Chapter VII
The Pacific War

The failure in 1938 of the Japanese attack at Lake Khassan had revealed the unexpected military strength of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East. The conclusion on 23rd August 1939 of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and the preoccupation of Germany with her war against Britain and France had freed the U.S.S.R. for the time being of anxiety as to her Western Frontiers. Japan's advance to the North, hitherto intended to be the first step in the realization of her national policy, was now deferred until a better opportunity presented itself.

As the door of opportunity closed in the North, the Southern gates began to open, and Japan took various steps preliminary to the realization of the second major part of her national policy, the advance to the South. France and Britain suffered a grave rebuff at Munich in September 1938. Thereafter, Prince Konoye, on 3rd November 1938, publicly declared Japan's intention to establish the New Order in East Asia; and in that same month, Japan announced that she could no longer apply the Treaty System unconditionally. She said that the application

of the principles of "The Open Door" and "Equal Opportunity" might have to yield in face of the changed conditions in China. in that same month of November 1938, the Five Ministers' Conference decided to capture Hainan Island. That island was taken in February 1939 and the Sprately Islands in March 1939.

In September 1939, there came war between Germany and Poland, France and Britain. At once, we find Ambassador OSHIMA and General Terauchi speaking of the advisability of Japan advancing to the South: from the month of September 1939 onwards, the attitude of the Japanese military in China towards foreign interests was noticeably more intransigent; and about that time, the Japanese began to bomb the Yunnan Railway. In November 1939, the Japanese Foreign Office demanded that France should cease forwarding military supplies over the Yunnan Railway to China and should admit a Japanese Military mission to French Indo-China to see that no such supplies went forward. Nothing could better advertise Japanese aggressiveness in the South, for France was entitled to forward these supplies, and there was as yet no indication that French military strength would be broken. Nevertheless, Japan felt strong enough to present these demands upon France, in view of France's preoccupation with the war in Europe. On 2nd November 1940, Japan presented to the Netherlands demands which, if granted, would have given her a preferential position among the

nations in respect to the economy of the Netherlands East Indies. In March 1490, KOISO told the Diet Committee of Accounts that Japan should expand into the Pacific Islands so as to be economically independent of the United States of America.

On 9th May 1940, Germany invaded the Netherlands. Japan at once asked for and received from the United States of America, Britain and France assurances that they would preserve the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. Japan gave a similar assurance. Nevertheless, by 22nd May 1940, she had asked for and received from Germany the statement that Germany had no interest in the Netherlands East Indies, a statement which was interpreted, in Japan, and as it turned out rightly interpreted, as giving Japan a free hand in her relations with the Netherlands East Indies, as far as Germany was concerned.

On 17th June 1940, France asked Germany for an armistice. on 19th June 1940, Japan renewed her demand on French Indo-China for the cessation of passage of supplies through Indo-China to China and for the reception of a Japanese Military Assistance Mission to ensure that none went forward. These demands had been refused by France when they were made in 1939, but the situation of France was now very different, a fact of which Japan was taking advantage. Now the Governor of French Indo-China agreed, and the Japanese Military Mission arrived in Hanoi on 29th June 1940.

KOISO, then Minister of Overseas Affairs, spoke to the German Ambassador on 24th June 1940, of Japan's colonial aspirations in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies and inquired what Germany's attitude was towards proposed military activity of Japan in these territories. The Ambassador adhered to the German declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies already given on 22nd May 1940. He further stated that Germany would probably raise no objections to Japanese action in French Indo China, but she would wish Japan to tie down the United States in the Pacific by a threat of attack on the Philippines and Hawaii. On 1st July 1940, Japan refused a United States offer of an agreement to preserve the status quo in the Pacific during the European War. The reason for this refusal was stated in an interview between KIDO and Arita, the Foreign Minister, as the inadvisability at this time of having Japan's activities, including those in the Netherlands East Indies, restricted. There could be no plainer admission of Japan's aggressive intentions towards her neighbors. On 8th July 1940, Kurusu and Sato told Ribbentrop that for nine years the object of Japan had been to build a new China freed from the Treaty System, thus giving the lie to repeated official declarations of Japan made during those years. On 16th July 1940, Japan notified the Netherlands that she was sending an economic mission to Batavia to discuss supplies by the Netherlands East Indies to Japan.

On that same day, the Yonai Cabinet resigned under pressure from the Military and their supporters, who thought the Cabinet too supine to take advantage of the opportunity for Japanese aggression in the South now presented by the fall of France and the Netherlands and the anxieties of Britain in Europe. The way was clear for the accession of the Second Cabinet of Konoye on 22nd July 1940 and for the steps it took to further that policy of Japanese aggression to the South.

Japanese Policy in 1940

During the Second Konoye Cabinet, which took office on the 22nd July 1940, important decisions were made which contributed directly to the launching of the Pacific War on 8th December 1941.

The negotiations with Germany leading to the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27th September 1940 have been discussed in an earlier part of the judgment. However, for a clearer understanding of the decisions made and the plans adopted during the Second and Third Konoye Cabinets and the succeeding Cabinet under TOJO, it is advisable to review briefly the policy and plans adopted from July to October 1940. These were a reaffirmation of the policy enunciated by the HIROTA Cabinet on 11th August 1936, and the practical application of that policy to the circumstances obtaining in the latter half of the year 1940.

The important matters were: The Cabinet decision of 26th July 1940, the decision of the Four Ministers' Conference of 4th September 1940, and the Liaison Conference of 19th September 1940, the outline of Japanese foreign policy prepared in the Foreign Office on 28th September 1940--the day after the signing of the Tripartite Pact,--the decisions of the Cabinet meeting of 3rd October 1940, and the "Tentative Plan Towards the Southern Regions" prepared in the Foreign Office on 4th October 1940.

As a result of these, it was settled by the beginning of October 1940 that the policy of the Japanese Government was to move to the Southern Regions with a view to the occupation of Singapore, british Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, at the same time striving to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. In the event of war breaking out with the United States, which was considered possible, the Philippines, Guam and other American possessions would be included among the territories to be taken.

In somewhat more detail, the policy aimed at the following: (1) reliance on the Tripartite Pact; (2) conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R.; (3) successful conclusion of the war in China: (4) incorporation of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, the Straits Settlements, British Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, British Borneo and Burma into the Greater East

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (which hereafter for shortness we will refer to as the "Co-Prosperity Sphere"); (5) to offer to mediate for settlement of the European War and in return obtain from Great Britain recognition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; (6) conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the United States, whereby the United States would recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for Japanese respect for the independence of the Philippines.

On the 4th October 1940, Konoye made a statement to the Press in which he said that if the United States refused to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continued its challenging attitude and acts, both the United States and Great Britain would be forced into war with Japan, meaning that Japan would be compelled to go to war with them. He explained that Japan was maneuvering, diplomatically to induce the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States to suspend aid to China.

By this time, the aggressive intentions of Japan had become so evident that the United States of America was not prepared to continue to supply Japan with the raw materials to manufacture munitions of war which would be used to realize these aggressive aims. A Presidential Proclamation was issued extending to all iron and steel scrap, except to the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain, the embargoes imposed in 1938 and 1939 in protest against Japan's disregard of treaties. It should be noted that the

United States of America had, on 26th January 1940, terminated its Commercial Treaty with Japan. The embargo was extended and placed under a licensing system on 10th December 1940. Copper, brass, zinc, bronze, nickel, and potash were added to the embargo list on 3rd February 1941. Scrap rubber was added on 5th May 1941. By 20th June 1941, the situation had so deteriorated that all petroleum exports from the United States were banned, except to Great Britain and South America.

Measures were adopted to counteract the American embargoes by strengthening the national economy of Japan and by organizing Japan-Manchukuo-China as an economic bloc. The Cabinet decided that tit was necessary to allot to each of the three countries within the bloc well defined spheres of activity in labor, finance, exchange, manufacturing, communications, transportation, etc., in order to avoid economic rivalry, dual investments, and duplication of enterprises.

Measures to Implement Policy

In a policy study of 25th October 1940, the Konoye Cabinet decided to recognize the puppet Central Government of China led by Wang Ching-Wei and to negotiate a basic treaty with that government for adjustment of relations between it and the Government of Japan. The Treaty was signed on 30th November; and the new Ambassador to the puppet government was instructed that

since the Cabinet had adopted the puppet Central Government as an instrument for long term warfare, he should bear that point in mind and cooperate to the fullest extent with the Army and Navy.

HOSHINO, as President of the Planning Board and formerly Director of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo, was actively directing the negotiation of a joint declaration to be made by Japan, Manchukuo and China upon the occasion of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. KIMURA was appointed to the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee on 7th November 1949. The Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration was initialed in final form on 8th November and published on 30th November 1940 at the time the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty was announced. This joint declaration stated that the three countries would cooperate on a military and economic basis and take all necessary measures to establish the New Order in Asia.

HOSHINO has explained the reorganization of the Japanese economy to bring it in line with the new economic bloc. He stated that in November the Cabinet decided upon a plan to group companies of each industry into associations in order to control those companies through the heads of the associations, who were to be appointed by the Cabinet and placed under the supervision of the Minister of Commerce and industry. He said that laws and ordinances were issued to place the plan into effect and that

there was little revision of the plan thereafter. As a result of that plan, no less that 212 major corporation mergers took place in 1940 involving capital amounting to 2,300,000,000 yen; and during the dirst half of 1941, there were 172 major mergers involving over 3,000,000,000 yen.

The Privy Councillors had indicated during the deliberation upon the Tripartite Pact a number of measures that should be taken to prepare Japan for the war which they expected to follow the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Immediately after the Privy Council meeting, HOSHINO began to take measures to strengthen Japan's financial structure. On 19th October 1940, an Imperial Ordinance entitled "Ordinance Concerning Operation of Funds of Banks and Other Financial Institutions" was promulgated to add to government control over finances by requiring all financial institutions to adjust their investment policies according to government directives and providing for compensating of losses incurred by financial institutions as a result of government directives. On the same day, the Imperial Ordinance for Control of Corporate Accounts was promulgated, by which institutions were required to conserve funds for attainment of the object of the National General Mobilization Law.

Imperial Rule Assistance Association

One of the matters giving the Privy Councillors concern at the meeting of 26th

September 1940, during the discussion of the Tripartite Pact, was the reaction to be expected from the Japanese people to the hardships to which they were being subjected and which would be increased as a result of the signing of the Pact because of economic sanctions the United States was expected to impose. Konoye's answer to that problem was the organization of the imperial Rule Assistance Association on 10th October 1940. KIDO and Konoye had discussed the organization of a great all-embracing political party in May 1940a, before the fall of the Yonai Cabinet, but had deferred action. HASHIMOTO brought to the Preparatory Committee of the Association his long experience in the organization of political associations; and HOSHINO assisted as a member of the Committee. The Articles of Association were drawn in detail with the obvious intention that the Association should spread over Japan into every district, county, city and even into every home. The Association was designed to turn Japan into a one party state on the lines of totalitarian states in Europe. Other political parties would be abolished. The Premier was to be at the head of the Association and the leader of the one party. Its purpose was presented euphemistically as being to establish a spiritually and physically the national structure to aid the Emperor in realizing the aims of Hakko Ichiu and making Japan the leader of a glorious world.

