Chapter VII
The Italian Campaign: Sicily and Southern Italy, July-November 1943

Allied Strategy in the Mediterranean

The decision to attack Sicily was taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. At that time the conquest of the island was considered simply as a continuation and completion of the North African strategy, designed to open the Mediterranean to our shipping and provide a base for future attacks on Southern Europe. Before the Sicilian invasion actually took place, however, the strategic concept had developed further.

The TRIDENT Conference of the Allied leaders at Washington in May 1943 reaffirmed the decision to attack Germany in North-West Europe, and fixed the date, for planning purposes, as the spring of 1944. At the same time, however, the resolve was taken to go on from Sicily with a view to knocking Italy out of the war: to "carry out such operation in exploitation of HUSKY (the conquest of Sicily) as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German Divisions". The first object defined by this directive was soon achieved; the second continued in effect until the defeat of Germany as the basis of the Italian campaign.

It had thus been decided, before a single Allied soldier set foot on the soil of Italy, that the forthcoming campaign there would be a subordinate enterprise. It was to play second fiddle to the great project in North-West Europe, its long-term strategic function was to contribute to the success of that project by tying down German forces in the south. The extent to which, from the conquest of Sicily onwards, the Mediterranean was to become a secondary theater, was emphasized by another decision of the TRIDENT Conference. The Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean was instructed to dispatch to the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1943 seven (finally eight) veteran divisions. "It was our purpose", writes General Marshall, ,"to avoid the creation in Italy of a vacuum into which the resources of the cross-Channel operation would be dissipated as the Germans had bled themselves in the North African campaign".

The Assault on Sicily

The enemy undoubtedly suspected that the Allies, having liquidated his African armies by the splendid victory in Tunisia in

May, were planning some new offensive move in the Mediterranean; but he could not fathom with certainty either its time or its objective. His strategists, we now know from captured documents, disagreed on the question of where we were likely to strike next. He completely failed to interfere effectively with the gigantic concentration of forces which was taking place. The fast assault convoy from Britain had no casualties during the long passage. The slow assault convoy, it is true, did suffer by enemy action. On 4-5 July three of its ships fell victims to submarines off the North African coast; and in the sinkings 55 Canadians lost their lives. With these ships we lost also more than 500 vehicles and some artillery, and this considerably embarrassed the Canadians during their early operations.¹

In the meantime the 231st and 1st Brigades had been battling hard under the scorching sun for Regalbuto, about five miles east of Agira. The Hermann Görings held the place with great determination, using their tanks as pillboxes among the ruins.

sea, amounted to 2434 of all categories; 38 officers and 447 other ranks had been killed or had died.

It was a fine performance for a "green" division (and it should be emphasized that the Division could not have done as well as it did but for its exceptionally sound and careful training during the years in England). General Leese's comments, in a letter written to General Simonds on 6 August, the day the Canadians passed from under his command, were detailed and generous:

Now that your are shortly to leave 30 Corps I would like to write and congratulate you and the Division on your magnificent fighting since you landed in Sicily.

The landing operations went extremely smoothly and reflect the greatest

First On the Continent

One very satisfactory consequence of the invasion of Sicily had

Sicily: 10 July-17 August, 1943

Campobasso
From a painting by Major C.F. Comfort

Campobasso, "dominated by an extremely unlikely castle on a highly improbable hill", was developed as a leave centre for the Canadians in Italy in the autumn of 1943, and was known as "Maple Leaf City". In the foreground are Canadian troops and carriers.

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Footnotes

1. The story of the Canadian campaign in Sicily and Southern Italy in 1943 is told in the booklet From Pachino to Ortona in somewhat greater detail than can be presented here. Some new information is however incorporated in this chapter.

2.