Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946): 301-337 [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147-E, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]

CHAPTER II
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR CROSS-CHANNEL
(OVERLORD) OPERATIONS

PART I
EARLY PLANS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

A. Introduction: British Planning, 1940-1941.

1. Introduction: British Planning 1940-1941. Detailed planning for cross-channel operations of the combined Anglo-American armies formally began early in 1943 in accordance with decisions taken at the Casablanca Conference. In the previous Chapter, reference has been made to the strategical decisions taken at the first Anglo-American War Conference (the Arcadia Conference), held in Washington, 22 December 1941-14 January 1942. Long before this date, however, British Planning staffs had been at work preparing preliminary studies of the operations that would be necessary to land armies on the Continent to defeat the German forces. In British strategy such an operation was envisaged in the final stage of war operations in the European theater.

2. From the time the British expeditionary forces were successfully evacuated from Dunkirk, at the end of May 1940, the British staffs had had in mind the eventual return to the Continent. Such an operation would involve larger scale amphibious operations than had yet been undertaken. The experience of the British in landings in Norway in April 1940, had clearly indicated the major problems that would be confronted in the planning and preparations of such amphibious operations. Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and Defense Minister had set the British Joint Planning Staffs to work in May 1940 to implement the strategic concepts of the British War Cabinet. Even in that darkest moment of the war, this planning envisaged ultimate victory. The immediate strategy imposed, by the World situation at that time on the British High Command, was inevitably the defensive. In statements on long-range British intentions presented to the American Staffs in the Summer of 1940, definite provisions had been included for the ultimate return of British armies to the Continent.

3. During the period 1940-1941 the organized War Cabinet, with Mr. Churchill as Defense Minister, as well as Prime Minister, reinforced the Chiefs of Staff Committee and undertook to establish unity of command for future operations, and as a first step in July 1940, the Prime Minister asked Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, who had organized and conducted the

brilliant operations at Zeebrugge in World War I, to serve in the new post, then being created, of "Director of Combined Operations".¹ This new combined Operations Organization was charged not only with the organization and training of "Commando" Striking Forces for raids on German-held Europe, but also with the joint planning of amphibious operations. Such operations necessarily involved the employment, under unified command, of specially trained units of sea, land, and air forces. Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, has himself described the problems and difficulties that were encountered in the planning and conduct of small-scale Commando amphibious operations in 1940-1941. The Combined Operations Staff, formed at this time, working with the "Combined Commanders Committee" initiated the planning and preparations for cross-channel operations which preceded the development of the OVERLORD plan.
4. In the summer of 1941, when plans officers of the Staffs of the U.S. Special Army and Navy Observers in London began to work regularly with the British Joint Planing Staffs, initial work was done on "ROUND-UP" plans for landings on the French channel coast. These plans, like the later OVERLORD plan, are rightly associated with the name of Lieutenant-General Frederick E. Morgan. After thirty years in the British Army, Morgan had served as a Colonel commanding troops, with the British Expeditionary Forces in France and Belgium in 1939-1940. He was among those responsible for the organization of the retreat from Dunkirk. In the spring of 1941, as a Major-General commanding the British Army Defense Forces in the Devon Command, Morgan devoted his main attention to preliminary planning for the return of British Armies to France. Plans for a cross-channel operation soon came to be called "the MORGAN Plan". Many senior officers of the various British forces were consulted as these plans developed. Among them were Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, RN., then Vice-Admiral in Command of the Dover Station, and Captain (later Vice-Admiral) Lord Louis Mountbatten, who succeeded Admiral Keyes as Director of Combined Operations in October 1941. Admiral Ramsay had already begun in 1941 to study the naval and amphibious aspects of such a cross-channel operation.

5. When Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had their first meeting with President Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff at the historic "Atlantic Charter" meeting in Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, the "ROUND-UP" Plan was already in existence. After 'Pearl Harbor' when Mr. Churchill, with

the British Chiefs of Staff, went to Washington for the first Anglo-American War Conference, a more detailed plan for the operation "ROUND-UP" was presented. This plan involved an operation from south-eastern England to the French and Belgium Channel Coasts, the question of the exact landing area being left for later decision.¹
6. The discussions of this "ROUND-UP" plan in 1941-1942, like the early discussions in 1943 of the later "OVERLORD" plan, revealed a fundamental divergence between American and British strategical concepts. It was obvious to the Chiefs of staff, when they met in the Arcadia Conference, that the Allies in 1942, would be on the defensive in all theaters. The situation then confronting the combined Anglo-American forces was ably described in Mr. Churchill's address to the American Congress, and in his later address to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. The program which Mr. Churchill then presented had been discussed in detail by the British Chiefs of Staff in Staff Conferences in December 1941.

7. The Prime Minister had himself prepared for the discussions in Washington a note on "The Future Conduct of the War". In presenting this to his military advisors he explained that: "he thought it important to put before the peoples of both the British Empire and the U.S. the mass invasion of the continent of Europe as the goal for 1943. He thought, in general, the three phases of the war could be described as:

   1. Closing the Ring;

   2. Liberating the Populations;

   3. Final assault on the German citadel".²

8. In the discussions which followed, the Prime Minister suggested the main points which he thought should be emphasized in the forthcoming discussions with the Americans. These points were:

   1. A concerted U.S. - British effort to re-establish "our Naval position in the Pacific as soon as possible, and restore positions in the Far East which may fall into enemy hands";

   2. The despatch of U.S. forces to Northern Ireland (3 Infantry Divisions and l Armored Division) to release trained British troops in the United Kingdom for overseas theaters;

   3. The bombing of Germany by U.S. Air squadrons (initially at least six squadrons) to be based in the United Kingdom;

   4. The United States to take the lead in occupying North Africa (initially with a force of 25,000 men to be built up to a total of at least 150,000 in 1942);

   5. The United States should leave the largest possible number of destroyers in the Atlantic for cooperation with the Royal Navy in convoy escort, and anti-submarine duty;

   6. The United States should help the Royal Navy by providing auxiliary aircraft carriers, and by assigning the highest priority for providing the aircraft required for equipping Royal Naval carriers. ¹

9. The specific proposals thus presented by the British delegation at the Washington Conference were based on the strategic concepts developed by the British War Cabinets and the British Chiefs of Staff from May 1940. These had already been defined in the "General Strategy Review" communicated to the President and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the Argentia Conference in August 1941. In

this review it had been made clear that:

"So powerful is the German army that even if the Russians are able to maintain an eastern front, it would still be possible for them to face us in the West with forces which in the present state of German efficiency and morale we should be unable to overthrow. We must first destroy the foundations upon which the war machine rests - the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it and hopes of victory which inspire it. Then only shall we be able to return to the Continent and occupy and control portions of his territory and impose our will upon the enemy.

The methods we intend to employ are:

1. Blockade

2. Bombing

3. Subversive activities and propaganda.---

We believe that, if these methods are applied on a vast scale, the whole structure upon which the German forces are based, the economic system, the machinery of production and distribution, the morale of the nation, will be destroyed, and that, whatever their present strength, the armed forces of Germany would suffer such a radical decline in fighting value and mobility that a direct attack would once more become possible.

When that time will come no one can with accuracy predict. It will depend largely on how well we are able, with American assistance, to keep to our programme of Air Force expansion and to obtain and protect the necessary shipping.

It may be that the methods described above will by themselves be enough to make Germany sue for peace and that the role of a British Army on the Continent will be limited to that of an Army of Occupation. We must, however, be prepared to accelerate victory by landing forces on the Continent to destroy any elements of the German forces which still resist, and strike into Germany itself.

"We do not foresee vast armies of infantry, as in 1914-1918. The forces we employ will be armored divisions with the most modern equipment. To supplement their operations the local patriots must be secretly armed and equipped so that at the right moment they may rise in revolt ----

The intervention of the United States would have a dramatic effect on the certainty with which we could contemplate success and the date by which we could expect it. Blockade would benefit by the heightening of control at source, forces might be available either to assist Weygand (i.e., in North Africa) or to act against Vichy, the American bomber effort would increasingly swell the air offensive against Germany, and in the final phase, American armored forces would participate"---¹

10. At the first meeting of the American and British Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 24 December 1941, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, in response to questions from Admiral Stark, outlined British views concerning the size of the forces which the United States would send to Europe. For example:

    "from a preliminary study ........ of the landing of armies on the Continent of Europe, it seemed that 15 to 17 Divisions, including armored Divisions, would be the maximum forces which could be landed and maintained if the operations were to take place toward the end of 1942 or early 1943. Later on it might be possible to increase these forces up to forty (40) Divisions.....

    The general idea was that it would not be possible to undertake land operations on a large scale in Europe until the Germans showed signs of cracking, and then the governing factor in the size of the forces to be maintained would be transportation and maintenance.".²

11. The consensus of opinion in the later Staff discussions in Washington was expressed in a memorandum presented to the President and to the Prime Minister on American-British strategy. In this paper, under the heading "Development of Land Offensives on the Continent", the following statement was made:

    "It does not seen likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian Front, will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing-down process .... to conduct limited land offensives".

