELIMINATE DIFFICULTY OF UNDERSTANDING VOICE CIRCUIT NAMES

CO USS Denver comments and recommends:

1. It was noted that considerable difficulty was experienced by operators on voice circuits in understanding the geographical names used in reporting enemy ship locations. Many repeats and frequent spelling with corresponding delays resulted. It is suggested that all voice circuit operators should be familiarized with the operating area so that the names of islands, waterways, points, landmarks, etc., will be thoroughly familiar to them beforehand in order that vital transmissions not be delayed. Another solution would be to extend the use of the numbered or named "point" system. The voice call system is unnecessarily complicated and requires more effort than its security affords in remembering or keeping straight the names of ships and commands in a force of this size used in this operation where calls are assigned at random. For simplicity some reduction in security should be accepted and calls assigned on some basis which would facilitate their being remembered by officers and talkers without continual reference to a list.

2. In other respects communications were uniformly excellent throughout.

EQUIPMENT

CO USS Raymond recommends:

1. VHF should be provided on all escorts.

2. NAN equipment should be provided on all escort vessels operating with carriers.

CO USS Santa Fe comments and recommends:

1. The tug Munsee, with the unreliable TBY equipment, could not be consistently contacted on the TBS frequency. It is suggested that some type of equipment which would enable the tug to carry on reliable communications with men of war on a VHF channel be provided.

ComCruDiv 13 comments:

1. The lack of satisfactory TBS communications with Pawnee and Munsee was felt acutely. For fleet salvage work TBS communication with salvage vessels is considered essential.

2. The lack of a second TBS in Santa Fe continues to be source of constant inconvenience. It has not been possible to transmit on TBS secondary; an RBK has been required to cover this circuit instead of other important circuits, and the sole standby for TBS in ComCruDiv THIRTEEN's Flagship is a single TBY.

3. The lack of a dependable shipborne VHF installation is another source of inconvenience and loss of military efficiency. With only the makeshift installation of two AN/ARC-4 aircraft VHF radio units, it is not felt that the Flagship's CIC installation is properly equipped to handle the fighter direction and intercept work frequently encountered.

During the past 10 months, however, this division has not had opportunity or the necessary equipment to remedy these and other discrepancies in the material installations of the communications department.

CTU 77.4.3 comments:

To meet the additional traffic load required aboard a flagship, an ATC, ten channel, high frequency aircraft transmitter was installed and set up on the ten frequencies most likely to be used. This proved an excellent addition, especially for communications with aircraft and as an emergency standby transmitter. The PD-1 recorder was extremely useful in checking the accuracy of messages sent and received.

CTG 77.4 comments and recommends:

Equipment and Methods.

1. This command prepared for voice and key communications for the PHILIPPINES Operation with the lessons of past amphibious operations in which close air-support was required in mind. On my

flagship, all CW circuits were located in Radio One. All voice circuits other than aircraft VHF circuits were centered in Radio Three, which is located next to CIC. Six receivers, three RBH's, two RAS's, and a useful high frequency receiver, salvaged from a wrecked B-25, were available in Radio Three. In addition, two RBB's were "piped" into Radio Three from Radio One.

2. Also available in Radio Three were two remote phone units (RPU). Microphones from these units were installed at a desk in the center of Radio Three and from this position an officer controlled all high frequency voice transmissions. He was in continuous contact with the flag bridge through a sound power circuit. By means of a jack box at the central desk he was able to listen to vital circuits and make immediate transcriptions of outgoing and incoming messages without the delay of rewriting them from log sheets.

3. This system worked admirably and is recommended for support aircraft voice communications. The value of having officer supervision and participation in the actual transmission of dispatches was amply demonstrated. Speed of decision was possible, and accurate, immediate routing of the most vital information to those who simply had to have the facts proved very advantageous.

4. It is recommended that a system of jack boxes similar to those installed in CIC's at present be made available to CVE flagships involved in close air-support missions.

5. It is also important that more reliable voice receivers be allowed combat CVE's. The RBH type receiver is not satisfactory and it is dangerous to trust an important warning or support net to such a receiver. A receiver of the type of the RBC is recommended.

6. It is also necessary that a second TBL be installed in CVE task group flagships. The communication duties of these ships are extensive. More equipment is essential if they are to do the job assigned. It is felt that a transmitter of the general type of the ATC, used in carrier aircraft, should be added to the allowance of the flagship. The facility with which frequencies may be shifted by means of such equipment would insure flexibility of communication, which is so important when so many frequencies are employed.

GENERAL

CO USS Fanshaw Bay comments and recommends:

1. In general the same comments apply to this operation as were made in my communication report for the MOROTAI operation; namely, too many circuits to be handled by too little equipment and too few personnel. However, in spite of the greater volume of traffic, communications were much better than in that operation.

2. All high frequency voice circuits were handled in Air Plot. An ATC, ten channel, high frequency aircraft transmitter was installed and set up on the ten high frequency channels most liable to be used. This proved invaluable for aircraft communications and as a standby transmitter when it became necessary to instantly shift to another frequency. The four RBH-1 receivers were set up on 2096 kcs. (ICSA), 3115 kcs. (LAW), 3000 kcs. (GAW), and 6195 kcs. (IFD) -- which was later shifted to 2530 kcs. The two main circuits, 2096 and 3115, were split phoned and handled by one operator. 6195 was monitored and controlled in CIC and 3000 was guarded on a speaker. The TBL transmitter was set on 2096 and piped to the remote unit in Air Plot where it was controlled. 6195 was on the TDE transmitter and controlled by the remote unit in CIC. In addition, a remote microphone and headset were available for use on this circuit in Air Plot when required. 3115 was set up on the TCE in CIC and controlled in Air Plot. When it became necessary to set up additional voice frequencies such as 3080 kcs. (SAO) or 4195 kcs (SAD-E-1), the receiver on 3000 was temporarily shifted to the frequency desired and the ATC transmitter set up on the desired frequency. LAW and ICSA were recorded on the PD-1 recorder. The PD-1 recorder proved extremely useful in checking the accuracy of messages received in addition to providing a voice log of all transmissions sent and received.

3. All VHF circuits, with the exception of TBS, were controlled and monitored by CIC personnel.

4. All CW traffic was handled by Radio One. The TAJ and TDX transmitters were used for this and remotely keyed from Radio One. At one time a minor casualty to the TAJ necessitated setting up the IF side of the TDE on 430 kcs. (T.G. Common). The IFD frequency which was set up on the HF side was shifted to the ATC in Air Plot and controlled there until the TAJ was put back into commission.

5. NAN equipment was received and installed just prior to sortie. This was the first time it had been seen or used. However, excellent results were obtained in the use of this equipment.

6. Due to the large number of circuits required to be guarded by the flagship, some of these were "farmed out" to other ships in company. This worked satisfactorily with the exception of one or two times it was necessary to receive an exceptionally long dispatch.

7. It is recommended that a 233-A VHF Transceiver be installed in the Communication Office, set up on an unused channel and used exclusively for communication information such as: requests for repetitions of garbled messages received on Fox schedules, and the checking of internal indicators on no-break dispatches, etc. This would relieve the already crowded visual channels of this additional traffic.

ComCruDiv 13 comments:

The great bulk of communications within the Task Group was handled on TBS Primary (72.1 mcs). In general, commun