Hashimoto and Shiratori Appeal for Public Support of War Policy

A number of organizations were affiliated with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. HASHIMOTO was a member of the Board of Directors of the Association. He organized the Sekiseikai, an ultra nationalist society. On 7th November 1940, while on an organizing tour, he issued his command to that society as follows: "Rise up resolutely, time approaches. Instigate at once a powerful national movement, using every kind of method, speeches, meetings, posters, etc., and begin a sweeping campaign against sympathizers of England and America and at the same time start a movement ot inspire moral support of the Advance Southward." He delivered an address to a meeting of the society at Kyoto attended by more than 5,000 persons on

2nd January 1941. In that speech, HASHIMOTO advocated the overthrow of England and America, as he had done in his popular speech "Praying to Soldiers". Here again, he advocated a "Southward Advance".

HASHIMOTO was engaged in writing during this period. He published his "Inevitability of Renovation" on 20th December 1940; and on 30th January 1941, he published his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World" and issued the 14th edition of his "Second Creation". In his "Inevitability of Renovation", after mentioning that the end of the year was approaching and that it was time to "ring a loud alarm bell", he advised that it was time to attack Great Britain while she was engaged in war with Germany and Italy in order ot eliminate her opposition to the establishment of the New Order in Asia and the Pacific Region, and that the defeat of Great Britain should be followed by an attack upon the United States. His "Second Creation" contained the "Declaration of HASHIMOTO Kingoro". That declaration was to the effect that the world was facing an historic turning point, and that Japan, whose national policy was Hakko Ichiu, should take a bold leap and immediately display her original character by following the Emperor blindly with all the Nation's capacity in order to become the glorious leader of the World. He stated that war preparations should be completed to enable Japan to crush Great Britain and the United States, who were interfering with Japan's expansion upon the Continent of Asia and her advance to the south. In his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World", HASHIMOTO displayed his support of totalitarian government and admiration of the methods of dictators and admitted having taken part in the Manchuria Incident. Japan's secession from the League and renunciation of the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty, as well as in the May and

February incidents and other plots in Japan.

SHIRATORI had retained his position as ambassador to Italy until 28th August 1940, when he became a Diplomatic Councillor in the Foreign Office and assisted in the reorganization of the Government along totalitarian lines and in the purge from the Foreign Service of those thought to have Anglo-Saxon sympathies. During this period, he lectured and wrote extensively in support of the proposed Tripartite Pact. In november 1940, he collected a number of his lectures and magazine articles and published them in one volume for distribution in support of the Pact. He declared in his "European War and the Attitude of Japan", which had been published in November 1939, that the European War could be developed to aid Japan in the establishment of its aims in the Far East. He stated in his "Necessity of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance" of December 1939 that the aim of Germany and Italy was to divide the world into a comparatively few groups of States with each group dominated by one member State, and that Japan should join Germany and Italy in their endeavor in order to establish the New Order in Asia, i.e. the domination of East Asia. In his "Trend of the Great War" of June 1940, he said that Japan was actually involved in the war because the fuse of the European War was first attached by the China War; and he asked significantly whether the enemies of Germany and Italy who were opposing the establishment of the New Order in Europe were not the enemies of Japan. He advised, in his "Comment on Japan's Non-interference" of June 1940, that since Japan had been assuming the leading role in establishing the New Order ever since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, she should give early assistance to the Axis Powers, who were attempting to destroy the Old Order based upon democratic

capitalism and establish the New Order based on totalitarian principles. He advised that this assistance should take the form of containing the American Fleet in the Pacific and suggested as Japan's possible reward the Netherlands East Indies and British colonies in the Far East and the Pacific.

SHIRATORI continued his writings after the Tripartite Pact was signed. He stated in his "Conclusion of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance" of 29th September 1940 that historians of the future generations would probably refer to the Pact as the "Treaty of the New World Order", as it not only represented a racial feud between the Anglo-Saxon and the Teuton and between the Yellow and White Races, but it included a positive programme to overthrow the status quo and prescribe the New World. He declared in his "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow", published in December 1940, that the totalitarian movement was spreading over the world like a prairie fire, leaving no room in the World of Tomorrow for any other concept of world and man. He said that Japan had maintained a pure and unadulterated totalitarian government during her entire existence which embodied the principle of the unity of the sovereign and subjects of one organic body as the immutable faith of the Japanese people. He said that the Manchurian Incident was a bursting forth of this healthy instinct of the nation, which had been hitherto suppressed by conditions long imposed by the democratic powers. He called for reexamination and a return to the true spirit of Hakko Ichiu. He pointed to the China War as essentially a conflict between Japan and the democratic powers, and declared that the wars in the East and in the West were in fact one war.

Total War Research Institute

A Privy Councillor had inquired during the deliberations upon the Tripartite Pact about preparations to meet the situation in case of war. The National Policy Investigation Association, or Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai had existed since 1936 as an investigating and advisory body to assist the Government in the solution of the graver political problems; but its principal value was that it served as a medium to bind the Zaibatsu to the Military. The Total War Research Institute was organized as an official government board or commission by Imperial Ordinance on 30th September 1940. The Ordinance provided that the Institute should be under the Prime Minister and control basic study and research in connection with national total war as well as with the education and training of officials and others to wage total war. HOSHINO became the Acting Director of the Institute on 1st October; and he was followed by high-ranking Generals and Admirals, who continued the work of the institute until April 1945. SUZUKI was one of the Councillors of the Institute. Each Ministry of the Government was represented in the Institute. Many Boards and Bureaux of the Government, as well as the Government of Formosa, the South Manchurian Railway, the Zaibatsu Companies, and the Yokohama Specie Bank were also represented on the staff of the Institute. Students were selected from every branch and department of the country's activities. Lectures were delivered, studies or exercises were conducted. The Institute compiled research reports on important subjects which were useful in planning total war.

To provide more manpower in order to achieve Japan's leadership of all East Asia, a campaign to encourage increase in the birth rate of the Japanese was adopted by the Cabinet on 22nd January 1941. HOSHINO advanced the plan and

it was adopted by the Cabinet with Home Minister HIRANUMA and War Minister TOJO warmly supporting the measure. The plan was to make payments to young married people to encourage early marriages, reduce the marriage age, ban birth control, give priority on materials to prolific families and establish special bureaux to encourage a high birth rate. The purpose was to increase the population so as to insure the leadership of Japan over East Asia, and furnish manpower for labour and military service in the development of Japan's plan in East Asia. The goal set was a population for Japan of 100,000,000 by 1950. The plan was put into effect by appropriate ordinances and decrees.

Cooperation Under Tripartite Pact

Active cooperation with Germany and Italy under the Pact began shortly after it was signed. OSHIMA wrote in a newspaper article published on 27th October 1940, that one could not fail to be deeply stirred by the fact that the Pact had been concluded and that Japan's objective of founding a New World Order had been made clear, but that the nation with unswerving resolution should make preparations for the attainment of that objective without delay. he advised that mutual economic and military cooperation with Germany and Italy should be perfected speedily so that no opportunities to establish the New Order in Greater East Asia and the South Seas would be lost.

The three Signatories of the Pact agreed on 20th December 1940 to form the Commissions provided for by the Pact. The Agreement called for the establishment of a General Commission and two Technical Commissions, military and economic, to be formed independently of each other in each of the three capitals. MUTO, as Chief of the Military

Affairs Bureau, and OKA, who had become Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, were appointed to the Technical Military Commission in Tokyo.

OSHIMA was appointed Ambassador to Germany on the day the agreement was reached, and became a member of the General Commission in Berlin. The Army and Navy had urged OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador because he was recognized as a strong supporter of the Pact and his appointment would promote cooperation with Germany and Italy. Matsuoka, in a speech delivered on 15th January on the occasion of OSHIMA's departure for Germany, stated that he was most delighted that OSHIMA was returning as Ambassador to Germany as he had built up such a personal credit among the German leaders that he could talk to them without reserve, and that practical use of the Pact would largely depend upon OSHIMA's ability.

Matsuoka planned a visit to Germany after OSHIMA's arrival there. His purpose was to promote cooperation under the Pact, to secure German assistance in settlement of the China War and to negotiate a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R., as contemplated by the Pact, for the purpose of neutralizing the U.S.S.R. during the advance to the South. The mediation of the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, which we will mention presently, delayed Matsuoka's departure for Germany, He arrived in Berlin in March 1941, and after holding conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler, proceeded to Moscow, where he concluded the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 13th April 1941. Ratifications of that Pact

were exchanged in Tokyo on 20th May 1941. As we have indicated, and as we have discussed elsewhere, this Pact did not mean that Japan had abandoned its aims of aggrandisement at the expense of the Soviet. The Pact was dictated by expediency. It was a matter of timing.

With war proceeding in China and a war in contemplation with Great Britain and the Netherlands and possibly with America, it was necessary to do everything possible to avoid immediate war with the U.S.S.R.

Preparations for Move to the South

One of the principal elements of the policy adopted by the Cabinet in September and October 1940, was the establishment of an economic bloc of Japan, Manchukuo and China in order to accelerate the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was decided that the first stage of development of the Co-Prosperity Sphere should be a penetration into the whole area west of Hawaii, including French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, British Burma, and the Straits Settlements, excluding for the time the Philippines and Guam. A complete strategical plan was formulated. An attempt was to be made to effect a settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to employ his troops, rewarding China by allowing her to annex Tonkin Province of French Indo-China and Northern Burma. It was planned to conclude protective treaties with french Indo-China and Thailand under the guise of military and economic alliances in order to secure bases in those countries for an advance on Singapore. Thailand was to be promised part of French Indo-China as her reward. However, in order to delay Thailand in making preparations to resist invasion by Japan, it was planned to pretend that Japanese-Thailand relations were secure until Japan was ready to start military action. To avoid destruction of the oil wells and other resources in the Islands of the Netherlands Indies, it was decided to capture Singapore before beginning operations against the Netherlands East Indies, and to call upon the inhabitants during the seige of Singapore to declare their independence, seize the oil wells and

hand them over intact to the Japanese. Independence movements were to be used in French Indo-China, Burma and Malaya to assist penetration in those areas. Military action was to begin upon settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, or upon Germany's invasion of England, whichever occurred first; and in the event that neither occurred, the action was to commence when Germany had achieved some substantial military success. Action was to be coordinated with Germany military plans.