    In 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out."¹

B. Combined Planning, January-June 1942.

12. The American staffs, in December 1941, were influenced by traditional offensive doctrines, implicating the strategic concepts expressed by them at the ARCADIA Conference, and at subsequent meetings. Moreover, the American war production program was already well advanced. Hence the U.S. Staff representatives knew the great striking force which American man-power and industrial production would make available, when American Armies could formed, trained and equipped with the most effective offensive weapons. The American military leaders were, therefore, committed to an offensive strategy which would involve a maximum concentration of armed forces, at the earliest possible moment, in that area in which decisive military victory could most quickly be achieved. This strategy was up-held by the American Chiefs of Staff from the time of their first meetings with their British colleagues, in the informal staff conferences which began in 1940, and which led to the ABC-1 Agreement of 27 March 1941. The same views were emphatically expressed by General Marshall in the subsequent American-British conferences, and at meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

13. General Marshall's views had already found expression in the Joint Army-Navy Board "Comment on 'General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff'" (30 September 1941). This "Comment" extended and developed the definition of the "principal Offensive Policies Against the Axis Powers", contained in the ABC-1 Agreement (27 March 1941). It was pointed out

    "that military operation, to be effective, should be directed against specific and concrete objectives and that care must be exercised to avoid diffusion of effort ----"

14. In criticizing the British strategic concepts, the Joint Board had referred especially to the -

"offensive employment of land forces ---. The 'Review' (of the British Chiefs of Staff) does not envisage the offensive use of such forces on a sufficient scale, either in operations designed to break down the German military power, or in the final operations designed to accomplish the complete defeat of Germany.

The Joint Board agrees that no clear decisions are now (September 1941) possible as to major land offensives against Germany. The Joint Board holds the opinion that --- plans should be made for equipping and training for offensive use land task forces of the British Commonwealth and possible allies, for eventual use wherever land offensives may ultimately appear to be profitable."¹

15. In this same "Comment", the Joint Board had noted that the British Chiefs of Staff had given only minor attention to

    "possible operations by land forces. Except in the case of Russian, the principal strength of the possible enemies of Germany is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may greatly contribute to victory. The opinion is held that dependence cannot be placed on winning important wars by naval and air forces alone. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use of land armies."²

16. General Marshall was ably assisted at the Arcadia Conference in his advocacy of immediate planning for the strategic offensive by land forces, by the new appointed Assistant Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, Brigadier-General (later General of the Army) D.D. Eisenhower. At this Conference Eisenhower strongly emphasized the necessity of the complete pooling of Anglo-American resources in the war, and of the establishment of a combined Command system to undertake, as soon as possible, cross-Channel operations which would bring Anglo-American forces in contact with the full power of the German armies.

17. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization, established in January 1942, immediately organized a Combined Planning Staff to review possible operations in 1942. General Eisenhower, appointed in February 1942, Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the War Plans Division, participated in these early planning activities. From the first he was convinced that American forces should be sent as quickly as possible to the British Isles, in preparation for the early undertaking of cross-Channel operations. With control of the seas assured, both Eisenhower and Marshall were convinced that Anglo-American forces could cross the Channel as soon as air supremacy could be obtained in the landing area. Eisenhower therefore began the preparation of plans for such an operation. A first draft was completed and presented to General Marshall on 22 March, 1942. After discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, General Marshall decided that the strategic concept of this draft plan was sound, as a basis for further discussions with the British staffs. It was then arranged that General Marshall, accompanied by Mr Harry Hopkins as personal representative of President Roosevelt, should proceed immediately to England for conference with the British Chiefs of Staff and with the Prime Minister.

18. At the meetings which followed in London, the combined Chiefs of Staff reviewed the over-all war situation and discussed the detailed strategic plans to be developed for operations in 1942 and 1943. General Marshall strongly urged that all available forces, British and American, be concentrated in England to prepare for a full-scale Cross-Channel offensive in May 1943, or as soon thereafter as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, maintained that it would be a mistake to hold British and American forces unemployed in England for at least twelve

months as this would give Germany a free hand against Russia. The British favored the immediate use of forces, as they became available, for offensive operations in order to divert German forces from the Eastern front. The British believed this could be achieved by as rapid an increase as possible of the air offensive against Germany from bases in the British Isles, and by sea and land operations in the Mediterranean. The British pointed out, moreover, that if Russian resistance could continue with offensive operations in 1943, and with simultaneous attack by American and British forces from the Mediterranean and from England, it might bring about a rapid defeat of Germany.
19. No agreement was reached at these London discussions in April 1942, on any definite plan for later cross-Channel operations, but a plan was approved for the rapid build-up of forces in the United Kingdom (the BOLERO Plan). The British agreed that all possible British shipping should be diverted to assist in the transport of American air and land forces to the United Kingdom. It was also agreed that American Plans officers should work with British Planning Staffs in London to develop, as soon as possible, detailed plans for operations on the Continent.

20. In May 1942 combined planning staffs therefore began the work of drafting detailed plans for the various alternative operations then under consideration. These were:

    1. Operation IMPERATOR, a major raid scheduled for the summer of 1942 with the object of destroying aircraft and provoking an air battle.¹

    2. Operation JUBILEE, a major raid scheduled for the summer of 1942 against Dieppe ² (this was actually executed).

    3. Operation WETBOB, a small scale assault to capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula in 1942. ³

    4. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, a small scale "sacrifice" assault on Le Havre in 1942.

5. Operation ROUND-UP, a full scale invasion of France in 1943.

6. Operation LETHAL, a small scale assault to seize and hold the Brest Peninsula in 1943.¹

7. Operation HADRIAN, a small-mode assault to capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula in 1943.²

8. Operation CRUICKSHANK, a small scale-assault against the Low Countries in 1943.³

9. Operation TORCH, an opposed invasion of Northwest Africa in November 1942.⁴
21. General Marshall has himself described the results of his conferences in London in April 1942:

    "A general agreement was reached that the final blow must be delivered across the English Channel and eastward through the plains of Western Europe. At that time the Red Army was slowly falling back with the full fury of the German assault, and it was accepted at the London Conference that everything practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union, lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe, and a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean".⁵

22. During General Marshall's visit to London it had been agreed that steps should be taken immediately to arrange for two special planning committees, one in Washington and one in London to prepare a maximum build-up of United States forces and equipment in the United Kingdom. Such forces would then be available for any operation that might later be decided upon, whether in accordance with one of the cross-Channel operations plans, or for operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Those two committees, called the "BOLERO Combined Committees", were charged with covering:

    1. Overall requirements of troops, equipment, and facilities.

    2. Allocation of forces and equipment.

    3. The determination of requirements for shipping, port facilities, concentration areas, and communications systems.

    4. The analysis of time schedules for troop and cargo movements to the United Kingdom.¹

23. It was specifically provided that this committee was not to be responsible for planning any tactical operations. The London Committee was established under the British Chiefs of Staff as a single combined planning agency, with representatives of the U.S. and British Armies, Air Forces, Navies, Shipping authorities, and other Government services concerned. This committee was to work directly with the Washington Committee. It was to be specially charged with questions of port capacity and accommodations in the United Kingdom, while the Washington Committee would be primarily concerned with production questions.²

24. On General Marshall's return to Washington, the next steps in planning cross-channel operations were further discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff with the President. It was decided that a group of staff officers should proceed to London for further discussions with the British services. General Eisenhower, General Mark Clark, General H.H. Arnold (U.S. Army Air Forces), and Rear-Admiral (later Admiral) J.H. Towers (U.S. Naval Aviation) therefore arrived in London on 26 May 1942. President Roosevelt, in announcing this visit in a Press Conference,

emphasized the fact that the air offensive against Germany was not the exclusive topic of conversation. General Eisenhower and General Clark were chiefly concerned with further discussions of the possibility of planning cross-Channel operations for the beginning of 1943. This group returned to Washington on 3 June 1942, to participate in the Washington Conference attended by the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, visited London and Washington at the time to complete negotiations for the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, and for the U.S.-Soviet Lend-Lease Agreement, Molotov also strongly urged, both in London and in Washington, that the Western Allies should open a 'second front', by cross-Channel operations at the earliest possible moment, in order to divert German forces from the Eastern front.
26. General Marshall in commenting on the discussions at this Washington meeting, of possible future operations, such as "SLEDGEHAMMER", "ROUND-UP", and "TORCH", pointed out that:

    "During these discussions, the Allied situation in North Africa took a more serious turn, culminating in the loss of Tobruk. The discussions thereafter were devoted almost exclusively to the measures to be taken to meet the threat facing Cairo, Rommel's forces having been checked with difficulty on the El Alamein line. Further advances by his Afrika Korps, with its Italian reinforcements, and German successes along the south-eastern portion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the total oil supply in the vicinity of Abaden. It was a very black hour."¹

C. Preliminary Cross-Channel Plan: ROUND-UP 1943.

27. The plan for Operation ROUND-UP went through a series of metamorphosis.¹ The central concept provided for an operation in two phases. The first phase would be a Cross-Channel Assault by combined British-U.S forces on the north coast of France, with British forces striking the Pas de Calais sector, and with U.S. forces assaulting selected beaches between Fecamp and Caen. A simultaneous assault on the Cherbourg Peninsula was also envisaged.