During November 1940, the Konoye Cabinet began to make advances to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for settlement of the China War. MATSUOKA continued his overtures to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and expected favourable progress as a result of conversations to be held by him in Berlin. The recognition by Japan of the puppet Central Government of China, however, had destroyed any possibility of reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo.

Thailand's Claims

With the outbreak of war in Europe, thailand had presented demands to French Indo-China for the return to Thailand of territory lost to Indo-China in the year 1904. On 12th June 1940, a Non-Aggression Pact was signed between French Indo-China and Thailand. One of the terms provided for the appointment of a commission to settle the matter of the disputed border. When France sued for an armistice with Germany on 17th June 1940, Thailand demanded the revision of the border in accordance with her wishes as a condition of ratifying the Non-Aggression Pact of 12th June 1940.

On 30th August 1940, there was concluded between Japan and France the so-called Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, by which France agreed to the entry of Japanese troops into Northern Indo-China. A note was sent by Thailand to the French Indo-China authorities on 28th September 1940, repeating her demands and proposing the Mekong River as the boundary between Thailand and French Indo-China. The Note stated that Thailand would not press her claims to territory in Laos and Cambodia unless and until such time as France renounced her sovereignty over French Indo-China. On 11th October, the French rejected these demands. Thailand then began to concentration of troops along the border, and France countered by a like concentration. It appeared that hostilities would commence soon, but Japan limited her occupation of French Indo-China to the Northern part of that territory, and Thailand, left without Japanese support, stayed her hand.

In late October 1940, Thailand sent a delegation to Japan to learn the Konoye Cabinet's intentions regarding the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. The Japanese plans formulated in September and October 1940 contained a suggestion that a secret committee should be formed under the Japanese Thailand Non-Aggression Pact to make preparations for a military alliance between Japan and Thailand, to be signed as soon as Japan should begin the military action against Singapore. Accordingly, it was decided at the Four Ministers' Conferences of 5th and 21st November 1940 to assist Thailand in her negotiations with French Indo-China and force French Indo-China to accept THailand's demands by returning the territory on the west side of the Mekong River across from Luangprabang and Bakuse to

Thailand, provided Thailand would accept the Japanese demands. Prime Minister Pibun of Thailand accepted the Japanese demands. In this way, Japan prejudged the issue of a dispute in which she subsequently insisted in acting as arbitrator.

Following the Four Ministers' Conference of 21 November 1940, Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that he had proposed to Thailand that if she limited her territorial claims, the Konoye Cabinet would be willing to mediate between Thailand and French Indo-China. He told the Ambassador that if the need should arise, Japan would request the support of the German Government in dealing with the Vichy French Government. He said also that a cruiser was to be despatched to Saigon as a demonstration against French Indo-China to force her to agree to the Japanese demands. This cruiser was scheduled to arrive in Saigon about the middle of December.

The Prime Minister of Thailand, having agreed to the Japanese terms for so-called "mediation" of the dispute, Thailand resumed military action against French Indo-China; and on 28th November 1940, an engagement was fought between Thailand and French troops. Taking advantage of this action, Matsuoka informed the French Ambassador that he would act as an arbitrator regarding Thailand's demands for recovery of territory ceded to France in 1904.

The Ambassador replied the next day that the Vichy French Government appreciated the offer of arbitration, but that it expected its territorial integrity in French Indo-China to be respected.

French Indo-China and Thailand to be Used
for Attack on Singapore

On 23rd January 1941, Kurusu, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, explained to Weizsacker that an advance southward against Singapore was unthinkable without using the land bridge of the Malay Peninsula after crossing French Indo-China and Thailand territory. For that reason, Britain should be prevented from interfering with Japanese arrangements with Thailand. A group led by Diplomatic Councillor SHIRATORI was demanding an immediate attack upon Singapore, which they considered the key position in the Pacific Area. As a consequence, the Japanese military authorities and the German Military Attachés; in Tokyo in January 1941, made a study of the possibilities of such an attack. The conclusion reached was that the attack should be carried out in phases by occupying Saigon, and then landing on the Malay Peninsula.

The Liaison Conference of 30th January 1941 decided to utilize the mediation of the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand to establish Japan's position in those countries and to obtain naval bases on Camranh

Bay as well as air bases in the vicinity of Saigon to be used for the attack upon Singapore. The steps taken to give effect to this decision will be dealt with later. The true purpose of the mediation was to be concealed, it was decided, and the negotiations were to be described as an attempt to maintain the peace between the disputing parties. After the Liaison Conference, Konoye and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs informed the Emperor of the decision of the Conference and secured his approval. KIDO, who was aware of the decision, recorded in his diary that this procedure of by-passing the Imperial Conference was unusual.

Germany prevented the Vichy French Government from sending reinforcements to French Indo-China, and French Indo-China was forced to sign an armistice with Thailand on 31st January 1941. Under the terms of the armistice, the troops of both countries were to retreat from the lines held on 28th January, and all military action was to cease. Japanese were to supervise the observance of the armistice, which was to continue until a permanent peace treaty could be agreed upon. SATO, who had been on temporary duty with the South China Expeditionary Forces during the first invasion of French Indo-China in September and October 1940, was one of Japan's representatives in the supervision of this armistice. He did not return to his duties in

the Military Affairs Bureau until March, when an agreement had been reached between Japan and Vichy France for settlement of the dispute and France had agreed to all of Japan's demands.

The armistice having been signed, preparations for the mediation proceeded. The Japanese Mediation Commission was appointed on 5th and 6th February 1941, with Matsuoka, MUTO and OKA among its members. The negotiations were to begin on 7th February; and on 6th February, Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that his Cabinet intended to use the mediation to force both France and Thailand to agree to make no political or military agreement with any third power, and requested that the German Government be so notified.

The results of this mediation of Japan in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China were seen when the peace treaty between Vichy France and Thailand was finally signed on 9th May 1941. The Treaty provided for the cession by France to Thailand of territory and for the establishment of the border along the centre of the Mekong river, all as claimed by Thailand. We have previously seen that this result had been determined at the Japanese Four Ministers' Conferences of 5th and 21st November 1940.

Liaison Conferences

The action of the Prime Minister and Chiefs of the General Staffs on 30th January

1941 established a precedent which was customarily followed until the end of the Pacific War. Important decisions were made at Liaison Conferences, and reported directly to the Emperor for his approval. Thereafter, Imperial Conferences were held only on the most important questions, such as decisions to declare war. The Liaison Conference therefore latterly became the real policy-determining body of the Empire. Members of the Conference were the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Home Minister, Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs and their Vice-Chiefs, the Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau and Naval Affairs Bureau, President of the Planning Board and the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. In the Second Konoye Cabinet, TOJO, HIRANUMA, HOSHINO, MUTO, SUZUKI after his appointment as President of the Planning Board, and OKA after his appointment as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, regularly attended these Conferences and participated in the formation and execution of government policies.

Diplomatic Discussions

In February 1941, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden summoned Ambassador SHIGEMITSU for a conference on the situation. He referred to reports that the situation in the Far East was extremely strained, and expressed disapproval of Matsuoka's statements

and contentions that only Japan had the right to mediate in conflicts in the Far East. He condemned the fraudulent nature of the mediation then being conducted between France and Thailand. He declared Britain's intention to defend her territories in the Far East. SHIGEMITSU replied that he was not aware of any strained situation. The evidence shows, however, that he was not only aware of the critical situation but was also thoroughly familiar with the plans adopted by the Konoye Cabinet and the action which had been taken up to that date to carry them into effect. He said that he interpreted Mr. Eden's remarks as a clear statement of the British position based on the premise that British-Japanese relations were near the breaking point; and after complaining of British-American cooperation, he stated that he would make a complete report to his Government and request instructions.

Matsuoka saw in this conference between Mr. Eden and SHIGEMITSU an opportunity to carry out the fifth provision of the plan adopted in September and October 1940, which was that at an appropriate time Japan should attempt to mediate so that Britain would make peace with Germany, and to use that mediation to obtain from Britain recognition of Japan's domination of South East Asia and the adjacent parts of the Pacific. The plan was that Japan, in return for that recognition, would promise the preservation

of the British Empire, including Australia and New Zealand, and would promise general economic cooperation with Britain. Matsuoka was conducting the mediation between France and Thailand; and on 10th february 1941, he informed the German Ambassador that an attack upon Singapore was being prepared. However, on 13th February, he cabled SHIGEMITSU to inform Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an impending crisis in the Far East was a ridiculous fantasy.

Matsuoka told SHIGEMITSU that the report of the British Ambassador seemed to have been made upon the assumption that Japan would acquire military bases in French Indo-China and Thailand and then commence action against Britain in the South Seas concurrently with Germany;s invasion of England. He said it was difficult to understand on what ground the Ambassador in Tokyo had based the alarming report as he, Matsuoka, he privately investigated and had been unable to find any basis for the report. Notwithstanding Matsuoka's denial, the substance of the British Ambassador's report was in fact what had been decided by the Liaison Conference of 30th January 1941 at which Matsuoka was present. Matsuoka instructed SHIGEMITSU to say to Mr. eden that there was no basis for the Press reports that Japan was planning to start military action at any moment as there was nothing that Japan could gain by such action.

Matsuoka saw the British Ambassador in Tokyo on 15th February 1941, and, after attempting to learn the source of the Ambassador's information regarding the impending crisis in the Far East, assured him that so long as Britain and the United States refrained from taking provocative action, Japan would under no circumstances initiate action which should cause anxiety on the part of those Powers. [Singapore surrendered to Japanese forces on this date exactly one year later. --HyperWar] The Ambassador enquired whether Matsuoka would check the southward advance and asked whether Japan expected exhorbitant compensation for her role as mediator of the French-Thailand dispute. Matsuoka replied that he would try to check the southward advance to the best of his ability, and assured the Ambassador that Japan's purpose in mediating the dispute was solely to restore peace between French Indo-China and Thailand.

Matsuoka, on 20th February 1942, complained to the British Ambassador regarding the reinforcement of the British garrison in Malaya. Matsuoka complained also to the American Ambassador that Britain was taking offensive action in reinforcing the garrison in Malaya. The American Ambassador replied that it seemed to him extraordinary that Japan should interpret and characterize an obviously defensive measure as an offensive one. He then mentioned the occupation by Japan in succession of Weichow, Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands, as well as the concentration of troops in French Indo-China, and the public declarations of intention

to advance to the South. He observed that the facts could hardly be interpreted by either Great Britain or the United States as indicating peaceful intentions on the part of Japan.

Matsuoka address a Note to Mr. Eden on 17th February 1941. He denied the report of an

impending crisis in the Far East. He claimed that the primary purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to limit the sphere of the European War by preventing third Powers from becoming engaged, and thereby to bring the war to an early termination. He assured the British Government that this was the sole object of the Pact, which constituted the fundamental basis of Japanese foreign policy. He submitted that he could not but be anxious because of the British and American Governments' attempt to prepare for supposed contingencies in the Pacific Ocean and in the South Seas, and observed that if the United States would restrict its activities to the Western Hemisphere, the situation would indeed be very much mitigated. He then stated that the uppermost thought in his mind had always been world peace, and that he sincerely hoped for an early termination of the China and European Wars. He suggested that Japan act as mediator for the settlement of the European War.

The British Government replied to Matsuoka's offer of mediation of 24th February 1941. After assuring the Japanese Government that the preparations by Great Britain and the United States in the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas were purely defensive, and that they intended to take no offensive action against Japan, the British Government rejected the offer for mediation of the European War. The British Government stated that it had made every effort to avert the hostilities in Europe before their commencement; but having been forced into the hostilities, it had no thought but to carry them to a victorious conclusion.

Mr. Churchill had a conversation with

SHIGEMITSU on the day this reply was despatched to the Japanese Government in which he emphasized Britain's determination to continue the war. He expressed regret that Anglo-Japanese relations, which had been friendly from the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, should be getting worse. He said it would be a tragedy if a clash should occur between the two Nations, that the defensive works under construction around Singapore were merely for protection, expressed his confidence in victory in the European War, and said that the question of mediation of that war as mentioned by Matsuoka would not arise. SHIGEMITSU denied that Matsuoka had suggested mediation and stated that Matsuoka had only intended to emphasize Japan's spirit toward peace. He expressed regret that Britain had been giving aid to the Chungking Government in its resistance to Japan.

Matsuoka, in a communication addressed to Mr. Churchill on 27th February 1941, reaffirmed his explanation of Japan's intentions under the Tripartite Pact, and again assured Britain that Japan had no intentions of attacking her. He professed surprise that his Note to Mr. Eden of 17th February had been interpreted as an offer of mediation, but hinted that he was not adverse to the idea.

Preparation for the Attack Upon Singapore

The failure of the attempt to destroy British-American cooperation and gain British acceptance of their penetration into South East Asia through mediation in the European War made it

necessary for the Japanese leaders to pursue their alternative plan to use force to accomplish the same end by an attack upon Singapore. Preparations for the attack proceeded at a rapid rate. Aerial photography was undertaken in January 1941 to collect data for the landing operations at Kota Bharu. Additional mapping of that area was completed by the Japanese Hydrographic Office in July 1941. The maps were completed and printed by the Naval General Staff in early October 1941.

The War Ministry, in conjunction with the Finance Ministry, as early as January 1941, commenced preparing military currency for use in the areas which they expected the Japanese troops to occupy in the advance to the South. Special currencies were printed and deposited with the Bank of Japan to be drawn by the Army as it occupied enemy territories. The military currency thus prepared consisted of dollars which were suitable for use in Malaya, Borneo and Thailand; guilders for use in the Netherlands East Indies; and pesos for the Philippines. In January 19841, therefore, both the War Ministry and the Finance Ministry contemplated Japanese armies occupying those territories for which this currency was prepared.

The Total War Research Institute early in 1941 compiled research reports on such subjects as "The Estimate of the domestic and Foreign Situation from the Total War Viewpoint", "Study of Total War Pertaining to the National Strength of Imperial Japan and the Foreign Powers", "Draft of the Plan for the Establishment of Greater East Asia", and "First Phase in the Total War Plan".

OSHIMA returned to Berlin to take up his duties again as Ambassador to Germany. He informed Weizsacker of the German Foreign Office on 22nd February 1941 that

Singapore would have to be seized by an attack from the sea and from the land; and on 27th February, he told Ribbentrop that preparations for the attack upon Singapore would be completed by the end of May; he added that the occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need. On 28th March 1941, Ribbentrop told Matsuoka that the capture of Singapore was essential and that the Philippines could be occupied at the same time. Matsuoka agreed with Ribbentrop and felt that if Japan did not take the risk of conquering Singapore, she would become a third-rate power.

Further Preparations

The Japanese Imperial Headquarters continued its preparations for the attack upon Singapore during Matsuoka's visit to Germany. The Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs informed the German Ambassador late in March 1941 that they were vigorously preparing for the attack upon Singapore. SHIRATORI discussed with the German Ambassador the strategy for the attack; it was his opinion that a frontal attack by the Navy should not be made, but that bases should be established on the Malay Peninsula from which the Japanese Air Force, aided by German dive bombers, might bomb Singapore in preparation for the attack down the peninsula. Matsuoka, in a conference with Field Marshal Goering on 29th March 1941, made arrangements for assistance from the German Air Force in return for an increase in the amount of rubber to be supplied to Germany by Japan.

Economic measures for war were being accelerated in Japan. An important question was oil, as the United States was increasing its embargo and the negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies at Batavia were making

no progress. HOSHINO, of the Planning Board, estimated that the Army and Navy had sufficient oil in storage until the oil in the Netherlands East Indies could be seized. He, however, believed that the maring was narrow, as Japan's production was only 300,000 tons and her annual consumption was 2,000,000 tons. This fact made careful planning necessary for the capture of the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies intact. this need for careful planning caused the Imperial Headquarters to suggest to Konoye in April 1941 that HOSHINO be replaced by SUZUKI,a soldier, in whom the Army and Navy had complete confidence. Konoye discussed the matter with KIDO, and on the 4th April, HOSHINO was appointed a member of the House of Peers and SUZUKI was appointed President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio.

The leaders of Japan now decided to strengthen the close relationship among Japan, French Indo-China, and Thailand, to continue economic negotiations with the Netherlands at Batavia, and to maintain normal economic relations with other countries; but, in case they should conclude that the Empire's self-existence was threatened by the embargoes of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, to resort to arms immediately to prevent consumption of Japan's reserve of vital war materials. KIMURA was appointed Vice-Minister of War on 10 April, and nine days later he became Director of War Supplies. These appointments necessitated his relief from the Japan-Manchukuo Join Economic Commission.

Military topographical data was being assembled for military operations in various part of

the world. Espionage activities in the Netherlands East Indies were being carried out increasingly. Operations were being planned against Java, Sumatra, Bali and other places as well as Singapore. Mandated Islands were being fortified and plans were being completed for operations in the South Seas. Data were being assembled for use in Burma and Malaya. The work of printing military script for use in the occupation of southern areas continued.

Matsuoka, in conference with Hitler on 4th April 1941, requested Hitler to furnish Japan, through the Technical Military Commission established under the Tripartite Pact, with all available information, including the latest technical improvements and inventions relating to submarine warfare. He explained that the Japanese Navy would need this information in case it should decide to attack Singapore. Matsuoka added that sooner or later war with the United States would be unavoidable and Japan desired to be ready to strike decisively at the right moment. But Matsuoka cautioned Hitler not to mention in any cab les to Japan that an attack upon Singapore had been agreed upon, lest the secret leak out. Ambassador OSHIMA took part in Matsuoka's conferences in Berlin relating to assistance in the plans for the attack upon Singapore.

Neutrality Pact -- Japan-U.S.S.R.

An important question was th time for the attack upon Singapore. The Germans urged its immediate commencement, but the Konoye Cabinet's policy from the beginning, which Matsuoka had helped to form at a Conference on 19th July 1940, had contemplated a

Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. to protect the Japanese rear during the attack upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Hitler insisted in his conversation with Matsuoka on 27th March 1941, with OSHIMA and other present, that a better opportunity to begin the attack than the present would never occur again. Matsuoka replied that it was only a matter of time before Japan would attack, as the Japanese had the feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years. Matsuoka referred to negotiations with the U.S.S.R. for a Non-Aggression Pact. The next day, Ribbentrop tried to discourage Matsuoka from concluding the Pact with the U.S.S.R., stating that Japan should attack Singapore immediately, and this if the U.S.S.R. interfered, Germany would attack the U.S.S.R. immediately. Ribbentrop repeated that assurance the following day. Matsuoka maintained his intention to visit Moscow on his return from Berlin, and he concluded the Pact with the U.S.S.R. on the 13th of April 1941.

French Indo-China

Matsuoka returned to Japan to conclude the formal agreements with France and Thailand which he had arranged before his departure for Berlin and support for which he had obtained during that visit.

In June 1940, shortly after the fall of France, she was forced to agree with Japan's demands to permit a military mission into Indo-China to ensure observance of the embargo on materials to China. The Military Mission arrived at Hanoi on the 29th June 1940.

The Japanese Cabinet having decided upon its foreign policy, Foreign Minister Matsuoka moved on 1st

August 1940 to put that policy into effect. He called the French Ambassador and delivered what was virtually an ultimatum to France regarding French Indo-China. He also discussed with the German Ambassador an alliance and the securing of German approval to a Japanese invasion of French Indo-China.

In presenting his views to the french Ambassador, Matsuoka informed him that, although Japan appreciated the admission of the military mission into French Indo-China, the Konoye Cabinet desired that France should allow Japanese troops to be stationed in Northern French Indo-China and the right to establish air bases there for action against the National Government of China. The French Ambassador pointed out that the demand was equivalent to requesting France to declare war against China, although Japan had not done so. Matsuoka replied that the request was the result of necessity and that unless it was granted, French neutrality might be violated. Matsuoka assured the French Ambassador that if the request was granted, Japan would respect French territorial integrity and would evacuate French Indo-China as soon as possible.

Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador of his demands upon France and stated that he would be grateful if the German Government would not object ot the action taken and would use its influence to induce the French Government to grant the demands. The French Ambassador asked, on 9th August 1940, for a clarification of the Japanese demands and a guarantee of French territorial rights in French Indo-China. Matsuoka again requested the German Government on 14th August 1940 to support the Japanese demands by influencing the Vichy France Government. On that day, he threatened France with military

action if the decisions to grant the demands of Japan were further delayed. After further negotiation between Matsuoka and Henri on 20 and 25th August, the latter, on 25th August, informed the Japanese Foreign Office that France had decided to yield to the Japanese demands. The so-called Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, consisting of an exchange of letters, was signed on 30th August 1940.

According to the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, the occupation of French indo-China was to be temporary, as it was stated to be solely for action against China and would be limited to Tonkin Province; and further, that Japan would respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

The arrangements for the establishment of air bases and the passage of Japanese troops into TOnkin Province were left for negotiation between the head of the Japanese Military Mission at Hanoi and the Governor-General of French Indo-China. The Governor-General of French Indo-China was slow to yield to the demands of the leader of the Japanese Military Mission, Nishihara. Nishihara threatened on 4th September 1940 to remove his Mission from Hanoi and order the advance of the Japanese South China Expeditionary Army across the French Indo-China border. On 4th September 1940, an agreement was signed, but certain details remained to be settled. On 6th September 1940, a unit of the Japanese Army in China crossed the border into French Indo-China. This action was said to have occurred through mistake and negotiations were continued.