28. Development of subsequent phases of the operation would depend on the seizure of sufficient aerodromes and the acquisition of the major ports of Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg, which were to be made operative at the earliest practicable date. Based on successful completion of Phase I and assuming that the full number of divisions would be available, Phase 2 was to be carried out in two broad stages:

    1. The capture of Paris and

    2. The capture at Antwerp.

29. The plan provided for a widely dispersed attack, on the suggested target date of 1 April 1943, by 36 reinforced divisions, (20 British and 16 U.S.) with 6 divisions in assault and 10 divisions in follow-up or early build up. ² The assault was to be supported

[Page 66 is an extension of footnotes from Page 65]

by:

1. 6,652 Aircraft

2. No heavy bombarding ships

3. Six old cruisers, 1 gunboat, 25 destroyers and 48 fire-support craft. ¹

Assault lift was to be provided by approximately 1,788 major assault craft and ships. ²

30. The operation was to consist of four simultaneous assaults:

    1. An attack by two British Infantry divisions against two beaches in the vicinity of Boulogne; to be followed up by 5 divisions, arriving over a period of 18 days. The object was to secure a beachhead, make a juncture with the U.S. forces in the Seine area and thereafter to advance on and capture Antwerp.

    2. An attack by two U.S. reinforced infantry divisions against two beaches between Le Havre and Fecamp (north Seine sector) to be followed up by one infantry, one armored division and 1/3rd of a tank division. The object was to capture Le Havre then to advance north and eastward, making a juncture with British forces, and thereafter, in conjunction with U.S. forces further west to capture Rouen and later Paris.

    3. One reinforced U.S. Infantry division (3 RCT), followed up by one infantry and 2/3rds of a tank division, were to attack the Normandy beaches astride the Caen-Ouistraham Canal. The object was to secure the Caen aerodromes, converge on the Seine, joining the northern U.S. forces near Rouen, and thereafter to envelope and capture Paris.

4. One and 1/3rd infantry and commando divisions with a follow up of 2/3rds of an infantry division were to attack the south-east beaches of the Cherbourg Peninsula with the object of seizing and holding the Port of Cherbourg and the whole Peninsula. The remainder of the 36 divisions were to come in gradually and thereafter 2 divisions a month were to arrive direct from the U.S.
31. This was general outline plan of the operation (ROUND-UP in 1943), which was discussed by the CCS in July 1942, as the alternative to the North African invasion (TORCH in 1942). When the decision was then made to abandon ROUND-UP in favor of TORCH, the likelihood of success in ROUND-UP seemed dangerously speculative. German forces were stretched but they had not suffered serious defeat. They held an estimated 25 divisions in France. ¹ Italy was still in the War. The Italian and French navies still demanded surveillance. As long as use of the Mediterranean could be denied to the Allies, Germany was not required to disperse forces in defensive positions along the Mediterranean seaboard. Germany's submarine campaign was then at its peak and the rate of allied shipping losses still greatly exceeded the rate of new construction. ² The speed and reliability of the build up of allied reinforcements from the U.S. was still dubious.

32. The German air force was heavily engaged in the east but its striking power had not yet begun to decline. Allied air forces employed for ROUND-UP would be operating at extreme ranges over a widely dispersed front. The Allies, far from having the overwhelming air superiority required for an amphibious assault, would therefore probably have not even had parity of air strength in the area of operations. From the assault lift point of view, ROUND-UP forces were scheduled to assault with 6 divisions (one more than in OVERLORD) but with about 2/3rds the lift. Thus, the weight of assault, and the follow-up which could be delivered, fell far short of the density and speed achieved in OVERLORD. The planned cross-Channel build up was far slower than that later employed for OVERLORD. Hence, there was a much greater chance that the Germans could concentrate their forces for decisive action before the Allied spearhead was firmly established ashore. Moreover, as the assault was to be dispersed over a wide area, the Germans

would have been able to concentrate their forces to defeat the four small Allied spearheads in detail. Finally, the weight of bombardment, which Air and Naval forces could deliver against beach defenses, immediately before H-hour, was minute in comparison to that actually employed in OVERLORD.

D. Plan for a Sacrifice Operation: SLEDGEHAMMER 1942.

33. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was a plan for an attack to be launched before September 15, 1942, against Le Havre. The assault was to be made by one British division, one British airborne brigade, and three American airborne battalions. The assault was to be built up to a total strength of 8-2/3 divisions (6-1/3 British and 2-1/3 U.S.)¹

34. General Eisenhower has described the SLEDGEHAMMER Plan as follows:

    "The SLEDGEHAMMER conception was not initiated upon a probability of a tactical success, but rather upon the possibility that general emergency conditions might arise requiring a 1942 attack against the western coast of Europe with the purpose either of taking advantage of an unusually favorable opportunity or of supporting, indirectly, the Russian front. Only the latter of these contingencies need be considered. SLEDGEHAMMER springs from the obvious fact that ROUND-UP will be a feasible operation, only in the event that the Russian Army is in the field next spring as an active fighting force.
    ----

    It is difficult to give an estimate of probabilities (of success). Lack of suitable landing craft limits the initial landing to a total British-American force of approximately one division. Aircraft operating from England can support the operation only at reduced efficiency. Difficulties in maintenance are obvious. The danger of early defeat by enemy forces in France, even assuming a successful landing of the landing division, is always present. I personally estimate that, favored by surprise, the chances of a fairly successful landing by the landing division are about 1 (chance) in 2, or finally

"establishing a force of 6 divisions in the area with supporting air and other arms, about 1 (chance) in 5. Later probabilities would depend largely on intensity of German reaction, and our success in developing and maintaining Le Havre as a workable port.

But we do not forget the prize we seek is to keep 8,000,000 Russians in the war.

The decisions that must be made are:

1. Is the Russian situation sufficiently desperate to justify an operation whose minimum cost would be measured in a great reduction in our readiness for 1943 ROUND-UP?

2. Would a reasonably or partially successful SLEDGEHAMMER help the Russians effectively?

If both these questions are decided in the definite affirmative, SLEDGEHAMMER is a practicable operation and should be launched at the earliest possible date, in spite of the relatively bleak outlook of eventual success. If either question is answered in the negative, we should not conduct SLEDGEHAMMER, but should:

1. redouble our efforts to build up ROUND-UP.

2. if the Russians are defeated this fall, go immediately on the strategic defensive in the Atlantic and begin to build up an offensive against Japan."¹

E. Build-up of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom (Operation BOLERO).

35. A major step in preparation for a cross channel invasion was the establishment of the program for transporting U.S. troops and material to the United Kingdom. The BOLERO build-up program was originally approved in order to establish a sufficiently large force in England to launch ROUND-UP in 1943. The plan was so soundly conceived that it was capable of supporting almost any offensive action in Europe which the CCS might approve.¹ American forces, equipment and supplies, sufficient to launch ROUND-UP 1943, would in fact have been available in time in the U.S., but that they could not be moved to Europe unless the British could provide 60% of the required shipping.²

36. A study was made early in 1942 of the availability of British shipping for the BOLERO build-up. At the time of General Marshall's visit to England, British shipping was fully employed and its future employment was scheduled for many months to come. The major uses of British shipping were:

    1. Moving war material from the U.S. and the U.K. to Russia.

    2. Moving war material from the U.S. to the U.K.

    3. Moving food and other goods for the civil population from the U.S. to the U.K.

    4. Moving U.S. troops and military cargo from the U.S. to the south-west Pacific.

    5. Moving British reinforcements to the Middle East.

    6. Moving British reinforcements to the Burma-India Theater.

37. The British could not take on the burden of moving U.S. forces to England without curtailing some of the above commitments. In their opinion, reduction of shipments to Russia was totally unacceptable. Reduction in the scale of movements of reinforcements to Burma and India was also unacceptable, unless the United States could undertake the task of defending the sea approaches against Japanese seaborne attack. If this were done, they estimated that they could arrange the movement of 50% of the U.S. requirements in the 10 months between June 1942 and April 1, 1943 provided:

    1. The U.S. Army would scale down its schedule of vehicles, equipment and food to about 3/4th's of its standard.

    2. The U.S. Army would accept a maximum of 2-months reserve of food stocks and equipment in England.

    3. The British Government would accept a reduction of 1-3/4 million tons in the United Kingdom import program for the 10 months involved.

    4. No unforeseen scale of shipping losses occurred, and no other major overseas movement were required, either resulting from disaster elsewhere or offensives in other theaters.¹

38. Tentative agreements were accordingly reached on this basis. The British agreed to carry 50% of the U.S. forces and material included in General Marshall's estimate, and United States shipping was to carry 40%. ² The U.S. Army was to accept the reduced scale of equipment, supplies and reserves, while the British agreed to reduce to about one half, their import program and also to reduce the scale of their reinforcements to India. General Marshall agreed for the U.S. Navy to undertake the protection of the Pacific areas involved. The U.S. Army was to be responsible for making forces available in America, while the British were to be responsible for their reception in England.

39. Two special BOLERO planning committees were formed, one in Washington and one in London. Each was composed of representatives of both the British and the American Army, Navy, Air Forces, shipping authorities, and other agencies. The

Washington BOLERO Committee, which was put under the Combined Staff Planners (a committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff), was authorized to outline, coordinate and supervise all plans relating to the movement, reception and maintenance of American forces. Plans evolved by the Washington BOLERO Combined committee were to cover:

1. Over-all requirements for an allocation of troops, equipment, shipping, port facilities, concentration areas, and communication systems.

2. Analysis of time schedules for troops and cargo movements to the United Kingdom, and

3. The allocation of naval escorts.

This Committee was not responsible for the preparation of operational plans.