The American Ambassador called upon Matsuoka on 19th September 1940 and informed the Foreign Minister that the United States Government regarded Japan's demands upon France as a serious infringement of the status quo in French Indo-China contrary to the Japanese Cabinet's announcement. The Ambassador's remonstrance was disregarded, however, as an understanding had been reached with the German Government and the Tripartite Pact was expected to be signed in a few days.

The Vice-Foreign Minister informed the French Ambassador on 19th September that unless an agreement was reached between Nishihara and the Governor-General of French Indo-China before 23rd September, the Japanese Army would cross the border into Indo-China on that day. The Japanese Military Mission evacuated French Indo-China and put to sea on 22nd September in preparation for the expected invasion. The Japanese Army began the advance into French Indo-China at 2:30 p.m. of the same day. Faced with an actual invasion, the Governor-General was forced to accept the Japanese demands and signed an agreement on 24th September 1940 for military occupation of Tonkin Province, the establishment of air bases and the grant of military facilities in French Indo-China. The occupation of Tonkin Province proceeded rapidly and the air bases were established.

Relations With the Netherlands East Indies

Japan's policy and actions having provoked sanctions and economic restrictions by America, she decided that her warlike needs, especially of oil, must be obtained from the Netherlands East Indies.

On 12th January 1940, Japan gave notice to the Netherlands that the Treaty of Judicial Settlement,

Arbitration, and Conciliation of August 1935 would expire in August 1940. Under this treaty, the parties were bound to settle any dispute between them by peaceful means, and a permanent committee had been set up to settle disputes.

The Foreign Office made a study of Japan's economic preparation for war in March 1940. That office came to the conclusion that the United States, having insisted upon observance of the Nine-Power Pact from the very beginning of the China War, might be expected to extend her embargoes against vital war supplies for Japan if Japanese aggression continued. Ways and means were considered to make Japan independent of the United States for the supply of war materials. Counter-measures suggested were: to seek sources of supplies in other countries, to consolidate the "intimate relationship" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, and to bring the counties of South East Asia under Japan's economic control.

The Japanese Minister at The Hague had delivered to the Netherlands Foreign Minister a Note on 2nd February making certain demands. The principal demands made at that time were: that restrictions upon exports from the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies to Japan and restrictions upon imports from Japan into the Netherlands East Indies should be removed; that laws respecting entry into the Netherlands East Indies should be modified; that facilities for Japanese investment in the Netherlands East Indies should be extended; and that all anti-Japanese publications in the Netherlands East Indies should be censored. A reply to these demands was still under consideration when Germany invaded the Netherlands.

On the 15th April 1940, Foreign Minister Arita

issued a statement to the press. In this he pointed out that an intimate economic relationship of mutual dependence existed between Japan and the South Seas Region, especially the Netherlands East Indies, and that if the European War were allowed to spread so as to disturb the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, Japan would be deeply concerned and the peace of East Asia would be disturbed. The next day, the Japanese Minister at The Hague called upon the Netherlands Foreign Minister to explain Japan's concern regarding the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Minister replied that his Government had not sought, nor would it seek any country's protection of the Netherlands East Indies, and that it was determined to refuse any offer of protection or intervention of any kind which might be made by any country. the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in reply to Arita's press statement, informed him on 17th April that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies or any alteration of the status quo anywhere in the entire Pacific Area by other than peaceful means would be a threat to the peace.

Germany invaded the Netherlands on 9th May 1940; and two day slater, Arita reaffirmed his statement of 15th April regarding the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. This statement contained the information that he had called upon the Metherlands Minister in Tokyo to reaffirm the determination of the Netherlands Government to accept no intervention in the Netherlands East Indies. The announcement stated that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and

Italy had been notified of Japan's continued concern over the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, issued a statement the day following, in which he said that during recent weeks a number of Governments, including the United States, Great Britain and Japan, had made clear in official utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, that this was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922, and that he assumed those Governments would continue to abide by their commitments. The british Ambassador called upon Arita on 13th May and delivered a British statement to the effect that the British Government had no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies and believed the Dutch forces there sufficient ot maintain the status quo. The Netherlands Minister called upon Arita on 15th May and informed Arita that the Netherlands Government believed that Great Britain, the United States and France had no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies. The French Ambassador called upon Arita on 16th May and stated that his Government agreed that the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies should be maintained.

The day after the French Ambassador had called upon Arita and delivered to him the assurance from France, which completed the assurances from all the Allied and Neutral Powers concerned that the status quo would be maintained in the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese Ambassador called upon Mr. Hull

in Washington. After the Ambassador had questioned Mr. Hull regarding the status of certain Netherlands possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Hull interrupted him and pointed ot material which had arrived via news services from Tokyo in which the Yonai Cabinet was reported to be discussing frequently questions regarding the Netherlands East Indies and Japan's supposed special rights in them. He said that the United States, Great Britain and France had recently renewed their commitments to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, but notwithstanding the efforts to maintain an understanding with Japan, there were constantly coming from Tokyo statements implying that the commitments had not been made. The Ambassador assured Mr. Hull that the Yonai Government was completely satisfied with the situation following the statements of the powers and that his Government had no intention of proceeding against the Netherlands East Indies.

The Netherlands Minister assured Arita on 16th May 1940 that the Netherlands East Indies had no intention of placing any restrictions on the exportation of oil, tin, rubber and other raw materials vital to Japan, and was desirous of maintaining general economic relations with Japan. In a Note handed to the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo on 20th May, Arita referred to that assurance and informed the Minister that Japan desired the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to give definite assurances that the quantities of articles enumerated in an accompanying list would

be exported to Japan each year regardless of circumstances which might arise. This demand was rejected by the Netherlands on 6th June and attention was called ot the fact that economic relations between the two countries were governed by the so-called Hart-Ishizawa Agreement of April 1937 and to the further fact that Japan had recently renewed its commitment to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies.

In Berlin, the Japanese Ambassador called at the German Foreign Office in Berlin on Arita's instructions and asked for a declaration of the German position upon the status of the Netherlands East Indies. Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador in Tokyo to assure Arita that Germany had no interest in the Netherlands East Indies and that she thoroughly understood Japan's anxiety regarding the Netherlands East Indies. He instructed the Ambassador to mention during his interview with Arita that Germany, in contrast to the policy of the other great Powers, had always pursued a policy of friendship with Japan and believed that this policy had been advantageous to Japanese interests in East Asia. The German Ambassador delivered this declaration of disinterest to Arita on 22nd May as instructed, for which Arita expressed gratitude. The next day, the Japanese Press gave great publicity to the declaration, contrasted the German attitude with that of the other Posers, and asserted that the German declaration gave Japan a free hand to act as she desired with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. Subsequent events showed that this assertion was entirely justified. On 24th June

KOISO told the German Ambassador that Japan had colonial aspirations in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Japan, having received Germany's statement of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies on 22nd May 1940, informed the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo on 16th July 1940 of their intention to send a delegation into Batavia for economic negotiations. Before the departure of the mission from Japan, the Yonai Cabinet resigned. The Second Konoye Cabinet took office on 22nd July. the basic principles of foreign policy decided by Konoye, War Minister TOJO, Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the Navy Minister on 19th July before they assumed office were formally adopted at the Liaison Conference of 27th July. The policy thus adopted, among other things, called for strengthening of the diplomatic policy towards the Netherlands Eats Indies in order to obtain important materials. Accordingly, the Konoye Cabinet proceeded with arrangements to despatch the economic mission to Batavia.

Drafts of alternative demands to be made upon the Netherlands were in the course of preparation while the selection of a chairman for the economic mission was being debated. The Navy was not prepared for an attack against the Netherlands East Indies. This is confirmed by a statement made by prince Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff, to the Emperor on 10th August 1940, that the Navy at that time wished to avoid using force against the Netherlands and Singapore, and that the later war came, the better, since at least eight months were needed to complete preparations after a decision for war was made. Now the help of the Navy was essential in any attack on the Netherlands East Indies, for seaborne expeditions would be necessary. The drafts of the alternative demands to be made upon the

Netherlands stated that the Cabinet had decided to express their opinions frankly upon the problems of entry, enterprise and investment in the Indies, and requested that the Netherlands Government agree to the demands of the Japanese Empire, which was devoting itself to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, and Japan maintained that it was necessary to establish rapidly the economic self-sufficiency of the Co-Prosperity Sphere centered around Japan, Manchukuo and China and extending to the South Pacific. The first proposal asked, inter alia, that the Netherlands East Indies, as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, give preferential treatment to Japan and allow Japan to exploit and develop certain natural resources of the Indies. The second proposal asked that the Netherlands East Indies cease relations with europe and take its place as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, allow a measure of self-government by Indonesians, and conclude a joint defense agreement with Japan to defend the Co-Prosperity Sphere. All restrictions on the export of goods, especially to Japan, must be abolished. these were demands which no independent country would grant, save under duress.

The mission met with a cool reception when it arrived in Batavia in September 1940, and Kobayashi, the head of the Mission, advised Matsuoka on 13th September 1940 that the Governor-General of the Indies was not impressed by the serious situation and by Japan's threatening attitude. he suggested termination of the negotiations as he considered them to be futile. Matsuoka, however, had advised Kobayashi's assistant, Consul-General Saito, on 3rd September 1940, that the negotiations should not be limited to political problems and should also be directed toward the

acquisition of oil fields, as that was one of the Cabinet's main purposes in despatching the mission to Batavia. Kobayashi advised Matsuoka on 18th September that he would continue the negotiations as an aid to the acquisition of oil fields, but suggested that the negotiations on that subject, which had until then been in progress in Tokyo, be transferred to Batavia.

The Tripartite Pact was signed, and the occupation of Tonkin Province, together with the acquisition of military bases in French indo-China was assured in late September 1940. According to the plan adopted in September and October 1940, it was decided to develop the attack upon Singapore by securing bases in French Indo-China and Thailand, and to lull the Dutch into a sense of security by continuing the economic negotiations at Batavia while secretly instigating an independence movement among the natives and securing military data for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. it was decided also to launch a sudden attack upon Singapore, and while that attack was in progress, to call upon the natives of the Netherlands East Indies to declare their independence of the Netherlands, secure the oil wells and natural resources of the Netherlands East Indies, and deliver them intact to the Japanese forces as they advanced from Singapore to occupy the Netherlands East Indies. The call for the uprising of the natives of the Indies was to include a warning that if any of the oil wells or other resources of the Netherlands East Indies were destroyed, the leading Dutch officials would be killed by the invading Japanese forces. The plan contained provisions for the organization of a new government in the Netherlands East Indies in order that Japan might conclude a protective treaty with it under the guise of a military alliance which would provide for the

appointment of Japanese military and economic advisers in powerful positions in the new government. The new government was to be organized by a committee of Japanese and natives, with the Japanese forming a majority, and the Netherlands East Indies were to be governed by the committee until the new government could be established.

The signing of the Tripartite Pact and the invasion of French Indo-China raised serious misgivings among the Netherlands delegation at Batavia, who hesitated to continue the negotiations. The Japanese delegation assured them that the Pact was not directed toward the Netherlands Government and that Japan desired to continue the negotiations in order to promote friendly political and economic relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan. The Netherlands delegation agreed to continue, on the understanding that Japan had no hostile intentions towards, and did not claim leadership over the Netherlands East Indies, and requested the Japanese delegation to submit a list of points for discussion. On the day that the assurance was given, Kobayashi sent to Matsuoka a recommendation that no time should be lost in placing the Netherlands East Indies in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and that, with that in mind, appropriations should include funds for propaganda and training of personnel in preparation for that move. the new policy necessitated the replacement of Kobayashi by a man thoroughly familiar with the policy and plan. Kobayashi announced his recall to Tokyo two days after giving the above assurance.

The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin informed the German Government that Japan was prepared to act as purchasing agent to supply the German Government with vital war materials from the Far East and the Netherlands East Indies in return for Germany's support of Japan's advance to the

South and into the South Seas. The German Government accepted this offer, and on 4th October 1940, delivered to the Ambassador bills of exchange as advance payment for tin, rubber, castor oil, and spice to be obtained in the Netherlands East Indies. A complete working agreement for conducting the purchases was made. This agreement made further revision of the policy toward the Netherlands East Indies necessary. The Cabinet, on 25th October 1940, revised its policy to meet its agreement with Germany. It was decided that the obligations of the Japanese Government to Germany required the Indies to be in the Greater East Asia Economic Sphere immediately by establishing close economic relations and by developing and utilizing their rich natural resources for cooperation with the Axis Powers. Complete details of a plan to place the policy into effect were agreed upon. Among others, these were that the Netherlands East Indies should sever economic relations with Europe and America, that the production in and export of essential war materials from the Netherlands East Indies should be placed under Japanese control, and that the formulation and execution of all economic problems of the Netherlands East Indies should be placed under a Japanese-Netherlands Commission. Had these ends been achieved, Japan would have controlled the economy of the Indies.

OSHIMA, who at this time had no diplomatic post, wrote an article for the Yomiuri newspaper on 27th October 1940, in which he called attention to Japan's obligation to cooperate with the Axis, pointing out that the Tripartite Pact imposed new obligations. He advised that the Japanese should realize that fact and establish a close relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity among Japan, French Indo-China, India, the Netherlands East Indies, the South Seas

Islands, etc., for cooperation with Germany and Italy. He referred to the American embargo on vital war supplies, which was then being increased in an effort to halt further Japanese aggression, and said that America was not the world's arbiter, and that if she would employ her vast natural resources to help establish the New Order, she would indeed make a great contribution to world peace.

The Netherlands delegation had given the Japanese an elaborate and detailed statement of the oil situation on 7th October 1940, in which they set forth the amount of the various petroleum products they were prepared to supply to Japan in view of the overall situation and demands by other countries, and also detailed the areas in the Netherlands East Indies which were available to the Japanese for exploration and exploitation for oil The Japanese delegation replied on 21st October 19940 that they were not satisfied with the amount of oil which the Dutch proposed to supply, and expressed general dissatisfaction with the proposals. They said that Japan desired to acquire rights to explore and exploit not only the oil areas reserved for private enterprise, but also the Government reserve areas as well.

Consul-General Saito, in commenting upon the proposals to Matsuoka on 25th October 1940, explained, that from the viewpoint of an industrialist, the proposals were most reasonable, but that from a strategical viewpoint, they should be given further consideration. He pointed out that the plan to prospect for oil must be used for the exploration of areas as bases for military operations against the Dutch by sending into those areas a large number of planes, as well as troops disguised as labourers, and he requested advice as to the areas considered strategically important by the Military.

The Japanese delegation purported to accept the Dutch proposals on 29th October 1940. They, however, stated that they understood the proposals and their acceptance as granting to Japan certain large areas in Borneo, the Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, the Aroa Archipelago and the Schouten Archipelago as Japan's sphere for exploration and exploitation for oil They added that areas in Sumatra were also desired and that Japanese interests desired to participate in the capital investment of the Dutch oil companies. The Dutch took the position that the acceptance, which went far beyond the Dutch offer, put an end to the negotiations. The Konoye Cabinet however, had completed its plans to place the policy decisions of September and October 1940 into effect. Their preparations for employing force against the Netherlands were not yet complete. They announced that a special envoy was about to be appointed to instill new life into the negotiations. This envoy was appointed on 28th November 1940. He was Yoshizawa, a member of the House of Peers and formerly the Foreign Minister in the Inukai Cabinet.

Yoshizawa proceeded to Batavia and presented new proposals on 6th January 1941, which were in keeping with the policy decisions of October 1940. In the preamble to those proposals, it was stated that a certain interdependence existed between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies, that the Indies were abundant in natural resources and thinly populated and undeveloped, and that Japan earnestly desired to participate in the exploitation of their natural resources and to promote trade and economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. The detailed proposals called for modification of the entry

laws, granting mining and fishing rights to Japanese, opening an air service between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies, abolition of restrictions upon Japanese ships, the lifting of import and export restrictions, and the granting of manufacturing and enterprising rights to Japanese nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. These proposals, if accepted, would have placed the Netherlands East Indies under the economic domination of Japan. Had they been accepted, Japan would have obtained without war at least a considerable portion of her aggressive aims in South East Asia.

Yoshizawa reported to Matsuoka that he did not expect a favourable reply to this proposals, as the Netherlands East Indies were depending more

and more on Great Britain and the United States since the removal of the Dutch Government to London, following the German invasion of the Netherlands. He stated that the defeat of the Italian Army in the Mediterranean Theater, the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and the improvement of the Indies defences, had given the Dutch new confidence, and that determined measures would be necessary to include the Netherlands East Indies in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The Netherlands delegation answered Yoshizawa's proposals on 3rd February 1941 by stating that their first consideration was to provide for the welfare and progress of the native population of the Netherlands East Indies by improving economic relations and increasing trade with all neutral countries in a spirit of goodwill, and that the interest of the Netherlands East Indies demanded that economic relations with foreign countries be maintained on a basis of strict non-discrimination. They also pointed out that during the war, it was necessary to restrict trade and other economic activities in order to ensure that direct or indirect advantages would not accrue to enemies of the Netherlands. A strong objection was then made to the claim of interdependence between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies as being unwarranted by the facts.

The Dutch reply to Yoshizawa's proposals left the door open for further negotiations, but the Dutch were aware of a speech delivered by Matsuoka before the Diet on 21st January 1941, as well as of events in French Indo-China dn Thailand which seemed to indicate preparations for military action by Japan against the Netherlands East Indies, and consequently were suspicious of the

continuation of the negotiations. They warned the Japanese delegation that a Japanese occupation of Southern French Indo-China would constitute a military menace towards the Netherlands East Indies of such seriousness that it would cancel any agreement reached in the economic negotiations.

Matsuoka had said in his speech on 21st January 1941, that the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for geographical reasons, should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with Japan. He declared that the situation which had hitherto thwarted that relationship should be remedied, and pointed to the negotiations at Batavia as being directed to that end. Yoshizawa attributed the rejection of his proposals to Matsuoka's speech and complained to Matsuoka, warning him that if he were to be successful in maintaining the negotiations while the attack was being prepared, it was necessary for the officials in Tokyo to conduct themselves in a manner more conducive to that end.

The Dutch had been warned; and on 13th February 1941, Yoshizawa informed Matsuoka that the Dutch expected positive aid from the United States and Great Britain and preferred to rely upon the United States rather than upon Japan. He advised that discontinuance of the negotiations at Batavia was merely a matter of time, and that Japan's only means of settling the Indies problem was by force. Konoye instructed Yoshizawa on 28th March 1941 that failure of the negotiations would injure Japan's prestige, and that as the European situation was rapidly changing, the Japanese delegation should remain in batavia to await developments, despite the Dutch

attitude. These instructions were followed, and the negotiations continued.

The Japanese delegation replied on 14th May 1941 to the Dutch rejection of their proposals by making modified proposals, but stated that they desired to make it clear that the views expressed in the preamble to their proposals of 16th January were firmly held by the Japanese Government. The Netherlands delegation, aware of the further developments in the dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, rejected the modified proposals on 6th June 1941 as being incompatible with the essential principles of Netherlands economic policy. They also required that raw materials exported from the Indies to Japan would not be reexported to Germany.

The next day, Yoshizawa urgently requested authority to withdraw from the negotiations as he feared a Dutch request for the departure of his delegation. Matsuoka, describing the terms of the Dutch reply as "unwarrantable", authorized discontinuance of the negotiations. Yoshizawa asked for an audience with the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 17th June 1941. After making one last futile attempt to secure modification of the Dutch attitude, he produced a draft of a joint communiqué to be issued announcing termination of the negotiations. The communiqué, designed to save "face" for Japan both at home and abroad, was approved with minor changes by both delegations; it contained this statement: "It is needless to add that the discontinuance of the negotiations will lead to no change in the normal relations

between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan."

Preparations Following Tripartite Pact

TOJO said, during the discussion of the Tripartite Pact before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, that the Cabinet had considered the possibility of war with the United States resulting from the conclusion of the Pact, and revealed that there had been careful planning to meet that eventuality. The discussion at the Imperial Conference and before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council in September 1940 revealed that the Navy considered a Japanese-American war inevitable and was completely prepared for it, excepting that no adequate provision had been made for replenishing its war reserves of oil. HOSHINO said that the Planning Board had been carefully planning for the war with the United States by accumulating vital war materials, including oil, and that he considered the supply sufficient for a short, decisive war. He considered, moreover, that the supply could be replenished from the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere if the war should be prolonged. The Privy Councillors were aware that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact probably meant war with the United States, and in reporting upon the Pact, recommended that all necessary preparations be made for it.

Extensive preparation for war with the United States, Great Britain and other Powers followed. The puppet Central Government of China was recognized and the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc was strengthened to improve Japan's economic position to meet the American embargo on war supplies after War Minister HATA and other Japanese leaders had publicly proclaimed that Japanese

operations would not be stopped by what they termed the obsolete Nine-Power Treaty. The Planning Board under HOSHINO renewed its efforts to accumulate vital materials. As already related, Konoye's Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized with the help of HOSHINO, KIDO and HASHIMOTO to steel the people against the deprivations of the war with the United States and Great Britain which the Japanese leaders claimed to be inevitable. Propaganda in the form of writings and lectures was disseminated to popularize the waging of wars of aggression for acquisition of territory and natural resources. HASHIMOTO, SHIRATORI and OSHIMA were heavy contributors to this propaganda campaign. A military planning board in the form of the Total War Research Institute was organized and placed in operation with HOSHINO as its first President and with SUZUKI as one of its Councillors. OSHIMA was sent to Germany to promote cooperations between the Axis members in the adventure upon which they had embarked.