40. The London BOLERO Committee, which was put directly under the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, was established so as to provide a single combined planning agency with which the Committee in Washington could deal directly for planning and information purposes.¹ The London Committee dealt primarily with questions of port capacity and accommodation, while the Washington Committee was principally concerned with production questions.²

41. Troop movements were begun under the BOLERO program in July 1942. Though curtailed in order to meet the requirements of TORCH and the Mediterranean theater, the BOLERO Plan and Committees continued to function throughout the war. After the decision to launch TORCH, the policy was adopted of limiting BOLERO shipments primarily to the transport of air forces and general cargo, so that when the time came to concentrate U.S. troops in Britain, supplies would be abundantly available.

42. The BOLERO operation became the basis of a joint Army-Navy shipping program, as a result of a joint logistic plan which was adopted in March 1943.¹ The object of the plan was to insure coordinated logistical effort and procedure in each area of unified command (of which the European Theater was one),² in order that the personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, shipping and other services of the Army and Navy would be most effectively provided and utilized.

43. The Theater Commander (C.G. ETOUSA in the case of the European Theater) was charged with control of, and responsibility for all Army-Navy logistical services within the area under his command. He established an Army-Navy theater logistical organization which was required:

    1. to keep the Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S. Army, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, informed of future requirements;

    2. to supply items or services common to both the Army and Navy from a single agency;

    3. to establish a schedule of priorities of Army and Navy shipments arranged in a single list;

    4. to arrange on a joint basis storage and port discharge facilities at shipping destinations;

    5. to provide items from local sources if obtainable in his theater and to screen them out of requisitions submitted to supply agencies in America.

44. Based upon information supplied by the Theater Commander, Army and Navy seaboard agencies serving the Theater were charged with the necessary coordination to meet fully the combined requirements of both services with respect to:

    1. Allocation of shipping

    2. Loading of ships

    3. Routing of ships.

The progress of BOLERO shipments to the U.K. is shown in the following table: ¹

		U.S Army Cargo Thousands of tons.	U.S. Navy Cargo Thousands of tons.	Monthly Total. Thousands of tons.
1942	monthly average.	70.2		70.2
1943	monthly average.	197.8	3.9	201.6
1944	monthly average.	392.1	20.9	413.0
1943	January	38.6	-	38.6
	February	20.4	-	20.4
	March	24.7	-	24.7
	April	60.8	-	60.8
	May	36.6	-	36.6
	June	176.0	-	176.0
	July	292.7	-	292.7
	August	324.3	1.3	325.6
	September	302.9	1.6	304.5
	October	395.4	12.6	407.9
	November	322.8	13.3	336.1
	December	378.1	17.5	395.6
1944	January	281.6	8.2	289.8
	February	233.7	22.9	256.6
	March	467.8	38.2	506.0
	April	496.4	60.1	556.5
	May	601.6	32.7	634.3
	June	635.9	23.0	658.9
	July	541.2	23.1	564.3
	August	353.8	25.4	379.2
	September	251.6	4.9	256.5
	October	331.3	4.7	336.0
	November	306.9	3.0	309.9
	December	203.9	4.3	208.2
1945	January	141.9	0.9	142.8
	February	117.1	0.8	117.9
	March	115.3	0.9	116.2

[Part of preceding table originally appeared on this page]

PART II
THE OVERLORD PLAN: COSSAC APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE, 1943.

A. Casablanca Conference Decisions: January 1943.

1. After serious consideration, the CCS concluded in July 1942 not to attempt the invasion of Northwest Europe in 1942 with the inadequate resources then available (see Chapter I). The application of available resources to the Mediterranean campaign for the TORCH operation prohibited the accumulation of sufficient strength in England for a full scale invasion in 1943. In the 1942 discussions, it had seemed possible that the forces required for a small scale cross channel operation in the late summer or early autumn of 1943, might still be made available.

2. After the decision was reached to launch TORCH in November 1942, outline planning for cross channel operations was continued in London with the object of having plans and long-term preparations in readiness should the CCS find it possible or expedient to execute some sort of an assault. Studies thus prepared were submitted at the Casablanca Conference which met in January 1943. The CCS then decided that, while the main American-British effort for the first half of 1943 would be directed toward exploiting the success of African operations, planning and preparations for the future cross channel assault should be continued. This would make it possible, when forces did become available, for the operation to be executed without delay.¹

[Page 79 footnote continued.]

[Page 79 footnote continued.]

3. In order to put this further planning on a combined basis, and to make sure that plans were realistically based on the resources which the CCS would be able to allocate to cross-channel operations, the CCS at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, directed the formation of a combined British-U.S. authority with the title of COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command) to undertake detailed planning and preparations for future cross-channel operations.¹ It was also agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should designate a senior British officer to act as COSSAC. General F.H. Morgan was selected for this assignment in February 1943. He set about immediately organizing a nucleus staff and took over and continued the planning that had been begun in 1942 in relation to "ROUND-UP".

B. COSSAC: Functions and Organization.

4. The CCS on 12 April 1943, after reviewing the initial steps taken in England to organize planning for the OVERLORD Operation, issued a directive to General Morgan, as COSSAC, covering the following points:

   1. The CCS have decided to undertake preparations for operations against Europe;

   2. The object is to defeat German fighting forces in Northwest Europe;

   3. The CCS have decided to appoint a Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) in the future;

   4. They have decided to appoint you Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) pending SAC's appointment;

   5. You will prepare plans in the following order of priority:

      1. For a return to the Continent with such forces as are available in the event of a German collapse, weakening, or withdrawal. i.e. Operation RANKIN.¹

[Page 84 continued footnotes from page 83]

2. For a limited cross-channel assault with a target date of 1 August 1943, to seize and hold a bridgehead such as the Cotentin Peninsula, in case the CCS decide at a later date to execute such an operation.

3. For a full-scale invasion of northwest Europe in the Spring of 1944.¹
6. Small-scale amphibious operations (COMMANDO raids) will be dealt with by the Chief of Combined Operations consulting you;

7. You will be provided with monthly forecasts of forces likely to be available for RANKIN and other operations;

8. When you have completed your plans you will report to the CCS.

9. You will be provided with a staff drawn from the British and U.S. Navies, Armies, and Air Forces.

10. Service Ministries and ETOUSA will assist on administration and logistic aspects of your plans.

11. Controlling Security Officer will be consulted for coordination of cover plans and deception. ²

5. This directive was modified as a result of the Trident Conference,¹ at which the CCS came to the conclusion that the possibility of even a limited cross channel invasion in 1943 before the weather closed in (15 September) was extremely remote, and that a full scale invasion was the most promising line of strategy for 1944. The new directive ordered COSSAC to submit by 1 August 1943 an outline plan for an assault, employing specified forces for the target date of 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be developed. ²

6. To enable COSSAC to draw up his Appreciation and Outline Plan, he was provided with a combined staff, comprising Army, Navy and Air Officers of both British and the U.S. services. In the beginning this staff consisted of representatives of the various military authorities directly or indirectly involved in this preliminary planning. These representatives at first acted more as liaison officers from their respective chiefs than as officers of one staff. The authorities represented were:

   1. C-in-C, Portsmouth (an R.N. Home Command). This was Admiral Little who was subsequently designated ANCXF.

   2. Commander of British Army forces in the U.K. This was General Paget who was subsequently designated CG 21 AG.

   3. C-in-C Fighter Command (the R.A.F. Commander of fighter air forces in Britain). This was Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory who was subsequently appointed C-in-C, AEAF.

   4. Commanding General ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations U.S. Army).

   5. COSSAC and personal staff.

   6. Admiralty.

   7. The British War Office.

8. The British Air Ministry.

9. The Chief of Combined Operations, and

10. Other miscellaneous authorities.

The representatives of each of these authorities often had army, air, and naval components so that the early staff was a thoroughly heterogeneous collection.

7. The head of the U.S. section on COSSAC's staff was Brigadier-General R.W. Barker, USA. The U.S. Army Air Forces automatically came under his jurisdiction. During the COSSAC period the U.S. Navy representatives worked under the U.S. Army Command in the European Theater.¹ The U.S. Naval representation on COSSAC's staff included officers designated by ComInCh and ComNavEu who formed part of the ETOUSA section.² Gradually, however, the various elements were sorted out and the staff settled down in an organization with two main sections, the British and the U.S., each with an Army, Navy and Air sub-section. This process was continued until ultimately the two naval sections were working together; the two air sections were doing their part together; and the innumerable sub-sections of the two armies were paired off, each pair doing its part as one team.

8. In view of the fact that the Royal Navy was scheduled to provide the bulk of NEPTUNE sea-going forces, the R.N. section of the COSSAC staff was from the first

regarded as the pre-eminent naval authority.¹

C. COSSAC Appreciation and Outline Plan for OVERLORD, July 1943.

9. COSSAC was not required to start his planning from scratch. He had available very elaborate and well grounded plans prepared in 1942 for projected operations such as ROUND-UP, SLEDGEHAMMER, HADRIAN and others. In addition, his staff included a large number of officers who had had experience in drafting these plans and in devising the various operations which had been executed in the Mediterranean. The production of the COSSAC-OVERLORD Appreciation and Outline Plan consisted for the most part in a revision of the old ROUND-UP Plan, in the light of Mediterranean experience and on the basis of the forces tentatively allotted for a 1944 Cross-Channel operation.