Relations With U.S.A. and Great Britain

In October 1940, Konoye issued a statement to the Press in which he said that his government was maneuvering diplomatically to induce the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere envisaged by the Japanese leaders, a euphemism for Japan's domination of East Asia. He implied that if the United States refused to understand the real intentions of Japan, she, as well as Britain, would be forced into war. The United States Government because of that statement, extended its embargo to iron and steel scrap and increased its preparedness for

defense. The Japanese Embassy in Washington complained that the Japanese Government found it difficult to concede that the extension of the embargo was caused solely by concern for the defence of the United States. The United States Government replied that despite the Nine-Power Treaty and other Japanese obligations, American trade had been practically eliminated from Manchuria and North China, and that it now appeared that Japan was intent upon forcing American enterprises from Shanghai also.

The United States Government was concerned about Japan's advance to the south and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, which had been followed by Konoye's warning. The President of the United States, in an address to Congress, declared that at no previous time had American security been so seriously threatened. On 15th January 1941, the Secretary of State told the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that it was clear that Japan was animated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific, and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms, so as to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one half of the entire population of the world. It was apparent to the Government of the United States that the Japanese military leaders were about to undertake the conquest of the entire Pacific Area, at least to the westward of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India.

The United States Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, represented one of the greatest

obstacles to the execution of the Konoye Cabinet's policy for military moves to the South. It was feared by many of the Japanese leaders that this fleet might be used to reinforce Singapore, and they advocated an immediate attack upon Singapore to prevent this. The Japanese Navy, however, was demanding that more oil essential supplies be accumulated and that adequate preparations be made for replenishing those supplies before launching the attack upon Singapore. The Navy estimated in August 1940 that at least eight months would be required for this preparation. The Navy maintained its demands before the Imperial Conference and the Privy Council during the discussions which preceded the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

The general plan adopted by the Konoye Cabinet took the Navy's demands into consideration by providing for an attempt to eliminate the threat of the United States Pacific Fleet through negotiations for a non-aggression pact with the United States Government. The suggestion was that, as part of such a Treaty, Japan should guarantee the security of the Philippines and Guam, and the United States should recognize the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Preparation for an attack upon the United States forces was to proceed during the negotiations, so that in case the negotiations should fail, a surprise attack might be launced.
A plan to destroy the United States Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor in Pearl Harbor by a surprise attack to be launched while the United States was at peace with Japan, was conceived and submitted to the Commander of the Combined Fleets for study. He approved the plan and transmitted it to the Imperial General

Headquarters as early as January 1941. The plan called for the organization of a task force to deliver an aerial attack upon the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. to avoid detection and make the surprise complete, this force was to use a Northern route little used by commercial shipping. In conjunction with the aerial attack, it was planned to use submarines to destroy any ships that might attempt to escape the air attack. There were many details to be worked out, such as the development and manufacture of shallow water torpedoes and midget submarines, as well as the perfection of a method of refueling at sea to allow the employment of the longer but more secure Northern route of approach. The Japanese leaders considered that if the attack upon Pearl Harbor should be successful and result in the destruction of the United States Fleet, they would be able to seize all the important points in the Pacific and Indian Oceans before the United States would be able to prepare and launch a counter-attack. It was hoped that the United States would weary of a prolonged and costly war, and negotiate a peace which would recognize Japan's supremacy in the territories it would have seized.

Foreign Minster Matsuoka took the first step toward the execution of the Cabinet's plan in January 1941 by appointing Nomura as Ambassador to the United States to undertake the negotiations. Matsuoka delivered to Nomura his instructions on 22nd January, immediately before Nomura's departure from Japan. These were that Nomura should make the President of the United States and his subordinate officials understand that Japan had been forced to sign the Tripartite Pact

because of American and British interference wit the organization of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, that the Pact was merely defensive, but that it provided for immediate military assistance from the other two Powers in case the United States attacked any one of the Signatory Powers, and that Japan would be faithful to the Alliance. He further instructed Nomura to advise the United States Government that it would be well for the United States to cease interference with Japan's aims in East Asia and to cooperate with Japan in the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for an opportunity to participate in the benefits which might accrue from the establishment of that sphere.

A propaganda campaign was immediately commenced, which was designed to convince the United States Government of the gravity of the situation and of the need for prompt negotiation of an understanding. The Cabinet decided to secure bases on Camranh bay and around Saigon for an attack to the South and called upon the German Government to prevent the reinforcement of French troops in French Indo-China. The Plan was approved at the Liaison Conference on 39th January 1941. The United States Government learned of the plan from its observer at Vichy, France, who reported on 28th January 1941 that the German Government had forbidden the Vichy Government to send reinforcements. in consequence of this, America, on 3rd February 1941, added many non-ferrous metals and potash to its embargo list. It was at this time that Mr. Eden saw SHIGEMITSU and asked for an explanation of the report form the British Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that a crisis was expected in the Far East within a week or two.

The extension of the embargo by the United States Government caused Matsuoka some embarrassment in the Diet. He sent Nomura further instructions. He urged Nomura, immediately upon his arrival in Washington, to make it clear that Japan had never intended to attack the United States, but that the Japanese Government did not understand why the United States was preparing for war against Japan; and that, if the United States continued to prepare, the result would endanger peace in the Pacific, as Japan had not been so much exhausted by the China war as some seemed to think and that continued warlike preparation by the United States was not advisable. He again instructed Nomura to emphasize the necessity for cooperation between the two Governments in the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to avert a crisis in the Pacific Area.

The United States Lend-Lease Act became effective and gave new encouragement to the Powers resisting the Axis to the extent that the Netherlands delegation increased its resistance to the demands of the Japanese economic mission at Batavia. Mr. Eden was awaiting a reply from SHIGEMITSU to his inquiry regarding the report of an impending crisis in the Far East, and the American Ambassador in Tokyo was demanding cessation of Japanese interference with American trade in French Indo-China. Matsuoka instructed SHIGEMITSU to inform Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an impending crisis was a ridiculous fantasy, although only three days before he had informed the German Ambassador that he planned to visit Berlin to learn the attitude of the German Government toward the activities of the United States Government, for, as he explained, Japan planned to attack Singapore to deprive the United

States as bases in the Pacific in case she should enter the European War. This was the situation when Nomura arrived in Washington.

The President of the United States received Nomura on 14th February 1941. He said that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating as a result of Japan's advance to the South and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. He suggested that the new Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the United States Secretary of State the important phases of American-Japanese relations. Nomura made a cautious reply to the President, and in reporting to Matsuoka, asked for further clarification of Japan's obligation to attack the United States in the event of that Power's entry into the European War. Matsuoka replied to Nomura on 4th March that he had made his position clear on that point on a number of occasions, that Japan would participate in the war in case the United States declared war on Germany.

The preparations for the attack upon Singapore were rapidly progressing. OSHIMA informed Ribbentrop in Berlin on 22nd February 1941 that the preparations would be complete by the end of May, and that for safety's sake, preparations were also being made for war upon the United States as well as upon Great Britain.

He said that the occupation of the Philippines had been included in the preparations. Notwithstanding these preparations, Matsuoka assured Mr. Eden in his message of 17th February of the Japanese Government's peaceful intentions, and suggested that Japan act as mediator of the European War. The British Government rejected the offer on 24th February 1941, and said that, although it had been an unwilling participant in the European War, with the assistance it was receiving from the United States it would be able to maintain itself against all enemies, and that it was determined to continue the war until Naziism was completely eradicated from Europe.

United States Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura held a conversation on 8th March 1941. Nomura said it was unthinkable that Japan and the United States should fight because of the destructive effects that would inevitably result. Mr. Hull agreed with him, but enquired whether the Japanese Military, who were in control of the Japanese Government, could expect the United States to sit quiet while two or three nations organized naval and military forces and went out to conquer the rest of the world. Nomura denied that these were the intentions of his Government and said he did not believe there would be any more military movements

unless the United States embargo should force his Government ot make them. Mr. Hull then mentioned the Tri-Partite Pact and the public declarations of Hitler, Matsuoka and other important German and Japanese leaders to the effect that their countries under the Pact were determined to establish a New Order in the World by use of force. Nomura again denied that it was the intention of his Government to use military force for conquest. Mr. Hull replied that as long as Japanese forces were all over China and as far south as Thailand and Indo-China, and so long as this was accompanied by threatening declarations by Japanese statesmen, there could only be increasing concern by nations who were vitally interested in halting the world conquest by force.

The President of the United States talked with Nomura again on 14th March 1941, only three days after Matsuoka, with the assistance of the German Government, had forced the Vichy French Government to accept Japanese terms of settlement of the border dispute between France and Thailand. The President complained to Nomura that the American people were aroused over what appeared to be a concerted effort under the Tripartite Pact to effect a junction of the German and Italian forces approaching the Suez Canal and the Japanese forces approaching Singapore. Nomura assured the President that Japan did not intend to

advance further to the South. The President then suggested that an armed clash between Japan and the United States could be avoided if the Japanese Government would remove the cause of the American people's suspicion of their intentions.

Matsuoka went to Berlin for consultations with Hitler upon the question of concerted action under the Tri-Partite Pact after receiving the French acceptance of his terms for settlement of the France-Thailand dispute. He paused in Moscow, and the American AMbassador in the U.S.S.R. was invited to talk with him on 24th March 1941. Matsuoka was emphatic in his assurance to the American Ambassador that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any American, British or Dutch possession and he insisted that Japan had no territorial ambitions. He said that Japan was ready to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity and political independence of the Philippines. He declared that Japan would not go to war with the United States. However, upon Matsuoka's arrival in Berlin, he explained to Hitler that his denials of his Government's intentions to attack were intended to deceive the British and Americans until the day when Japan would suddenly attack Singapore.

United States Conditions for Discussions

Colonel Iwakuro, of Nomura's staff, working in cooperation with certain private citizens of the United States and Japan, composed a draft of proposals which it was thought might serve as the basis for an agreement between Japan and the United States. This draft was presented to the State Department for delivery to Mr. Hill. Mr. Hull saw Nomura on 16th April 1941, informed him that the draft had been received, but that the United States Government could only consider proposals presented formally by the Ambassador. Nomura said he was prepared to present the draft formally as a basis for negotiations. Mr. Hull explained to Nomura that before the United States Government would commence negotiations, it was necessary for the Japanese Government to convince the American Government of its sincerity by abandoning its doctrine of conquest by force and its use of force as an instrument of national policy and to adopt the principles which the United States had proclaimed and was practising, and which it considered as embodying the foundation on which all relations between Nations should properly rest. Mr. Hull then stated these principles as being: (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations: (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Equality of commercial

opportunity; and (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo of the Pacific, except by peaceful means. Mr. Hull emphasized that his talk must not be considered as the commencement of negotiations and that his statement of principles must be accepted before negotiations could begin. Nomura replied that he was convinced that his Government had no intention of advancing further to the South, but that he would submit the principles enunciated by Mr. Hull to his Government and ask for instructions.