10. The early phases of COSSAC planning were reviewed in two broad but rather heterogeneous conferences. The first of these, held between 24 May and 23 June, was organized by the CG ETOUSA at the U.S. Assault Training Center, Woolacombe, England, and was primarily a U.S. conference. The second, called Operation RATTLE, was a conference held at Largs, Scotland between 28 June and 1 July 1943. All authorities and agencies of both America and Britain, which would have any possible military connection with OVERLORD, were represented at the RATTLE conference. The agenda of both conferences were given over to a general discussion of all possible aspects of an amphibious operation against the strongly defended shores of Northwest Europe.

11. After these two conferences, a complete but very general summary of the preparations required and of the operational methods appropriate for the proposed operation, was drawn up. Each aspect of the problem was made into a "project". A suitable committee, drawn from all interested authorities,

was set up to deal with each project. In due course each committee submitted its findings. These were then developed by the COSSAC staff into the COSSAC Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation OVERLORD. From time to time during the process of compiling the COSSAC Plan, various drafts were circulated to all interested parties, including the British and American Chiefs of Staff and the CCS, so that all could have a chance to add or subtract or revise the plan before its final publication. The final COSSAC Plan was published on 30 July 1943 under the label COS (43) 416 (O) and CCS 304 of 10 August 1943.
12. The size and nature of the operation, as planned by COSSAC, was limited by the forces which the CCS undertook to make available:

    1. The land forces allotted were a maximum of 30 and a minimum of 26 divisions of balanced forces; plus 6½ U.S. divisions scheduled to arrive in the United Kingdom, too late for the assault but soon enough to be used in the later phases of the build-up. In addition, three to five divisions per month were to arrive after the assault.¹

    2. The airborne forces allotted were 2 airborne divisions, 5 paratroop regiments and 1 airborne tank battalion. Air lift for only 2/3rds of one division was available.²

    3. The forecast of available air forces provided for an approximate total of 11,377 aircraft of all types.³

    4. The allotted assault lift was sufficient to land three divisions in assault, two divisions in follow up, and to sustain a build-up of approximately one division a day.⁴

    5. Naval strength sufficient to provide protection against hostile naval forces was available, but naval bombardment vessels were meagre.⁵

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]

13. COSSAC's problem was to advise the CCS whether a force so limited could successfully invade Europe by 1 May 1944, and to draw up an outline plan for doing it. The COSSAC Plan therefore included:

    1. A review of the resources which the CCS had authorized

    2. A survey of enemy capabilities, and

    3. A plan by which, under certain conditions, a Cross Channel amphibious operation could be launched from England to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further operations could be developed.

14. The COSSAC survey indicated that German dispositions for the defense of the French coast were of three kinds:

    1. Garrison troops installed in fixed defensive positions were posted along the entire coast, in varying degrees of strength, covering every stretch of beach which nature had made suitable for landing.¹

    2. The Germans were well aware that an Allied assault could not survive unless it could be sustained and reinforced by a vast build-up. This would force the Allies to concentrate on capturing a major port, without which the build-up would be impossible. The Germans, therefore, made it a second principle of their defense to concentrate heavily on the defense of major ports.

    3. The third component of the German defense was a mobile reserve which could be moved rapidly to any point along the periphery, once the Allies had committed their forces.

The Germans considered that the Allies were most likely to launch their invasion against the Pas de Calais. Hence they had concentrated the bulk of coastal defenses, and the major part of their army forces in that sector.¹
15. The available allied ground and air forces would be adequate to deal with German forces in France provided they could once be firmly established ashore.² The allotted assault lift was sufficient to move a maximum of three divisions in assault, with two more divisions as follow-up forces. This figure set a limit on the weight of the assault which the Allies could deliver. Available cross channel shipping set a limit to the build-up rate of one division per day. The COSSAC Plan conditioned by available solutions of two main problems: first, that of getting assault forces, limited by the available assault lift, onto the beach; and second, that of holding off the German mobile reserve until the allied preponderance of forces could be firmly established, with the available build-up lift.

16. COSSAC planning began with a study of the sectors of the French coast, which would be most suitable for the initial landings. The coast line of Brittany and beyond was dismissed at once, because it was out of range of U.K. based fighter air cover and because the time required, for the turn round of build-up shipping, would reduce the build-up rate below an acceptable minimum. The remaining possible areas were the Pas de Calais area, the area around the mouth of the Seine, the Caen sector, and the Cotentin (Cherbourg) Peninsula. Of these, geography seemed to make the Caen area the least suitable. Its beaches were furthest from U.K. fighter airplane bases; it was furthest from U.K. ports, thus requiring the longest shipping turn round time and therefore the slowest rate of build-up; it had the fewest airfields, and it was not the best area for deploying armor. But its major handicap was that it did not possess a port of sufficient capacity to handle the build-up. The nearest port to the eastward was Le Havre, which could not be reached from the Caen sector, except by a long flank march over difficult country with a very poor lateral road and rail network, and after crossing the wide and well defended Seine river. The nearest port to the westward was Cherbourg, which could

not be reached except after another hazardous flank march, with wretched lateral communications through the Vire swamp and up the rocky difficult Cotentin Peninsula.
17. The Germans had recognized that by nature the Caen sector was the least suitable for landings, and they had therefore left it the least defended. They had concentrated their strongest defense on the Pas de Calais sector which was closest to airfields, closest to U.K. ports, contained the best terrain for manoeuvering, and led most directly into Germany. They had concentrated strong garrison forces around the Seine group of ports and around Cherbourg and the Brittany ports. But they held the coastline from the Vire river to the approaches to the Seine estuary with only one division, behind defenses less concentrated and less developed than in any Sector.¹

18. From the Naval and Air point of view, the Caen sector though less advantageous than the others, was acceptable. From the Build-up point of view the Caen sector, being shy of a major port, was utterly unacceptable, unless a method of discharging the necessary tonnages over the beaches could be devised. COSSAC evolved methods by which the beaches could be sheltered, piers could be run out from the shore and ships could be provided with anchorages. In effect his plan was to build pre-fabricated ports in England and to assemble them on the French shore concurrently with the assault phase. COSSAC therefore, selected the Caen sector for the assault area. It was the only sector in which the German peripheral defenses were weak enough to give the Allied spearhead, limited as it was by the shortage of assault lift, a reasonable prospect of success. But COSSAC laid it down, as a condition, that sheltered water and artificial harbors must be provided.

19. Having contrived a method by which the Allied spearhead could gain a foothold, COSSAC next considered the problem of how the Allied army could establish itself in strength before the German mobile reserves would have a chance to crush it. This question resolved itself into the problem of how to win the Build-up race. The Germans would be faced with a Build-up problem too. Their mobile reserves would have to be brought up progressively, one part at a time, just

as allied forces would have to be ferried across the channel progressively. COSSAC believed that if the Allies could stay ahead in the race, they would eventually win, because their reservoir of troops was greater than the German reservoir. The problem was how to win the race with the limited build-up lift available.
20. One essential question faced was that of the early construction and efficient operation of the artificial harbors. A second essential problem was that of disorganizing German lines of communication leading up to the assault area. This would require both air action and sabotage by the French resistance. Another method would be to tie down German armies in the Pas de Calais, Scandinavia, and southern France by maintaining a threat against those areas. Another method would be to tie down German reserves in Italy, the Balkans, and in the German homeland by operations or threatened operations in Italy and the Mediterranean. All of these would contribute to the allied chances of winning the battle of the build-up. But COSSAC realized that, with the cross-channel shipping available to the Allies, they could not win the build-up race, nor maintain their foothold in Normandy, if the Germans had unlimited reserves available. In fact, if German mobile reserves in France exceeded some 12 full-strength first-line divisions, they would in all probability be able to win the build-up race and push the Allies back into the sea, before the full weight of the army could be established in the bridgehead area.

21. COSSAC made one further condition to his plan. The Allies must have overwhelming air supremacy over the channel and assault area. Failing this, the allied armada would be disrupted at sea and the soldiers would never get to the beach. Even if they did reach the beach, a comparatively small scale of German air action over channel build-up lanes could fatally delay the allied build-up, while the necessary disruption of German lines of reinforcement would also be prejudiced.

22. COSSAC reported that OVERLORD in 1944 was possible with the forces allotted, provided these three conditions were met, namely:

    1. overwhelming air supremacy,

    2. artificial harbors,

    3. German mobile reserves not exceeding 12 divisions in France or 15 available to be brought in from Russia or the Mediterranean.

PART III
OVERLORD AND ANVIL: PLANNING THE 1944 GRAND ASSAULT

A. Quebec Conference Approval of OVERLORD, August 1943.

1. The COSSAC for Operation OVERLORD was submitted for the consideration of the President, the Prime minister and the CCS at the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August 1943. At that time the situation in Europe was good. The Sicilian campaign was finished except for mopping up operations. Mussolini had fallen from power. Italian peace negotiations were in progress. Plans and preparations were in hand for the occupation of Italy and for an offensive against German armies in Italy. The position in Russia was stable and in fact favorable for the Russians.

2. British views on the COSSAC plan were:

   1. that COSSAC's three conditions were necessary for the success of the operation;

   2. that the Allied margin of superiority during the critical first days was small; and,

   3. that it was essential that the scale of German reserves should be reduced below the maximum twelve divisions specified by COSSAC or else the operation might not succeed.¹

3. United States views on the COSSAC plan were that it was soundly conceived and within the means which would be available on the target date. In regard to the apprehension of the British Chiefs of Staff over the necessity of meeting COSSAC's three conditions, the U.S. Chief of Staff believed that, although OVERLORD would be more difficult and hazardous than any other operation attempted up to that time, the increasing pressure of the Russian armies, the demoralizing effects of the bomber offensive, and the steady air-ground pressure from the Mediterranean would have the cumulative effect of reducing the scale of German resistance to be offered in May 1944.² The U.S. Chiefs of

Staff recommended that the plan be approved and that COSSAC be directed to proceed with full preparations to launch OVERLORD on a target date of 1 May 1944.¹
4. The COSSAC OVERLORD plan was therefore approved, after being reviewed by the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff urged that OVERLORD should be definitely scheduled for May 1944. The Prime Minister stated that the British would agree to execute OVERLORD but only subject to the proviso that COSSAC's three conditions were met by the target-date. If it developed that the strength of the German ground or fighter air forces proved to be greater than that upon which the success of the operations was promised, the question of whether the operation should be launched was to be subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subject to this proviso, Operation OVERLORD for May 1944 was approved.²

5. At the Quebec Conference COSSAC drew attention to three measures which required immediate action if it were to be possible to launch OVERLORD in May. These were:

   1. The system of command to be employed should be decided on and the principal commanders and command organizations should be established so that detailed plans and preparations could be started immediately.

   2. The air offensive, then in progress should be re-oriented so as to bring about an over-all reduction in German fighter air strength and so as to disrupt German lines of transport into the assault area.

   3. A cover plan should be devised and the execution of it should be undertaken, so that the reduction and dispersion of German force in Western Europe, necessary for the successful execution of OVERLORD, might be effected.

6. The CCS in directing COSSAC to produce that OVERLORD plan, had limited the "lift" available to that required for three divisions in assault and two in follow-up. COSSAC's plan was developed on the basis of this limitation. He reported at the Quebec Conference that -

   "It is possible to undertake the operation described, on or about the target date named (1 May) with the sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain set of circumstances in existence at that time ----. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport air craft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption of one course only or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success in the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up production, strategical re-allotment, or, in the last resort, of postponement of the date of the assault."

7. At the Quebec Conference, General Morgan, and General Barker, and indeed the whole COSSAC staff, repeatedly urged the provision of more landing vessels. But the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were busy with their plans for the Pacific amphibious offensive and with persuading the British to launch an amphibious offensive against Burma. The British Chiefs of Staff in their turn were busy with projects for launching various amphibious offensives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently little attention was given to the fact that OVERLORD was being planned with a precariously small spearhead.

8. One of the points of COSSAC's plan was that a diversionary threat against the Mediterranean coast of France should be mounted with a target date contemporaneous with NEPTUNE D-Day. This threat should be followed by an unopposed landing in southern France when the NEPTUNE battle had finally compelled the Germans to move their forces.¹

B. Plans for Landings on the French Mediterranean Coast (ANVIL Operation)

9. The CCS approved at Quebec the COSSAC proposal planning operations on the Mediterranean coast of France, to coincide with OVERLORD. General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander in the Western Mediterranean was therefore directed to draw up an outline plan for a diversionary assault (not merely a threat) against southern France in assistance to OVERLORD.¹ General Eisenhower's report on this project made the following points:

   1. Shortages in assault lift would limit any assault against southern France to a scale not larger than one division of two brigade groups, with a very slow build-up.

   2. An actual assault would probably have less effect in pinning down the enemy than a threatened assault.

   3. Availability of troops and assault shipping would depend on the progress of the campaign in Italy: until Rome was captured the assault lift available in the Mediterranean would be required to support Allied armies in Italy.

   4. In case the Italian campaign had put the Allied forces into the Po Valley by June 1944, the assault into France could be launched from both land and sea, with better prospects of success, both as an operation and as a diversion.²

10. Concurrently, General Eisenhower submitted a plan to use resources in the Mediterranean to mount a threat against southern France.¹ This plan involved:

    1. A threat of an assault by one division with a one division follow-up;

    2. The assault would be made to appear to be timed for OVERLORD D-Day or slightly afterward;

    3. The threat would be made to appear as an invasion by British or U.S. forces or both, with a heavy build-up of French forces.

    4. The threatened assault would be aimed at Toulon as a first objective.

    5. The plan also provided for an actual invasion in case the Germans removed their mobile reserves and air forces in sufficient quantity to make an unopposed landing, or an assault a against slight resistance possible.²

11. General Eisenhower's plan to employ ANVIL as a diversion only, followed up if possible by an unopposed landing, was approved by the CCS in November.³ At Teheran, Marshall Stalin, having ascertained that there would be 8 or 9 comparatively idle allied divisions in the Mediterranean, which could not be transferred to England in available shipping, suggested that Britain and America should attack in southern France rather than in Italy or the Balkans.⁴ For reasons not indicated in the minutes of

CCS meetings, nor in the minutes of the Plenary Meetings between the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin, the British and American leaders agreed to this Proposal.

C. Strategy and Logistics of 1944 Amphibious Operations:

12. At the Cairo meeting in November 1943 with Chiang Kai Shek, the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff had envisaged an amphibious operation in Burma. The U. S. Navy had plans for a series of amphibious assaults in the Pacific. The British were very desirous of launching a series of amphibious landings in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Italian campaign required supporting amphibious lift for one, and preferably two divisions. The acceptance of Stalin's suggestion for an assault against southern France in May 1944 would require amphibious lift for at least two divisions in assault, and one follow-up. Finally, the CCS had promised Stalin to launch the OVERLORD operation in May, for which the allotted assault and follow-up lift made the spearhead precariously weak. For this heavy program of simultaneous amphibious operations in different war theaters, Britain and America would not possess in the first part of 1944 the required assault lift in amphibious and landing craft.

13. The British reaction was prompt. They would have preferred to have continued with their Mediterranean strategy, to have applied available resources in the eastern Mediterranean, and to have allotted OVERLORD only those resources remaining after the requirements in the Mediterranean had been met. They would accordingly have preferred an elastic date for OVERLORD, dependent on the time when OVERLORD could be conveniently built up to the strength required by COSSAC conditions. But the Teheran decisions having been taken, and the Allies having committed themselves to landings in France, in operations OVERLORD and ANVIL in May 1944, they believed that OVERLORD had become paramount and everything else secondary. The British therefore cancelled their eastern Mediterranean projects.¹ The British also found it necessary to reduce their planned

operations (BUCCANEER) in the Indian Ocean to negligible proportions.¹
14. While landing craft in the Pacific were too far away to be drawn on to strengthen OVERLORD, Admiral King arranged to allot all new production, between November and D-day, to OVERLORD and ANVIL, to accelerate production and to transfer many of the larger amphibious ships from the Pacific to the European Theater. By these expedients, and by a project to use some OVERLORD follow-up landing craft in the assault and some build-up shipping in the follow-up, the CCS managed, before leaving Cairo, to strengthen the OVERLORD assault by almost one division.²

15. The Italian campaign would require supporting assault lift for two divisions until Rome was captured. ANVIL would require lift for two divisions in assault and one to follow-up. If this was to come from the Italian allocation the vessels would have to be available sixty days in advance of ANVIL D-day, in order to allow time for the necessary amphibious training of the assault divisions and to permit the vessels to be re-fitted, repaired and loaded. This meant that, if Rome fell before 15th March assault, lift for three divisions would be required in the Mediterranean but, if it did not fall until after March 15, either ANVIL would have to be postponed or assault lift for five divisions would have to be provided.³

with OVERLORD scheduled, even on the three divisional basis, Britain and America did not possess sufficient assault lift to meet requirements for five divisions in the Mediterranean. At the Cairo conference, therefore, the CCS left the question on the following basis:

1. OVERLORD was to be augmented from a three division assault to a four division (minus) basis;

2. The Italian campaign was to be accelerated so as to capture Rome and release assault lift before 15 March;

3. ANVIL was to be scheduled roughly contemporaneously with OVERLORD and was to employ lift released from the Italian campaign;

4. The U.S. Navy was to provide the bulk of assault lift and supporting naval forces for ANVIL, while the Royal Navy would provide roughly three fourths of the assault lift and the bulk of supporting Naval forces for OVERLORD.¹
16. In early December 1943, General Eisenhower was designated Supreme Commander and General Montgomery CinC 21st Army Group. General Eisenhower's cursory review of the COSSAC OVERLORD plan, had led him to consider that the plan provided for the assault being launched with insufficient initial strength. ² General Montgomery similarly considered that the assaults had been planned on too narrow a front, with insufficient forces. It would therefore be necessary to extend the assault area both to introduce a greater number of formations on D-day and also to accelerate the capture of Cherbourg. ³ On reviewing the amount of assault lift already allotted to OVERLORD it appeared that the transfer to the Channel of half of that allotted to ANVIL would permit OVERLORD to be launched on a five divisional basis.⁴

17. When General Montgomery arrived in England in December 1943, he arranged for the revision of the OVERLORD Plan to provide for an assault by five divisions with a two division follow-up, rather than by three divisions. Without waiting formal CCS approval, or allocation of the additional shipping for the assault lift, the combined staffs in London undertook this revision of the plan on the assumption that half of the lift assigned to ANVIL would be made available for OVERLORD. This revision provided that one of the two added divisions would assault on the east flank with the object of seizing Ouistreham and the Caen canal. The other would assault on the west flank at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula with the object of accelerating the capture of Cherbourg. Even if one half the ANVIL lift were available to OVERLORD, the five-divisional lift could not be provided without reducing the number of vehicles per division from the COSSAC figure of 3,200 to 2,500 and without reducing the number of landing craft allotted for gun support.