Nomura's request for instructions was received in the Japanese Foreign Office on 18th April 1941 and Konoye consulted with KIDO and the Emperor upon the answer to be given. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity appealed to the Zaibatsu, which urged the Cabinet to commence negotiations upon the basis of the proposed draft. KIDO and Konoye agreed that negotiations might be commenced with the United States Government, but that the Cabinet should be careful to keep faith with the German and Italian Governments, and should not abandon its plan to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere, that being Japan's fixed national policy.

Matsuoka, on his return to Tokyo, again paused in Moscow, where negotiations resulted in his signing of the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 13th April 1941. He explained to the

German Ambassador to Japan, who was accompanying him, that the Pact would substantially facilitate the Japanese advance to the South.

Konoye, after discussing with KIDO and the Emperor the reply to be given to Nomura's request for instructions, cabled Matsuoka to return to Tokyo promptly in order to consider the matter. Matsuoka arrived in Tokyo on 22nd April 1941, and sent Nomura a draft proposal to submit to the United States Government.

The campaign of infringement of the interests of the United States continued during the deliberation upon the answer to be given to Nomura. Japanese interference with the movements of American nationals and American merchandise in China became more pronounced. The American Consulate at Kunming in China was bombed for the third time and heavy damage caused. The Japanese Navy occupied Eniwetok Atoll and began setting up naval installations there. On 5th Mary 1941, the United States Government answered those acts by adding additional items, including scrap rubber, to its embargo list.

Ribbentrop learned of the conditions laid down by the United States for the commencement of the negotiations between Japan and the United States, and of the Japanese Cabinet's decision to open negotiations. He immediately stated to Ambassador OSHIMA that he could not

understand submitting to such conditions. OSHIMA assured Ribbentrop that his government had non intention of entering into any treaty with the United States embodying the principles laid down by Mr. Hull. Ribbentrop accused the Japanese Cabinet of having abandoned its plan for attacking Singapore and of having broken faith with the German Government. He demanded that the Japanese Government either refuse to agree to the Hull principles or agree only on condition that the American Government give its assurance that it would remain neutral. OSHIMA agreed with Ribbentrop, transmitted his views to Matsuoka,

and stated that he considered Ribbentrop's suspicions and accusation well-founded. He recommended that the Cabinet adopt ribbentrop's suggestion.

On 8 May 1941, Nomura reported to Matsuoka and pointed out that the United States would not recognize the New Order in East Asia, nor the retention of territory acquired through aggression, and was insistent on the observance of the four principles enunciated by Mr. Hull.

Nomura delivered the first official Japanese proposal to Mr. Hull on 12 May 1941. That draft was couched in obscure and platitudinous terms, which really provided for a secrete understanding between the two Governments, in substance as follows: The United States Government would agree (1) to recognize the establishment by Japan of the New Order in China in accordance with Konoye's three principles as embodied in the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration of 30 November 1940, and 6to advise generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to negotiate peace with Japan forthwith; (2) to enter into a secret agreement to withdraw aid to the National Government of China if the generalissimo did not enter into negotiations for peace; (3) to recognize the right of Japan to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing China and the Southern Area upon the understanding that Japan's expansion in that area was to be of a peaceful nature and to cooperate in producing and procuring from this sphere the natural resources which Japan needs: 94) to amend its immigration laws so as to admit Japanese nationals on the basis of equality and non-discrimination; (5) to restore normal economic relations between the two countries; (6) to take note of Japan's obligation under Article 3

of the Tripartite Pact to attack the United States if, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the assistance rendered to the Allied Powers resisting Germany and Italy amounted to an attack upon the Axis; and (7) to refrain from rendering assistance to the Allied Powers. The Japanese Government in return would agree to (1) resume normal trade relations with the United States; (2) assure the United States an supply of the commodities available in the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (3) join the United States Government in a guarantee of the independence of the Philippines on condition that the Philippines would maintain an status of permanent neutrality.

The day after this draft proposal was delivered to Mr. Hull, the Japanese delegation at Batavia delivered its amended demands to the dutch delegation which reiterated the Japanese Government's previous declaration of interdependence between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan. In Tokyo, Matsuoka informed the american Ambassador that both he and Konoye were determined that Japan's advance to the South would be made by peaceful means, "unless", he added significantly, "circumstances rendered that impossible." The American Ambassador inquired what circumstances Matsuoka had in mind. Matsuoka replied that he referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya, which he described as provocative.

Ribbentrop learned of the draft proposal presented by Nomura to the United States of America, and immediately took OSHIMA to task, expressing resentment of Matsuoka's decision to commence negotiations with the United States without consulting

the German and Italian Governments. He demanded that the attack upon Singapore be commenced without further delay. OSHIMA, reporting to Matsuoka, said: "I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking Singapore, she will invite the contempt not only of the United States and Great Britain, but also of Germany and Italy." He informed Matsuoka of the resentment of the German leaders against the negotiations with the United States and stated that, since the Japanese-American negotiations were considered to involve a change in Japanese foreign policy which violated the plans of the military, he had taken the liberty of informing the Japanese Army and Navy officials. This was the beginning of the friction between Konoye and Matsuoka.

United States Agrees to Negotiate -- May 1941

The United States Government accepted the Japanese draft proposal of the 12th May 1941 as a starting point for the negotiations and undertook to explore the possibility of an understanding with the Japanese Government. On 28 May 1941, Mr. Hull and Nomura met. In the course of the conversation, it became clear that there were two great obstacles to any successful prosecution of the negotiations: (1) the obscurity in which Japan's commitments under the Tri-Partite Pact were at present left, and (32) the provisions

for settlement of the China question. As to the first matter, Mr. Hull desired that Japan qualify its attitude towards the possible event of the United States being drawn into the European War as a measure of self-defense. As to the second matter, Mr. Hull pointed out that the Japanese insistence on retaining troops in China after the conclusion of any peace treaty with China would be a factor operating against friendship between the United States and Japan. Nomura was not able to state how many troops Japan proposed to retain in China, nor the areas where they would be quartered.

On 31 May, Mr. Hull told Nomura that, at some proper time before definitive discussions, he would discuss the draft proposal in strict confidence with the Chungking Government. Moreover, on 31 May, a further United States draft was handed to Nomura, in which it was proposed, inter alia, that Japan should state that the provisions of the Tripartite Pact did not apply to nations which became involved in the European War by reasons of protection, self-defense and national security. It was further proposed that Japan should submit to the United States of America the framework of the terms which she would submit to China. Annexed to this draft was a full statement of the attitude of the United States towards the activities of Germany and a declaration that the United States was resolved to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement which, in the view of the United States of America, was clearly directed to world conquest by force.

On the 4th of June, the Japanese Embassy suggested certain amendments to the American proposals.

Among them was the suggestion that the United States should drop from its draft the provision that the obligations of Japan under the Tripartite Pact did not apply to the case where a nation became involved in the European War as a measure of self-defence. Mr. Hull considered these Japanese amendments, and on 6th June, he told Nomura that they had carried the negotiations away from the fundamental points which the United States of America believed to be involved. In his view, they revealed a stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis, no clear indication of intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which would contribute to peace in the Far East, and a veering away from clearcut commitments on policies of peace and non-discriminatory treatment. Nevertheless, Nomura on 15 June 1941, submitted to Mr. Hull a new draft embodying the very suggestions to which Mr. Hull had already taken objection. Chungking was bombed by more than 100 Japanese planes on 10th June and American property was destroyed. Public statements by spokesmen of the Japanese Government emphasized Japan's commitment and intentions under the Tripartite Pact in a sense hostile to the interests of the United States of America. The negotiations at Batavia were obviously breaking down. The United States Government issued an order on 20th June banning all shipments of oil, except those to Great Britain and South America.

The Japanese had been pressing for an answer to their proposals of 12th May. Mr. Hull talked to Nomura on 21st June. He referred to the accumulating evidence from all over the world, including the public statements of Japanese leaders, indicating that the Japanese Military would endorse no understanding with the United States except one that envisaged Japan fighting on the side of

Hitler, should the United States become involved in the European War through its programme of aid to the democracies. He then stated that the proposal of 12th May 1941 violated the principles which the American Government was committed to uphold, particularly in respect to the provisions of the proposal relating to China. Mr. Hull then informed Nomura that he had come to the conclusion that, before proceeding with the negotiations, the United States Government must await some clearer indication than had yet been given that the Japanese government desired to pursue a course of peace. He expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would manifest such an attitude.

Preparations Intensified

The plan of September and October 1940 had been followed. The ultimate objective of the plan was the domination of East Asia by Japan. That objective was to be reached by the use of force if necessary. Some of the steps to be taken in the execution of that plan were in the alternative. The tripartite Pact had been entered into and used as an instrument for the intimidation of the Western Powers and as a guarantee of cooperation by the Axis Powers with Japan as she advanced to the South. The Non-Aggression Pact had been signed with the U.S.S.R. as a protection of Japan's rear as she made that advance. The attempt to negotiate a peace with generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in order to free Japanese troops and acquire the use of Chinese troops in making that advance had failed. The attempt to mediate the European War, and thereby secure British recognition of Japan's advance into South East Asia so as to eliminate the necessity of an attack upon Singapore had likewise failed.

The attempt to eliminate possible interference with that attack by the United States Pacific Fleet through negotiation with the United States had also failed. The negotiations at Batavia for acquisition of oil and other vital materials had failed also; those negotiations had terminated on 17th June 1940. Japan's reserves of war supplies were in danger of being depleted. The decision of the Imperial General Headquarters made in early April 1941 stood. The time for final preparation had now arrived.

The Japanese Navy began training and practice for the attack on Pearl Harbor in late May 1941. Dive bombing was practiced at Kagoshima, Japan, where the terrain resembled that at Pearl Harbor. The development of a shallow-water torpedo had been started early in 1941, as the waters in Pearl Harbor were shallow. The Navy spent considerable time in developing and experimenting with that type of torpedo during the summer. Refueling at sea was made a matter of special training in order to permit the use of the more secure northern route of approach to Pearl Harbor.

Cabinet Policy and Decisions of June and July 1941

OSHIMA, acting on instructions from his Government, began discussions with Ribbentrop on 10th June 1941 which were to lead to the acquisition of additional naval bases in southern French Indo-China for use in the attack upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. KIDO was advised by Konoye of the decision of