18. From the U.S. Naval point of view the net effect of General Montgomery's action was as follows:

    1. By abandoning the Burma campaign and by transferring amphibious responsibility for the Mediterranean to the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy had been able to scrape together assault lift for almost one additional division;

    2. As the Royal Navy did not have resources to fill out the fourth assault force, or to provide the fifth one, new naval assault forces would therefore have to be provided by the United States Navy;

    3. The United States Navy would be able to supply assault lift for the additional assault force only if ANVIL were cancelled; but the U.S. Navy was not prepared to assign to OVERLORD those forces which were committed to ANVIL unless and until ANVIL was officially cancelled or postponed.

    4. By drawing on fire support craft to provide lift, the bombardment effort would be unacceptably weakened at the same time that requirements were being increased and hence the additional vessels (destroyers, cruisers, battleships, etc.,) would be required which the Royal Navy could not provide, and which the U.S. Navy would have available only if ANVIL were cancelled.

19. Despite the fact that this revised planning, on a five divisional basis, made it necessary to rely on resources which were not then available, the three British Commanders in Chief began planning on this basis on 14 January and the initial Joint Plan was issued on 1 February.

D. 1944 Modifications of OVERLORD and ANVIL Plans: December 1943--March 1944.

20. The President and the Prime Minister, after the SEXTANT and EUREKA Conference, (Cairo-Teheran, November - December 1943), had approved the outline plan for both the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. The preliminary examination which General Eisenhower had made of the COSSAC and OVERLORD plans, with General Montgomery, had convinced both of them that it would be necessary to increase the strength of the initial assault on the Normandy beaches, even it this involved the abandonment, or postponement, of the ANVIL operation.

21. When General Eisenhower reached London in January 1944, to assume the functions and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander, he was immediately confronted with difficult problems of both strategy and policy, involved in the proposed modifications of the OVERLORD and ANVIL plans. General Eisenhower had conferred with the American Chiefs of Staff and the President in Washington in December, and with the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister in London in the middle of January. It had been agreed that the formal OVERLORD directive would not be issued until he had had the opportunity of reviewing the whole strategic situation, and of submitting his own recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In this review of the OVERLORD and ANVIL projects he had to take into account the policy commitments which had been made by the American and British authorities at the Cairo and Teheran conferences. The President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had made commitments to Russia, both for the beginning of the OVERLORD cross-channel operations in May 1944, and for the simultaneous launching of the landings on the French Mediterranean coast, as outlined in the ANVIL plan. Both the President and the American Chiefs of Staff desired that these commitments should be fulfilled if possible.

General Marshall, moreover, attached particular importance to ANVIL, in order to bring into action in the Mediterranean U.S. and French troops who could not be transported to England, and who would be relatively inactive if ANVIL were abandoned or postponed.
22. Both the American and British leaders shared General Eisenhower's conviction that the OVERLORD operation would mark the crisis of the European War. It was the major combined American-British operation which could not fail. Everything must be done, at whatever risk in other theaters, to make this attack the decisive assault on the European fortress of the Axis. General Eisenhower felt, moreover, that if the OVERLORD attack was made, with the limited strength originally envisaged in the COSSAC plan, the Allies would be working on a very narrow margin of strength. It seemed essential to increase the prospects of success, both by extending the area of assault, and by using an initial force of five (5) rather than three (3) divisions, in order to obtain quickly an adequate bridgehead which would permit the allies to retain the initiative for subsequent operations. The main factor in any such modification of the original COSSAC plan was the availability of landing craft for the assault lift. General Eisenhower agreed with the COSSAC view that, if adequate shipping were not available, any additional craft which might be obtained for OVERLORD, above the requirements for the three divisional landing, should be used as a floating reserve to strengthen the assault on the three beaches.

23. The reallocation of available shipping and landing craft in the European and Mediterranean theaters, therefore involved the decisions as to the extent to which the assault lift of ANVIL should be reduced to permit strengthening the OVERLORD assault. General Eisenhower considered that the southern France landings, simultaneously with the Normandy attack, would be an important contribution to the success of the OVERLORD assault. The mere threat of such landings in the south would only contain briefly, if at all, enemy forces in southern France, which might otherwise reinforce the enemy strength in the North. Moreover, American forces in the Mediterranean, and French armies stationed in North Africa, or serving in Italy, were adequate for the ANVIL operation. Such an operation would increase the cooperation to be received from French resistance Groups in breaking up enemy strength and the cohesion of enemy forces in France.

24. ANVIL and OVERLORD therefore had to be considered as two parts of one coordinated operation designed to drive the German armies back to the Rhine. The ideal would be to have a simultaneous five-division OVERLORD, and a three-division ANVIL attack. If, however, available ships and landing craft were insufficient for both operations to be conducted simultaneously, General Eisenhower felt that the five-division OVERLORD assault should have first priority in the allocation of the available lift, even though this would have the result of reducing the Mediterranean resources to a one-division assault basis. This would, in fact, make ANVIL only a threat until its execution could be justified, either by the allocation of increased shipping to the Mediterranean, or by enemy weakness following the OVERLORD attack.

25. Another possibility of increasing the initial assault forces might be envisaged by the postponement of the OVERLORD target date. While an attack on 1 May would be preferable, as it would give a longer campaign season, a months postponement was acceptable especially as it would permit a longer time for preparation of air operations and would make available an extra months production of landing craft.¹ Both the British and the American Chiefs of Staff had indicated to General Eisenhower their willingness to consider delaying the operation for a month. They also agreed that the OVERLORD operation should have over-riding priority in the allocation of assault forces and assault lift. The British, however, felt that although the ANVIL operation would be significant in contributing to the success of OVERLORD, it would be unwise to undertake it unless the assault could be made in sufficient strength, which they defined as not less than two divisions. Otherwise the British would prefer to maintain the threat of amphibious operations in southern France, while continuing offensive operations in Italy.²

The American Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand preferred to concentrate whatever forces were available in the Mediterranean for the ANVIL operation, even though this might involve complete postponement of any operation in the eastern Mediterranean and a reduction of the strength available for the continuation of operations in Italy.
26. General Marshall therefore recommended:

    1. a target date for OVERLORD of not later than 31 May;

    2. an ANVIL landing with a two-division assault;

    3. the OVERLORD operation with the largest assault possible with remaining resources;¹

    4. operations in support of Turkey should be suspended, and the resources made available for OVERLORD, ANVIL, or operations in Italy;

    5. the employment of these resources should be on the recommendation of SCAEF, who should also be given the authority to make reallocations of the resources of assault shipping between OVERLORD and ANVIL, after conferring with the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.²

27. The British Chiefs of Staff, after considering the views of the American Chiefs of Staff and of General Eisenhower, recommended that the forces assigned to OVERLORD should be built up to the strength requested by the Supreme Commander, and that any remaining forces available should be left in the Mediterranean. As these forces would be inadequate for the ANVIL operation, the British felt the most profitable use which could be

made of the Mediterranean forces would be the continuation of the Allied offensive in Italy. The British pointed out that it had been believed at the time of the Teheran Conference that the Germans would withdraw to a line north of Rome but that later information indicated that the Germans intended to resist to the utmost the Allied advance in Italy. As a result the Allies had no choice but to prosecute the Italian campaign. It was greatly in their interest to do so, since the main object of the Mediterranean strategy was to prevent the Germans from sending reinforcements to France, and, if possible, to make the Germans draw forces from France before OVERLORD D-day. The distance between the ANVIL and OVERLORD areas was so great . . . nearly 500 miles . . . the country so rugged, and the defensive power of modern weapons so great that the "pincer" argument did not apply (that is, a "pincer" operation with simultaneous landings in Northern and Southern France.) As a result, ANVIL was not strategically interwoven with OVERLORD, except for its diversionary effect, which could be equally exerted from Italy or other points. The disadvantages of not putting French forces into Southern France were realized but the British believed that the bulk of the U.S., U.K., and French forces would probably be needed for the Italian campaign. The British believed that further consideration should be given to proposals for increasing French participation in Northern France.
28. In their proposals the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the suspension of operations in support of Turkey, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to get a maximum possibility of success from the offensives in France and Italy, the British made the following proposals:

    1. The additional forces which were needed to build up OVERLORD to the strength required by the Supreme Commander, should be allotted immediately.

    2. The Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, should be told that he would have an assault lift of at least one division and that ANVIL as presently planned was cancelled.

    3. Further, he should be asked how he proposed to use his forces so as to contain the maximum number of German forces in his theater.

29. A difference of view also arose between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff as to the extent of authority to be given to SCAEF to exercise over-all control of allocations of resources in assault shipping between OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. General Marshall still felt that the Supreme Commander should exercise at least a coordinating authority for operations to be carried out in Northwest Europe, and in the Mediterranean. The British, on the other hand, believed that this authority should be retained by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who alone were in a position to review constantly the situation in the various theaters of war, and to determine priorities for allocation of available resources to particular theaters.¹

30. In the early part of February 1944, General Marshall and General Eisenhower exchanged messages concerning the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. On 6 February 1944, General Eisenhower asked for General Marshall's personal views and repeated his own belief that an assault of five divisions constituted the minimum which would provide a really favorable chance of success. He hoped that this could be accomplished by 31 May without the sacrifice of a strong ANVIL. The experience in Italy had confirmed the necessity of a landing force strong enough to obtain a quick success, especially a quick seizure of ports. A factor to be considered, General Eisenhower thought, was that recent developments in Italy, the failure to advance to and beyond Rome, had created the possibility that forces from there could not be disentangled in time for a strong ANVIL. The Germans were fighting bitterly in Italy, and as long as that continued it would partly compensate for the absence of ANVIL.²

31. In his reply, General Marshall pointed out that the British and American chiefs of Staff seemed to have reversed themselves completely. The Americans were now "Mediterraneanites", while the British were strongly pro-OVERLORD. In the American view the OVERLORD operation was paramount, but General Eisenhower himself was the best judge of the basis on which the attack should be launched. General Eisenhower was, therefore, asked to indicate the additional landing craft which should be assigned to OVERLORD, taking into account the consequences for future operations in the Mediterranean of any transfers of assault lift to increase that available for OVERLORD.¹

32. General Eisenhower then informed General Marshall that any offensive in the Mediterranean in the Spring of 1944 must be with all available forces. He felt, however, that a successful ANVIL would provide greater opportunity for the engagement of all Allied forces and would have an earlier effect upon the situation of the enemy in France than an intensified Italian campaign. General Eisenhower agreed that if the Allied aims in Italy could not be achieved soon, it was probable that the Allies would be committed to that battle with their whole Mediterranean forces. General Eisenhower then reviewed his own analysis of the OVERLORD plans and re-stated his own view, which was:

    1. to postpone the OVERLORD date to 31 May, in order to get an extra month's production of landing craft and added time for air operations, and to retain the ANVIL operation;

    2. the assault wave of OVERLORD must have five divisions heavily reinforced with armor;

    3. there must be two months of heavy air preparations;

    4. airborne troops must be used on D-day;

    5. two reinforced divisions must be landed on the second tide of D-day;

    6. there must be the strongest possible help from the Mediterranean;

    7. during the first sixty days OVERLORD would take all of the resources which the United Nations could muster;

    8. following that, the operation would be one in which the principal needs would be for land forces, cargo shipping and tactical air strength.²

33. In view of the variety of complicated issues that had arisen over the discussion of the OVERLORD - ANVIL plans, the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed that these questions should be finally decided by General Eisenhower, as the representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, in conference with the British Chiefs of Staff. The British agreed, on condition that any disagreement be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. ¹ At this conference, General Eisenhower indicated that it would be possible to launch OVERLORD without the allocation of all of the ships and craft previously requested. He felt that a maximum effort must be made to mount ANVIL, because it would greatly aid the OVERLORD operation by diverting German divisions from the build-up against the OVERLORD lodgment, ANVIL would also open a way into France for the French and American divisions in the Mediterranean, so that they could aid in the decisive effort against Germany. General Eisenhower also made detailed recommendations for allocations between OVERLORD and ANVIL.²

34. In the discussion with General Eisenhower, the British Chiefs of Staff repeated their opinion that both OVERLORD and ANVIL forces, as envisaged in General Eisenhower's proposals, were being under-estimated. Moreover, they felt that the slow progress of the Italian campaign would make it necessary to increase support for this offensive, even though this involved the immediate cancellation of ANVIL.³ On the contrary, the American Chiefs of Staff were still of the view that ANVIL should be launched with a two-divisional lift by drawing upon all available combat and shipping resources in the Mediterranean, even though this involved cutting down reinforcements and assignment of assault lift for Italian operations. General Eisenhower was, therefore, requested to state these views to the British Chiefs of Staff, with the recommendation that plans for OVERLORD and ANVIL should be followed, at least until 1 April, then the situation might, if necessary, be reviewed.⁴

35. The divergence of views which had developed in these discussions was brought to the attention of the President by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the 21st February, 1944. General Eisenhower was informed that this action was being taken and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support the Supreme Commanders' recommendations.¹ The President was influenced by over-all policy considerations involved in view of the commitments made to the Russians at the Teheran meeting. They had strongly approved the ANVIL operation, and would naturally not understand its abandonment. The President therefore directed that Eisenhower be informed that ANVIL could not be abandoned without referring the question to the Third Power. In view of the existing military and political situation, the President felt that it would be inadvisable to refer to this Third Power the strategic divergences which had developed between U.S. and British staffs.²

36. General Eisenhower therefore met with the British Chiefs of Staff for a further conference on the 22 February 1944.³ It was agreed . . .

    1. that the campaign in Italy should be given first priority on the Mediterranean resources until further orders;

    2. that alternative plans should be made by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean for amphibious operations which would aid the OVERLORD operation by containing the maximum number of enemy forces;

    3. the first of these alternatives should be ANVIL, on about a two-divisional lift and ten-divisional scale, to be launched shortly after the OVERLORD operation; the maximum use of French troops should be given full consideration;

    4. the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should base these plans on the present allocation of landing craft with certain listed exceptions;

    5. these arrangements should be reviewed on 24 March 1944 in the light of the then existing Italian situation;

6. if ANVIL should not prove to be practical at that time on a two-divisional scale, landing craft above a one-divisional lift, which could be used for OVERLORD, should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean;

7. plans should then be revised on the basis of the lift remaining in the Mediterranean;

8. if these conclusions were approved by the President and the Prime Minister, they should be transmitted to General Eisenhower and to General H.M. Wilson.¹
37. Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed to the conclusions reached at this conference between General Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff.²

38. The situation in the Mediterranean was further reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff at the end of March. At that time the Italian campaign was still bogged down in the Monte Cassino area, the Anzio bridgehead was fighting an isolated battle, dependent for its support and safety on the Mediterranean's limited supply of amphibious lift. It was, therefore, obvious that, irrespective of NEPTUNE requirements, ANVIL could not be launched concurrently with OVERLORD. The CCS accordingly decided to postpone ANVIL and to allot to OVERLORD the assault lift released.

39. Admiral King set the wheels in motion at once. On March 20, he allotted the assault lift, and also the naval organization, forces, commanders and staff required to make up the 5th Assault Force. From 20 March to 31 May (the OVERLORD target D) was a period of 70 days, a short time for the task of moving the vessels to England, organizing them into an Assault Force, training the Naval and Army forces, and putting the vessels in the required state of readiness for D-day. Yet the job was done.³ With the postponement of the ANVIL operation, the additional assault lift required for the OVERLORD five-divisional assault became available . It also became possible to provide the required Naval covering and bombarding forces necessary to neutralize enemy coastal defenses on the more extended 8-RCT front. The final preparations for undertaking, the NEPTUNE assault phase of the OVERLORD operation could now be taken.³

PART IV
AIR OPERATIONS IN RELATION TO OVERLORD

A. COSSAC Plan for Air Operations.

1. In the COSSAC outline plan, it was proposed that, during the preliminary stage of OVERLORD, which must start forthwith, air action should be directed toward:

   1. the reduction of German air forces on the Western Front;

   2. the progressive destruction of the German economic system;

   3. the undermining of German morale, and,

   4. the disruption of German coastal defenses and lines of communication in and leading to the assault area so far as it would be possible to do so without revealing the intended point of assault.

2. When the COSSAC plan was produced, the strategic air forces had been engaged in a very similar program for some time. The COSSAC plan therefore required only a slight modification in overall objectives and in the priorities assigned to the list of targets. The objects and scale of the bomber offensive had passed through several stages of evolution, corresponding to the development in the general war situation. In the early days of 1941 and 1942, the primary object had been to compel the Germans to divert air strength from Russia, by inflicting heavy punishment on German war centers. The Germans would thus be led to move air forces from Russia to ward off Allied bombers in the period before January 1943.

3. The CCS, at the Casablanca Conference, reoriented the priority of targets of the bomber offensive and defined the primary objective as the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to such a point that their capacity for armed resistance would be fatally weakened. The order of priority among primary objectives was established as follows:

1. German submarine construction yards;

2. the German aircraft industry;

3. German transportation;

4. oil plants, and,

5. other targets in the enemy's war industry.¹
4. Prior to 1943 the size of the American air force in the United Kingdom was so limited by transatlantic shipping shortages that it played a minor role in the bomber offensive. But, by January 1943, substantial movements of U.S. air forces into England had been assured. The CCS accordingly decided to put the bomber offensive on a combined basis, under the overall supervision of the British Chief of Air Staff, who was to act in this matter as the agent of the CCS.

[Manuscript's page numbering skips 122.]

B. Plans for Combined SICKLE-POINTBLANK Air Operations

5. At the end of April, the Commanding General of the 8th U.S.A.A.F. presented a plan for the progressive expansion in the employment of U.S. Air Forces, designed to match the cumulating arrival of bombers, and to function within the general framework of the agreed CCS plan for the combined bomber offensive.

6. Six systems, comprising seventy-six (76) precision targets, were selected as the objectives of the U.S. bomber offensive. These systems were:

   1. submarine construction yards and bases;

   2. the German aircraft industry;

   3. the ball-bearings industry;

   4. the oil indu